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1Abstract
New Zealand has a paradoxical relationship with nuclear science. We are as proud of Ernest
Rutherford, known as the father of nuclear science, as of our nuclear-free status. Early
enthusiasm for radium and X-rays in the first half of the twentieth century and euphoria in the
1950s about the discovery of uranium in a West Coast road cutting was countered by outrage at
French nuclear testing in the Pacific and protests against visits from American nuclear-powered
warships.
New Zealand today has a strong nuclear-free identity – a result of the New Zealand Nuclear Free
Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act of 1987 that prohibited nuclear weapons and nuclear
warships in the country’s land, air and water – that can be traced back to the first protests against
nuclear weapons in the 1940s. This thesis is based on the supposition that the “nuclear-free New
Zealand” narrative is so strong and such a part of the national identity that it has largely eclipsed
another story, the pre-1980s story of “nuclear New Zealand”. New Zealand’s early embracing of
and enthusiasm for nuclear science and technology needs to be introduced into our national
story. This thesis aims to discover and reveal that history: from the young New Zealand
physicists seconded to work on the Manhattan Project; to the plans for a heavy water plant at
Wairakei; prospecting for uranium on the West Coast of the South Island; plans for a nuclear
power station on the Kaipara Harbour; and the thousands of scientists and medical professionals
who have worked with nuclear technology. Put together, they provide a narrative history of
nuclear New Zealand.
Between the “anti-nuclear” voices, already well told in many histories of nuclear-free New
Zealand, and the “pro-nuclear” voices revealed in this thesis, options were considered and
decisions made. This thesis shows that the people with decision-making power tended to make
practical decisions based on economics and national interest when it came to deciding whether or
not to adopt a certain piece of nuclear technology or whether or not to participate in projects or
ventures with international agencies. This eventually led to a nuclear-free policy – focused on
weapons, nuclear-powered ships and waste – that since the legislation was enacted in 1987 has
been interpreted ever more widely by politicians and the public to include nuclear power,
uranium prospecting and many other applications of nuclear technology.
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3Chapter 1
Nuclear-free New Zealand:
Reality or a myth to be debunked?
“ … our nuclear free status … has become a defining symbol of our national identity.”
Prime Minister Helen Clark, 28 November 20071
 “New Zealandʼs nuclear-free status is a myth …”
Act MP Ken Shirley, 27 July 20052
New Zealand today is internationally recognised as being “nuclear-free”. The New Zealand
Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act of 1987 created a nuclear-free zone that
prohibited nuclear weapons and nuclear warships in the country’s land, air and water. In the
years that followed, government and the New Zealand public began to interpret the nuclear-free
policy more widely. In 1996 a Minerals Programme issued under the Crown Minerals Act
prohibited uranium mining, and prospecting for uranium. And in 2005, in response to calls for
nuclear power to meet New Zealand’s future electricity needs, the Labour Government stated
their clear policy of no nuclear power stations. This nuclear-free status, initiated by a Labour
Government in the 1980s, is now recognised by both major political parties, and is a reflection of
a strong nuclear-free national identity.
This thesis is based on the supposition that the “nuclear-free New Zealand” narrative is so strong
and such a part of the national identity that it has largely eclipsed another story, the pre-1980s
story of “nuclear New Zealand”. New Zealand’s early embracing of and enthusiasm for nuclear
science and technology needs to be introduced into our national story. This thesis aims to
discover and reveal that history: from the young New Zealand physicists seconded to work on
the Manhattan Project; to the plans for a heavy water plant at Wairakei; prospecting for uranium
on the West Coast of the South Island; plans for a nuclear power station on the Kaipara Harbour;
                                                 
1 From the Prime Minister’s address on ‘New Zealand and Peaceful Conflict Resolution’ in Cairo, Egypt, at
www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/new+zealand+and+peaceful+conflict+resolution downloaded 23 June 2010.
2 A statement made when presenting his New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control (Nuclear
Propulsion Reform) Amendment Bill to Parliament on http://www.parliament.nz/mi-
NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/7/c/1/47HansD_20050727_00001577-New-Zealand-Nuclear-Free-Zone-Disarmament.htm,
downloaded 23 July 2008.
4and the thousands of scientists and medical professionals who have worked with nuclear
technology. Put together, they provide a narrative history of nuclear New Zealand.
In attempting to write an alternative history – that of “nuclear New Zealand” rather than the
already told story of “nuclear-free New Zealand” – I hope first to show the extent of use, over
time, of radiation and nuclear science and technology in New Zealand; second, to reveal attitudes
(of the scientists and engineers involved and of the public, as reflected in the media, and of the
governments of the time) to all aspects of nuclear science and technology before New Zealand’s
current nuclear-free policy was adopted; and third, to show how recent an addition the nuclear-
free status is to national identity.
New Zealand’s nuclear-free identity is strong, and most New Zealanders are fiercely proud of it.
Perhaps this is why New Zealand’s nuclear history (as compared with its “nuclear-free” history)
has been neglected – it does not fit with established identity. But this is not the only reason. As
the following literature review shows, many books have been written about New Zealand’s
nuclear-free story and most general histories of New Zealand reference New Zealand’s nuclear-
free status. Science history in New Zealand, however, is a sorely neglected field. Although Ross
Galbreath’s history of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) was
published in 1998 and there has been a proliferation of (mostly amateur) biographies of New
Zealand scientists published in the last decade, there is little published material on New
Zealand’s science history – let alone its nuclear science history – and almost none that comes
from an academic source.3 In contrast, New Zealand’s social and political history is well
covered; there are many books, theses and academic articles describing the work of politicians
and the peace movement and the build-up to the adoption of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy.
This thesis argues that while being nuclear-free is an important part of New Zealanders’ national
identity, it is different from other national traits, like a talent for ingenuity or a passion for rugby,
in that it is a relatively recent addition to collective identity. History reveals that, apart from New
Zealand’s public and Governmental opposition to nuclear bomb testing in the Pacific, a broad
                                                 
3 Ross Galbreath, DSIR: Making Science Work for New Zealand, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1998.
Recent biographies of New Zealand scientists include Graham Bishop, The Real McKay: The Remarkable Life of
Alexander McKay, Geologist, Otago University Press, Dunedin, 2008; Veronika Meduna and Rebecca Priestley,
Atoms, Dinosaurs & DNA: 68 Great New Zealand Scientists, Random House, Auckland, 2008; Christine Cole
Catley, Bright Star: Beatrice Hill Tinsley, Astronomer, Cape Catley, Auckland, 2006; Simon Nathan, Harold
Wellman: A Man Who Moved New Zealand, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2005; Colin J. Burrows, Julius
Haast in the Southern Alps, Canterbury University Press, Christchurch, 2005; Mary McEwen, Charles  Fleming,
Environmental Patriot: A Biography, Craig Potton, Nelson, 2005; Ross Galbreath, Scholars and Gentlemen Both:
G.M. & Allan Thomson in New Zealand Science & Education, Royal Society of New Zealand, Wellington, 2002;
John Campbell, Rutherford: Scientist Supreme, AAS Publications, Christchurch, 1999; Ross Galbreath, Walter
Buller: The Reluctant Conservationist, GP Books, Wellington, 1989.
5all-encompassing “nuclear-free” ethos was not strongly apparent before the events of 1985,
when Prime Minister David Lange refused to allow the USS Buchanan access to New Zealand
ports and French agents bombed the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior while it was berthed in
Auckland. By examining New Zealanders’ consideration of aspects of nuclear science and
technology, like nuclear medicine, nuclear power, and uranium prospecting, and examining the
reasons why they were or were not adopted or accepted, this thesis shows that pragmatism and
national interest has dominated public and official attitudes and decision-making when it comes
to things nuclear. This suggests that had pragmatism (mostly in the form of economic
considerations) suggested different decisions be made, New Zealand might not today have had
such a strong nuclear-free identity. In the late 1970s, less than a decade before becoming so
proudly nuclear-free, New Zealand was considering nuclear power to meet growing electricity
demand in the North Island. In 1978, a Royal Commission of Inquiry rejected the immediate
development of nuclear power for New Zealand, not in response to anti-nuclear sentiment, which
did exist, but because a reduction in projected electricity demand and the recent discovery of the
Maui natural gas field meant New Zealand had sufficient indigenous resources to meet
electricity needs to the end of the century. This thesis also reveals a previously untold story of
the history of uranium prospecting in New Zealand and argues that while New Zealand has never
mined uranium, it is not because of a moral decision not to provide materials for the international
nuclear power and weapons industries. Rather, as chapter six shows, it is because no economic
deposits of uranium were ever found, despite 35 years of uranium prospecting initiated by the
DSIR and supported by the New Zealand and British governments.
There are other reasons why introducing the story of nuclear New Zealand into our history will
be valuable. There have been challenges to New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy in recent years
and there will be more challenges in the future. Human-induced climate change and the need for
new sources of energy with a low carbon footprint have led (rightly or wrongly) to calls for
nuclear power to be revisited as an option for New Zealand. Both former National Party leader
Don Brash and former Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer have suggested in recent years that New
Zealand revisit the question of allowing nuclear-powered ships into ports. But many of the voters
who might be considering these options in the future are from younger generations unaware that
we ever considered nuclear power in the past or who do not know why we banned nuclear-armed
and nuclear-powered ships from our ports. This is why it is important to introduce into our
national story New Zealand’s early enthusiasm for things nuclear, as well as the often pragmatic
rather than ideological reasons why, for example, nuclear reactors as a source of research
materials and electricity generation were rejected by our scientists and engineers while medical
6and scientific uses of radioactive isotopes were widely accepted, and why we rejected visits from
nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered warships.
Figure 1.1: After public and media response to Don Brashʼs comments that under a National Government New
Zealandʼs nuclear ships ban would be “gone by lunchtime”, he quickly tried to backtrack on this policy. Cartoon by
Tom Scott, The Dominion Post, 24 June 2004, ID: A-312-4-023, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
Figure 1.2: This Malcolm Evans cartoon from 21 April 2010 illustrated former Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmerʼs
suggestion that New Zealand might revisit the issue of visits from United States nuclear warships. Downloaded from
www.evanscartoons.com/image.php?id=1271825710
While New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy refers to nuclear weapons, nuclear propulsion, and
nuclear power, other practices associated with radiation or nuclear science have been tainted in
the eyes of the public with the “nuclear” association. In 1995 Hutt City mayor Glen Evans
proposed that the Hutt City Council declare its city a nuclear-free zone as had the former Lower
7Hutt City Council in 1984. An NZPA report declared Hutt City could not do this “because of the
nuclear reactor at the Gracefield nuclear physics research centre”.4 Evans and the NZPA were
not the only people confused. It was a common misconception that there was a nuclear reactor at
the DSIR’s Institute of Nuclear Sciences, by now part of the Crown Research Institute the
Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences. In the early 1990s when I was working for the
Institute (now known by the less provocative moniker of GNS Science) in Lower Hutt, taxi
drivers would call it “the bomb factory” and warn me about the nuclear reactor on the Gracefield
hill site (actually a particle accelerator used for radiocarbon dating). When Jools Topp, of the
Topp Twins country music duo, was offered radiation therapy as part of treatment for breast
cancer, she refused it, recalling to Radio New Zealand’s Kathryn Ryan in 2009 she had told the
doctors “I’m a lifelong member of Greenpeace, why would I let you irradiate me?”5 But New
Zealand society relies on nuclear technology much more than most people realise, with more
than 3,000 shipments of radioactive material entering the country each year for use in medicine
as well as industrial and environmental applications. More information about our nuclear history
and nuclear present will help people make informed choices in the future.
Scope
In revealing New Zealand’s “nuclear history”, this thesis examines the consideration of, and
subsequent introduction or rejection of, all aspects of radiation and nuclear science and
technology in New Zealand. It also examines concerns about their introduction and use, and
concerns about the impact on New Zealand of other countries’ uses of nuclear technology, for
example, with regard to nuclear bomb tests, nuclear power and nuclear waste. With regard to
radiation and radiation technologies this thesis is concerned only with ionising radiation – high
energy and potentially harmful radiation that is capable of removing electrons from substances it
passes through, thereby forming ions – including X-rays, alpha, beta and gamma radiation and
neutrons.
The start point for the thesis is a series of interrelated European discoveries in the last years of
the nineteenth century: Wilhelm Röntgen’s 1895 discovery that a penetrating radiation, that he
called X-rays, could be produced by electromagnetic means was followed by Henri Becquerel’s
observation that similar rays were spontaneously generated by uranium-bearing compounds, and
Marie and Pierre Curie’s announcement that uranium ores contained the more highly-radioactive
                                                 
4 NZPA, ‘Reactor Tempers Hutt City’s Nuke Free Declaration’,
www.rsnz.govt.nz/archives/news_pre_oct99/news/y_1995/m _09/d_18/a_3.php, downloaded 12 January 2000.
5 The Topp Twins interview, Nine to Noon, Tuesday 31 March 2009,
www.radionz.co.nz/national/programmes/ninetonoon/20090331 downloaded 21 March 2010.
8elements polonium and radium. These scientific advances led to worldwide applications in
medicine, industry and general science, including in New Zealand.
Further investigations, including some by New Zealander Ernest Rutherford, led to the discovery
that in addition to the electrons recently discovered by J.J. Thomson, atoms contained a
proportionately miniscule positively-charged “nucleus” comprised of protons and neutrons.
These advances led to the genesis of the entirely new discipline of nuclear science. By the end of
the Second World War this new science had been used to manufacture and unleash upon human
beings a devastating new type of bomb, to create new isotopes for application in industry and
medicine, and to accomplish new means to generate electricity. By the mid 1980s eight nations
were declared or suspected holders of nuclear weapons (which had been tested in the air,
underground and underwater), more than 300 nuclear power stations were being used to power
homes and businesses in Europe, the Americas and parts of Asia, and nuclear materials and
technologies were being used in industry and medicine throughout the world. From a movement
that began with opposition to the testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, New Zealand
in 1985 declared its nuclear-free intentions, rejecting any associations with nuclear weapons or
nuclear-propelled warships.
Method and sources
A review of existing literature reveals a significant gap in New Zealand’s history that this thesis
aims to fill. While little-known aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear history have been recently
uncovered by Ross Galbreath and John Crawford and are canvassed in books about New
Zealand’s nuclear-free history, and institutional histories – of the DSIR, universities, hospitals
and the Ministry of Works – reveal that New Zealand scientists and medical professionals have
been using radiation and nuclear technologies since they were first available, many aspects of
New Zealand’s nuclear history have been forgotten or never told. This thesis supposes there is an
untold “nuclear history” of New Zealand to tell and aims to uncover new information and
connect the already revealed details to create a narrative history of the scientific and popular use
– or rejection – of radiation and nuclear science and technology in New Zealand.
While the thesis is broadly organised according to chronology and themes, a person who features
throughout much of this narrative is Ernest Marsden. He was a student of Rutherford’s who, with
Hans Geiger, conducted the experiment that led to Rutherford’s determination of the structure of
the atom. Ernest Marsden was secretary of the DSIR from 1926 to 1947 and the Department’s
scientific advisor to the United Kingdom, positioned in London, from 1947 to 1954. Inspired by
9his early career in nuclear physics, Marsden had a post-war vision for a nuclear New Zealand,
where scientists would create radioisotopes and conduct research on a local nuclear reactor, and
industry would provide heavy water and uranium for use in the British nuclear energy and
weapons programmes, with all these ventures powered by energy from nuclear power stations.
During his retirement, however, Marsden conducted research into environmental radioactivity
and the impact of radioactive bomb fallout and began to oppose the continued development and
testing of nuclear weapons. It is ironic, given his early enthusiasm for all aspects of nuclear
development, that through his later work and influence Marsden may have actually contributed
to what we now call a “nuclear-free” New Zealand.
A biographical focus in the history of science in some cases overlooks the institutional and wider
social context of science. In the case of the present study, however, which concerns both the very
small country of New Zealand and a field as focused as nuclear science, the reverse is true. In
this case, as will be shown, one person significantly shaped both the institutional setting and the
wider social environment for his science. Therefore we can learn much about the context
precisely by examining his influence. Ernest Marsden’s wide experience, outspokenness and
apparent capriciousness towards nuclear weapons development makes him a compelling study
that provides insight into the changing attitudes to nuclear technology in the nation of New
Zealand as a whole. For these reasons, Marsden’s role, and his attitude towards things nuclear,
are followed and analysed closely in this thesis, from his work with Rutherford in 1909, to his
death in New Zealand in 1970. Marsden and his role in New Zealand’s nuclear history was the
subject of a 2006 article by this author and this work is drawn on over several chapters of this
thesis.6
Ernest Rutherford is also closely followed in this thesis. As the New Zealand-born scientist
known as the “father of nuclear physics”, Rutherford played a significant role in the
development of nuclear science as a discipline and, while uptake of new technologies associated
with the discovery of radiation and X-rays progressed in New Zealand independently of
Rutherford’s influence, his continued contacts with New Zealand reveal much about the times he
lived in and the role of science in New Zealand society. Another scientist, Jim McCahon, is also
followed as his changing career and concerns – from making Geiger counters for a wartime
uranium search, to working for the Department of Health’s Dominion X-Ray and Radium
                                                 
6 Rebecca Priestley, ‘Ernest Marsden’s Nuclear New Zealand: from Nuclear Reactors to Nuclear Disarmament’,
Journal and Proceedings of the Royal Society of New South Wales, 139 (2006), pp23-38.
10
Laboratory, to a lifelong involvement with the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament – help to
highlight some of the trends and issues at work in New Zealand in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.
To uncover this history, and reveal the decisions and the motives behind the decisions of the
scientists, engineers and officials considering nuclear options for New Zealand, this thesis draws
extensively on the records of the DSIR, State Hydro Electricity Department, Department of
Health, New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee and External Affairs Department, held at
Archives New Zealand in Wellington. More than 90 files are referenced, most of which (to the
best of my knowledge) have not been cited in any academic or other works to date.  Other
primary sources include the New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, the Appendices to the Journal
of the House of Representatives, articles from the popular press and trade and academic journals,
personal interviews with active participants, and manuscripts and letters from the Alexander
Turnbull Library in Wellington. A wide range of secondary sources are also consulted to provide
background and context to the issues.
Literature review
During the nine-year course of this thesis, two books on aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear
history were published. Both can be seen as insider histories as they were written by people who
were to some extent involved in making that history. In 2004, retired health physicist Andrew
McEwan launched the argument that New Zealand is not “nuclear free” in a book that covered
some aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear history but mostly served to meet McEwan’s goal of
clearing up “public” misconceptions about nuclear and radiation issues in New Zealand.7 While
McEwan’s book was not a history it did cover many events in New Zealand’s nuclear and
radiation history, mainly with the purpose of asking “Is New Zealand ‘nuclear-free’?” and “Has
it ever been?” McEwan described it as a “double standard” that New Zealand purports to be
nuclear-free yet its people are surrounded by natural forms of radiation, and have a health system
that depends on radioisotopes made in overseas reactors. McEwan’s answers to the questions he
posed is no. He saw “nuclear-free” as a warm, fuzzy “feel good” expression and danger that
“national antipathy to things nuclear will limit options New Zealand should be examining as it
considers future decisions on its development”. McEwan had previously written a history of the
National Radiation Laboratory, the organisation he worked at for 40 years and one of two major
public institutions involved in New Zealand’s nuclear history.8
                                                 
7 Andrew McEwan, Nuclear New Zealand, Hazard Press, Christchurch, 2004.
8 Andrew McEwan, Radiation Protection and Dosimetry in New Zealand: A History of the National Radiation
Laboratory, New Zealand Department of Health, Wellington, 1983.
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In his 2006 book Malcolm Templeton, a retired diplomat, approached New Zealand’s nuclear
history from 1945 to 1990 as a foreign policy issue, focusing on international relations and
public policy decisions leading up to New Zealand’s declaration as a nuclear-free country.
Templeton described his book as a “factual account of the development of governmental policy
and the conduct of intergovernmental negotiations”. Templeton was a senior official in the
Foreign Ministry when, in 1973, New Zealand sent a protest frigate to Moruroa and initiated an
International Court case against France. He has written a very thorough and factual account of
New Zealand in the nuclear age from the perspective of the Foreign Affairs officials and
department. One of Templeton’s conclusions was that that “New Zealand’s antipathy to all
things nuclear has become embedded in their collective psyche”: he suggested that while this
was derived from apprehension about nuclear weapons testing in the Pacific, it has become “a
national obsession to keep all things nuclear, power generation as well as weapons, well clear of
New Zealand territory”. Templeton’s other conclusions were about national defence and security
measures, ANZUS in particular, but this thesis is most concerned with that first conclusion, and
seeks to retrace attitudes to things nuclear back in New Zealand’s history, with a focus on
scientists and the general public as opposed to foreign affairs officials and the government.
International nuclear histories
The science and technology of radiation and the nucleus is recent; radiation was discovered at
the end of the nineteenth century and nuclear science emerged as a discipline in the mid-
twentieth century. During the Second World War scientists developed the technology to build
nuclear reactors to produce isotopes for scientific research, to generate power, and, most
significantly, to create the raw materials for nuclear weapons. Nuclear technology by then had
important ramifications for foreign policy and the peace movement. There is a growing body of
literature about the development of nuclear weapons, starting with official institutional histories
of the British nuclear programme written by Margaret Gowing in the 1960s and 1970s, and
Richard Rhodes’ Pulitzer Prize-winning account of the United States nuclear programme
published in 1986, and expanding into a post-Cold-War proliferation of books about the nuclear
age.9 New Zealanders’ involvement in the British nuclear programme at Chalk River, Canada, is
                                                 
9 Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, Macmillan and Co Ltd, London, 1964; Margaret
Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952: Volume 1 Policy Making,
Macmillan, London, 1974; Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-52,
Volume 2, Policy Execution, Macmillan, London, 1974; Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb,
Touchstone, New York, 1986; Lawrence Badash, Scientists and the Development of Nuclear Weapons, Humanity
Books, New York, 1995.
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also covered in Gowing’s books as well as in other books about the British and Canadian
programmes.10
When the British were ready to test their own nuclear weapons they looked first to Australia and
then to the rest of the Pacific for testing grounds. Lorna Arnold’s books provided detailed factual
accounts of the British atomic weapons trials in Australia and the Pacific and included some
mention of New Zealand connections.11 Australian scholars such as Alice Cawte, Wayne
Reynolds and Richard Broinowski have also written about this topic from an Australian
perspective, revealing the nuclear ambitions that encouraged Australia’s support for the British
nuclear programme.12 Like Templeton’s book on New Zealand’s nuclear story, these books
focused on the issues from a foreign affairs perspective and concentrated on Australia’s
relationship with the United Kingdom. Cawte documented Australia’s post-war pursuit of
nuclear technology, linking Australia’s hunger for nuclear technology to the drive to find
significant uranium deposits and the decision to allow the British to use Australian territory to
test its nuclear bombs in the 1950s. Cawte’s focus was on the political deals and decisions
related to the Australian pursuit of a nuclear future, and on the international contracts, treaties
and agreements that impacted on Australia’s pursuits. Broinowski also focused on issues of
foreign affairs in his examination of the likelihood of Australian uranium exports finding their
way into clandestine nuclear weapons. Reynolds showed that several Australian leaders
cooperated with the British nuclear programme in the hopes of securing information for the
development of their own nuclear weapons. He argued that desire for its own nuclear weapons
shaped many of Australia’s post-war priorities, and even led to the establishment of major
institutions like the Australian National University.
Histories of nuclear-free New Zealand
New Zealand’s nuclear-free status is seen as an important part of New Zealand’s national
identity and it has been given prominence in general and specialist histories of New Zealand. In
general histories of New Zealand published in the 1990s and 2000s, James Belich, Michael
King, David McIntyre and Philippa Mein Smith each covered New Zealand’s emergence as a
                                                 
10 See, for example, Robert Bothwell, Nucleus: The history of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1998; Robert Bothwell, Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company, University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1994.
11 Lorna Arnold, A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia, HMSO, London, 1987;
Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb, Houndmills, New York, Palgrave, 2001; Lorna Arnold and Mark Smith,
British Atomic Weapons Trials in Australia, 2nd edition, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004.
12 Alice Cawte Atomic Australia, 1944–1990, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1992; Wayne
Reynolds, Australia’s Bid for the Atomic Bomb, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2000; Richard
Broinowski, Fact or Fission: The Truth About Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions, Scribe Publications, Melbourne,
2003.
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nuclear-free nation, but only Mein Smith paid any attention to other aspects of New Zealand’s
nuclear history, documenting events such as the 1950s search for uranium, the University of
Canterbury’s acquisition of a research reactor, and New Zealand’s plans for nuclear power.13
This thesis argues that the focus on this aspect of national identity is unfairly excluding another
story, that of nuclear New Zealand. The story of nuclear New Zealand has been suppressed
furthermore by the lack of resources for general historians to draw on. This is partly because the
history of science is at yet a far underdeveloped subspecialty of New Zealand history. Writers of
general history rely, to an extent, on published specialist histories. Therefore the general lack of
material on any aspects of New Zealand’s science history holds back scholarly reflection on New
Zealand’s radiation and nuclear history.
There are, however, a proliferation of books about aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy,
many of which are written by peace activists and politicians. These “insiders” have documented
aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear-free movement and status in a series of books published in the
decade after New Zealand declared its nuclear-free status. For example, in 1992, peace activist
Elsie Locke looked at New Zealanders’ response to perceived nuclear threats in the context of a
history of peace activities. She covered New Zealand response to the bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the Stockholm Peace Appeal, New Zealand response to British, American and French
nuclear testing in the South Pacific, the origins and activities of the New Zealand Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament, and progress towards the development of a nuclear-free New Zealand, but
her narrative ends in 1975, before New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy was adopted.14
Kevin Clements’ 1988 book is one of the major publications on the lead-up to New Zealand’s
nuclear free policy. Like Templeton, Clements covered events from 1945 onwards, examining
them as to how they lead up to New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, and the implications of this
policy for New Zealand’s defence arrangements – but with more of an emphasis on the
perspective of the peace movement. Clements, a peace activist and pacifist, was a member of the
1986 Defence Review that followed the implementation of Labour’s nuclear-free policy. In Back
from the Brink he “traces the evolution of public and political concern about nuclear weapons,
the convergence of nuclear anxiety and the desire for a greater degree of political independence
                                                 
13 James Belich, Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000, Penguin,
Auckland, 2001; Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand, Penguin, Auckland, 2004; Philippa Mein
Smith, A Concise History of New Zealand, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005; David McIntyre, ‘From
Dual Dependency to Nuclear Free’. In Geoffrey W. Rice (ed), The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd edition,
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1992, pp520-538.
14 Elsie Locke, Peace People: A History of Peace Activities in New Zealand, Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1992.
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from nuclear allies”.15 Clements’ observations that there was early enthusiasm for peaceful uses
of nuclear technology and little or no opposition to activities like uranium prospecting are picked
up and built upon as one of the major themes in this thesis.
Stuart McMillan focused his 1987 book entirely on the nuclear ships debate, canvassing the
events up to and immediately following New Zealand’s 1985 refusal of the USS Buchanan into
port on the grounds that it would neither confirm nor deny whether it was carrying nuclear
weapons. McMillan’s focus on this issue is on the relationship between the peace movement and
the New Zealand Government, and the relationship between New Zealand and the United States,
and the implications of the 1985 decision for New Zealand.16
David Lange wrote about the birth and implementation of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy in
his 1990 memoir. Lange’s was a personal account focusing on his time first as leader of the
Labour Party from 1983, and then as Prime Minister from 1984 to 1989. Lange gave extensive
coverage to the ANZUS debate that arose over the Labour Government’s policy of closing New
Zealand’s ports to nuclear-powered or nuclear-weapon carrying craft, focusing on behind-the-
scenes political and bureaucratic matters including individual meetings and conversations and
examining the attitude of Foreign Affairs and Defence officials to the nuclear-free policy.17
The 1985 bombing of the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior spurred the publication of
many articles and a few books, which told the story of the French agents’ act of terrorism in
Auckland and illustrated how this act served to cement New Zealander’s support for the nuclear-
free policy.18
Histories of nuclear New Zealand
In introducing the subject of New Zealand’s “nuclear history” this thesis refers to ways in which
New Zealand uses or has considered using, nuclear and radiation science and technology, and
ways in which New Zealand has supported, or considered supporting, international nuclear
projects including nuclear power and nuclear weapons tests. New Zealand has long been
considered not to have much of a nuclear history – in fact, the most common response to telling
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18 Michael King, Death of the Rainbow Warrior, Penguin Books, Auckland, 1986; John Dyson, Sink the Rainbow!:
An Enquiry into the ‘Greenpeace Affair’, Reed Methuen, Auckland, 1986; Richard Shears and Isobelle Gidley, The
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people this thesis topic is a guffaw and the comment “it must be a very short thesis” – but this
thesis aims to correct that misconception. In the last two decades independent historian Ross
Galbreath, defence historian John Crawford and peace activist Owen Wilkes have spearheaded
the academic investigation of new aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear history.
Science historian Ross Galbreath was the first person to write about the New Zealand scientists
seconded to the wartime Manhattan Project and the post-war establishment of a nuclear sciences
team within New Zealand’s DSIR. In a 1995 article Galbreath provided an account of New
Zealand scientists’ involvement on the Manhattan and Montreal Projects, and asked and
answered the question “who were the New Zealanders and how did they become involved?”
Galbreath put the New Zealanders’ role in the context of British wartime cooperation with other
Dominions and the United States, as well as in the context of other New Zealand war-focused
scientific activities (for example, radar). He also looked at the motives of the different players, in
particular, the British, the New Zealanders and the Australians, and examined the British support
for a post-war atomic energy project in New Zealand, linking it to New Zealand’s “Rutherford
connection” and British security concerns about Australia. For details of the New Zealand
scientists and his work, Galbreath referred to several DSIR files from Archives New Zealand and
to Ernest Marsden’s papers at the Alexander Turnbull Library.19
In a 1998 article defence historian Crawford revealed, from previously classified documents,
some previously unreported New Zealand connections with the British Pacific nuclear testing
programme. In his article about New Zealand’s involvement in the British hydrogen bomb tests
of 1957-58 Crawford identified Ernest Marsden as advising Prime Minister Sidney Holland
against allowing the United Kingdom to test hydrogen bombs on New Zealand territory.
Crawford also revealed the joint United Kingdom-New Zealand plans for the establishment of a
heavy water plant to provide raw materials for the British nuclear energy and nuclear weapons
programmes. Crawford’s other research for internal defence force publications has looked at
New Zealanders involvement in the British nuclear tests in New Zealand and the Pacific.20
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Historian and peace activist Owen Wilkes took a different perspective on some of the same
information as Galbreath in his 2002 essay “New Zealand and the Atom Bomb”.21 Wilkes
profiled the contributions of nine New Zealand scientists to the teams in the United States and
Canada working towards the development of the atomic bomb and nuclear reactors. Wilkes was
interested in the extent to which the New Zealanders played a part in the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, and suggested – almost playfully – that perhaps the kiwis did play a crucial role
and given that timing was so critical perhaps if the kiwis hadn’t been there the bomb deployment
would have been delayed another week or two. He also examined the scientists’ motives and
attitudes to the project before and after the bombs were dropped, showing that while most of
them found it an “exciting job” during the war, after the war they, like most United States
scientists, were involved in a movement to put nuclear weapons under international control.
Wilkes also covered Ernest Marsden’s 1944 and 1945 uranium surveys, emphasising the key role
that Marsden played in advancing New Zealand’s atomic energy project within the DSIR.
Wilkes’ essay drew extensively on Ross Galbreath’s paper ‘The Rutherford Connection’ and an
unpublished history of New Zealand’s wartime involvement with the atomic bomb.22
In 2006, this author contributed to two academic articles to the field. Marsden’s role in the
wartime uranium survey, as reported on by Galbreath and Wilkes, and in advising Holland
against the use of New Zealand island territory for British bomb tests as uncovered by Crawford,
was elaborated on, along with Marsden’s other contributions to New Zealand’s nuclear history in
this author’s 2006 article on Ernest Marsden.23 A second article revealed the previously
unreported history of uranium prospecting on New Zealand’s West Coast.24 These articles are
elaborated on in this thesis.
Ernest Rutherford and the birth of a new science
Ernest Rutherford, often referred to as the father of nuclear physics, is the subject of numerous
biographies, including John Campbell’s 1996 biography, which focused on Rutherford’s early
life and studies in New Zealand and his visits to New Zealand once his career in the United
Kingdom was established.25 The body of work on Rutherford, as well as some writings by
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Rutherford himself, show his key role in revealing the nature of radioactivity and the structure of
the atom through which he pioneered the field of nuclear science, in which the atomic nucleus
became the subject of an entirely new field of physics.
Radiation technologies in medicine
New Zealand’s early responses to the new technology have been covered in institutional
histories of medical schools and hospital boards, as well as in short historical articles in
professional journals, usually by retired or active participants in the field. No attempts have been
made, however, at a more general enquiry into the New Zealand scientific community’s response
to the new science.26
One of the most wide-ranging publications in this area is a 1996 history of Australasian
radiology, which includes a chapter entitled “Diagnostic Radiology in New Zealand”.27 This
illustrated chapter introduces New Zealand’s early pioneers of X-rays, providing details of the
radiographers and hospitals involved. It continues with information about radiotherapy, radiation
injuries and the establishment of the National Radiation Laboratory and systems of radiological
protection in New Zealand. As well as referencing published medical histories, such as histories
of New Zealand hospitals and hospital boards, this chapter draws on a 1966 paper by Colin
Anderson, an Invercargill radiologist, who in turn drew on hospital board records and papers
published in the New Zealand Medical Journal to write his paper on the early uses of diagnostic
and therapeutic radiology in New Zealand. Anderson traced the first uses of X-rays in New
Zealand, the medical practitioners and lay-people who pioneered the field, and the early
incidence of radiation injuries. He also recorded the establishment of New Zealand’s radiological
societies, the National Radiation Laboratory, the Radiological Service Committee, and the
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Radiological Advisory Committee. Anderson’s paper has been used as a significant source of
information for subsequent works in this area.28
A 1995 book, written by a group of former hospital physicists, documented the history of
medical physics at Auckland, Wellington, Palmerston North, Waikato, Christchurch and
Dunedin hospitals and focused on the people involved and the equipment and technologies they
used. Much of the book took the form of personal reminiscences though there were also
references to earlier histories, medical journals and lectures.29
Another source of literature on the scientific background to radiation and nuclear science in New
Zealand comes from publications associated with the National Radiation Laboratory of the
Ministry of Health. In 1983 the Department of Health published a history of the laboratory,
written by Andrew McEwan.30 While McEwan, who worked for the National Radiation
Laboratory from 1963 to 2002 and was director for 13 years, was sometimes criticised for what
some people interpreted as a pro-nuclear attitude, this was a largely dispassionate account. In the
epilogue, however, he commented on “increasing concern about risks which are conjectural or
stochastic and individually of very low probability” arising from “popular misunderstanding or
ignorance of the effects of low-level radiation exposure … fuelled by the commonly sensational
approach to news reporting on radiation and radioactivity topics”.
Concern about misconceptions about nuclear science extended beyond McEwan. A 1998 report
on Radiation and the New Zealand Community, prepared by a group of scientists (including
McEwan), was published by the Royal Society of New Zealand to “give information and
perspective on the risks associated with the widespread use of radiations of different types in
modern society”, partly in response to misconceptions about what it meant for New Zealand to
be “nuclear free”.31 In presenting information for public discussion it touched on aspects of the
history of nuclear science, though its coverage of New Zealand’s nuclear history was limited to a
few paragraphs dispersed throughout the document to provide background to the issues
discussed. The report outlined the various applications of nuclear science in New Zealand and
included chapters on food irradiation safety and the “system of controls on radiation sources in
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New Zealand”. The report also provided useful data on radiation exposure in New Zealand.
There were few New Zealand references listed for this report, but it is likely that most (if not all)
of the data about New Zealand came directly from the National Radiation Laboratory.
Nuclear science in New Zealand
Ernest Marsden, like Rutherford, was a key player in New Zealand’s nuclear history. A student
of Rutherford, Marsden came to New Zealand in 1915 and in 1926 was appointed head of the
DSIR, a position from which he came to champion nuclear science. Marsden was influential in
getting New Zealand physicists working on the Manhattan Project and establishing a nuclear
sciences team at the DSIR. After leaving the DSIR he continued to advocate nuclear power for
New Zealand, though came to caution against the environmental impact of nuclear weapons
testing. Marsden has never been the subject of a full biography, though in 1969 he was the
subject of a book of personal memoirs about him, written by fellow scientists and colleagues, to
commemorate his 80th birthday.32
While many early histories of the DSIR or its various divisions mentioned nuclear science it was
Ross Galbreath who first focused attention on this area of the DSIR’s work. Galbreath’s 1998
history of the DSIR included a chapter detailing the birth of nuclear science in New Zealand –
from the scientists working on the Manhattan Project during the Second World War to the
establishment of the Institute of Nuclear Sciences and their work in fallout monitoring and
radiocarbon dating.33 Galbreath traced New Zealand’s success in nuclear sciences back to Ernest
Rutherford, through his student Ernest Marsden (later head of the DSIR).
The contribution of this thesis
While books have been written about aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear history, the only
attempts at looking at this history from a science perspective are Ross Galbreath’s articles on the
New Zealanders on the Manhattan project and a chapter on the Institute of Nuclear Sciences in
his book on the DSIR. There are no books that link these events into a bigger narrative that starts
with early uses of radiation technology in New Zealand and carry the story forward to New
Zealand’s declaring itself nuclear-free. This is, however, not surprising. New Zealand
historiography is thin, and it is only since the 1960s that New Zealand history has been given
much attention at all. The emergence of New Zealand historiography therefore coincides with
concerns about nuclear fallout and nuclear proliferation and their impact on humanity; it is not
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surprising that anti-nuclear or nuclear-free stories have been given prominence. While general
histories of New Zealand are now accompanied by many military and social histories, New
Zealand science history has still been neglected, and its nuclear science history as part of that.
This thesis draws on the work of authors such as Clements, Wilkes, Galbreath, Crawford and
Templeton, and takes some of the events covered by these authors, and introduces many new
events, to provide a coherent narrative of New Zealand’s pre-1985 nuclear history. The roles of
Ernest Rutherford, Ernest Marsden, and, to a lesser extent, Jim McCahon are examined in this
context. This thesis differs from previous histories that cover aspects of New Zealand in the
radiation and nuclear age – for example, Templeton’s Standing Upright Here or Clements’ Back
From the Brink – in that it adopts a history of science perspective. That is, the nature of the
science is examined and explained, and issues are considered from the perspectives of the
scientists and science organisations involved. These issues are considered against the
background of New Zealand’s foreign policy stance and the grass-roots nuclear-free movement.
As an emerging discipline in New Zealand, a history of science approach can add to published
histories by providing a window on New Zealand scientists’ involvement in, and responses to,
the issues of Pacific nuclear testing, nuclear propulsion and nuclear power development.
I have made special mention in this literature review of a number of “insider histories” in this
field. This is not necessarily a problem, so long as the “insider’s” involvement in that history is
made clear and any biases reported. To be fair, I will now disclose my own very minor
involvement with New Zealand’s nuclear history. As a teenager in the 1980s I marched against
visits by American nuclear warships to Wellington. When I travelled to the United States in the
summers of 1986/87 and 1987/88 I was proud of the positive recognition that New Zealand’s
nuclear-free policy got me. In 1991 I worked for several months as a journalist for the Institute
of Geological and Nuclear Sciences (IGNS) in Gracefield, Lower Hutt, a Crown Research
Institute that incorporated the former DSIR Institute of Nuclear Sciences. For the next seven
years I continued doing contract work for IGNS, writing for annual reports, newsletters and
marketing brochures, mostly about geological projects but also about nuclear science projects. It
was from this position, and with a growing awareness of the lack of public discrimination




The thesis is arranged chronologically, with each chapter having a specific focus within its time
period. Chapter two covers the emergence of the new science of radiation in the late nineteenth
century, focusing on the key role played by New Zealander Ernest Rutherford. New Zealand
responses to the new technologies are explored in Chapter three, including medical and industrial
use of radium and X-rays and the growing awareness of health risks associated with
radioactivity. New Zealand was as embracing of these new technologies as any nation, and by
the end of the 1930s radiation and X-rays were an important part of diagnostic medicine and
treatment. Encouraged by DSIR head Ernest Marsden, scientists were beginning studies of
natural radioactivity in New Zealand and starting to use radioactive isotopes as tracers. Key
sources for these first two chapters are contemporary issues of the popular press, the New
Zealand Medical Journal and the Transactions of the New Zealand Institute, Department of
Health archives, as well as many published biographies, institutional histories, and general
histories of science.
From Chapter four onwards the key sources are unpublished official files from Archives New
Zealand. During the Second World War, nine young New Zealand scientists and engineers
joined with British scientists to work on the Manhattan Project to develop the first nuclear
weapons, and on a project in Canada to develop nuclear energy. As shown in Chapter four,
Marsden – a former student of Ernest Rutherford – was crucial to the involvement of New
Zealanders in these projects. Marsden was keen for New Zealand to be at the forefront of the
new field of nuclear sciences, and initiated a South Island search for uranium and set up a
nuclear sciences team within the DSIR. When several of the New Zealand scientists who worked
on the Canadian nuclear reactor continued on to the United Kingdom, to help build the first
nuclear reactor there, Marsden hoped that they would bring their knowledge back to New
Zealand to build a Commonwealth nuclear reactor on New Zealand soil.
As shown in Chapter five, in 1955 the New Zealand Government joined with the United
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority to form a company to produce heavy water for the British
nuclear programme, and electricity for local use. The proposed plant, at Wairakei, would use
geothermal steam to power both ventures. The heavy water plant did not proceed, however, as in
1956 the United Kingdom withdrew from the venture for financial reasons. When British Prime
Minister Anthony Eden asked New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland for use of the
Kermadec Islands as a testing site for hydrogen bombs, Holland considered the request but
refused. But New Zealand support for the British nuclear testing programme came in other ways,
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with the use of New Zealand navy ships for surveying and as weather ships during the 1957 and
1958 nuclear tests in Malden and Christmas Islands. New Zealand took pride in British nuclear
achievements and while concern developed over levels of radioactive fallout reaching New
Zealand, British and American nuclear bomb testing was generally seen as an essential part of
winning the Cold War arm’s race.
Chapter six reveals the story of the DSIR-initiated search for uranium in New Zealand, and the
intensive prospecting that followed the 1955 discovery of uranium-bearing rock in the Buller
Gorge. Two New Zealand companies, Buller Uranium and Uranium Valley, prospected in the
Buller Gorge and Paparoa Ranges for more than a decade, joined intermittently by several
international companies. The Mines Department and the DSIR’s Geological Survey supported
the prospectors, acting in the hope that economic deposits of uranium would be found and a
mining industry established in New Zealand. No one protested at the possibility of a uranium
mining industry and when prospecting came to a halt at the end of the 1970s it was because
repeated investigations had shown that the uranium deposits in the region were not economic to
mine. The wartime uranium survey that Owen Wilkes covered in 2002, and that Galbreath had
briefly covered in 1998, was elaborated on in a 2006 academic article and an encyclopaedia
entry by this author, in which the 1944-45 surveys were established as the first significant event
in a 35-year government-supported search for economic deposits of uranium in New Zealand.
This author’s article published in the New Zealand Geographer forms the basis for this chapter.34
Chapter seven looks at public and official concerns about safety with regard to the use of nuclear
and radiation technologies in New Zealand and shows that early public concerns about
radioactive fallout from nuclear bomb tests did not extend to fear of nuclear science and
technology. Radiation protection work was driven by the Department of Health, but the public
and the media were increasingly aware of and concerned about radioactive fallout and its impact
on people’s health, with this fuelling opposition towards nuclear bomb testing and helping to
strengthen a growing movement opposing the further development and testing of nuclear
weapons. At the same time, waste from the Antarctic nuclear reactor being shipped through
Lyttelton and radioactive contamination discovered at Victoria University raised some concerns
about public exposure to radioactive materials. Cold War concerns about the possibility of New
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Zealand becoming a nuclear target led to the establishment of a Ministry of Civil Defence. This
chapter covers the period from 1949, when New Zealand’s first radiation protection legislation
was introduced, until the early 1960s.
Chapter eight shows New Zealand’s enthusiasm for what the United States called “peaceful uses
of the atom” and the gifts made to New Zealand under the American Atoms for Peace
programme, including equipment for the DSIR Institute of Nuclear Sciences and the University
of Auckland and a sub-critical nuclear reactor for the University of Canterbury’s engineering
school. It also examines non-military uses of nuclear science and technology in New Zealand in
the 1950s and early 1960s, including the Institute of Nuclear Sciences work in radiocarbon
dating, and the discussions and decisions with regard to the possible use of a nuclear reactor in
New Zealand, and the New Zealand delegations to United Nations conferences on the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy.
New Zealand’s plans for nuclear power for electricity generation are the focus of Chapter nine,
from early speculation about nuclear power in the 1950s, to firm plans for nuclear power
generation in the 1960s. To prepare for nuclear power, engineers were sent to the United
Kingdom for training and sites were investigated in the Kaipara Harbour and near Wellington.
When the time came to either start work on building a nuclear power station or finding
alternatives, a Fact Finding Group on Nuclear Power and then a Royal Commission on Nuclear
Power Generation in New Zealand were set up to report on the issue. By the time the Royal
Commission reported back to the Government, in 1978, New Zealand’s electricity demand
projections were greatly reduced and the discovery of the Maui gas field meant that New
Zealand now had sufficient indigenous resources to meet projected demand. While many people
made submissions to the Commission against the introduction of nuclear power on safety
grounds, the decision not to proceed with building a nuclear power station had already been
made. The opinions of the different players, however – scientists, engineers, politicians and
foreign affairs officials – are examined, along with media and NGO responses to the issue.
In Chapter ten, the nuclear-free movement and the emergence of New Zealand’s nuclear-free
policy is followed. By the time France began its nuclear testing programme in the Pacific in the
1960s, the United Kingdom and the United States had finished their Pacific testing programmes
and there was no sense of loyalty to stop New Zealanders protesting against French nuclear
testing. This time, the Government joined in, and the combined stance of the New Zealand
Government and people was firmly against any further nuclear testing in the Pacific. In the
1970s, public opposition to visits from nuclear-powered warships grew as well, with people
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protesting on the grounds that these warships could be carrying nuclear weapons but also due to
concerns about nuclear-powered warships being unsafe and a possible target in a nuclear war. In
1985, the Labour Government refused entry to a United States warship on the grounds that it
would neither confirm nor deny if it was carrying nuclear weapons. In 1987, the nuclear-free
policy was entrenched in legislation with the passing of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,
Disarmament and Arms Control Act. The French bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland
Harbour and the suspension of New Zealand from the ANZUS agreement by the United States
only served to cement New Zealand’s adherence to the new nuclear-free policy: being nuclear-
free was something most New Zealanders were proud of and it rapidly became an important part
of the collective identity.




Rutherford, New Zealand, and the new physics
“Other young New Zealanders have distinguished themselves in various
walks of life, but not one of them can in any way approach the brilliant
achievements of Professor Rutherford.”
The Press, Christchurch, 25 July 1905, p4
“It was quite the most incredible event that has ever happened to me in my life.
It was almost as incredible as if you fired a 15-inch shell at a piece of tissue paper
and it came back and hit you.”
Ernest Rutherford, Cambridge, 19371
The science of radiation and the nucleus, as a branch of physics, emerged at the end of the
nineteenth century, with the discovery, in close succession, of electrically generated X-rays,
spontaneous radiation emanations from uranium, and the radioactive elements radium and
polonium. It was a New Zealand scientist who determined the nature of this newly discovered
radioactivity, then went on to change forever scientists’ understanding of the structure of the
atom, and the nature of the nucleus inside it. It is ironic perhaps, that the birthplace of Ernest
Rutherford, known as “the father of nuclear physics”, is now well known around the world for
being “nuclear free”.
Rutherford left New Zealand when he was a young man, to continue his education and career in
the universities of the United Kingdom and Canada. He maintained close links with New
Zealand, visiting several times, helping local scientists to procure radium, and recommending his
former student Ernest Marsden to positions in Wellington.
Apart from the gifts of radium, however, New Zealanders’ response to the new physics had little
or nothing to do with Rutherford, who began his work on radioactivity after X-ray technology
was adopted in New Zealand, and who was not well known outside of Nelson and Christchurch.
The enthusiastic response to the new science by medics and scientists in New Zealand can be
seen as enterprising and open-minded professionals making good use of a helpful, fascinating
and potentially lucrative new technology.
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Ernest Rutherford in New Zealand
Ernest Rutherford was born on 30 August 1871 to James Rutherford, who worked at various
times as a flax-miller, mechanic and wheelwright, and Martha, a former teacher. Education was
important to the Rutherfords, and Martha taught all the Rutherford children reading, writing and
arithmetic before they started school. The family was not wealthy, however, and post-primary
education was costly. With 12 children in the house, scholarships were important for advancing
the children’s education to secondary level. At the age of 15, Ernest Rutherford won a
scholarship to Nelson College, a school modelled on British public schools, which focused on
“the advancement of religion and morality, and … the promotion of useful knowledge”.2
Rutherford was a strong student: in 1889, his final year at Nelson College, he was head boy and
dux and sat university scholarship examinations.  He won a scholarship and the following year
began his studies at the University of New Zealand’s Canterbury College in Christchurch where
he studied Latin, English, French, mathematics, mechanics and physical science and gained a
Bachelor of Arts degree. In 1893 he became one of only 14 postgraduate students in New
Zealand, graduating in 1894 with Master of Arts with first class honours in mathematics and
physical science. Rutherford was recognised by the university as an exceptional student, brilliant
and determined, and over the summer he was given the use of a small room beneath a staircase
(now immortalised as “Rutherford’s Den”) to conduct original research. He returned to
Canterbury College in 1894, enrolling in a Bachelor of Science in chemistry and geology.3
As well as passing his BSc exams, Rutherford completed two articles on the high-frequency
magnetization of iron, a subject of interest to the electricity industry, “where alternating currents
and iron-covered transformers were the high technology of the day”.4 The articles were
published in the Transactions and Proceedings of the New Zealand Institute (TPNZI), the
journal of New Zealand’s state-coordinated system of scientific societies, in 1894 and 1895.
Rutherford also submitted the articles as an application for an Exhibition of 1851 Research
Scholarship. The scholarship commemorated Prince Albert’s Great Exhibition of 1851 – a
showpiece of British industry and science held in London – with a scheme for providing
outstanding postgraduate research students with £150 per year for two years to conduct original
research in a field of importance to their national industries. When James Maclaurin, the selected
candidate, turned down the opportunity of the one scholarship available to a New Zealander that
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year, it was offered to Rutherford. A few weeks later Rutherford was on the steamer Wakatipu
bound for further studies at the University of Cambridge.5
Figure 2.1:  Ernest Rutherford in his Canterbury University College days. Source: Public domain image downloaded
from wpclipart.com on 22 April 2010.
The 1851 Exhibition Scholarships were important to the advancement of students like
Rutherford as they provided access to the world’s best scholars and laboratories. Physics,
Rutherford’s field, was not a national priority, and New Zealand lacked the staff, laboratories
and libraries for advanced scientific research. Rutherford left New Zealand at the end of a 10-
year economic depression, at a time when the Government saw the country’s few professional
scientists primarily as a means of assisting the economic development of the country.
Encouragement was given to applied sciences – like mining and agriculture – that had a tangible
economic return. While the country’s initial gold rushes were long over, new gold and coal
deposits continued to be discovered and exploited. And with the advent of refrigerated shipping
in the 1880s, New Zealand mutton joined wool as a significant export product, increasing the
country’s dependence on agriculture. 6 (It is interesting to note that today, in 2010, nearly
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two decades after the science reforms of the 1990s, the New Zealand Government has a similar
understanding of the value of science as something that must bring an economic return. It is
worth reflecting, however, that a scientist like Rutherford can make enormously valuable
advances from curiosity-driven rather than economically focused science.)
 
Figure 2.2: During the summer of 1893/94 Rutherford worked in a small cloakroom beneath the tiered seating of the
clock tower lecture theatres. This room is now part of “Rutherfordʼs Den”, a museum and educational facility. Source:
ID: 1/2-055425-F, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
Despite the Government’s focus on applied science, by the late nineteenth century, gentlemen
scientists who focused on natural history and geology still dominated New Zealand science.7
Articles in the TPNZI were generally grouped under headings of zoology, botany, geology,
chemistry and “miscellaneous”, where the occasional physics article sat alongside articles on
archaeology, ethnology and literature. Physics articles were few and far between and in the five
years of Rutherford’s enrolment at Canterbury College the only TPNZI articles on physics were
by Rutherford and his chemistry professor Alexander Bickerton.8
In contrast, Europe in 1895 was poised for a revolution in physics, and an overseas position was
Rutherford’s only opportunity for advancing his knowledge and participating in this revolution.
Rutherford arrived at Cambridge University in 1895. He enrolled in a BA by research, and began
work at the Cavendish Laboratory, under the Professor of Experimental Physics, Joseph John (J.
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J.) Thomson. Rutherford began his research in electromagnetism and wireless signalling, and
after sending messages from the Cavendish Laboratory to his rooms more than a kilometre
away, he briefly held the record for long-distance wireless telegraphy. At about the same time,
however, the sensational discovery of X-rays attracted the attention of scientists around the
world, Rutherford included.9
A new science is born
Wilhelm Röntgen’s discovery of X-rays had a significant impact on theoretical physics as well
as practical applications of the science. Röntgen, a German physicist, discovered X-rays in
November 1895. While experimenting with passing an electric current through a Crookes tube –
a glass bulb from which most of the air has been removed – he was astonished to find that a
small barium platino-cyanide screen at the other side of the room was glowing. At the time the
Crookes tube was encased in heavy black paper, shutting out any light it might emit, so Röntgen
concluded that the screen was glowing in response to some invisible energy radiating out from
the tube. He became engrossed in his finding and for months spent every day and night at his
laboratory, continuing to experiment with the mysterious new rays. As he could not determine
their source, Röntgen called them “X-rays”, finding that they passed not only through paper, but
through wood, rubber, copper and even thin sheets of most metals; however, they did not pass
well through human bones or lead. By placing opaque objects between the source of the rays and
a photographic plate, Röntgen discovered he was able to take X-ray pictures.10
Röntgen published his results in a German journal in late December 1895, with an English
translation published in Nature the following month.11 News of his discovery spread quickly to
the popular press where it caused an international sensation. Responding to public excitement
about the discovery, Röntgen appeared at packed public lectures to demonstrate the workings of
his X-ray machine, training it on the skulls, arms, and legs of enthusiastic volunteers. Some
people were alarmed by his discovery. There was talk of banning X-rays in opera glasses for fear
of insulting the virtue of the female singers by seeing through their clothes – one company even
started to market X-ray-proof underwear. Others were quick to take up the relatively simple
science involved. The American inventor Thomas Edison developed one of the first
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fluoroscopes, which produced instantaneous X-ray pictures by projecting the rays onto a
fluorescent screen rather than onto a photographic plate. Doctors quickly saw the potential to use
X-rays as a diagnostic tool, and in February 1896 Canadian surgeons used X-rays to assist in
removing a bullet from a man’s leg. Doctors also began to use X-rays for ostensibly therapeutic
purposes – to treat dermatitis, cancer and tuberculosis.12
X-rays arrive in New Zealand
The New Zealand media – concerned mainly with colonial news, the price of mutton in London,
and the latest shipment of British goods to arrive at Ballantyne’s or at Kirkcaldie & Stains –
were more subdued, responding only after the discovery of X-rays made news in Britain. The
New Zealand Mail reported that London doctors were using Röntgen’s discovery to take pictures
of gallstones and injuries to the bones, achieving “astonishing results”.13 Many New Zealanders
would have read about the discovery and its applications in British newspapers that were
regularly bundled up and shipped to New Zealand to keep the colonists up to date with news
from “Home” and on the continent.
Members of the New Zealand Medical Association, whose local branches subscribed to
international medical journals and had regular meetings to discuss local cases and international
developments, were particularly interested in the discovery of X-rays.14 In the July 1896 issue of
the New Zealand Medical Journal, the London correspondent described the new photography
developed by Röntgen, exclaiming that never “has a scientific discovery excited more general
interest, been followed up with such rapidity, and attained such extended success”.15 The
discovery of X-rays was also discussed at meetings of the New Zealand Institute’s incorporated
societies. William Travers, in his presidential address to the Wellington Philosophical Society in
July 1896, provided a detailed account of the discovery of “Röntgen Rays”, which he described
as “a most remarkable event in the history of physical and chemical science”.16
The New Zealand medical profession did more than talk about the new discovery. Many doctors
were aware of its ground-breaking applications to medicine and, as Ryan, Sutton and Baigent
recount in their history of Australasian radiology, the technology was easy to reproduce: all that
was needed was “one spark coil, one battery, one Crookes tube and some facility in handling
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photographic plates”.17 (By the end of the nineteenth century mains electricity was only
available in a few parts of New Zealand and batteries and generators were essential to powering
electrical equipment.) At the 26 August 1896 meeting of the Otago Branch of the New Zealand
Medical Association, Mssrs Kempthorne, Prosser and Co, who were in the process of
establishing a Dunedin laboratory offering “skiagraphy” (X-ray photography) to the medical
profession, demonstrated the new technology to the gathered doctors.18 The same year, William
Hosking, medical superintendent at Masterton Hospital, imported a six-inch coil to be used for
the generation of X-rays.19 Ryan, Sutton and Baigent recount that Hosking “installed his X-ray
equipment in his home … using electric power from a generator in an old wooden structure at
the back of the house”, using his equipment for both diagnosis and therapy.20 Other
entrepreneurs and doctors wasted no time in taking up the new technology, which was
particularly useful for identifying broken bones and lung disease. Rather than purchase their own
X-ray equipment, hospitals initially contracted radiological services from local doctors or
electricians who had purchased and installed their own X-ray equipment. In 1898, however, the
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch Hospital Boards each acquired their first X-ray
apparatus, and the Otago Hospital Board followed in 1904.21
Harry de Lautour – a Dunedin doctor who between January 1899 and October 1900 took 157
“radiographs” of patients – wrote the first radiological paper published in New Zealand, which
appeared in the New Zealand Medical Journal in 1900. De Lautour advised X-ray exposure
times of “four or five minutes for a hand or foot; eight or ten minutes for an ankle, leg or
forearm; twenty to twenty-five minutes for a thigh, shoulder or chest”, reassuring the reader by
saying: “so far I have not yet had any experience of burning”.22
While most of the early users of X-rays were doctors, amateurs and hobbyists were also attracted
to the new technology. A. D. Bell, a north Otago sheep farmer with a broad scientific interest,
used a battery-powered six-inch spark coil in the late 1890s for use in “radiographing dogs’ legs,
locating foreign bodies, and even the examination of broken wrists”.23
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In the introduction to their book on the history of Australasian radiology, Ryan, Sutton and
Baigent say that New Zealand was less affected than Australia by the “tyranny of distance”
when it came to the early development of X-rays and organ imaging.24 It is not clear why this is
so – perhaps New Zealanders had more aptitude than Australians in putting together the “one
spark coil, one battery, one Crookes tube” necessary to take X-rays? It is unlikely that New
Zealand being the birthplace of Rutherford had any impact on the update of X-ray technology,
however, as Rutherford’s work on radiation post-dated the adoption of X-rays in New Zealand
and was not well publicised outside of Christchurch.
Discovery of radioactivity and radium
Rutherford, now working at Cambridge, was fascinated by the discovery of X-rays, and he
enclosed in an 1896 letter to his parents two of the new “Röntgen photographs”; one of a frog
and one of a hand. Inspired by the new discovery, he put aside his research into
electromagnetism and began working on X-rays with his professor J. J. Thomson.25
Also inspired by Röntgen’s work, Henri Becquerel, professor of physics at the Museum of
Natural History in Paris, began to investigate the possibility that phosphorescent materials might
generate X-rays. He knew that when exposed to sunlight, certain minerals, such as those found
in uranium salts, would, even when moved into the dark, phosphoresce, or glow. He tested many
mineral samples by exposing them to sunlight, then wrapping them in black paper and placing
them on light-sensitive photographic plates. Any rays that penetrated the black paper to darken
the photographic plate, he reasoned, were X-rays, the same as Röntgen’s. Only one of the
samples, a uranium compound called potassium uranyl sulphate, seemed to be emitting such
rays. Then he made a surprising discovery, finding that the salt emitted the rays whether left
exposed in the sun or not, leading him to conclude that the mineral was spontaneously emitting
the rays. He tested other uranium compounds and found the same results, and discovered that
pure uranium emitted more X-rays than any of its compounds.26
Still in Paris, physics student Marie Curie was inspired by Becquerel’s work in the naturally
occurring emissions of uranium, initially called Becquerel rays. As well as studying uranium,
Curie began testing other elements and found that thorium, as well as uranium, emitted the rays,
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which she called “radio-activity”.  More significantly though, she found that pitchblende, a
black, shiny ore from which uranium was extracted, was even more radioactive than pure
uranium, indicating that there was another radioactive element in the ore. Excited by her
discovery, Marie Curie’s husband Pierre, a physics professor, put aside his research into crystals
and joined his wife in her search for the new element.27
Working with about a teacup of pitchblende they went through the process of separating the ore
into its constituent components. First they ground the pitchblende into a fine powder, which they
dissolved in acid. They then repeatedly boiled, froze and precipitated the acid solution. After
removing all traces of uranium and other known elements, a process that took many months,
they had reduced their teacup of pitchblende to a handful of fine black radioactive powder.
Marie Curie named the new element polonium, in honour of her native Poland. But with the
final refinement of polonium came an astonishing discovery; the residual powder was still
radioactive, meaning that there must be another unknown radioactive element in the pitchblende.
This new element was present in such minute quantities that it took several more months to
isolate it. Marie and Pierre Curie announced the discovery of the new element, which they
named radium, at the end of 1898. To isolate pure radium and determine its atomic weight and
number, a lot more pitchblende – and a lot of time – was needed. Working with a cast-iron basin
and an iron mixing bar, Marie Curie worked in a big draughty shed in a courtyard of the
Sorbonne’s School of Physics, going through the painstaking process of extracting radium from
the tonnes of pitchblende residue she had shipped in from the tailings of the Joachimsthal
uranium mine in Bohemia. By March 1902, after three years of work, the Curies had isolated
radium – which was found to make up only 0.1 gram per ton of pitchblende – and supplied
figures for its melting and boiling points, atomic weight, and other chemical properties. Pierre
Curie went on to measure radium’s remarkable energy output – each gram of the highly-
radioactive radium could inexplicably heat a gram of water from freezing to boiling point in less
than an hour.28
In 1901, Röntgen was awarded the first ever Nobel Prize in physics for his discovery of X-rays.
Marie and Pierre Curie shared the 1903 Nobel Prize in physics with Henri Becquerel –
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Becquerel winning for his discovery of “spontaneous radioactivity” and the Curies for “their
joint researches on the radiation phenomena”.29
Rutherford embraces the new physics
The new challenge for physical scientists like Rutherford was to determine the nature of the “X-
rays” and “Becquerel rays”, or what the Curies had called “radio-activity”. Rutherford had
begun his investigations into the new rays by working with Thomson to examine the effect of X-
rays on gases through which an electric current was passed.30 In 1897 Rutherford was capped as
one of Cambridge’s first BA research students. The university extended his scholarship for a
third year and he continued his studies into X-ray-induced conduction in gases.31
Thomson, who had continued to investigate the nature of cathode rays, announced in February
1897 his conclusion that the cathode ray was not made of light waves but was a fast-moving
stream of miniscule particles or “corpuscles” (later called electrons). By subsequently measuring
their speed and charge he deduced that these particles each had a mass nearly one two-
thousandth that of the smallest known particle, the hydrogen atom. Along with Röntgen’s
discovery of X-rays, and Becquerel and the Curies’ discovery of radioactivity emanating from
different elements, Thomson’s discovery of the electron revealed the existence of a sub-atomic
world. With this radical departure from classical physics – which said the atom is indivisible –
the sub-atomic age had begun. Following his discovery of the electron, and with experimental
evidence that stripping an atom of electrons left a positively charged atom with an almost
unchanged mass, Thomson developed a “plum pudding” model of the atom with negatively-
charged electrons dispersed like raisins in a solid, spherical, positively-charged atom.32
Rutherford was an “immediate convert”33 to the new theory (some scientists continued to believe
that the atom was indivisible) and began his investigation of the sub-atomic world by studying
the radiations emitted by uranium and thorium. He concluded in 1899 that uranium emitted “at
least two distinct types of radiation – one that is very readily absorbed [it could be stopped by a
piece of paper or a few centimetres of air], which will be termed for convenience the α [alpha]
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radiation, and the other of a more penetrative character, which will be termed the β [beta]
radiation”.34 In 1900 French physicist Paul Villard discovered a third type of radiation, a form of
high-energy penetrating X-rays, that he named gamma (γ) radiation.35
With his scholarship money running out, Rutherford applied for and was appointed Professor of
Physics at McGill University in Montreal, Canada, where X-rays were already a big research
topic. When he arrived in 1898, Rutherford introduced the study of radioactivity to the
laboratory and after a year’s research had identified the emanation from thorium as a new
gaseous element. Christchurch newspaper The Press kept readers up to date with Rutherford’s
overseas achievements and his 1900 visit to New Zealand, describing his career as “brilliant”
and acclaiming his achievements as raising the value of New Zealand degrees.36
Rutherford returned to New Zealand in 1900 to marry Mary Newton. As was the custom with
the arrival of distinguished passengers, the Lyttelton Times reported Rutherford’s arrival:
Professor Ernest Rutherford, formerly at Canterbury College, and at
present Professor of Physics at M’Gill [sic] College, Montreal, is now
in Christchurch on a visit. Professor Rutherford, who has had a very
distinguished career, succeeded Professor Callendar at M’Gill College,
and has been devoting his attention principally to the study of
radiations from such bodies as uranium and thorium. Some of his original
researches there attracted the attention of the scientific world, and
are quoted by the highest authorities.37
While in New Zealand, Rutherford submitted papers to the University of New Zealand for the
degree of DSc.38 By the time of Rutherford’s visit to New Zealand, the new physics had
captured the public imagination and was beginning to enter the popular culture. In the
Christchurch papers during Rutherford’s visit was the following advertisement for peppermints:
The unassuming Rontgen Ray
Appears to burn the flesh away
And leave the white and ghastly bones,
The cause for shudders, sighs, and groans;
So like a man who is ill and cold,
Who thinks he’s dead until he’s told
The way to health in manner sure
By taking Woods’ Great Peppermint Cure.39
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Back in Montreal, Rutherford continued his research into the nature of the emanations from
thorium and radium. The same year, he began collaborating with McGill chemist Frederick
Soddy. By the end of their 18-month collaboration, Rutherford and Soddy had discovered that in
the process of emitting radiation, an element is spontaneously transformed, either into another
element, or into an isotope (a physically different form of the first element). This remarkable
discovery, the transmutation of one element into another that they described as “modern
alchemy”, helped to explain the seemingly inexhaustible supply of energy from radioactive
elements like radium.40 They discovered that all the radioactive elements had a distinct “half-
life” – the time it takes for half of the atoms of the original sample of an element to decay into a
new element or an isotope. The half-lives of the elements they tested varied wildly – uranium’s
half-life was calculated at 4.5 billion years, radium’s half-life was 1,620 years, and a decay
product of thorium had a half-life of only 22 minutes. Other decay products were found to have
half-lives of only fractions of a second.41
Rutherford and Soddy were establishing the science that would eventually lead to the
development of nuclear bombs and energy. In a 1903 paper on “Radioactive Change” they
concluded that “the energy latent in the atom must be enormous”.42 Rutherford and Soddy
speculated about the release of energy from the atom and the possibility of atomic weapons, with
Rutherford jokingly speculating that “some fool in a laboratory might blow up the universe
unawares”.43 In 1905 Albert Einstein published his special theory of relativity, including his
equation E=mc2, suggesting that mass could be transformed into energy and energy could be
transformed into mass, and putting a figure to the enormous amount of energy inherent even in
one tiny atom.44 In public lectures, and a popular book, Soddy spoke of matter as a storehouse of
energy, boasting that a pint of uranium could drive an ocean liner from London to Sydney and
back.45
Rutherford combined scientific meetings with family reunions on a 1905 visit to New Zealand
with his new family. The Press called him “[one] of the most distinguished scientists of his age”
                                                 
40 Campbell 1999, p261; Badash 1995, p13.
41 Campbell 1999, p272; Gribbin 2002, p503; Rhodes 1986, p42-43.
42 E. Rutherford and F. Soddy, ‘Radioactive Change’. First published in Philosophical Magazine, May 1903.
Reproduced in Ernest Rutherford, The Collected Papers of Lord Rutherford of Nelson, London, George Allen &
Unwin, 1962, Vol 1, pp596-608. Quote from p608.
43 A. S. Eve, Rutherford: Being the Life and Letters of the Rt Hon Lord Rutherford, O. M., Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1939, p102.
44 David Bodanis, E=mc2: A Biography of the World’s Most Famous Equation, London, Macmillan, 2000, pp73-74;
Gribben, pp438-39.
45 Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1988, p6.
37
in one of several stories about his life and visit to New Zealand.46  At a scientific talk to a
crowded meeting of the Philosophical Institute of Canterbury on “Radium and its
Transformations”, Rutherford entertained the staff, students and dignitaries with an informative
lecture and several experiments involving radium.47 Before his visit he had sent J. S. S. Cooper,
a teacher who had followed Rutherford through Canterbury College, a sample of radium, which
at the time was extremely rare and, for most scientists, prohibitively expensive. Campbell
recounts that the radium “was later shown around the country at appropriate events, for example
in Auckland in conjunction with a lecture on electricity.”48
Rutherford continued to investigate the nature of radiation, and by 1907 had demonstrated that
beta radiation was a stream of negatively charged electrons and that alpha radiation consisted of
positively charged helium atoms ejected during radioactive decay.49 In 1907 he resigned his post
at McGill, and took up the position of chair of physics at the University of Manchester in
Britain. In 1908 Rutherford was awarded the Nobel Prize, not in his academic field of physics,
but in chemistry. 50 The announcement cited Rutherford “for his investigations into the
disintegration of the elements, and the chemistry of radioactive substances”.51 These were the
early years of the Nobel Prizes (which were first awarded in 1901) and the awards were not as
high profile as they are today. The New Zealand media response was subdued, with only small
stories appearing under modest headlines like “New Zealander honoured” on page 5 of the
Auckland Star.52
Rutherford’s prize was presented at a ceremony in Stockholm on 10 December 1908. In gaining
the Nobel Prize in Chemistry, he joined others who had made contributions to the new physics
(though they had won Physics prizes): Röntgen for the discovery of X-rays; Becquerel and the
Curies for their work on radioactivity; German physicist Philipp Eduard Anton Lenard for his
work on cathode rays; and Rutherford’s Cavendish Professor J. J. Thomson for his investigations
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on the conduction of electricity by gases.53 In his presentation speech, the president of the Royal
Academy of Sciences noted that Rutherford’s discoveries “led to the highly surprising
conclusion that a chemical element, in conflict with every theory hitherto advanced, is capable
of being transformed into other elements”. At the formal banquet following the prize-giving,
Rutherford joked that the fastest transformation he had ever encountered was his own instant one
from physicist to chemist.54
Rutherford gave away some of his Nobel Prize money (of £7680, compared to his annual salary
of £1000) but used some of the rest to buy radioactive materials for his research at Manchester
University. With the help of his assistant, Hans Geiger, Rutherford perfected an electrical
method of counting alpha particles. Geiger went on to improve the detector with Müller. Initially
referred to as a Geiger-Müller tube, it is more commonly known today as a Geiger counter.55
Figure 2.3: Hans Geiger and Ernest Rutherford in the laboratory at the University of Manchester.
Source: Sir Ernest Marsden Collection, F-65890-1/2, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
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The new physics in New Zealand
The application of the “new physics” in New Zealand was initially restricted to medical doctors
rather than scientific researchers, though it was not for lack of interest. From May 1896
onwards, X-rays, radium and radioactivity were occasional topics for popular lectures, always
with experiments and demonstrations, at the regional philosophical societies and science
institutes that made up the New Zealand Institute. The first such lecture took place just five
months after Röntgen’s discovery, when Professor Shand, of Otago University, gave a lecture on
“Röntgen photographic rays” to the May 1896 meeting of the Otago Institute, “illustrated by
numerous experiments”.56 Some scientists made use of overseas connections to obtain tiny
samples of radium, and at a meeting of the Otago Institute in June 1904 Dr Marshall exhibited
specimens of what he called “pitchblende radium”.57 Later that year, at a meeting of the
Wellington Philosophical Society, Mr Earp Thomas exhibited a tube of “bromide of radium”
which he claimed to have obtained from Madame Curie.58
It took longer for New Zealand scientists to conduct their own research into radioactivity and X-
rays. Apart from a short paper on X-rays in 1896, it was not until 1906 that the TPNZI carried an
article by a New Zealand scientist researching a topic in the new physics. In a 1906 article, Notes
on the Radioactivity of Certain Soils, John Howell, director of the Christchurch Technical
College, tested the radioactivity of various soils and mineral spring deposits from Auckland and
Te Aroha.59 Clinton Coleridge Farr and David Florance of Canterbury University College added
to Howell’s investigation of local radioactivity levels with an examination of the radioactivity of
water from Christchurch’s artesian wells, published in the TPNZI in 1909. To standardise the
electroscope they used to measure radioactivity, they used a standard solution of radium
provided by Rutherford (Florance had been a student of Rutherford’s in Manchester).60 The
same year, Farr and Florance also examined the radium content of igneous rocks from New
Zealand’s subantarctic islands, with their findings communicated by Rutherford to the
Philosophical Magazine in London.61 In 1910, using the same radium solution prepared by
Rutherford, Dominion Analyst James Maclaurin – who in 1895 had declined the 1851
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Exhibition Scholarship that Rutherford had then accepted – worked with a colleague to study the
radioactivity of thermal waters at Rotorua, Taupo and Te Aroha. Waters from Rotorua’s
Hamurana and Fairy Springs were found to be the most radioactive, though at levels much lower
than water and gases from hot springs at Yellowstone Park in the United States.62
Of greater international significance, however, was research by Thomas Laby at Victoria
University College in Wellington. Like Rutherford, Laby was a past recipient of an 1851
Exhibition Scholarship. In 1905 he had travelled from his home in Australia to Cambridge,
where he spent four years at the Cavendish Laboratory under Professor J. J. Thomson. In 1909
Laby came to New Zealand, to the newly created chair of physics at Victoria University College.
There he continued the research into gamma rays – using a radium source provided by
Rutherford with financial assistance from the Royal Society – that he had begun at the
Cavendish Laboratory. 63 Working with his research student Percy Burbidge, Laby published a
paper on gamma rays in the TPNZI of 1911.64 Laby also published results of his New Zealand
research internationally, including in the British journals Nature and Proceedings of the Royal
Society of London.65
Laby was the first dedicated physics professor appointed in New Zealand. The inaugural physics
professor at Canterbury University College was Australian-born Clinton Coleridge Farr, who
was appointed in 1911 following his study with David Florance of the radioactivity of
Christchurch’s water. At Auckland University College the first physics professor was a
Welshman, Gwilym Owen, who was appointed in 1913. Otago University, a separate institution,
did not establish a chair in physics until 1914, when they appointed Robert Jack from Scotland.
Before the appointment of physics professors, the subject was taught by either more junior
physics staff or by chemistry or natural history professors.66
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While some researchers were lucky enough to acquire an overseas source of radium, other New
Zealanders focused their attention on finding a local source of the newly discovered element.
Some prospectors were convinced they had found uranium ore from which radium could be
extracted, but the Mines Department was sceptical. In 1928 they advised the Imperial Institute in
London – which was seeking information on possible sources of radioactive minerals – that “no
radium-ore has yet been found in New Zealand, though one or two prospectors without scientific
training have made futile attempts to discover radium-bearing localities in districts where they
are very unlikely to exist”.67
Ernest Marsden and the gold foil experiment
While New Zealand-based physicists lagged behind, Rutherford was leading a team working at
the forefront of the new physics. In 1909, one of Rutherford’s undergraduate students at
Manchester, a 20-year old Lancashire man called Ernest Marsden, began to assist Hans Geiger
with experiments in which a beam of alpha particles was scattered after passing through a thin
metal foil. In response to Geiger’s advice that Marsden was now ready for a research project of
his own, Rutherford asked Marsden to see if he could get evidence of alpha particles directly
reflected from a metal surface. In a now famous experiment, Marsden observed that instead of
passing through, a tiny fraction of alpha particles were deflected straight back from a thin gold
foil. Rutherford later described this result as being “almost as incredible as if you had fired a
fifteen-inch shell at a piece of tissue paper and it came back and hit you”.68  Two years later,
after pondering the results of what is now known as the Marsden-Geiger experiment, as well as
additional scattering experiments, Rutherford came up with a new theory for the structure of the
atom. In an article published in May 1911, Rutherford proposed an atom with a centralised
concentration of mass and positive charge – which he called the nucleus – surrounded by empty
space and a sea of orbiting negatively charged electrons.69 Rutherford’s revolutionary “nucleus”
model of the atom, which contrasted markedly with Thomson’s earlier “plum pudding” model,
initially received very little attention from fellow scientists. Perhaps one of the reasons
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Rutherford’s model was not initially embraced is that this experimentally derived model of the
atom posed uncomfortable contradictions with the laws of classical physics.70
Figure 2.4: Ernest Marsden and Ernest Rutherford met in 1909, when Marsden was a student in Manchester.
In this photograph of Manchester University scientific staff and research students, Marsden is in the front row on the
viewerʼs far right and Rutherford is in the centre of the second row. Source: Photographer Ward of Manchester, Lady
Marsden Collection, PAColl-0091-1-006, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
Ernest Marsden graduated later in 1909 and went to a lecturing position in London, but in 1912
he returned to Manchester where he succeeded Geiger as Rutherford’s assistant and gained a
DSc. In 1915, on Rutherford’s recommendation, Marsden came to New Zealand to replace
Thomas Laby (who had taken a position at the University of Melbourne) as professor of physics
at Victoria University College in Wellington. Very soon after arriving, however, he volunteered
for war service and found himself fighting in trenches opposite Hans Geiger. Back at Victoria
University College after the war, rather than focusing exclusively on radioactivity, Marsden
broadened his research interests to include new fields such as seismology and coal efficiency,
and organised the building of a physics wing of the university’s Hunter Building.71
Marsden also continued his research into the nature of radioactivity. Laby had taken his supply
of radium with him to Melbourne, so Rutherford successfully petitioned the Royal Society to get
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a supply of radium sent to Wellington for Marsden to use.72  During his short professorship at
Victoria University College Marsden used this precious supply of radium to conduct
experiments into cosmic radiation, an extremely penetrating form of radiation coming from the
depths of space, discovered by Austrian scientist Victor Hess in 1912.73
The Rutherford-Bohr model of the atom
As the new physics became increasingly well accepted, physicists and chemists worldwide
continued to seek a better understanding of the atom, its particles, and their properties. One of
the problems of Rutherford’s nucleus model of the atom was that there was no explanation of
why the electrons, with their negative charge, did not collapse into the positively charged
nucleus. In 1913, the Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who had begun working with Rutherford in
1912, extended Rutherford’s model of the atom by fixing the energy levels in which electrons
could orbit the nucleus. Bohr explained that atoms emitted fixed amounts (quanta) of energy, or
radiation, when electrons jumped from one stable orbit to another. The “Rutherford-Bohr”
model – which is essentially an overlay of quantum requirements on an otherwise classical
conception of an atom as consisting of a nucleus and orbiting electrons – became the new
accepted model of the atom, and is broadly the picture of the atom we use today.74
Conclusion
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the development of an entirely new branch
of physics, the physics of radiation, which led to the physics of the atom and the nucleus. While
New Zealand did not have the scientists or laboratories to conduct original research in this new
discipline, the technology was seen as useful and worthwhile and was readily adopted for
medical applications. X-rays were in use in New Zealand just months after their European
discovery, and medics and researchers made use of scarce and valuable radium made available
thanks to the efforts of New Zealander Ernest Rutherford, who in his work in the northern
hemisphere was at the forefront of the new science.
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Rutherford’s initial influence in New Zealand with regard to radiation science was in providing
radium for scientific use and attracting people to his lectures on radiation and radium on his
visits to New Zealand. His most lasting influence, however, was in recommending his student
Ernest Marsden to the role of professor of physics at Victoria University College in Wellington:
Marsden would go on to play an influential role in New Zealand’s nuclear history, as will be
shown over the following chapters.
Another factor worthy of consideration is that physics was not a well-established academic
subject in New Zealand before the twentieth century. It is not therefore surprising that the
physics professors appointed in the second decade of the century were embracing of the “new
physics”. Unlike in Europe and North America, there was no old guard of physicists holding on
to Newtonian ideals and resisting the new science.
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Chapter 3
The public are mad on radium!
Applications of the new science
“… the public are mad on radium …”
Government balneologist Arthur Wohlmann, 19141
“The energy produced by the breaking down of the atom is a very poor
kind of thing. Anyone who expects a source of power from the transformation
of these atoms is talking moonshine.”
Ernest Rutherford, 1933.2
For New Zealand medics, scientists and the general public, the “new physics” had an immediate
allure. Like New Zealanders today, these early twentieth century professionals were early
adopters, striving to keep up to date with the latest applications of radiation science, especially
for the treatment of diseases and the promotion of health. Patients, in turn, sought the assurance
of having the latest treatments on offer in New Zealand. As the use of X-ray and radium
technologies became more widespread around New Zealand and the world, however, so did
awareness of the hazards of working with radiation.
The new technologies of X-rays and radium were linked in that they both produced penetrating
(and what we now know as ionising) forms of radiation that could be used in diagnostic or
therapeutic medicine. While the public were unlikely to be aware of the physical differences
between, for example, X-ray therapy and radium therapy, they were in fact two very different
processes: an X-ray machine produced an electrically-generated form of electromagnetic
radiation emitted by electrons that could be used in diagnosis or therapy; radium, or its daughter
product, radon gas, was used mostly as a close-range therapy for the alpha particles it emitted.
Radium had applications outside medicine too: when mixed with beryllium, scientists could use
it as a source of neutrons for physics experiments.
Early use of diagnostic X-rays
The application of X-ray and radium technology to medicine in New Zealand happened mostly
independently from other countries, with Australasian cooperation not formalised until the
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Australian and New Zealand Association of Radiologists was formed in 1935. The pace of
development was similar in both countries, though uptake of the new technology was somewhat
faster in New Zealand. As well as having a population of technologically savvy early-adopters it
is possible that the small size of the country meant that a few keen individuals could have a
widespread impact on the adoption of a new technology.3
By the second decade of the twentieth century diagnostic X-rays were in widespread use. In
1916, for example, Auckland Hospital used their X-ray apparatus for 1,394 diagnostic
examinations.4 X-rays were also used for dental diagnosis from the 1910s and were in routine
use by the 1930s.5 Specialised medical attention like X-rays, however, came at a cost to the
patient. An X-ray radiograph cost between half a guinea and three guineas in 1917 (up to $100
in 2010 New Zealand dollars) limiting its application to wealthier patients.6
The First World War was a period of great technological advancement, particularly in medicine,
and many of New Zealand’s medical officers were exposed to these new technologies; for
example, in the form of mobile X-ray units used to detect lodged bullets and pieces of shrapnel.
The war also saw the development of new X-ray apparatus and the standardisation of X-ray
techniques, most of which reached New Zealand by 1920.7 The technology was sophisticated,
and New Zealand, with its small population, did not yet have the trained professionals to use it.
By December 1924, 35 New Zealand hospitals had X-ray apparatus, and 17 of them employed
lay radiographers.8 In the remaining hospitals, the X-ray equipment was used by anyone “who
could be impressed into service”; medical superintendents, house surgeons, hospital engineers,
electricians or nurses were all called upon to take responsibility for radiography.9 One nurse was
known to take her knitting into the X-ray room – “it worked out something like half a row of
sock for an ankle and up to two rows for a lumbar spine”.10
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As the technology became more advanced and established, medical applications for X-rays
expanded beyond diagnosing bone fractures and joint conditions. Chest X-rays became an
important tool for confirming the diagnosis and extent of pulmonary tuberculosis, which only a
few decades earlier had been the number one killer of New Zealanders. By injecting or feeding a
patient solutions that were impervious to X-rays, such as compounds containing barium or
iodine, soft tissues such as the digestive and urinary tracts could be examined by X-ray.11
X-ray technology was applied wherever it was seen to be potentially beneficial, even to antenatal
care. By 1926, 44 New Zealand hospitals had X-ray equipment, and the Director-General of
Health was proud to announce that arrangements had been made for pregnant women to have X-
rays for diagnosis of conditions such as multiple pregnancy, hydrocephalus or malformation of
the foetal skeleton. The practice of offering antenatal care to all pregnant women was new,
launched only two years earlier as part of the Department of Health’s Campaign for Safe
Maternity. With the new X-ray screens and fast films now in use, the Department of Health
assured there was “no danger either to mother or child”.12 By the mid-1930s the antenatal X-ray
was on the list of standard X-ray procedures offered by New Zealand hospitals, available for an
outpatient charge of 5 shillings a film.13
X-rays were popular and the public was happy to pay for them: as well as being offered in
hospitals, X-ray machines were used in health spas (to diagnose joint conditions) and by
chiropractors. In shoe shops, sales staff with no training in radiography operated “pedascopes”
or “shoe-fitting fluoroscopes”. Most pedascopes had no limits on radiation exposure time, and
children could play unsupervised on the machines, irradiating their feet and watching their foot
bones on the screen.14
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Figures 3.1 and 3.2: From a handful of X-ray machines at the turn of the century, New Zealand had an estimated 450
X-ray installations by 1944. These advertisements ran in the New Zealand Journal of Health and Hospitals in 1920.
Source: H1, 53/19 (28298), Archives New Zealand, Wellington, NZ.
X-ray and radium therapy
X-rays were used diagnostically as soon as it was discovered that human bones were opaque to
X-rays, but their therapeutic use followed experiments to determine their effect on skin diseases.
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X-rays were perceived to have a beneficial effect on skin conditions like acne, ringworm and
skin cancer, though it was soon noticed that radiation also caused skin burns and hair loss.15
As with adoption of diagnostic X-rays, experiments with radiation therapy in New Zealand
followed close behind the first international publication of the new techniques. Radiotherapy
trials in New Zealand began as early as 1901, but more advanced therapy was taking place in
London, and some New Zealanders travelled there for treatment.16 In 1902, The Press described
how a Christchurch patient, Craig Robertson, who had suffered for 26 years from “rodent ulcer”
(now known as basal cell carcinoma), was treated in London with the new “X-Ray Light Cure”.
Before leaving for London, Robertson had been through 15 operations to treat his condition,
which affected his face, and the “ulcer, which started in his cheek, just to one side of the mouth,
had extended close to his eye … and he was in great fear that it would go to the brain”.17 On
arriving in England, Robertson received treatment at London Hospital. The Press described his
treatment as follows:
The light ... is administered through a round globe ... The patient sits
down before the battery, with the globe placed on a wooden stand at
about the level of his head, and from twelve to eighteen inches in front
of him. Two small coils are attached to points at the two ends of the
globe, from the battery. A leaden mask is placed over the patient's
face, with a small hole cut in it just over the place where the ulcer
is, and the apparatus is placed so that the light from the X-Rays will
fall exactly upon that spot. The mask is used to prevent the rest of the
face being shrivelled away. A tap is given to the battery in the manner
of touching a spring, and the process begins. When it has lasted for ten
minutes a second touch with the finger cuts off the light. An exposure
of the ulcerated place to this light during ten minutes each day, for
six days a week, forms the whole of the simple process.18
Following his treatment, which involved 10-minute X-ray sessions, six days a week, for several
months, Robertson declared, “I felt noticeably better after only eight days, and in from five to six
months I was quite well.”19
New Zealand medical practitioners were quick to master the new technology and it wasn’t long
before individual practitioners in New Zealand were offering paying patients radiotherapy
services. William Hosking, superintendent of Masterton Hospital, used radium and X-ray
equipment to offer a private radiotherapy service and is credited with using radium to cure a
carcinoma of the lip soon after the turn of the century. Other early practitioners of radiotherapy
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included P. Clennell Fenwick in Christchurch, Percy Cameron in Dunedin and William Stowe in
Palmerston North.20
As demonstrated by the enterprising William Hosking, radium, like X-rays, emitted radiation
that could be used for therapeutic purposes. An advantage of radium over X-rays was that it
could be used to treat cancers that were difficult to reach externally and was therefore used for
inter-cavity treatments, for example, for cancer of the uterus, or for direct insertion into tumours.
By emitting alpha particles, which travel only a few millimetres, the radium was able to destroy
the cancerous tissue into which it was inserted, without damaging the healthy tissue surrounding
it. Radium, however, was much more expensive than X-rays and hard to obtain, and it took
longer to become established for medical use.21
Marie and Pierre Curie had first extracted radium in 1902.  By 1907, in recognition of its
medical benefits, radium was being extracted in one Austrian and two French factories. By 1913,
however, they had together made available only 20 grams of radium. The United States was the
next to enter the market, and between 1913 and 1926 put about 200 grams of radium on the
market, about half of which was used in medicine (the rest was used in luminous paints). When
Belgium and Canada entered the radium market in the 1920s this precious substance became
more available and affordable to hospitals in New Zealand. And as the availability of radium
increased, its price dropped, from US$160,000 per gram in 1913 to US$120,000 in 1926; and
then down to US$70,000 per gram once the Belgian company Union Miniere de Haut Katanga
(which sold radium produced from uranium mined from the Belgian Congo) first became a
major producer, significantly increasing supply and eventually gaining a near-monopoly on
production.22
Although radium was becoming increasingly available, New Zealand hospitals were poorly
funded and radium was initially prohibitively expensive. Under the Hospitals and Charitable
Institutions Act 1909, hospitals were funded by levies on local bodies, central government
subsidies and monies from donations, bequests and patient fees. Public appeals were a common
way of raising money for capital expenditure and this was how radium was purchased in the four
main centres.23
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In 1914, Percy Cameron, who was in charge of Dunedin Hospital’s X-ray department,
recommended the establishment of a “Radium Institute” at the hospital. Cameron had bought a
small supply of radium in 1911 and had been using it successfully at the hospital and in private
practice.24 The same year, Herbert McClelland Inglis, honorary radiologist to the Christchurch
Hospital, made an appeal for public funds to buy a supply of radium for the hospital. Medical
opinion, however, was divided on the success of radium as a therapy and in Wellington, the
hospital’s medical superintendent cited the “enormous cost of radium … [it was selling for
£20,000 a gram at the time], the differences of opinion amongst eminent medical authorities as
to its therapeutic value, the dangers attending its use, and the absolute necessity of having a
trained expert for its administration” as reasons to hold over a proposal to secure a supply of
radium for Wellington Hospital.25
By 1917, however, medical and public opinion had moved in favour of radium. A 1917 public
campaign in Dunedin raised enough money for an additional 180 mg of radium, and patients
came from all over New Zealand for treatment. In 1921 another public appeal raised more than
£2000, which – along with a Government subsidy of 24 shillings to the pound26 – Dunedin
Hospital used to purchase more radium applicators.27
Wellington was next. In November 1923, following the success of the Dunedin campaign, a
committee led by the Mayor of Wellington launched a public campaign to raise £10,000 towards
establishment of a radium department at Wellington Hospital. The money from the successful
public campaign, along with a government subsidy at the lower rate of 10 shillings in the pound,
was used to purchase 750 mg of radium for £12,250, along with deep X-ray therapy apparatus at
a cost of £3740. In London, Ernest Rutherford selected a tube of radium bromide from Radium
Belge’s radium supplies. The radium arrived at Wellington Hospital, along with an
authentication certificate signed by Marie Curie.28 In 1925, Noel Hill, then a part-time physics
student at Victoria University College, installed, under Marsden’s supervision, 650 mg of the
hospital’s radium supply in a radon plant in the hospital’s basement. Radon gas emanating from
the radium (it was also called “radium emanation”) was collected and sealed in tiny glass tubes
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before being enclosed in suitable applicators, including platinum seeds and needles, for use in
cancer treatment throughout the country.29
Figure 3.3: Wellington’s radium appeal successfully appealed to citizens’ sense of duty in raising £10,000
for purchase of radium and radiotherapy equipment for Wellington Hospital. Source: MS-Papers-1293-
119/03, Misc Records, Hutt City Council, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
Christchurch Hospital’s radium and deep therapy department was made possible by a then-
anonymous donation of £4000 from Sir Arthur Sims, a Christchurch businessman and
philanthropist who had earlier been taught by Rutherford at Christchurch Boys’ High School.30
Combined with an earlier donation of £500, and the government subsidy of 10 shillings in the
pound, this money was used to purchase half a gram of radium and a deep therapy X-ray
machine. Clennell Fenwick was appointed to head the department and he travelled to the United
Kingdom to train in radium therapy and bring back the required plant. A public appeal followed,
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bringing additional funds to the newly established service.31 By December 1924 the X-ray
therapy plant and radium was installed and the department established, with Fenwick working
“day and night” treating patients.32 As medical practitioners increasingly recognised the value of
radium therapy, demand increased. Just two years after the department was established Fenwick
was finding it very difficult to keep up with the demand for radium therapy; he described the
hospital’s radium supply as being in “incessant use”.33
Auckland Hospital was slower on the uptake, but after the chairman of the hospital board
declared that “Auckland had taken a back seat too long and should not play second fiddle to any
city in the Dominion” it too launched a radium appeal. With the £10,000 raised it bought radium
and a deep therapy unit for treatment of cancer patients at Auckland Hospital.34
Radium, the subject of public appeals in the four main centres, had needed little introduction; as
the Government balneologist Arthur Wohlmann, who ran the Department of Tourist and Health
Resorts’ Rotorua Bathhouse, wrote in 1914, “the public are mad on radium”.35 In 1905
Rutherford had spoken on “Radium and its Transformations” to a crowd at Canterbury
University College.36 In 1919, Auckland public lectures on “The Discovery and Properties of
Radium” and “The Lessons of Radium” by Professor Gwilym Owen, Auckland’s physics
professor, were packed, with the hall’s 400 capacity not big enough to accommodate the
enthusiastic crowds.37
As well as being known for their medical use, X-rays and radium had become part of popular
culture, with some manufacturers using the terms to give their products an air of modernity and
superior strength. From as early as 1911 Radium Polishes Ltd offered a range of polishes (none
of which contained radium).38 As well as Radium Floor Polish with which “everything will be
brighter”, New Zealand housewives could clean their stoves with X-ray Stove Polish with “The
Shine That Lasts Longest” and, somewhat alarmingly, bake bread using Radium Brand Flour.39
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Figure 3.4: Christchurch Hospital X-ray Department, c1920s, as shown in P. C. Fenwickʼs History of the North
Canterbury Hospital Board. Source: B-K 675-32, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
Figure 3.5: Christchurch Hospital Deep Therapy Department as shown in P. C. Fenwickʼs History of the North
Canterbury Hospital Board. Source: B-K 675-28, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
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Figure 3.6: Advertisers used the connection with “radium” and “X-rays” to confer superior cleaning power on their
polishing products. Source: Newspaper advertisements from Auckland Star, 25 November 1908, p10, The Dominion,
1 November 1923, p2 and The Dominion, 29 October 1925, p14.
Once full radiotherapy services were established in the four main centres, the hospital boards
worked to add to their supplies of radium and keep their equipment up to date. At first William
Massey’s Reform Government matched public donations to the tune of 10 shillings in the pound.
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Lobbying from the hospital boards led Gordon Coates’ Government to match donations pound
for pound to a total of £5000 of government money for each of Auckland, Wellington,
Christchurch and Dunedin hospitals.40 Patients outside these centres needing treatment could
either have X-ray therapy from local equipment or if “deep therapy” was required, they could
travel to the main centre, or have an appropriate stock of radon sent out for their treatment. The
maximum fee for a complete course of deep therapy was set at £25.41
By 1929, the combined radium stocks of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin
hospitals (in the form of pure radium, radium needles and radium plaques) was such that New
Zealand had a greater supply per head of population than the United Kingdom. Wellington
Hospital, with 650 mg of radium in the emanation plant plus 100 mg of radium available for use
in needles and applicators, had the greatest supply. Smaller amounts of radium were held by
Wanganui Hospital, Victoria University College, and by independent medical practitioners
around the country.42 Following consultation with radiologists using radium, the Department of
Health decided that each main centre should have a one-gram supply.43 By this time radium was
selling for £12,000 per gram, which the Dominion described as “more costly than the rarest
jewels”.44
Smaller regional hospitals continued to request funds for their own radium supplies but by 1931
New Zealand was in the throes of the Great Depression. The Department of Health’s budget had
been slashed and money was not available for what was still considered unproven treatment. The
Department of Health’s stance was that:
… knowledge in regard to radium and its uses is in a state of flux and
the position needs clarifying as regards dosage, technique, and the form
in which the Radium should be applied before further large sums of money
are spent in purchasing additional supplies of this therapeutic agent.45
By this time, however, the British Empire Cancer Campaign Society (the forerunner of today’s
Cancer Society) was active in New Zealand and began subsidising smaller centres to purchase
their own stocks of radium.46
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Other uses of radium
The mechanisms by which radiation worked as a cancer treatment – and therefore the potential
dangers of its use – were not well understood by the public, or even by some medical
professionals. If radiation was such a successful treatment for cancer surely it could be used for
other conditions? Enthusiasm for radium led unscrupulous quacks and well-meaning medics to
take advantage of the new therapy, prescribing first X-rays and then radium for all manner of
ailments. Respected Dunedin Hospital radiologist Colin Anderson described radium being used
in the 1920s to treat women with non-malignant conditions such as fibroids, or even irregular or
excessive menstruation; the standard treatment was to insert a 50 mg tube of radium bromide
into the uterus for 24 hours. Anderson noted, “haemorrhaging in young girls is even more
difficult to control than in older women” and suggested that “fairly large doses may be given
without fear of destroying ovarian function”.47 New Zealand, however, with its smaller
population, escaped some of the most bizarre applications of radium. Internationally, radiation
was also used to “treat” acne, ringworm, arthritis and depression and for cosmetic purposes such
as banishing unwanted facial hair. Radium was also introduced to products as unlikely as
toothpaste, contraceptive gels, face creams and even chocolate bars.48
New Zealanders who read magazines and newspapers from abroad would have been aware that
radon, the radioactive gas that emanated naturally from radium, was being promoted in Europe
and the United States as a cure-all and general tonic, often in the form of radon water. In New
Zealand, the Rotorua Bathhouse – a large and elaborate complex in the style of a European spa –
had the dubious distinction of including radon water among its list of “treatments”, which
otherwise included soaks in mineral springs, mud baths and a range of massage, hydro and
electrical therapies. Following a visit to Europe, Arthur Wohlmann, the Government
Balneologist, advised the manager of the Department of Tourist and Health Resorts that
treatment by radioactive waters had come to stay and its “possibilities were very great”. He
recommended the purchase, for £250, of a “radium activator” to create radioactive water to sell
at the Rotorua Bathhouse. Cabinet approved the purchase and the apparatus arrived in late
1914.49
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The radium activator consisted of a porcelain jug with a side tap for draining off water. Inside
the jug, a small porcelain container contained a minute quantity of radium bromide (probably
mixed with some other mineral salts) whose continuous emanation of radon gas irradiated any
water that filled the jug. The radioactive water was to be drawn off and replenished daily.
Radium, whose chief naturally occurring isotope radium-226 has a half-life of 1,620 years, could
irradiate the water almost indefinitely. Radium’s daughter gas, radon-222, however, had a half-
life of less than four days, and to be “effective” users were told that the radioactive water had to
be drunk within 24 hours of being drawn. Wohlmann tested and verified the radioactivity of the
activated water and recommended each patient take four-to-six small glasses a day.50
Wohlmann’s recommendations demonstrated, on the one hand, a sophisticated understanding of
the different radioactive elements and their relationship to each other, but, on the other hand,
overconfidence in a type of “therapy” that had no scientific basis and involved ingestion of
radioactive substances, which had already proved to be potentially harmful.
In a story about the bathhouse’s new treatment, the Rotorua Times declared radioactive water to
be especially valuable in treating gout and diabetes, soothing the nerves and “tightening loose
teeth”.51 The radon water “therapy” was initially popular; Wohlmann said the treatment was
successful and a number of patients were sent to Rotorua with the express purpose of taking the
radon water. Sales of Rotorua’s radon water peaked in 1916, when more than 8,500 glasses were
sold. After that, however, there was a steady decline in sales, with returns dropping by almost 50
per cent each year.52 It is likely there was an element of enthusiasm for a new fad that
contributed to the initial popularity of radon water therapy. By 1922, however, by which time
John Duncan had succeeded Wohlmann as Government Balneologist, sales of radon water had
declined to less than 300 glasses a year, and the general manager of Tourist and Health Resorts
asked Duncan to “take steps to have the sale of radium water discontinued”. The declining sales,
and the manager’s wish to have sales discontinued, were possibly because of increasing
evidence that radium could be harmful. Radon water sales continued for two years after the
request to discontinue but by 1925, when the general manager asked the tourist manager now in
charge of the Rotorua Bathhouse about the location of the radium emanation apparatus, he was
told that the jar, inside of which was “a porcelain cylinder containing what appears to be a kind
of earth” was chipped and broken and sitting in a storeroom. Let’s hope the tourist manager
didn’t investigate the “earth” too closely, because there are potentially fatal consequences of
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touching even minute quantities of radium, consequences which by this time were beginning to
be appreciated.53
Hazards of radioactivity realised
Enthusiasm for X-rays and radium lasted long after radiation had been shown to cause
superficial burns and more serious damage. Thomas Edison and his assistants suffered problems
with their eyes following X-ray exposure as early as 1896, and skin damage following X-ray
exposure was reported later that year.54 In 1901 Pierre Curie and Henri Becquerel published a
paper in which they described the burns they had received – both intentionally and inadvertently
– from exposure to radioactive substances.55 It was public knowledge that there were dangers
associated with radioactivity. In 1905, Rutherford, lecturing to a crowded hall at Canterbury
University College, complained he was not able to illustrate his lecture on “Radium and its
Transformations” with striking experiments “because it was hardly safe to carry in one’s cabin a
sufficient amount of radium to make such experiments”.56 Some New Zealand scientists and
medics, however, were rumoured to have radium even closer to their person – there are reports
of both Masterton doctor William Hosking and Wellington physicist Charles Watson-Munro
carrying radium around in their pockets.57
The science of radiology was new, and practitioners in New Zealand as well as overseas
experimented with arrangements of equipment and procedures. As with any new technology,
there were accidents and mishaps. While it was noticed very early that X-rays could cause skin
burns, the more long-term effects of the radiation were not initially known. In addition, the
machines were rarely earthed, and operators were at risk from electrical shock as well as
radiation.58
New Zealand doctors and technicians did not escape harm. In 1905 Mr Wright, the electrical
instructor at the Thames School of Mines, overexposed his hand in an X-ray machine. John
Campbell, Rutherford’s biographer, recounts that the “wound would not heal, creating great
medical interest as the first case of x-radiation injury in Australasia”. The pain was so great that
Wright chose to have his hand amputated rather than travel to the United Kingdom for
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treatment.59 Medical practitioners from around the country received radiation damage to their
hands, from either handling radium, or from exposure to X-rays. As well as being exposed to
scattered radiation, resulting from poor shielding of X-rays tubes, operators regularly exposed
themselves to radiation through a process known as “setting the tubes”. The operator placed their
hand between the radiation tube and the fluorescent screen, and adjusted the equipment until a
sharp image of the bones of the hand appeared on the screen. When using a screen rather than
film, the exposure had to be long enough for the doctor to study the picture, and they would
often stand in the path of the radiation to get a better view of the screen. Frequent and prolonged
use of these practices often led to radio-dermatitis and, eventually, to radiation-induced cancer.
Many New Zealand medics suffering X-ray burns complained of ongoing pain and some were
forced to retire.60 A dentist who had seen many colleagues with radiation burns to their hands
described the condition as “excruciatingly painful … absolutely demanding morphia for the
control of pain”.61 Other medics, including Dr Clark, an Auckland Hospital radiographer, Dr
Keith Macky, an Auckland orthopaedic surgeon who did a lot of X-ray work, and Dr Donald J.
Goodwin of Whangarei, whose desk was next to the X-ray chest stand, were unknowingly
receiving radiation that would eventually lead to their deaths from cancer. Christchurch’s
Clennell Fenwick suffered radiation damage to his fingers from handling radium, and Percy
Cameron, who worked first in Dunedin and then in Wellington, suffered blindness, as well as
hand and bone injuries caused by radium handling.62
Patients, too, were often victims of what radiologist Colin Anderson later referred to as
“ignorance” or “irresponsibility”.  In his history of the development of radiology in New
Zealand he recounted an episode in a North Island hospital where a patient was receiving
treatment to the anterior chest wall. The hospital matron who was administering the treatment
was called away and forgot about the patient, who suffered an X-ray burn the thickness of his
chest wall. Several years later a man died in Timaru Hospital from a huge carcinoma of the
anterior abdominal wall, which had developed at the site of extensive X-ray burns received some
years earlier while he was receiving radiotherapy.63 Dental X-rays had their own hazards. An
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account in the New Zealand Dental Journal told of a patient who suffered complete hair loss for
six months, as well as persistent dermatitis of the scalp, following a series of dental X-rays.64
One treatment for radiation burns was, ironically, radon ointment. The ointment used was a
preparation of radon in Vaseline. Following the idea that radiation accelerated healing, the
ointment was used to treat small skin areas suffering necrosis after radiotherapy.65
Radiation-induced cancer
While it was established early on that radiation could cause superficial burns and skin irritations,
by 1920 a terrible irony had emerged concerning the medical use of radiation. While radiation
was found to be wonderfully effective in treating cancer, scientists and physicians concluded it
was also instrumental in causing cancer, as well as sterility, bone disease and other afflictions.66
The cancer-risk of working with even small amounts of radioactive material came to light in the
late 1920s with the widely published fate of the radium dial painters in the United States. The
United States Radium Corporation factory in New Jersey employed up to 250 dial painters. The
workers, mostly young women, sat side by side at long workbenches using radium paint to
illuminate numerals on the dials of soldiers’ wristwatches, aeroplane instruments, and other
military equipment. To get a fine point on the brush for more control over their work, the women
would wipe the radium-contaminated brush between their lips. While the dangers of gamma
radiation from radium were known by this time, radium paint, containing one part radium to
some 30,000 parts zinc sulphide, was not believed to be dangerous.67
The radium paint business flourished after the First World War, with radium used to illuminate
millions of wristwatches along with dolls’ eyes, gun-sights and fish-bait. Then, between 1921
and 1924, three of the United States Radium Corporation’s dial painters died, seemingly from
natural causes. Many of the other dial painters began having serious problems with their teeth
and jaws. The dial painters were variously diagnosed with necrosis of the jaw, phosphorus
poisoning, anaemia and stomach ulcers.68
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A 1925 investigation found the incidence of anaemia and infected mouths among former
employees of the United States Radium Corporation to be beyond coincidence. More thorough
investigations followed. All the dial painters examined had abnormal blood counts. On being
examined in a dark room, the women were found to be luminous – their faces, hair, hands, arms,
even their corsets and underwear glowed in the dark, contaminated by minute particles of
radium. The same year, a paper in the Journal of the American Medical Association described
radium’s “deadly … rays” and reported that once radium entered the body it spontaneously and
continually irradiated the “blood forming centres” and over time could cause severe anaemia and
other disorders. By 1928 at least 15 dial painters had died from confirmed radium poisoning.
Five former employees of the United States Radium Corporation received wide publicity and
public sympathy when they filed a lawsuit against the company.69
The injuries and deaths of the radium dial painters taught scientists and doctors that internal
exposure to radium could be fatal, and had to be controlled. Continued medical investigations of
the dial painters provided information about the behaviour of ionizing radiation in the body,
showing that rather than being passed straight through the body as previously thought, these
isotopes accumulated in various organs – radium tended to accumulate in the bones – from
where it irradiated the surrounding cells.70 At about the same time as these links were being
made, the American biologist Hermann J. Muller established that X-rays could induce
detrimental genetic mutations and chromosomal changes in fruit flies.71 This 1927 discovery
provided a vital clue as to how exposure to radiation could lead to cancer.
Evidence for the links between radiation exposure and cancer continued to build and was
published internationally, including in New Zealand. In 1929 the American Medical Association
condemned the use of radiation to remove unwanted body hair, and in 1932 it withdrew radium
from its list of remedies approved for internal administration. By 1934 more than 200 American
radiologists were reported to have died from cancers attributed to radiation exposure. And in
July 1934, Marie Curie, the celebrated discoverer of radium, died from pernicious anaemia after
suffering years of ill health resulting from her exposure to radium; her fingers were already
scarred by a painful radiodermatitis and her eyes clouded by radiation-induced cataracts.72
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In New Zealand, there was growing public awareness of the hazards of radiation exposure. The
Evening Post of 21 January 1933 reported from London on the perceived need for control of
radium, which Lord Lee of Fareham described as “the most lethal and dangerous of poisons”. In
1932, the American millionaire industrialist and golf champion Eben Byers had died after
drinking three bottles of radioactive water a day for several years. His anaemia, brain abscess
and necrosis of the jawbone were attributed to radium poisoning. The case was widely
publicised and radon water, along with other radium-based “health” products, declined in
popularity.73 The Evening Post reported on Byers’s fate, describing the radon water as causing
“intense suffering” and “a slow death”.74 By this time the sale of radon water at the Rotorua
Bathhouse had been discontinued, but Byers’s death did not stop an enterprising company trying
to sell radon water in New Zealand in the 1950s.75
Radium continued to be used to treat benign medical conditions, however, despite its potential
for skin damage and radiation burns. As late as the 1940s, X-rays were used to treat eczema,
warts, acne and even birthmarks (naevi); the practice was advertised as £1 for the first treatment
and 5 shillings for subsequent treatments.76
Charles Hines, the radiographer in charge of Christchurch Hospital’s radium department,
described the practice of radiotherapy treatment of naevi:
A [radium] plaque is applied, with strapping, in close contact with the
naevus for 12 minutes. The treatment is absolutely painless, which is a
great advantage for it is best commenced at a very early age – six to
eight weeks. Most naevi show a definite paling and diminution in size in
two or three weeks after treatment, which is repeated at monthly
intervals. Six or eight treatments are usually necessary to effect
complete disappearance, though naturally, much depends on the size of the
lesion, which can vary from the size of a lentil to – in some cases – an
area of skin covering perhaps the whole of an arm and shoulder.77
Despite the mounting evidence of the dangers of radioactivity, many people still considered it to
be curative. In 1936 the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) conducted
tests on a “specially prepared flannel said to possess radioactive properties” promoted for the
treatment of various complaints. Thankfully for any users of the flannel, it was found to contain
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little detectable radioactivity.78 Holidaymakers and invalids continued to flock to the “Radium
Bath” at the Rotorua Bathhouse, which was widely believed to have therapeutic radioactive
qualities, even though it contained “less radium than ordinary tap-water”.79
Safety measures introduced
The Department of Health took the initial lead in alerting practitioners to the hazards of working
with X-rays and radium, though it was some time before concerns about patients caught up with
concerns about medical staff. Departmental staff kept up to date with radiation safety measures
being recommended in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States and, while there
were no official safety standards in New Zealand, hospitals were alerted to relevant literature,
with recommendations that they adopt the overseas standards. In a 1921 circular, the Department
of Health drew the attention of hospital medical superintendents to the September 1921 issue of
the New Zealand Journal of Health and Hospitals. Alongside articles on the risk of anthrax
infection from Japanese shaving brushes and the disinfectant properties of tobacco smoke, was a
report on the preliminary findings of the British X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee.80
The report was concerned with the safety of people working in X-ray and radium departments.
The dangers of overexposure to radiation and X-rays were reported as including “visible injuries
to the superficial tissues” and “derangements of internal organs and changes in the blood”.
Recommendations included advice on the use of lead screens, shields and gloves to help protect
the operator from radiation exposure from X-rays, and guidelines for the safe handling of
radium, which it advised, “should always be manipulated with forceps or similar instruments and
… carried from place to place in long-handled boxes lined on all sides with 1 cm of lead”. The
committee also recommended that periodic blood tests be taken from radiation workers, in order
to recognise any changes at an early stage. 81
The report made recommendations that employees in X-ray and radium departments should:
- work not more than seven hours a day
- have Sundays and two half-days off duty each week, “to be spent as much as possible out of
doors”
- have an annual holiday of one month or two separate fortnights.82
These recommendations were not always heeded. John Campbell, senior radiographer for the
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Auckland Hospital Board, recalled in 1952 that in the 1920s he “was on duty every night, week
end, high days and holidays, without pay or time off in lieu”.83 The same issue of the New
Zealand Journal of Health and Hospitals alerted readers that exposure to radium was believed to
be more dangerous than exposure to X-rays, with prolonged exposure leading to possible death
from pernicious anaemia. (Though how seriously the article was taken is not clear – it was
followed by a story on the “dangers of excessive tea drinking”.84)
Despite New Zealand’s early adoption of X-ray technology, in 1922 David Wylie, Director of
the Department of Health’s Hospitals Division, considered that the “general standard of X-ray
work is poor in the majority of hospitals”. Wylie called for hospital boards to keep X-ray
equipment up to date, and to follow the British habit of employing and training “radiographers”
to operate the X-ray apparatus.85 The following year, the number of injuries and accidents to
both radiographers and patients prompted the Director-General of Health, Thomas Valintine, to
tighten the conditions under which radiographers operated by issuing an edict that a radiologist
should always be present during the administration of X-rays and X-ray therapy. Valintine also
consulted radiologists in Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin, and approached the four university
colleges, the technical schools, the Education Department, the Society of Radiographers and the
School for Radiographers at King’s College in London.86 His subsequent draft bill for the
registration of radiographers sought to establish them as medical auxiliaries with the right of
unrestricted practice. Anderson reports, however, that amongst the more highly-trained
radiologists the draft bill suffered “universal condemnation” as a result of the radiographers
being given the right of unrestricted practice.87
Operator safety was, however, already beginning to be taken more seriously. In 1922 Dunedin
radiologist Percy Cameron was described as wearing gloves and a lead-leather apron and retiring
to a lead-lined room to operate the X-ray table.88 In 1924, when Christchurch Hospital installed a
new X-ray therapy plant, the operator was “situated in a room as far distant from the tube as
possible, the walls and ceilings of which are lined with heavy sheet lead”.89 Radium used for
cancer treatment was stored in a block of lead to protect the attendants from injury.90
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At the second meeting of the International Congress of Radiology in 1928, a consortium of
international groups established the International X-ray and Radium Protection Committee. The
committee, which was made up of scientists and doctors, made recommendations to reduce
hazards in the operation and handling of radiation technology such as specifying the thickness of
lead used to shield X-ray tubes and the walls of rooms storing radium. Their recommendations
had no statutory authority, however, and were directed wholly at people who worked with X-
rays, such as physicians and radiographers, with no reference to the patients receiving
treatment.91
The lack of precision (compared to today) in the early use of X-rays resulted in varying doses
being received by patients, in part due to a lack of consensus as to the appropriate dose as well
as imprecise practices and equipment. Decades later, Auckland radiographer John Campbell
recalled the procedure for taking an ankle X-ray in the 1920s, which illustrates the potential for
electrical (as well as radiation) danger posed by much of the early X-ray equipment:
The expose time for an ankle was about 15 seconds. As no timing device
was incorporated in this model we used the old photographic method –
one, two, three, etc., etc., eventually arriving at 15. Another couple
of seconds were added for luck. This proved alright if the tube had not
emitted several sparks and frightened the patient and he or she had not
moved … .92
The idea of a safe radiation dose, or “tolerance dose” was considered by the 1928 International
Congress of Radiology. Radiation was initially measured by epilation dose (an amount of
radiation that would make a subject’s hair fall out) or multiples or fractions of an erythema dose
(an amount of radiation that would cause the skin to become red and inflamed) but these were
inexact and very subjective measures. The International Congress of Radiology chose the
roentgen (R) as the unit of X-ray measurement and defined it as the amount of radiation needed
to produce a given number of charged ions in a given amount of air. In 1934 the International X-
ray and Radium Protection Committee recommended an exposure limit of 0.2 R a day, or 1 R a
week. As an extra safety precaution the United States adopted an exposure limit of 0.1 R a day.
While exposure to radiation was now recognised as potentially harmful, levels below the
tolerance dose were believed to be safe and unlikely to cause permanent damage.93
The New Zealand Department of Health continued to keep medical superintendents of all public
hospitals advised of international safety advice. In a 1933 letter, the Department drew attention
to a revised report of the British X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee published over three
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issues of the Journal of the Hospital Boards’ Association, and to “further suggestions for the
safe custody of radium and precautions to be taken when using radium and radon” contained in
two Australian publications.94 The British recommendations made detailed guidelines with
regard to radium therapy, designed to protect workers from the effects of beta rays on the hands,
and the effects of gamma rays on “the internal organs, vascular and reproductive systems”. Once
again, the committee recommended that radiation workers have three-monthly blood tests to
detect any changes at an early stage.95 No New Zealand regulations were drawn up, however,
and initiative on the part of the medical superintendents and hospitals was required to research
and act on the overseas findings and recommendations.96
Before the Second World War, radium and radon were transported around New Zealand by post
in ordinary cardboard containers. The photographic company Kodak contacted the Department
of Health in 1937, alerting them to the possibility that radioactive material could damage
photographic film transported in close proximity. New Zealand had no guidelines regarding the
transport of radioactive materials and Kodak’s concerns about their film quickly translated into
concerns about the possibility of postal workers being unwittingly exposed to radiation. The
Department of Health decided to seek the advice of the National Radiation Committee of Great
Britain and the New Zealand branch of the British Empire Cancer Campaign Society.97
The expert on this matter was physicist Jack Strong, of the British Empire Cancer Campaign
Society’s Travis Radiophysical Laboratory. Strong looked at the amount of radon Wellington
Hospital was sending out from its radon plant and calculated that if one postal worker were
responsible for carrying all the radon posted, and if he carried each delivery package for an
average of two hours at a distance of 10 cm from his skin, he would receive a radiation dose of
160 R during the year. The tolerance dose at this time was 100 R per year, which Strong called
“an exceedingly conservative estimate”. The radon was sent to a variety of sources, however,
and no one postman had been exposed to the year’s supply.98
To further clarify the issue, the Department of Health sought information from the British High
Commissioner who referred them to the regulations laid down in the International
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Recommendations for X-ray and Radium Protection (of which the New Zealand authorities
should have been aware) and the Recommendations of the British X-ray and Radium Protection
Committee. The New Zealand authorities were advised that in the United Kingdom, the Post
Office authorities permitted up to 50 mg of radium to be sent by post provided the radium was
“completely surrounded by one inch of lead”.99 Clearly, the New Zealand safety standards were
lacking.
The Department of Health circulated revised International Recommendations for X-ray and
Radium Protection in 1942. In an accompanying letter, Michael Watt, who had succeeded
Valintine as Director-General of Health in 1930, noted that he believed the recommendations
were “already being observed” but asked that staff members be alerted to the
recommendations.100 The international recommendations advised that discretion should be
exercised in transmitting radium salts by post, with quantities of up to 50 mg radium able to be
posted provided they were in lead-lined boxes. The general recommendations aimed to reduce
overexposure to X-rays and radium by providing staff with adequate protection – such as lead
screening – and suitable working conditions. With the tolerance dose still at 1R per week, it was
recommended that staff carry photographic film badges to measure cumulative radiation
exposure.101
Despite the new focus on safety, there were still mishaps and carelessness. Radium, expensive
and potentially dangerous, was not always treated with the care it deserved. On at least two
occasions radium needles used in New Zealand hospitals were accidentally thrown in the rubbish
and incinerated, though in both recorded accounts, from 1924 and 1939, the valuable substance
was safely recovered.102 Well into the 1940s, however, New Zealand’s medical radiation safety
measures were lacking. As Dr Colin Alexander, a house surgeon at Auckland Hospital, recalled
to Ryan, Sutton and Baigent:
… my dominant memory of the early days is the cavalier attitude to X-ray
safety, notwithstanding the plain evidence of the potential dangers … In
Auckland, the main X-ray room had about four tables, all working
simultaneously, separated only by curtains, resulting in a bath of whole
body radiation for all concerned. We all had regular blood counts and
had extra holidays to compensate for the hazard, but the documented lack
of any detectable ill-effect eventually led to our losing the latter
perk.103
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Travis Radiophysical Laboratory
The New Zealand branch of the British Empire Cancer Campaign Society (now the Cancer
Society of New Zealand) was established in Wellington in 1929 to encourage the establishment
of cancer treatment clinics and research into the causes of cancer.104 While tuberculosis was the
nineteenth century’s biggest killer, better living conditions and hygiene standards, coupled with
an increased life expectancy, had led heart disease and cancer to eclipse tuberculosis in causing
fatalities. By 1928, New Zealand’s cancer death rate was 9.87 per 10,000 people per annum,
nearly double the rate from tuberculosis and second only to heart disease in causing mortality.105
The Society received subsidies from the Department of Health, and money from public
donations. In 1933 the Travis Trust, which was established from the estate of the late William
Henry Travis of Christchurch, offered the Society £500 a year for three years to pay the salary of
a physicist. Jack Strong – a Victoria University physics graduate and a radium attendant at the
hospital since 1932 – was appointed to run the Laboratory. After training in Australia, Strong set
up a laboratory and workshop in the basement of Wellington Hospital where he took charge of
the radium plant previously staffed part-time by science students, and began to provide cancer
treatment centres with help in dealing with the physical aspects of radiation therapy.106 As well
as operating the radon plant, which captured the radon gas emanating from a supply of radium
and packaged it for supply to treatment centres around New Zealand, he set up New Zealand’s
first standards for measuring radiation dosage and travelled to the four main centres to provide
advice to radiotherapists and calibrate X-ray apparatus used in radiotherapy.107 It was now
recognised that the success of radiotherapy depended on the accurate measurement and
administration of the treatment dose. Successful treatment was a function of experienced
technicians, and well-calibrated equipment.108
Strong found working conditions at Wellington difficult: the basement room used for
standardisation work was found to have high levels of radioactive contamination.109 In 1937,
when Canterbury University College offered to accommodate a specialised X-ray and radium
laboratory, and the trustees of the Travis Trust agreed to help pay for it, the Society moved the
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centre of its radiological service to Christchurch.110 The Travis Radiophysical Laboratory was
transferred to the science department of Canterbury University College where Strong was joined
in 1938 by George Roth (who succeeded Strong when he died in 1941). The laboratory’s first
task was to set up standardisation equipment and to calibrate all of New Zealand’s therapeutic
X-ray plants and clinical dosimeters (used to measure radiation dose) to this standard. Most
developed countries, including the United Kingdom, United States and Germany, inspected X-
ray installations only as required and on a cash-for-service basis. In contrast, New Zealand, like
Sweden and Australia, established a nationwide physical calibration scheme, whose service was
free of charge. The New Zealand service was unusual in that it was set up and organised by a
private body, the British Empire Cancer Campaign Society, under close cooperation with the
Health Department.111 For the next 10 years, the Travis Radiophysical Laboratory provided a
free service whereby its two physicists visited up to 26 X-ray therapy plants and 18 clinical
dosimeters twice a year to calibrate equipment against the laboratory’s portable standards and to
advise on measures to protect patients and staff from radiation and electrical risks.112
Figure 3.6: The Electrical Wiring (X-Ray) Regulations aimed to protect operators and patients from the electrical
hazards associated with X-ray equipment. This dental X-ray machine, installed in the 1930s, had an uninsulated
overhead high tension wire, which could have caused electric shocks if touched while in use. Source: National
Radiation Laboratory, Christchurch, NZ.
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In the 1940s, radiologists began taking a leading role in promoting the safe use of radiological
equipment. Despite the safety measures introduced by individual hospitals during the preceding
two decades, by the 1940s some New Zealand radiologists were expressing concern about the
safety of their staff and patients. With no national standards or monitoring procedures in place it
fell to individual radiologists to ask the Laboratory to measure the cumulative dose received by
individual staff members, and to advise on improvements to existing protective measures.113 It
had also become clear that without a complete record of all publicly and privately owned X-ray
plants it was impossible to ensure adequate protection for all X-ray workers at the country’s
many hundred widely scattered installations.114 The Laboratory was impressed by the
radiologists’ requests, and the “severe damages” which they observed had been sustained by
some workers. Discussions at a 1943 conference of radiologists called by the Health Department
led to drafts being prepared for recommendations and regulations to cover electrical and
radiation protection.115 The next year, in the interest of safety and accuracy, New Zealand
radiologists called for all users of X-ray equipment to be registered and for calibration visits to
be extended to all diagnostic X-ray plants, as well as to therapy plants.116
The Electrical Wiring (X-ray) Regulations were introduced in 1944, by which time there were at
least 450 X-ray plants believed to be operating in New Zealand. These regulations provided
technical provisions for the electrical safety of X-ray plants and for the first time, required the
registration of all X-ray plants.117 It was not until 1949, however, that radiation protection was
also subject to regulation.
Radiation sciences firmly established in medicine
By the beginning of the Second World War, the New Zealand medical system was dependent on
radiation technology. Many of the staff now working in radiology departments had studied
overseas, and radiology and radiography were becoming more established sciences.118
The free hospital care, including X-ray examinations and treatment, established under the first
Labour Government’s Social Security Act 1938, led to an increase in demand for diagnostic X-
rays and a consequent increased workload for radiographers and radiologists, especially when
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out-patient benefits were introduced in 1941 and many people took the opportunity to have a
free medical check-up.119
The advent of the Second World War led to a further increase in the demand for X-rays in New
Zealand. In September 1939, as a step towards eliminating people suffering from active
tuberculosis from the armed services, X-ray plants were installed in the military training camps
at Burnham, Trentham and Papakura and all military recruits were given a chest X-ray. This
screening was later conducted at hospitals around the country.120
By the 1940s the death rate from tuberculosis was at an all-time low but it was still a significant
health problem, especially for Maori, whose tuberculosis death rate was up to 10 times higher
than that for non-Maori. In 1941 the Department of Health began X-raying every Maori
secondary school pupil to try to stop the spread of undiagnosed tuberculosis. The establishment
of the Department of Health’s new Division of Tuberculosis further increased the demand for X-
rays. Their research into the incidence of tuberculosis involved the initiation of mass miniature
X-ray programmes for early identification of the disease. Chest X-rays were required for all new
apprentices, for entrants to teachers’ training colleges, and for trainee nurses and dental nurses.
(Applicants found to have tuberculosis were not considered acceptable candidates.) This all put a
strain on the country’s X-ray facilities, and the hospitals were unable to keep up with demand.121
The Second World War also impacted on the radon that Wellington Hospital had supplied to
hospitals around the country since its radon plant was established in 1925. In 1940 George Roth
was commissioned to dismantle the plant, extract its 650 mg supply of radium, and arrange for it
to be safely stored until the war was over.122
Understanding and using the atom
While scientists and medics throughout the world were taking advantage of the discoveries of X-
rays, radium and radioactivity, physicists and chemists continued to seek a better understanding
of the atom, its particles, and their properties. Against general scientific opinion, the novelist H.
G. Wells predicted in 1914 that the energy in the atom would become available for use. In The
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World Set Free Wells envisaged a European conflict involving “atomic bombs” and after which
“atomic energy” would be used for the benefit of humankind.123 The book was widely discussed,
but Rutherford – despite his earlier joke that “some fool in a laboratory might blow up the
universe unawares”124 – dismissed Wells’s claims, saying to the New Zealand Herald in 1914 “it
did not appear within the region of possibility that a substance could be manufactured having the
properties of Wells’s bombs”.125
Rutherford left Manchester in 1919 and returned to the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge, this
time as director of the laboratory, following the resignation of J. J. Thomson.126 Here he
concluded from a series of experiments in which he had bombarded nitrogen atoms with alpha
particles from a radium source, that the nitrogen atoms were being transformed into oxygen
atoms, with a hydrogen nucleus – later called a proton – ejected. Rutherford had “split the atom”
and the science of nuclear physics – the manipulation of the atomic nucleus – was launched.127
In New Zealand, though, physics was still a poor relation to the biological and earth sciences. In
1919, zoology, botany and geology continued to dominate the Transactions and Proceedings of
the New Zealand Institute. Of more than 3,000 papers published over the 50 volumes of the
journal, only 152 were under the heading of physics, and these included papers on astronomy
and meteorology.128 (These figures did not, however, fully reflect the output of the New Zealand
Institute’s members, because, with a topic like physics, without regional boundaries, members
were perhaps more likely to publish their work overseas, particularly in scientific journals in the
United Kingdom.)
One of the people who would have the greatest influence on New Zealand radiation and nuclear
science was Rutherford’s ex-student, Ernest Marsden. In 1922 Marsden left his position as
Victoria University’s professor of physics to become assistant director of education. His most
influential position, however, was as first permanent secretary of New Zealand’s brand new
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR). In this role, taken up in 1926, Marsden
became a champion of nuclear science and technology in New Zealand. As well as dealing with
the management and administration of the DSIR, whose initial focus was on scientific issues of
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relevance to agriculture, Marsden continued to be involved in his own research. In the late
1930s, working with a young DSIR scientist called Charles Watson-Munro, Marsden conducted
a survey of radioactivity in New Zealand soils, in an attempt to establish a connection between
radioactivity and the regional incidence of goitre.129 The effect of radioactivity on people was
not fully understood and links between radioactivity and a variety of health effects were being
sought. In 1937 the Director-General of the Mental Hospitals Department wrote to Marsden
querying any regional link between radioactivity and “feeble-mindedness”.130
Other New Zealand scientists had continued to examine the radioactivity of New Zealand soil
and water through the 1920s. Particular attention was paid to both geothermal water and
Christchurch’s artesian water supply, which was found to have a radon content 10-to-20 times
higher than other New Zealand samples tested. Other researchers made use of X-rays for
experiments such as chemical and crystal analysis or as a remote means of detecting mouldy
apple cores in apples destined for export markets.131
Back in the United Kingdom, following Rutherford’s transmutation of nitrogen into oxygen, he
and his team at the Cavendish Laboratory conducted further experiments in “artificial
disintegration” of elements. They soon discovered, however, that the experiment only worked
for a few light elements. Rutherford determined that artificial disintegration of heavier elements
would require a source of radiation with more energy, and in greater supply, than a stream of
radioactive particles from a radium source. Under Rutherford’s instruction, Cavendish
laboratory physicist John Cockcroft and research student Ernest Walton spent years designing
and building electrical devices to accelerate streams of electrons and protons. By 1930 there
were five international research laboratories in a race to develop electrical equipment to
accelerate particles to high speeds. In 1932, when Robert Van de Graaff in the United States
developed a 1.5 million volt accelerator, an impatient Rutherford hurried his team along. Using
their modest 300,000 volt equipment – a handmade array of transformers, rectifiers, glass tubes
and vacuum pumps – Cockcroft and Walton bombarded a target of lithium with high voltage
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protons and detected alpha particles on a scintillation screen, evidence that some of the lithium
atoms had absorbed a proton and split in half: 7Li3 + 1H1 > 24He2. While Rutherford had, in
1917, used a natural source of radioactivity to knock a proton out of a nitrogen atom’s nucleus,
Cockcroft and Walton had literally split a lithium atom in half. (“The atom split but world still
safe,” read the Sunday Express. “Let it be split, so long as it does not explode” said the Daily
Mirror.) Cockcroft and Walton’s splitting of the lithium atom was artificial disintegration by
artificial means and they soon concluded experiments into the energy releases and mass changes
to confirm Albert Einstein’s equation that E=mc2 (energy equals mass times the square of the
speed of light). Cockcroft and Walton would go on to win the 1951 Nobel Prize in Physics for
these achievements.132
Experimental evidence for the neutron was provided in 1932 by James Chadwick, a former
student of Rutherford’s at Manchester. The existence of a nuclear particle with a similar mass to
the proton but no electrical charge had been proposed more than a decade earlier.133 Chadwick’s
discovery of the neutron more fully explained isotopes – how a single element could come in
several forms with the same chemical properties but different atomic weights and degrees of
radioactivity.134 In 1935 he won the Nobel Prize in Physics for this discovery.
Although he was scientifically isolated in New Zealand, Marsden kept up to date with
international developments in the world of nuclear physics and was quick to adapt new
technologies for New Zealand. Following Victor Hess’s 1912 discovery of cosmic radiation,
Marsden had taken an interest in the phenomenon. In 1919 the Wellington Philosophical Society
had granted Marsden £125 for the purchase of apparatus with which he conducted experiments
in Apia (Samoa), and on Mount Egmont in Taranaki to “ascertain whether or not there is an
extra-terrestrial radiation of a radio-active nature”.135 In 1936 Hess’s discovery of cosmic
radiation won him the Nobel Prize for Physics, and Marsden established a cosmic-ray meter at
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the DSIR’s Magnetic Observatory in Christchurch, which sent its results to the Carnegie
Institute in Washington for compilation with other results from around the world.136
Figure 3.7: As head of the DSIR from 1926 to 1947, Ernest Marsden championed the development of nuclear
sciences in New Zealand. Source: Sir Charles Fleming Collection, 1/4-018564-F, Alexander Turnbull Library,
Wellington, NZ.
Marsden also made early use of the commercial products of cyclotrons. In 1931 – as part of the
race to develop equipment for the electrical acceleration of sub-atomic particles – Ernest
Lawrence, of the University of California, invented the cyclotron. The cyclotron was designed to
generate high-energy ions for studying nuclear reactions, but its ability to produce radioactive
isotopes was soon recognised as an important function. For most of the 1930s Lawrence and his
colleagues were the only source of these isotopes, which soon began being used as radioactive
tracers. As well as being used in chemistry and medicine, these artificially radioactive isotopes –
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of elements like iodine, phosphorus, sodium, and iron – were used to study the distribution of
these elements in animal organs and tissues.137
Marsden saw local applications for the new technology, pioneering the non-medical use of
radioactive isotopes in New Zealand in innovative agricultural experiments. By the late 1930s
the ovine disease known as “bush sickness”, which caused slow wasting and death of affected
animals, had been traced to a deficiency in cobalt rather than iron, to which it had previously
been attributed. In 1938 Marsden designed an experiment to establish the role played by cobalt
in animal metabolism, which involved administering radioactive cobalt (radiocobalt) to a sheep
and then conducting a post-mortem examination of the cobalt contents of different organs of the
body.138 Marsden, following the hands-on experimental tradition of his teacher Ernest
Rutherford, first considered producing radiocobalt in New Zealand – he planned to irradiate
cobalt with neutrons from a radium-beryllium source – but acknowledged that it could be
produced “much better and with more activity by a cyclotron”.139 In January 1939, in response to
a written request, Marsden received a small quantity of radioactive cobalt and radioactive
manganese prepared in Ernest Lawrence’s cyclotron at the University of California in
Berkeley.140 Charles Watson-Munro of the DSIR’s Dominion Laboratory, working with other
DSIR and Department of Agriculture scientists, conducted a series of experiments in which
selected sheep were injected or fed with a solution containing radioactive cobalt and then killed.
Their organs were then examined, to determine the distribution of cobalt, using an ionisation
chamber built by Watson-Munro.141 Initial results suggested that the small amount of cobalt that
was retained in the body (most was expelled in urine and faeces) was concentrated in the liver
but later analysis revealed an error in technique and the results of the experiment were “rendered
useless”.142 The manganese, meanwhile, was injected into an apple tree and its distribution in the
felled tree measured. Following the failure of the bush sickness experiments a further series of
experiments was recommended, using larger quantities of radiocobalt. But when the Second
World War intervened, pure research was put aside to focus on research of direct benefit to the
war effort.143
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In 1933 Ernest Rutherford had reiterated his belief that the power of the atom could not be
harnessed, saying that the “energy produced by the breaking down of the atom is a very poor
kind of thing. Anyone who expects a source of power from the transformation of these atoms is
talking moonshine.”144 But by the dawn of the Second World War, the understanding of the
atom was growing in complexity and true to H. G. Wells’s predictions, so was the possibility of
a future when atomic transmutation would provide the means of providing nuclear power and
destructive weapons.
Conclusion
New Zealanders were quick to take advantage of X-ray and radium technology. X-rays were
useful and relatively easy to use and medical practitioners were soon offering X-ray medical
services to a paying public. While radium was harder to obtain and more complex to use, it was
also considered to be of potentially enormous medical use. Some enterprising New Zealand
doctors were using radium as early as 1901, soon after its discovery and well before radium
therapy was widely accepted. Patients eagerly sought radium therapy once it became available,
and an enthusiastic and generous public helped to fund radium therapy plants in the four main
centres: by 1929 New Zealand had more medical radium per head of population than the United
Kingdom. There were wider pseudo-medical applications of X-rays and radium too, with X-ray
machines a popular “toy” in shoe shops and radon water sought for dubious treatment from a
public that Government Balneologist Arthur Wohlmann’s described as “mad on radium”.145
With regard to safety, New Zealand learned from mistakes and discoveries made internationally,
but also from its own mistakes and discoveries: many of the early doctors working with X-rays
and radium suffered work-related illness, injuries or death. The Department of Health followed
safety measures being recommended in other countries and made recommendations to New
Zealand’s medical profession on safe procedures for working with X-rays and radium. By the
1940s, however, this top-down instruction had reversed and the radiologists were pushing for
national standards and regulations: the Electrical Wiring (X-Ray) Regulations were introduced
in 1944.
While physics was still a fringe science in New Zealand, non-medical scientists, who kept up to
date with international science journals, took advantage of the new science to examine the
radioactivity of New Zealand soil and waters, and measure cosmic radiation. In Europe, Ernest
                                                 
144 New York Herald Tribune, 12 September 1933. News clipping reproduced in Charles Weiner, ‘Physics in the
Great Depression’, Physics Today 23, 10 (1970), p33.
145 Wohlmann to General Manager, Dept of Tourist and Health Resorts, 25 May 1914, TO1, 24/34, ANZ.
79
Rutherford delved deeper into the atom, launching the field of nuclear physics and earning
himself the title of the “father of nuclear physics”. Rutherford, however, was not to see the
application of this science. Lord Rutherford of Nelson, as he had elected to be known when he
was elevated to the peerage in 1931, died in October 1937, just two years before the start of the
Second World War set in train developments that would soon lead to the manufacture and use of
nuclear weapons and energy.146 It was Rutherford’s student, Ernest Marsden, as head of New
Zealand’s DSIR, who would now have the greatest influence on New Zealand and its work in
the new field of nuclear science.
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Chapter 4
Some fool in a laboratory:
The atom bomb and the dawn of the nuclear age
“How proud New Zealand must be that the foundations of the amazing discovery
concerning latent atomic energy were laid by her own great scientist Rutherford.”
Viscount Bledisloe in telegram to New Zealand, 9 August 19451
“When the first atomic bomb exploded,
the world as we have come to know it came, I believe, to an end.”
Karl Popper, Christchurch, August 19452
The Second World War saw the application of nuclear science to a new and deadly form of
weapons and a way of generating electricity. This work hinged on the early twentieth century
discoveries of New Zealander Ernest Rutherford. Because of this Rutherford connection, and the
efforts of the DSIR’s Ernest Marsden, New Zealand’s support for the development of the first
nuclear weapons and nuclear energy was not just theoretical: a team of young New Zealand
scientists worked on the Manhattan Project, the American-led project to develop the first nuclear
weapons, and on the Canadian-based British-led project to develop nuclear energy. While the
New Zealanders’ role in the massive Manhattan Project was minor, the New Zealand team in
Canada played a significant role in the development of the first nuclear reactors in Canada and
subsequently in the United Kingdom.
New Zealand was supporting the British efforts in nuclear science as she did in all aspects of the
war, but also had self-interested motives. After the Second World War Marsden took the lead in
establishing a nuclear sciences team within the DSIR and gained support to use the skills gained
in the northern hemisphere to built a nuclear reactor in New Zealand.
There was no public outcry when the New Zealand scientists’ involvement was revealed after
the war – New Zealand was as proud of the work of her scientists as of her soldiers who had
fought in the war. And although he had died in 1937, the development of the bomb saw Ernest
Rutherford elevated within New Zealand’s sense of its own identity and place in history.
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Physics and the Second World War
New Zealand joined Britain in declaring war on Germany in September 1939, with New
Zealand’s strong links with Britain demonstrated in Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage’s
loyal declaration that “where she goes, we go, where she stands, we stand”.3 Over the next six
years, as the war escalated and expanded, more than 200,000 New Zealanders would serve in the
war in Europe and the Pacific.4  Following the outbreak of the Second World War Ernest
Marsden, secretary of the DSIR, was given the title of Scientific Advisor to the Defence
Department and, later, Director of Scientific Developments, in which role he was charged with
mobilising New Zealand’s scientific manpower.5 Conscription to the armed forces was
introduced in 1940 and, after 1942, remaining workers, including scientists and science students,
could also be directed by Manpower Committees into what were considered essential
industries.6
The DSIR put its efforts into supporting the war effort, particularly through advances in
agriculture and food science, and by finding local sources of scarce goods. Geologists were
directed to find strategic minerals like mica and asbestos, and chemists experimented with new
fuel sources and created insect and shark repellents for soldiers stationed in the Pacific. The
DSIR’s biggest efforts, however, were in physics – Marsden’s field of expertise – with the
establishment of two new physical sciences laboratories that grew to become two of the DSIR’s
largest divisions. Scientists at the Wellington-based Radio Development Laboratory were
involved in a secret programme to develop radar, which was initially the Allies’ top scientific
priority. The Physical Testing Laboratory, which in 1943 was renamed the Dominion Physical
Laboratory, was established to cater to the Armed Services’ demands for physical testing and
calibration of instruments.7
Radium too, played its part in the war effort. In January 1944, a “luminising laboratory” was set
up in a Dominion Physical Laboratory base in Lower Hutt. Four young women were employed
to apply radium-activated luminous paint to illuminise dials and markings on radio
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communication equipment for the New Zealand Armed Forces to use in jungle and tropical
areas. They were only one group of workers using radioactive paint during the war. In 1943, T.
R. Ritchie, the Director-General of Health, had written to Marsden about the use of radioactive
paints at a factory in Auckland and in an Air Force factory, expressing his concern that “workers
do not realise the tremendous danger of the inhalation and ingestion of the powder used”.8
Ritchie and George Roth, head of the Travis Radiophysical Laboratory, agreed that regulations
should be made to cover every person handling unsealed radioactive substances, with a six-
monthly radon-exhalation test and GM counter test.9 Marsden, however, thought that such
regulations would be premature, stating that the cost would be “excessive for the small amount
of work to be done which is only on an experimental scale”.10 It was against this background,
and in the absence of any New Zealand regulations, that the DSIR laboratory was established.
The laboratory was set up, however, with reference to the British Factories (Luminising) (Health
and Safety Precautions) Order 1942 and was required to comply with British standards as
modified by Roth.11 Copies of the United States Bureau of Standards Handbook on Safe
Handling of Radioactive Luminous Compound were also circulated by the Department of
Health.
Despite the well-publicised plight of the American radium-dial painters in the 1920s, safety was
not given the priority it deserved and conditions in the Lower Hutt laboratory were not up to
international standards. The young women employed to apply radium-activated luminous paint
to the dials and knobs of wireless-ammeters worked three to four hours daily on this task. They
worked in a makeshift laboratory set up in three small Army huts.12 The young women sat on
upholstered seats above floors covered in tarred paper. They worked at Vitrolite-covered
benches covered in a hood with an exhaust draught to remove radon gas and stray particles and
applied paint with brushes. They wore gowns, aprons, caps and gloves, washing the gloves at the
end of the day. The radioactive paint was kept stored in a steel safe with 2-inch walls in a
concrete-based windowless hut.13
A Dr J. M. Davidson inspected the luminising laboratories in May 1944 and found conditions
wanting. Davidson condemned the makeshift laboratory as “ill-adapted for this purpose
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[making] it unnecessarily difficult to maintain a high standard of hygiene and safety”.14
Davidson found radioactive contamination on various tins and bottles in cupboards, in crevices
around painting hoods and even in a bottle of sweets which had been surreptitiously introduced
into the painting room. The gloves the women washed at the end of the day and hung up to dry
were found to be “heavily contaminated with luminous paint”.15
The Dominion Physical Laboratory was receptive to the Davidson report and the laboratory was
closed for three weeks while they wet-cleaned the painting room, installed new work stations,
laid linoleum on the floor, replaced upholstered chairs with easily-cleaned steel tube chairs,
installed new ventilation systems and replaced paint brushes with resin-impregnated wooden
meat skewers that were disposed of after each working period.16 From September 1944, 1-litre
breath samples were collected from each staff member of the luminising laboratory and sent
monthly to the radiophysical laboratory in Christchurch. Here Roth and his colleagues had
developed equipment for measuring the radon content of operators’ breath, with the aim being
the early detection of ingested or inhaled radium. (Sporadic tests were also undertaken of four
luminisers working for the RNZAF.)17 In December 1944, results of the radon exhalation tests
revealed that four of the five staff had results between 10 and 80 per cent of the tolerance dose
(the acceptable limit) and one had a result of 130 per cent of tolerance dose, which reduced to
less than 10 per cent of tolerance after a rest and an unspecified treatment.18 Roth stated that the
radon exhalation tests “proved that the protective measures recommended for luminising work in
New Zealand were wholly successful in that all the workers examined at the end of their
employment remained well within the tolerance limit for ingested and inhaled radium”.19
Over a period of 18 months, from January 1944 to June 1945, the Dominion Physical Laboratory
workers used more than 400 g of radium-activated luminous powder to paint some 14,000
milliammeter dials. Over the same period the laboratory also used radium paint to develop
prototype luminous rifle sights, jungle trail markers and tuning controls, which were passed on
to the Ministry of Supply. In a 1945 paper in the New Zealand Journal of Science and
Technology, J. M. C. Tingey, who led the Dominion Physical Laboratory team of dial painters,
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reported that over the course of the work, “[r]outine testing of dial painters showed that the close
contact with this highly radioactive material had not affected any to a measurable degree”.20
Figure 4.1: After the review of the laboratoryʼs safety measures, staff worked in a ventilated painting cabinet, with
hard surfaces that were easy to clean. This photo is probably of J. M. C. Tingey, who led the Dominion Physical
Laboratory team that used radioactive paint to illuminate dials and ammeters for military use. Source: J. M. C.
Tingey, “Luminizing Army Radio Equipment”, New Zealand Journal of Science and Technology 27B (1945), p140.
Safety measures at the luminising laboratory were initially substandard, but it was not public
opinion, media pressure or staff concerns that led to changes, rather it was the actions of health
scientists keeping up to date with best practice internationally, and DSIR officials being willing
to heed this advice and take on the recommendations.
Unleashing the energy of the nucleus
While radium and X-rays had been among the great discoveries in physics at the end of the
nineteenth century, early twentieth century developments in the new physics were now
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culminating in a wartime project to unleash the energy inside the atomic nucleus, thanks in part
to the work of New Zealand’s Ernest Rutherford.
As covered in chapter three, the first explorations into the nucleus had been made by Rutherford
in 1909 when he had devised the experiment that led to his discovery of the nucleus. Then, in
1917, he had “split the atom”: nitrogen atoms he bombarded with alpha particles emitted a
hydrogen nucleus, or proton, and were transformed into oxygen atoms.21 Physicists soon
understood that this transmutation of one element into another was chiefly a nuclear process.
But, by the late 1920s, years of exhaustive research trying to determine the structure and
composition of the nucleus by bombarding it with alpha particles from radium had yielded
limited new information. A more powerful stream of particles was believed to be possible using
electricity. Experiments by Rutherford’s team at the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge – John
Cockcroft and Ernest Walton – had split a lithium atom in half.22
Walton and Cockcroft had conducted their experiments on lithium, the third element in the
periodic table, which contains only three protons and either three or four neutrons in its nucleus.
A greater source of electrical energy would be needed to investigate the nucleus of heavier
elements. The Italian scientist Enrico Fermi soon led the way, after realising that slowing the
neutrons, through collisions with water or another hydrogen-containing substance, improved the
outcomes of the experiments. Fermi was bombarding heavy elements like uranium – the heaviest
naturally-occurring element – with these slow neutrons and somehow creating new elements
heavier than those he had started with (some of the atoms he was working with were absorbing
the neutrons). German chemist Otto Hahn and physicist Lise Meitner were inspired by Fermi’s
work and set out to repeat his experiments. After Meitner fled Nazi Germany for Sweden, Hahn
continued the work with a colleague, Fritz Strassmann, conveying the results to Meitner by post.
In Sweden, with the help of her physicist nephew Otto Frisch, Meitner realised that by
bombarding uranium with slow neutrons, Hahn had fractured atoms of uranium into lighter
elements, such as barium, with more neutrons, and energy, being released in the process.
Meitner calculated the incredible release of energy from the disintegration of uranium, which
she called “fission”, as being in the order of 200 million electron volts from a single atom. In
principle, given a great enough mass, a critical mass, of a heavy material such as uranium, the
neutrons emitted by the fission of one atom would initiate fission in neighbouring atoms, setting
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off a chain reaction and initiating an incredible release of energy. When these results were
published in 1939, a global search for a way to harness this energy began and, with war
imminent, the focus was on using the energy for a bomb.23
Scientists in the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union soon began working
on fission but by the start of the Second World War, in September 1939, Germany was the only
country to have a military office focused on nuclear energy. When, in 1940, it was established
that uranium-235, an isotope comprising only 0.7 per cent of natural uranium, was responsible
for fission, scientists began to focus on separating uranium-235 from natural uranium, which
comprises mostly uranium-238, and on determining the critical mass that would be needed to
sustain a chain reaction.24
Britain set up the MAUD Committee, focused on directing secret research towards producing a
uranium bomb, in 1940. Four of the five original committee members were Cavendish alumni,
who had studied under or worked with Ernest Rutherford: James Chadwick, John Cockcroft,
Philip Moon and the Australian physicist Mark Oliphant. The MAUD Committee’s reports,
presented in June and July 1941, recommended that it was feasible to make an effective uranium
bomb with as little as 25 lb (about 11 kg) of uranium-235, and that it would be possible to create
electricity from nuclear energy, using uranium as the fuel source and heavy water as a moderator
to slow the neutrons.25 Their report stated that a 25 lb uranium bomb would not only have the
equivalent destructive power of 1800 tons of TNT, it would “release large quantities of
radioactive substances, which would make places near to where the bomb exploded dangerous to
human life for a long period”. When the British government accepted the MAUD Committee’s
recommendations to proceed with both a nuclear power project and a nuclear bomb project, a
new directorate with the nonsensical code name “Tube Alloys” was established within the
British DSIR.26 Following the MAUD Committee’s advice to secure control of uranium
supplies, Britain initiated a Commonwealth search for uranium, but felt secure in the knowledge
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that of the world’s two known largest uranium supplies, in Canada and the Belgian Congo, one
was on Commonwealth land.27
The United Kingdom’s nuclear programme was initially more advanced than the American
programme, where scientists were also working on nuclear projects. There was a free exchange
of information and ideas between scientists from the two countries, though this was mostly from
the United Kingdom to the United States.28 Following the American entry into the Second
World War in 1941, however, a coordinated and well-financed United States effort to develop
nuclear bombs was launched, the Manhattan Project. One of the first key sites was at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, where a plant was built to separate uranium-235 from uranium-238 using both
electromagnetic and gaseous diffusion techniques. At Hanford, Washington, nuclear reactors
were built to produce a newly discovered artificial element, plutonium, as an alternative fuel
source for a fission weapon. Plutonium was produced by bombarding uranium (the heaviest
naturally occurring element) with neutrons in an atomic pile and had atomic number 94,
compared to uranium’s atomic number 92.29 At Los Alamos, in New Mexico, scientists were
tasked with putting the raw materials together to design and produce a nuclear bomb. Together,
the Manhattan Project became the world’s biggest ever scientific endeavour; it eventually had a
budget of more than US$2 billion.30
As the American project advanced ahead of the British project, and the United States refused to
share information, Britain sought to join forces with the United States. After the signing of the
Quebec Agreement of August 1943, under which the British and American scientists would
collaborate on their nuclear energy projects, the Tube Alloys Project was subsumed into the
American nuclear programme and groups of British scientists began working on specific aspects
of the Manhattan Project.31 Oliphant went to Berkeley in November 1943, to work with his
friend Ernest Lawrence, the inventor of the cyclotron, on the separation of uranium-235 by
electromagnetic means.32 Two other Australian scientists, Harrie Massey and Eric Burhop, also
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Cavendish graduates, joined the British group at Berkeley, where Massey led a group of
theoretical physicists.33
In April 1944, John Cockcroft flew to Montreal to lead a joint American-British-Canadian
project to produce an experimental pile, or reactor, using uranium rods in a heavy water
moderator to produce an intended output of 10,000 kW. A rural site near the village of Chalk
River, on the south bank of the Ottawa River, was eventually chosen for the laboratory.34
New Zealand scientists on the Manhattan and Montreal Projects
It seems surprising that of all the Commonwealth countries, New Zealand would have played a
significant role in the British nuclear programme, but it makes sense when it is recognised as
being due to the efforts of one man, Ernest Marsden, and the result of New Zealand’s Rutherford
connection to nuclear science. In his role as head of the DSIR, Marsden made several wartime
trips to the United Kingdom, mostly to advance the secret programme to develop radar in New
Zealand.  Here he learnt of the nuclear programme through his many contacts in the British
physics community.35
In December 1943 Marsden was travelling through the United States on his way to the United
Kingdom where, in Washington DC, he chanced upon James Chadwick, by now scientific
director of the British nuclear research project, as well as Australian physicist Mark Oliphant
and Danish physicist Niels Bohr, who had been smuggled out of Denmark and was travelling
under an assumed name. Following the August 1943 signing of the Quebec Agreement,
Chadwick and Oliphant were in Washington with the top secret task of arranging details of
scientific cooperation between the United Kingdom and United States’ nuclear research
programmes. Oliphant later recalled they were in their hotel lobby waiting for the elevator when
they felt taps on their shoulders and turned to find Marsden in full military uniform. They were
taken aback to hear Marsden say, “I can guess why two nuclear physicists are here!” During the
elevator journey Marsden put in a good word for New Zealand’s participation in the bomb
project. He followed this up in London with Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer
and the British Minister in charge of atomic energy matters. Many of the Commonwealth
scientists working on the British nuclear research programme were, like Marsden, past students
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or colleagues of Rutherford, and Marsden was able to trade successfully on his reputation of
being involved in the birth of nuclear physics, which, as Harrie Massey later said, had earned
Marsden “a place among the immortals”.36
Following the necessary protocol, the British Government asked New Zealand Prime Minister
Peter Fraser for five New Zealand men to join the British nuclear research team.37 Robin
Williams, a young physicist with the DSIR’s Radio Development Laboratory, recalled reporting
to Wellington in July 1944 to find Marsden “cock-a-hoop about the fact that he had managed to
get a number of New Zealanders in on the atom bomb project.”38 Williams was joined by Bill
Young, from the DSIR’s Defence Development Section and George Page and Charles Watson-
Munro, also from the Radio Development Laboratory. Their terms of employment seconded
them to the United Kingdom DSIR for “a period of one year or for the duration of the war,
whichever is the longer”. Marsden was very keen for New Zealand to launch an atomic research
programme when the war finished and following the secondment the men were required to
return to New Zealand for at least one year.39
Most of the British scientists working on the electromagnetic separation of uranium had now
transferred to the University of California at Berkeley. When Williams and Page joined this
team in July 1944, they took the number of British men on this part of the project to 35, though
Gowing points out that “the influence of the British was far higher than their numbers would
suggest”.40 As well as Williams and Page, there were two other New Zealand-born scientists on
the team who had arrived from the United Kingdom with the British group.41 One of them was
Maurice Wilkins who later, disturbed by the outcome of their project, abandoned physics for
biophysics and went on to share the 1962 Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for his work
on the structure of the DNA molecule.42
The electromagnetic separation process the British scientists at Berkeley were working on
involved first accelerating ionised uranium using an electric field, then passing the beam of
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accelerated ions through a magnetic field which deflected the uranium-235 ions slightly more
than it deflected the uranium-238 ions (because of their lower mass), and allowed for separate
collection of the two isotopes. The different masses of the uranium-235 and uranium-238
isotopes would lead them to different receivers for collection. The challenge was to design and
build the most efficient plant possible, and theoretical and experimental physicists were needed
to help solve problems arising from the design challenge and the operation of the plant. Williams
mostly worked under Massey, with a group of theoretical physicists who contributed to the
project by improving the team’s understanding of the fundamental processes involved in the
uranium separation. Page, along with the engineers on the project, made significant
contributions to improving and simplifying the design of the electromagnetic separation plant.43
Both Williams and Page, though based at the University of California in Berkeley, made several
trips to the base at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, which Williams described as being like a “workers’
camp and a prison camp combined with lots of fences … lots of mud and prefabricated
houses”.44
Links between the nuclear project and Rutherford continued. In Canada, a team of mostly
English and Canadian scientists, led by another Rutherford old-boy, John Cockcroft, had begun
a project to develop a heavy-water nuclear reactor. In assembling his team, Cockcroft was
seeking “engineers with a decent physics background and physicists with a flair for
engineering”. Watson-Munro and Young travelled to Montreal from New Zealand and another
New Zealander, Ken George, reported directly to Montreal from his post as the DSIR’s scientific
liaison officer in Washington, where, in recognition of the growing importance of the
relationship with the United States, New Zealand had opened a legation only two years before.
As part of the Canadian team, which comprised 40 Canadians, 40 British, and a small group of
men from France and other nations, the New Zealanders began work on building a low-energy
atomic pile, using natural uranium fuel and heavy water as a moderator.45 The leaders of the
British nuclear programme were very pleased with the New Zealand scientists, and Oliphant told
New Zealand’s scientific liaison officer in London that New Zealand was being compared
favourably with Australia for offering “five good men without questioning the soundness of the
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purpose and the good faith of the British government”.46 It wasn’t really a matter of New
Zealand’s unquestioning support, however. Marsden strongly believed that it would be to New
Zealand’s ultimate advantage to have men gaining scientific experience on the world’s most
ambitious scientific project.
After connecting the New Zealand physicists with the nuclear project, what was Marsden’s role?
He could have left the New Zealand scientists to their work and focused on his many other
duties as head of the DSIR, but a reading of his letters of this time suggests he was preoccupied
with the work in North America. As a scientist turned administrator, Marsden was tremendously
excited about these new applications of nuclear physics and felt stymied and frustrated in his
administrative and managerial role so far from the action. He wrote regularly to the American-
based scientists, asking, sometimes inappropriately, for details of their research.47 In January
1945, after the New Zealand team had been in North America only a few months, Cockcroft
wrote to Marsden requesting three more scientists from New Zealand. Marsden, in turn, wrote to
the Minister of Scientific and Industrial Research seeking permission to send three more men to
North America.48 He also recommended that “in view of the overwhelming importance of the
work to the future of New Zealand ...  it is in my opinion most necessary that we should have a
team of men on this work and one way to do this would be for Cabinet to give authority for such
a section or team and appoint the men to it to return for duty in New Zealand as soon as
hostilities cease”. Marsden was either prescient in his thinking – or well informed – when he
added “I presume the full story of the operations of the T. A. project will ‘break’ within say six
months, and if we are able to announce that the Government has taken appropriate action in the
matter, i.e. such as the above, it will be a source of justifiable satisfaction to the country.”49 It
was a little less than eight months later that the operations of the “Tube Alloys” project “broke”,
and the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.
Marsden gained permission to send the additional New Zealand scientists, and in March 1945,
Arnold Allan and Gordon Fergusson, both assistant physicists with the Radio Development
Laboratory, left New Zealand to join Watson-Munro’s team in Montreal.50 In response to
Cockcroft’s request for a third man, Marsden first recommended Ian Walker “an excellent New
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Zealand electronics man in UK”, but, as an alternative, asked “can you find room for me at a
senior scientific officer grade – in any direction of work, for any period of time”.51 At receiving
no response to this offer, Marsden repeated it to Watson-Munro writing “I would be quite glad
to get back to pure research for the rest of my life”.52 Cockcroft, perhaps alarmed by Marsden’s
inappropriate offer, informed Marsden in May 1945 that a third man was not required – for
now.53
As he was unable to be involved in the North American research programme, Marsden directed
his enthusiasm to plans for a nuclear research team in New Zealand after the war and a search
for uranium in the South Island. In a letter to Ken George in April 1945 Marsden wrote “we
shall have a self-contained team on TA in New Zealand in due course” and “we are having quite
a lot of fun chasing radioactive minerals (don’t repeat this!). They are fairly widespread in small
concentrations and the problem is in care and methods of concentration.”54 In July 1945 he
gained Cabinet approval to place all the men working on the nuclear project in America,
together with some remaining in New Zealand, in a special team, and on the permanent staff of
the DSIR.55
Wartime uranium survey
Marsden’s characteristic positivity, which his colleagues later described as “infectious
enthusiasm” and “irrepressible optimism”, had overstated the results of the uranium survey.56
When the United Kingdom had initiated a Commonwealth search for uranium in 1942, they had
excluded New Zealand, whose geology was not considered promising.57 Marsden, however,
thought he knew better and in December 1943, while on his fruitful trip through the United
States, had taken matters into his own hands, writing to the director of New Zealand’s
Geological Survey to ask him to initiate a search for radioactive minerals in the South Island.58
At about the same time, Marsden initiated publication of a radioactivity survey he and Watson-
Munro had made in the 1930s.59
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Back in New Zealand, Marsden consolidated the plans for a uranium survey. In July 1944,
Marsden wrote to D. G. Sullivan, the Minister in charge of Scientific and Industrial Research, to
say that although the likelihood of finding commercial quantities of uranium in New Zealand
was small, “in view of the coming importance of the subject and likely demand, I recommend
that authority be given for a thorough survey ...”. The New Zealand War Cabinet approved
funding for the uranium survey in July 1944 and a team of DSIR physicists assembled at the
Dominion Physical Laboratory in Wellington to start work on the uranium project.60 After
reading relevant books and journals the team decided the best way to detect uranium was to use
a Geiger counter, a radiation-measuring device developed by Rutherford’s assistant Hans
Geiger, so they set about trying to make them, and reducing them to a reasonably portable size.
61  In October 1944, a mining engineer and a physicist, carrying a Geiger counter to measure
radioactivity, began secretly exploring beach sands along the West Coast of the South Island,
from Karamea to the Moeraki River. Surveys of Stewart Island beach and river sands, and of
beach sands and dredge tailings at Gillespies Beach, followed.62 In late 1944, Marsden made
requests to Ian Coop, the DSIR’s scientific liaison officer in London, for instruments and
materials for the uranium search. Coop was able to procure some items – lead, tungsten wire and
sieves – and send them to Marsden in New Zealand, but, because of the war, many of the
requested items were in short supply. In his reply, Coop advised that the British Directorate of
Tube Alloys were surprised to find out about the New Zealand uranium survey and were
concerned to emphasise that Marsden must treat the project as secret.63
Later that year, Marsden learned of a visit to New Zealand by a Mr G. H. Hall, a representative
of the American chemical company Union Carbide who was working in close contact with
the United States Government. Marsden learned that Hall was in New Zealand “to assess
the probable sources of radioactive minerals such as uranium and thorium”. Hall was not
secretive about his work: when Marsden eventually met with Hall, he advised Marsden on
suitable tools for deep drilling in sands, which was where the highest concentrations of uranium
were being found.64 Hall reported favourably on the possibility of the cheap production of
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uranium oxide and thorium oxide from New Zealand and inspired Marsden to resume the South
Island search for radioactive minerals.65
Figure 4.2: Jim McCahon on the South Island uranium survey in the 1940s. Courtesy Jim McCahon.
In autumn 1945 a team set up camp at Gillespie’s Beach (downstream from Fox Glacier on the
West Coast) whose black sands had shown significant levels of radioactivity. Jim McCahon, a
young physicist seconded to the DSIR, later recalled the work:
[It was] very hot, so we worked most of the time nearly naked and, of
course, any time a little cloud came over the sun we were free feed for
the sandflies. When we had been there for about ten days, Dr Ernie
Marsden of the DSIR called in to see how we were getting on. This whole
project was a favourite of his. We told him of the sandfly troubles. He
went away to his car and came back with a bottle labelled dimethyl
phthalate – the stuff that is nowadays called “dimp”. He had bludged
this from the airforce up in the islands and he gave it to us for
protection. It was an absolute godsend.66
In March 1945, the DSIR chartered the Government ship New Golden Hind, and the secret
uranium survey was extended. The ship sailed down the South Island’s east coast and around
Bluff to investigate the eight sounds from Milford Sound to Nancy Sound. Once in the fiords,
the scientists explored the coasts in outboard motor boats, testing the radioactivity of coastal
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rocks with their Geiger counters, but they failed to find any promising sources of radioactive
minerals.67
The “atomic age” begins
By the end of May 1945, scientists and technicians at Los Alamos had received enough
plutonium from the plant at Hanford to begin assembling a plutonium-based bomb. In a matter
of weeks they had the makings of the world’s first nuclear weapon. On 16 July, the bomb,
codenamed Trinity, in which two masses of plutonium were driven together by an explosive to
create a mass greater than critical mass, was tested in a remote corner of the Alamogordo Air
Base in the New Mexico desert. The explosion, witnessed by busloads of Los Alamos scientists
and other observers, yielded energy close to that of 20,000 tons of TNT, vapourising the steel
tower holding the bomb, fusing the desert sand below it into a crater of radioactive green glass,
and sending a mushroom cloud 12 kilometres into the desert sky.68
The success of the test paved the way for the planned use of nuclear weapons against Japan, just
as metallurgists at Los Alamos were assembling the final components in Little Boy, a uranium-
based bomb and Fat Man, a second plutonium bomb. On 6 August an American B-29 bomber
took off from the American base at Tinian, in the Northern Marianas Islands, and dropped a
3-metre-long bomb containing 60 kg of uranium-235 on the city of Hiroshima. The bomb
exploded about 600 metres above the ground, with an energy yield equivalent to 12,500 tons of
TNT, producing a rapidly expanding fireball that incinerated everything and everyone within a
radius of about 1.6 km, and spread fires across a further 11 square kilometres. The press release
issued by the White House later that day described the bomb as “the greatest achievement of
organised science in history”. Three days later, an even more powerful plutonium-based fission
bomb was exploded over Nagasaki. Burn injuries and radiation affected many of the initial
survivors and by the end of 1945 an estimated 140,000 people had died from the Hiroshima
bomb and 70,000 from the Nagasaki bomb.69
Few New Zealanders would have connected the work of New Zealand scientists and the
dropping of the first nuclear bombs, but the day of the Nagasaki bombing, Viscount Bledisloe,
New Zealand’s Governor-General from 1930 to 1935, wrote from London to the Minister of
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External Affairs to congratulate New Zealand, saying “How proud New Zealand must be that
the foundations of the amazing discovery concerning latent atomic energy were laid by her own
great scientist Rutherford – we tender her our warmest congratulations”.70 An official New
Zealand press release, issued on 13 August 1945, linked the atomic bombs to Rutherford’s early
work, provided information about Marsden’s uranium survey, and outlined the role of the New
Zealand scientists working in North America, saying “New Zealand should be proud to know
that some of her scientists of this generation were at the forefront of this latest development”.71
Japan agreed to surrender the day after Nagasaki was bombed.72 The general reaction in New
Zealand, and in other Allied countries, was one of jubilation and relief. The war that had taken
more than 11,000 New Zealand lives and impacted on every aspect of society was finally over.
While it was marvelled at that a single bomb dropped from a great height could cause such
devastation, there was initially no widespread awareness of how fundamentally different these
bombs were: the conventional bombings of cities like Tokyo, Hamburg and Dresden had
produced more casualties than in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, and the longer-term effects of
radiation from the bombs were not yet known. Even those who saw the horrific aspect of the
new type of bomb were able to put a positive spin on it: The Listener editorial of 17 August
described the use of the atomic bomb as having “sickened many people and given others a faint
gleam of hope”, but took the stance that it was “justifiable to hope as well as to shudder”: there
was hope that the atomic bomb could mean the end of war.  There were a few letters to the
editor about the bomb – mostly expressing the hope that it could mean an end to war forever
– but most New Zealanders were focused on relatives still overseas and on the practical
necessities of coping with wartime shortages like how to re-waterproof an old raincoat, or how
to make a fowl-house from old sacks and a wooden frame.73 Some people, however, did realise
the enormity of this new scientific and military development. A few days after the bombings,
philosophy lecturer Karl Popper addressed a packed lecture hall at the University of Canterbury
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with the words “when the first atomic bomb exploded, the world as we have come to know it
came, I believe, to an end”.74
Robin Williams was holidaying in California with his wife when they saw the news headline
announcing the Hiroshima bombing, and he realised it was the result of the project he had been
working on. Williams remembers no discussion of moral issues among the British scientists in
his team, and soon after he returned to Berkeley the assembled team began to disperse.75
Williams was the first of the New Zealand team to leave North America, travelling to
Cambridge to take a PhD in mathematics.76 Page, who had earlier described his secondment to
the United States as “a chance of a lifetime”, transferred to Montreal to work with Watson-
Munro’s team.77
Jim McCahon, who had been employed on Marsden’s South Island uranium search, was in the
laboratory in Wellington, analysing samples taken in the search, when he heard a radio bulletin
announcing the Hiroshima bombing. He later described himself and his colleagues as having
been astounded. When the uranium survey was first announced, they had found the German
paper detailing the initial discovery of uranium fission in which “they had surmised that this
could be used as a source of enormous amounts of energy but … not as an explosion. So we
were thinking of nuclear power supplies … but not bombs.”78
A Labour Government, under Prime Minister Peter Fraser, was in power in New Zealand when
Japan was bombed. There was no big discussion about the atomic bomb in Parliament, but
various politicians referred to it, amid debate about other issues, in a mostly positive light.
Robert Macfarlane, Labour MP for Christchurch South, had a positive view, accusing people
who wrote letters to the newspaper expressing indignation about the use of the bomb of being
pacifists, and saying that apart from its use as a destructive weapon, the atomic bomb “might
have opened a new era of development for the people of the world and so some good may arise
from its invention”. Major Clarence Skinner, a Minister in the Labour Government, spoke
proudly of the work of the British and American scientists, who didn’t take long “to show the
Japanese scientists who could do the best”. He continued by saying, “A couple of doses of
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atomic bomb worked the oracle, and now we see the Japanese taking orders from mere mortal
men. I join with other members in offering my gratitude for what has happened during the last
few weeks – the ending of the war.” Another Labour MP, Edward Cullen, had a less positive
view and expressed his opinion that the atomic bomb was “a frightful instrument against
humanity”.79
Parliament did, however, take action to control any uranium resources New Zealand might have.
Under Marsden’s recommendation, and following the advice of the British DSIR, New
Zealand’s Atomic Energy Act was passed on 7 December 1945 to give the State full ownership
and control over uranium and other radioactive elements, with the Minister of Mines having
power to control the mining and disposal of uranium-bearing rock and its products.80 The
military and economic importance of uranium was now recognised around the world, and
Canada, South Africa, India, Australia and the United States all introduced similar legislation at
about this time.81
Scientists were quick to realise the dangers of this new weapon. In September 1945 Williams
and Page were among 13 British Berkeley scientists, including Wilkins, Oliphant and Massey,
who, acting on their belief that “the advent of this new weapon of destruction ought to be the
signal for renewed efforts to achieve lasting world peace” signed a letter to British Prime
Minister Clement Attlee calling for international control of the use of atomic energy and urging
cooperation with Russian and other scientists.82 This desire for international cooperation with
regard to nuclear weapons was widespread among scientists. The same month, Marsden advised
the Minister of Scientific and Industrial Research of resolutions passed at a meeting of the New
Zealand Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (an advisory council established at the
same time as the DSIR) calling for the development and control of atomic energy to come under
the aegis of the United Nations, with the results of research available to all people. “Any attempt
at secrecy in this epoch-making field of research is fraught with the gravest possible danger to
our civilisation”, Marsden added.83 The New Zealand scientists’ attitudes were in line with a
worldwide movement that included many of the scientists who had worked on the North
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American nuclear projects. As the New Zealand World War II narrative on atomic energy
colourfully put it in 1948, these international groupings of scientists were driven by “fear of the
immediate physical consequences of an armaments race in the atomic age, fear of the destruction
of civilisation and of the best fruits of the human spirit, fear that science might be shackled by
security and other regulations and enfeebled by its prostitution to nationalistic military ends”.84
Less than six months after the dropping of the first atomic bombs, in January 1946, New
Zealand was one of 51 nations represented at the first General Assembly of the United Nations.
The first resolution adopted concerned the establishment of an Atomic Energy Commission,
comprising the members of the Security Council, plus Canada, to deal with issues related to the
peaceful uses of atomic energy and the elimination of atomic and other weapons of mass
destruction.85 In the general debate in the plenary meeting, the New Zealand representative
suggested that control of the Commission should not be left exclusively to the Security Council,
as had been suggested, but should rather be the responsibility of the entire General Assembly –
this way small countries like New Zealand could continue to be able to have a say on such issues
– but this was not heeded.86 Later that year, the United States presented a proposal known as the
Baruch Plan, which called for international inspection of all nuclear-related facilities to ensure
they were not working on atomic weapons and stipulated that the United States stop all weapons
work and turn over its atomic energy knowledge, and existing weapons, to the United Nations.87
While the DSIR scientists’ work on the nuclear bomb finished once the bomb had been used,
another group of New Zealanders became involved in the bombs’ aftermath, with New Zealand
army engineers involved in the demolition of bomb-damaged buildings and bunkers in
Hiroshima. They, along with other personnel from Jayforce – the New Zealand army brigade
stationed in Japan from 1946 to 1948 as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force –
witnessed the devastation and after-effects of the bomb. Some Jayforce personnel later recalled
being told to remain inside their trucks or trains when passing close to the zone where the atomic
bomb was detonated in Hiroshima, but most people recalled no warnings about the dangers from
radiation poisoning. Even people not stationed in Hiroshima would take sightseeing trips to the
devastated city, where they would “hunt for souvenirs such as fused glass”, or offer goods for
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sale on the local black market. One officer later recalled eating oysters from a Hiroshima pearl
farm.88
Back in New Zealand, once the excitement of the end of the war was over, there was a growing
awareness that a new age, the “atomic age”, had begun. In New Zealand, as in the rest of the
Western world, the atomic age was seen as a modern and sophisticated new era. In 1946, among
The Listener advertisements for pointy bras, laxatives and cork-tipped cigarettes appeared
Monterey’s advertisements for Atomic Red lipstick. Australian historian Marilyn Lake in 1990
described post-war women as being “invited to step into an alluring, exciting future”, enticed in
part by a linked rise in advertising and consumerism in which advertisements aimed at women
“incited sexual desire and promised its gratification”.89 It seems in appalling bad taste now to
link sexuality with weapons that had killed thousands of people, but the Atomic Red lipstick ads
promised women they’d be “charged with excitement … devastating … all conquering”, saying
women who wore the lipstick were chic and daring.
    
Figure 4.3: Among the advertisements for pointy bras, laxatives and cork-tipped cigarettes appeared Montereyʼs
advertisements for Atomic Red  lipstick. New Zealand Listener, 15 February 1946 and 8 March 1946.
New Zealand scientistsʼ work on nuclear reactors
The New Zealand scientists working on the Manhattan Project had fulfilled their role and moved
on, but what of the scientists in Canada? In August 1945, Norman Manssen, one of the men
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Marsden had recommended earlier, became available and travelled to Montreal to work with the
New Zealand team at Chalk River. In seeking permission to send Manssen, Marsden expressed
his view that the experience he and the other scientists would gain on the project “would pay
handsome dividends to New Zealand upon their return. It will enable us to proceed upon
developments of this new source of energy to our own ultimate economy.”90 Marsden still had
plans for a nuclear programme in New Zealand.
As the Montreal project had developed, scientists had made a case for producing a “zero energy
pile” – a pile that produces a chain reaction but almost no extra heat or energy. Such a pile
would be simple to produce, flexible in its applications, and would have great research value
producing neutrons and radiations for use in a range of experiments. It would also provide
information that could be applied for the planned larger pilot plant to produce energy. The plan
was approved for a zero energy experimental pile, or ZEEP, in which rods of aluminium-
sheathed uranium would be placed in a tank of heavy water surrounded by a graphite reflector.
Watson-Munro, who was leading the small New Zealand team at Chalk River, was one of six
scientists and engineers assigned to the detailed engineering of ZEEP.91 By September 1945,
ZEEP, the first nuclear reactor built outside the United States, was complete and Watson-Munro,
with the help of Allan and Fergusson, had played a major role in its construction, particularly by
designing the electronic control equipment for the reactor.92
New Zealanders’ involvement in the development of nuclear energy continued. After the war,
the British Government turned their focus to a United Kingdom-based atomic energy research
project, and in 1946 Watson-Munro and three of the other New Zealanders – Fergusson, Page
and Walker – left Canada for the newly established United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research
Establishment in Harwell. The remaining New Zealanders – George, Young, Allan and Manssen
– initially remained in Canada to continue work on the pilot pile, which became known as the
NRX (National Research eXperimental) reactor. While Young was put in charge of the Montreal
workshops, George worked on designing nuclear instrumental equipment, and Manssen
supervised the installation and commissioning of the electronic and electrical equipment for the
NRX reactor, which went critical in July 1947 and for many years was considered one of the
best research reactors in the world. In the United Kingdom, Watson-Munro took charge of the
construction of a Graphite Low Energy Experiment Pile, or GLEEP, the first nuclear reactor in
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the United Kingdom, which was completed in August 1947 and was intended for use for
experimental purposes as well as the production of radioactive isotopes. Page, also working at
Harwell, designed the United Kingdom’s first mass spectrograph.93 Allan and Manssen
transferred to Harwell after completing their work at Chalk River.94
An atomic pile for New Zealand?
After the war, Marsden started to enact his vision for a nuclear New Zealand. If he couldn’t be
part of the big science taking place in Europe and America he would make it happen at home. In
January 1946 Marsden gained Cabinet approval to establish a new team of 10 scientists at the
Dominion Physical Laboratory. Their mission was to carry out fundamental and applied atomic
research and advise on atomic energy and the application of isotope techniques to problems in
agriculture, health and industry. The same Cabinet decision allowed for the secondment of
physicists, chemists or engineers to nuclear organisations in the United Kingdom and Canada to
ensure New Zealand kept up to date with new developments and techniques. Under the
secondment arrangement, New Zealand would pay the officers’ salaries, and in return would
receive supplies of artificially radioactive elements, technical information and cooperation and
liaison work in connection with the laboratory in New Zealand. An annual budget of £19,000
was allocated to implement these proposals.95
Even before this approval was granted, Marsden had organised a second New Golden Hind
expedition – this one not secret – to complete the initial survey. Dick Willet, of the New Zealand
Geological Survey, led the January 1946 expedition that searched the rocks, beaches and gravels
in the southern sounds from Preservation Inlet up to Thompson Sound. He took with him
geologist Harold Wellman, and three geophysicists, Jim McCahon, Kemp Fowler and Graham
Fraser, to operate the Geiger counters and measure the radioactivity of the rocks and dredgings.
The bearded scientists and Rarotongan crew supplemented their diet of bully beef, potatoes and
pumpkin with fresh fish, crayfish and swan: “Shooting at [swans] from a lurching dinghy is
useless; the method is to run down a young one unable to fly and brain it with an oar” reported
Fowler. 96
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Figure 4.4: The New Golden Hind  sets off from Wellington on its second uranium survey in January 1946. Those
standing on the left are Minister of Works Bob Semple, and Minister in charge of the DSIR Daniel Sullivan. Seated in
the front are physicist Jim McCahon, geologist Dick Willett, and Harry Allan, Director of the DSIRʼs Botany Division.
In the back are a shipʼs officer, A. S. C. Wright, Captain Cole, the radio operator, physicist Kemp Fowler, the
Ministerʼs secretary, geologist Harold Wellman, Director of the Geological Survey Mont Ongley, and physicist
Graham Fraser. Source: Simon Nathan.
Over the course of the two-year uranium survey, the geologists tested the radioactivity of rocks
and beaches along nearly 1,600 kilometres of coast; the sands and gravels from more than 100
streams and rivers; and the concentrates from more than 20 sluicing and gold-dredging claims in
Nelson, Westland, Otago and Southland.97 As the only result of the survey, uranium-bearing
minerals were found in gold dredge tailings on the West Coast, but their quantity and
concentration was deemed too small to permit their economic recovery.98
Without a domestic source of uranium, was there still hope for a nuclear reactor for New
Zealand? New Zealand might not have had any promising uranium deposits, but it did have a
skilled group of scientists, and, as Marsden had pointed out in a September 1945 letter to
Edward Appleton, the director of the British Tube Alloys project, “they cannot unlearn the
things they picked up from their work with you and cannot well be prevented from using the
knowledge …”. Marsden had also offered for New Zealand scientists to continue to be seconded
to British nuclear projects, in return for “reasonable information received and the possible
supply in the next year or two of labelled atoms for experimental work in medical, agricultural
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and chemical fields”.99 As Marsden had said, the New Zealand scientists could not “unlearn”
what they now knew about nuclear energy: following his work on GLEEP and ZEEP Watson-
Munro was now one of the world’s experts on construction of nuclear piles, and despite the
British-American agreement not to share nuclear technology with other countries it was going to
be impossible to keep this technology from New Zealand.100 Aware of this, Cockcroft wrote to
Marsden in May 1947. After voicing appreciation of the New Zealanders who had come to the
United Kingdom to work on GLEEP, Cockcroft expressed his hope that New Zealand would
“build a Gleep, or perhaps something a little more powerful, in your area of the world. Munro
would be well able to do this for you, and I should think it would be possible to arrange for the
basic materials to be provided”.101 Cockcroft at this time, as part of a policy of an Empire-wide
approach to defence science, was also open to the idea of a Commonwealth nuclear reactor to
produce plutonium for British bombs.102
Before returning to New Zealand, Watson-Munro, in consultation with Marsden, submitted a
report to the New Zealand Government on the construction of a low energy atomic pile in New
Zealand. The pile was recommended on two grounds: for the production of radioisotopes for
industrial and agricultural research; and to serve as the nucleus of an atomic research project.103
Marsden also believed the pile would provide a “long term contribution to Commonwealth
defence”.104 In August 1947, based on Marsden and Watson-Munro’s report, New Zealand’s
newly-established Atomic Energy Research Committee recommended the construction of an
Australasian low energy pile in New Zealand.105 The pile was proposed to be used “for the
provision of certain radio isotopes whose life was short and which are needed for medical and
research purposes, and to afford, as a general strategic reserve, skill and experience to New
Zealand scientists in atomic energy development”.106 In Australia, the Council for Scientific and
Industrial Research had already begun its own research into nuclear energy and the Bureau of
Mineral Resources was searching for uranium. While Australia was more immediately
enthusiastic than New Zealand about embracing nuclear technology – it asked the United
Kingdom directly for information on using atomic energy – it did not have the group of
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scientists experienced in working on nuclear energy that New Zealand now had. Mark Oliphant
and a small group of Australians had worked at Berkeley on the electromagnetic separation of
uranium for the Manhattan Project but only one Australian engineer had worked on the
Canadian nuclear energy project. After helping to set up the British Atomic Energy Research
Establishment at Harwell, Oliphant returned to Australia to head a school of nuclear physics at
the new Australia National University in Canberra.107
The American post-war secrecy led the Commonwealth countries – including New Zealand,
Australia and the United Kingdom – to side together, often conducting research on projects
without American knowledge. In a way, this encouraged the sense that there was a choice to be
made between the United Kingdom and the United States, and New Zealand scientific loyalty
was clearly with the United Kingdom. In September 1947 Marsden left his position as secretary
of the DSIR to become the DSIR’s Scientific Advisor in London. It seems an unlikely move for
someone of Marsden’s seniority to move from a role as head of department to a liaison role, but
his letters over this time reveal some motives. It seems that Marsden, to some extent, felt
unappreciated by those above him in the Public Service Commission. He also strongly supported
Commonwealth cooperation with regard to defence science, and felt he could play a stronger
role in cementing cooperation between New Zealand and the United Kingdom if he was in
London. In his personal letters, he mentioned several British requests for a more senior officer to
be sent from New Zealand as scientific representative. On top of this was Marsden’s already
demonstrated desire to be involved in the big science that was happening in the United
Kingdom, and with New Zealand having an ambivalent attitude to proceeding with plans for a
nuclear reactor, Marsden perhaps felt he could push things along further from the United
Kingdom.108 When Marsden arrived in London, he and Watson-Munro met Lord Portal, head of
the Atomic Energy (Review of Production) Committee, to talk about the Commonwealth atomic
pile. They discussed the advantages of a small atomic pile in New Zealand for research
purposes, to be followed up by a large power production pile in Australia, “capable of producing
fissile materials suitable for the manufacture of atomic bombs”. At this time, the Atomic Energy
Production Organisation was erecting three large atomic piles in the north of England, all
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capable of producing fissile material for military purposes. It was suggested that it might be
strategic to locate one of these in Australia.109
Marsden’s enthusiasm for New Zealand’s assistance to British nuclear defence plans can be seen
as incongruous when measured against his prior support for the 1946 Baruch Plan, which called
for international inspection of all nuclear-related facilities to ensure they were not working on
atomic weapons and stipulated that the United States dispose of its atomic weapons, stop all
weapons work and turn over its atomic energy knowledge to the United Nations. In a 1947
speech, Marsden, who advocated atomic energy as being of “untold benefit to the world” said
that it was not, however, safe to develop atomic energy on a world-wide scale until there was a
practical and enforceable agreement that it would not be used for atomic bombs.110 No such
agreement was put in place and his stated views on atomic weapons seem to conflict with his
concurrent plans for development of a nuclear reactor in New Zealand, which he promoted as
being of defence significance to the Commonwealth. A reading of his letters, however, suggests
that his was a pragmatic approach. At the start of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union were proceeding with development of nuclear weapons, and Marsden believed that a third
nuclear power, the United Kingdom (with the support of the Commonwealth), would make for a
more balanced and stable world, with “more safety in three strong world groups than two”.111
On receiving sympathetic responses to the proposal for a New Zealand atomic pile from both
Lord Portal and John Cockcroft, who was now director of the Atomic Energy Research
Establishment at Harwell, Marsden was tremendously excited. He admitted he had initially
thought the reactor proposal was an “ambitious dream”, but was now convinced it would be “a
statesmanlike step to take at higher levels with enormous repercussions for the good of our
country”. Marsden, writing from London, believed the reason New Zealand was getting more
support than Australia was “partly sentimental, because of its origination by Rutherford, partly
practical because of the record of our boys here”.112
In response to a ministerial request, Marsden and Watson-Munro provided an advisory report,
which was agreed to by John Cockcroft, on the construction and use of an atomic pile in New
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Zealand. The November 1947 report recommended a graphite uranium pile costing £100,000 to
construct and up to £35,000 a year to run. The project would use the skills of the New Zealand
scientists who had worked on the North American nuclear programmes and would take one-to-
two years to build. They made it clear that the proposed pile “would not produce an atomic
bomb but “would contribute substantially in the future to the security of the Commonwealth”.113
The Minister of Scientific and Industrial Research, however, was critical of the report,
questioning the need for a New Zealand pile on the basis that radioisotopes were available only
from overseas and New Zealand scientists would be best trained in more sophisticated offshore
facilities.114 Marsden and Watson-Munro were not deterred, however, and in March 1948,
Watson-Munro expanded on this report, with a paper on “Amplification of Reasons for an
Atomic Pile in New Zealand”, again outlining the issue of many isotopes being too short-lived to
import from overseas, and emphasising the benefits of a pile as a practice run for a future atomic
energy project. 115 At this time, New Zealand was having great difficulty securing radioisotopes
from overseas because of the very short half-life of some of them, and the large amount of
shielding required for some overseas shipments (a 1 lb shipment of radioactive cobalt was
brought to New Zealand on a Navy frigate, and was reported as requiring three-quarters of a ton
of concrete shielding).116 The defence applications were also raised, partly from having a centre
of nuclear physics away from the northern hemisphere, but also in giving New Zealand scientists
expertise to help deal with “an atomic dust attack on a major New Zealand city or water
supply”.117 But this time, Henry Tizard, scientific advisor to the British Ministry of Defence,
gave the proposal a lukewarm reception, telling Marsden the defence arguments in favour of the
pile were weak.118
Peter Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister, then sought the opinion of the British Prime
Minister on the value of the project.119 Clement Atlee replied favourably, saying the project
would be of “advantage to the Commonwealth” and offering the assistance of the United
Kingdom Government.120 Fraser travelled to the United Kingdom in December 1948, and
visited the low energy atomic pile at Harwell. Marsden briefed Fraser on his visit to Harwell,
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where he would see the GLEEP in action, and meet the five New Zealanders now working there,
one of whom was George Page.121 Marsden also briefed Fraser on the benefits of a low-energy
atomic pile, pointing out that while South Africa and Australia could more easily obtain
radioisotopes from the United Kingdom, in New Zealand’s case a change of aeroplane was
involved, resulting in more difficult organisation and the loss of valuable time, having a great
impact on important short-lived isotopes of iodine and phosphorus. Marsden added that the pile
suggested for New Zealand “is about 10 times as powerful as that of GLEEP ... but will be less
bulky, and will involve no danger whatsoever to anyone living near it. A suggested site is near
Lincoln College, ie, handy to aerodrome and Medical School and a good distribution centre.”122
Marsden continued to advocate for construction of an atomic pile in New Zealand.123 But given
his absence from New Zealand, and – despite Atlee’s offer of assistance – with limited support
from the New Zealand Government for an atomic pile, many of the DSIR’s original nuclear
sciences team moved into other areas of research. Charles Watson-Munro, George Page and
Cliff Dalton eventually moved to the Australian Atomic Energy Commission Research
Establishment, where Watson-Munro became chief scientist.124 The DSIR nuclear sciences team
Marsden had established continued, though rather than operating a research reactor they focused
on measuring environmental radioactivity, using radioactive tracers, and experimenting with
radiocarbon dating.125
Conclusion
New Zealand scientists on secondment from the DSIR assisted the development of nuclear
weapons in the United States and played a major role in the British nuclear energy programme,
first in Canada and then in the United Kingdom. The New Zealand involvement in these projects
was initiated by Ernest Marsden, the secretary of the DSIR, using the networks he established as
a student of Ernest Rutherford’s. After the Second World War, Marsden set up a DSIR nuclear
sciences team and completed a DSIR survey of radioactive minerals in the South Island, hoping
to find a source of uranium for use in a local nuclear programme. Marsden, with Charles
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Watson-Munro, promoted plans for a research reactor in New Zealand to produce radioactive
isotopes and gained British support for their plan. In 1947 Marsden left his position as secretary
of the DSIR to become the DSIR’s scientific liaison officer in London. From here, he pushed for
the establishment of a Commonwealth nuclear reactor in New Zealand.
After the Second World War, most scientists were of the opinion that, as with most scientific
information, knowledge about atomic energy should be freely shared between nations and
among the global scientific community, regardless of political alliances. The New Zealand
scientists who worked on the North American nuclear projects, along with Ernest Marsden,
agreed with this. These idealistic plans were not to come to fruition, however. In the years that
followed, information exchange came to a halt, with a breakdown in United States-British
relations and the start of an international arms race and the Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Information about atomic energy and atomic weapons was top secret as
first the Soviet Union, then the United Kingdom, then France and China, began their own
development of nuclear weapons.
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Chapter 5
Cold War and red hot science:
The nuclear age comes to the Pacific
“As it detonated, I felt the heat and saw the flash through my eyelids and fingers. About half
a minute later we were told to face the burst. All cloud cover had gone, and the coloured
fireball was climbing rapidly upwards. It was an impressive sight ...”
Maurice Hayman, Operation Grapple, 19581
“ … the inhabitants might be advised to eat only coconuts during the period of the tests.”
Department of Health recommendation, 19572
Historians have described the 1950s as a golden age of prosperity and optimism, with full
employment for men, a baby boom and a rise in consumer culture.3 A less positive view of the
decade describes a culture of conformity where ideological challenges to the right wing
hegemony were unwise, free speech was restricted, and fear of communism led to suspicion of
anyone with communist ideals being a Soviet agent.4 While the end of the Second World War
was certainly a cause for optimism, the Cold War was now a source of fear. And while the
dawning “atomic age” promised a bright new future for the world, it also involved a nuclear
arms race. Most New Zealanders, however, initially saw the perceived threat from the Soviet
Union and other Communist nations as justification for the nuclear arms race, even when the
search for new bomb-testing territories led the Pacific to become what Stewart Firth has called a
“nuclear playground”.5
The first two nations to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific were the United States and the United
Kingdom. McIntyre has described New Zealand’s post-war period as one of dual dependency on
the United Kingdom and the United States, New Zealand’s powerful new friend and protector.6
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When it came to their Pacific nuclear testing programmes, however, the strength of the New
Zealand-United Kingdom relationship was apparent: the Government offered logistical support
to the British nuclear testing programme and New Zealanders took pride in British scientific and
military achievements. In contrast, the United States nuclear testing programme was
acknowledged, rather than celebrated, as necessary to their maintaining supremacy in the arms
race. In both relationships, however, New Zealand’s independence is apparent: this chapter will
show that New Zealand said “no” to specific American and British requests when it was not
politically or economically expedient to say “yes”.
The Pacific “nuclear playground”
The wartime cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom on nuclear
weapons and nuclear energy development did not last. The United States Atomic Energy Act of
1946 transferred control of atomic research from a military to a civilian organisation. Following
reports of Soviet infiltration into the Canadian nuclear energy project, the Act also prohibited the
transfer of nuclear technology to other countries, ending the British-American partnership
agreed to in the 1943 Quebec Agreement. The United Kingdom now had to work independently
to develop its own nuclear weapons.7 The United Kingdom had already decided to move its
atomic energy research and development programme from Chalk River to Harwell, and now
made plans for a weapons development laboratory as well.8
Post-war New Zealand was changing politically and was beginning to assert greater
independence. Known as a Dominion of the British Empire from 1907, New Zealand now
dropped “Dominion of” and was known solely as “New Zealand”. With the passing of the
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act in 1947, New Zealand Parliament lost its legal sub-
ordinance to the Parliament of the United Kingdom and gained control of its own rules of
government.9  New Zealand’s first National Government came to power in 1949 under the
leadership of Sidney Holland, who remained Prime Minister until 1957.10
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While the relationship with the United Kingdom was still strong – it was the destination of two-
thirds of New Zealand’s exports and the source of nearly half of New Zealand’s permanent
immigrants – the Pacific War with Japan had highlighted New Zealand’s need for the United
States’ protection.11 A New Zealand legation had opened in Washington in 1941, but the
relationship strengthened after 1951, when the ANZUS Treaty was signed. This security
agreement between New Zealand, Australia and the United States offered the United States
support for their “soft peace” with Japan while giving Australia and New Zealand a guarantee of
protection against any Japanese military threat.12 There was also growing anxiety, particularly
from Australia and the United States, about Communist expansion into South East Asia: the
People’s Republic of China had been formed in 1949 after a long civil war and the most
populous country in the world was now Communist.13
Figure 5.1: In the late 1940s and 1950s the Pacific became what Stewart Firth has called a “nuclear playground” for
the nuclear powers. This map shows sites of nuclear bomb tests and major missile trajectories. Source: Stewart
Firth, Nuclear Playground, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1987, p viii. Reproduced with permission.
Despite the importance of the relationship with the United States in protecting New Zealand
from Japan or the perceived threat of Communism, when the United Kingdom and the United
States began testing nuclear bombs in the Pacific, it was clear that New Zealand’s support lay
with the United Kingdom.
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Table 5.1: American atomic weapon tests in the Pacific, 1946-62.
Operation and location (local date) Magnitude







































Bikini and Enewetak Atolls – Operation Redwing
17 weapons tested 21 May and 22 July 1956 0.19kt – 5 Mt
Bikini, Enewetak and Johnston Atolls –
Operation Hardtack
36 weapons tested 28 April and 18 August 1958 0.02 kt – 9.3 Mt
Christmas Island and Johnston Atoll –
Operation Dominic
36 weapons tested 26 April and 4 November 1962 40 kt – 8.3 Mt
The United Statesʼ Pacific nuclear tests were mostly in the Marshall Islands, in the North Pacific, but some of the
tests were of such magnitude that they impacted on surrounding Pacific islands, and distributed fallout throughout the
world. Source: Adapted from S. L. Simon and W. L. Robison, ʻA compilation of nuclear weapons test detonation data
for U.S. Pacific Ocean testsʼ, Journal of Health Physics 73, 1 (1997), pp258-264. Downloaded from
http://www.hss.energy.gov/HealthSafety/IHS/marshall/marsh/journal/rpt-22.pdf on 26 March 2009.
According to Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis, victory in the Second World War brought
no sense of security to the victors.14 After the successful deployment of nuclear weapons in the
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war against Japan, the United States continued to develop nuclear bombs and test them in
Nevada, and in new Pacific testing grounds in the Marshall Islands. On 1 July 1946 the United
States exploded a nuclear bomb in the atmosphere above a fleet of captured and obsolete
warships in Bikini Atoll to determine the effect of an atomic burst on navy ships and personnel.
The target fleet of 70 vessels carried thousands of animals – goats, pigs, rats, mice and guinea
pigs – to observe the effect of the shockwave and visible, thermal and nuclear radiation. The
21 kt explosion created an enormous fireball that rapidly mushroomed skywards.15 Most
newspaper reports were matter-of-fact about the details of the first Bikini Atoll bomb test, but a
week later, a New Zealand Listener editorial described the test as “deeply depressing” – the birth
of the atomic bomb had not led to the end of war, but to the prospect of more horrible war.16 The
bomb tests were not discussed in New Zealand’s Parliament, although Thomas Bloodworth, an
Auckland politician and a member of New Zealand’s Legislative Council, described the atomic
bomb as putting “fear and apprehension into the minds of every thinking man and woman.”17
This first Pacific nuclear test was followed by another test a few weeks later. New testing sites
were found at Enewetak Atoll, a Marshall Islands coral atoll 350 km west of Bikini, and at
Johnston Atoll, an uninhabited American territory in the North Pacific, and between 1948 and
1958 the United States tested nearly 70 nuclear weapons.18 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had its
own nuclear weapons programme and with the explosion of a plutonium fission bomb in the
Kazakhstan desert in August 1949 – news of which was received in New Zealand as an
inevitability – the nuclear arms race began.19
In the United Kingdom, the Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell (where the New
Zealand team led by Charles Watson-Munro had developed GLEEP, Europe’s first nuclear
reactor) continued to research all aspects of atomic energy. New plants were established to
produce plutonium and uranium-235, primarily for military purposes. Following Britain’s 1947
decision to proceed with building a nuclear bomb, the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment
was established at Aldermaston, under the leadership of William Penney.20
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On the other side of the world, New Zealand was assisting Britain’s nuclear programme in a
project involving the use of Wairakei’s geothermal steam to produce heavy water as a moderator
for British atomic piles. The project had first emerged in 1945, when, following suggestions
made by local authorities, the Government directed the DSIR to investigate the commercial
utilisation of the geothermal resources in the Rotorua area. One of the many propositions
investigated was the production of heavy water. Following the investigations by a small DSIR
team (that included Jim McCahon of the Dominion Physical Laboratory, who had also worked
on the wartime uranium survey), Marsden informed the United Kingdom of the possible
availability of large quantities of heat for the production of heavy water, and was encouraged to
proceed with the studies.21 By 1947, after two dry years that led to electricity shortages,
geothermal power was also emerging as an attractive option for electricity generation. The
Wairakei field, next to the Waikato River north of Taupo, was considered the most promising
area.22
Marsden, now working as Scientific Liaison Officer in London, supported the project. In 1949
he reiterated his earlier suggestion to John Cockcroft,23 who was now director of the British
Atomic Energy Research Establishment at Harwell, that New Zealand’s geothermal steam could
be used to concentrate heavy water through fractional distillation.24 Cockcroft was receptive to
Marsden’s suggestion and a scientist from the DSIR Dominion Physical Laboratory, J. A.
(Tony) McWilliams, was transferred to Harwell to study the distillation of the heavy water
fraction from naturally occurring water through use of geothermal steam.25 In March 1952 the
New Zealand Government received formal advice that the British authorities attached great
importance to the development of additional supplies of heavy water and requested a thorough
survey of its potential production in New Zealand be undertaken as a matter of urgency.26 Later
that year, a project development team conducting a shallow drilling and scientific investigation
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programme proved the Wairakei field had steam capable of producing 20 MW of electric power
annually.27
Marsden continued to encourage the project, liaising between Harwell, the DSIR and the Prime
Minister’s Department. Distillation experiments continued at Harwell, while in New Zealand,
the DSIR focused on assessing the availability of geothermal steam and its corrosive properties
and conducting heat transfer tests.28 Heavy water was required primarily as a moderator – to
dampen and control the motions of the high-energy neutrons released from the fuel source – for
use in Britain’s research reactors. The nucleus of heavy hydrogen, or deuterium, was the
optimum size to slow fast neutrons, making heavy water a desirable commodity for controlling
nuclear reactions. At the time the United Kingdom was interested in New Zealand’s ability to
provide heavy water, it was being made commercially in Norway and elsewhere by electrolytic
separation, a process that requires large quantities of electricity. Because of its slightly higher
boiling point – heavy water boils at 101°C – the heavy water can also be separated out by
fractional distillation, a process that requires large quantities of heat. The attraction of the
geothermal resource was that nature had provided vast quantities of the hot water needed to
produce heavy water – in other locations a hydro or coal-burning power plant would be needed
to produce the hot water through electrical means.29
Britain had its own nuclear bombs ready to test by 1952. With no domestic space for nuclear
testing, however, Britain turned to the Commonwealth and decided on the uninhabited Monte
Bello islands off the northwest coast of Australia. Australian Premier Robert Menzies readily
agreed to Clement Atlee’s request to use the islands. An Australian Government press release
issued in 1955 summed up Australia’s attitudes to British nuclear testing by saying “England has
the bomb and the knowhow; we have the open spaces, much technical skill and great willingness
to help the Motherland”.30
Wayne Reynolds argues that in the post-war period, as Britain developed nuclear weapons
without support from the United States, the Empire became vital to British survival, for raw
materials, manpower and testing zones. While Australia was happy to offer support, the country,
with its vast deposits of uranium, had plans to develop its own nuclear weapons; support for the
                                                 
27 Thain 1998.
28 A. D. McIntosh to Office of High Commissioner for the UK, 13 June 1952, AAOQ, W3424 (box 5), 74/22/-, Vol
1(a), ANZ; J. A. McWilliams’s report on Harwell secondment, n.d. but c. June 1953, AAOQ, W3424 (box 5),
74/22/-, Vol 2, ANZ.
29 Martin 1998, pp256-259.
117
British nuclear programme had a strong element of self-interest in terms of wanting a head start
in developing Australian nuclear weapons. Australia had more fear of Chinese communism than
New Zealand did, and therefore more of a willingness to come under the protection of the
“nuclear umbrella”. New Zealand’s much lower level of support for the British nuclear testing
programme can on the surface be seen to be a result of having less to offer – New Zealand did
not have Australia’s supposedly “empty” spaces or uranium deposits – but Reynold’s argument
about nuclear ambitions holds sway. New Zealand had no such nuclear ambitions, and said yes
to British requests when it was politically or economically expedient to do so, and no when it
was not.31
Table 5.2: British Atomic Weapon Tests in Australia
Operation and location (local date) Est yield
Monte Bello Islands, WA – Operation Hurricane
3 October 1952 25 kt


























Britainʼs first nuclear test series was held in Australia. Source: Adapted from Lorna Arnold, A Very Special
Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia, London, HMSO, 1987; and Roger Cross, Fallout: Hedley
Marston and the British Bomb Tests in Australia, Wakefield Press, 2001.
New Zealand’s military assistance to the British nuclear programme should also be seen in the
context of other Cold War military cooperation. New Zealand had already played its part in
operations and wars to resist the perceived Communist threat, for example by assisting Britain
with the Berlin airlift in 1948 and fighting alongside British and Australian soldiers in the
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Korean War from 1950. A degree of cooperation with the nuclear programme was consistent
with these actions.32
The United Kingdom’s first nuclear weapon detonated on 3 October 1952, in the Monte Bello
Islands, off the coast of Western Australia. While the United States’ Bikini Atoll tests in 1946
were described by The Listener as “depressing” and news of the 1949 Soviet test was received as
an inevitability, New Zealand’s response to the first British test was positive. “Unless the United
States has something up her sleeve Britain has taken the world lead in the race for tactical atomic
weapons” said The Dominion proudly, citing the “unusually large” area of ground level
destruction caused by the blast.33 The newspaper’s editorial noted that “British people
everywhere [and in the 1950s that included New Zealanders] will doff their hats to the quiet,
clever ‘back-room boys’ who made this achievement possible”.34 The United States did, of
course, have something “up her sleeve” – they were already far ahead of the British programme
and were about to start testing a hydrogen bomb.
The next British test series, codenamed Totem, was in a desert location 500 kilometres
northwest of Woomera in South Australia. After the first shot of the Totem series, on 15 October
1953, the wind blew a narrow radioactive plume to the northeast.35 Despite the fallout being
detected in New Zealand, there was a romantic tone to the local newspaper reports of the blast.
An NZPA report published in The Press read:
As the weapon exploded, the whole countryside was deluged with light,
dimming the early morning sun. The fireball was lit for a time by vivid
internal flashes. It turned into a column of peach-coloured smoke, which
soon took on the conventional mushroom shape.36
The nuclear tests were of great interest to New Zealand scientists and scientific organisations
who made their own attempts to detect radioactive fallout. Following the 1952 explosion four
RNZAF aircraft were dispatched from Whenuapai to collect air samples at a distance of 5,600
km from the Monte Bello Islands explosion – three of the four aircraft collected significant
radioactivity.37 Under the tutelage of Charles Watson-Munro, now professor of physics at
Victoria University College in Wellington, two graduate students conducted research into
atmospheric radioactivity, to determine baseline levels of radon in the atmosphere
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and the effects of meteorological conditions of atmospheric radioactivity. Watson-Munro’s own
research determined that fallout from the 15 October 1953 explosion was transported rapidly to
New Zealand on high velocity, high altitude winds, arriving in Wellington from the test zone
3,500 km away the day after the explosion.38
Staff of the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory in Christchurch also built apparatus to
detect radioactivity from the tests. Most of the activity collected after the 1953 explosions had a
half-life of the order of 30 minutes, indicating that it consisted of the decay products of the
radioactive gas radon. This showed that the dangers of radioactive fallout from the explosion
were not posed exclusively by products of the explosion – larger radioactive elements produced
by the splitting of uranium-235 atoms – but also by radioactivity of their decay products, and
their decay products in turn.39
After another test series at the Monte Bello islands, the British selected a new permanent inland
test site at Maralinga, in South Australia, and prepared for Operation Buffalo, which took place
in September and October 1956. A further test series, Operation Antler, took place in September
and October the following year.40
As well as the Australian task force and scientific staff, observers of the first Maralinga test
included an “Indoctrinee Force” of some 250 officers, including five from New Zealand, whose
role was to observe the test and its aftermath, and pass on their knowledge and experiences to
other members of the Armed Forces.41 The New Zealand military authorities were advised that
the officers taking part would be “subject to radiation hazard”. The Indoctrinee Force was
stationed about 8.2 km from the first blast, with their backs to the explosion. They were
instructed to turn around two seconds after the blast, and witnessed the fireball and the emerging
mushroom cloud.42 Following the blast, the indoctrinees, dressed in protective clothing, toured
the blast area, examining the effect of the blast on targeted items in the area.43 One of the New
Zealand members of the Indoctrinee Force, Lieutenant Colonel John Burns, later recalled
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standing in full combat gear with his back turned when a bomb was detonated. “The heat … was
just like the blast from opening the door on a hot oven roast. And the flash was blinding white,”
he said.44
A report issued by the National Archives of Australia in 2001 revealed that along with 70
Australians, two of the New Zealand officers, including Burns, were intentionally exposed to
radiation. On 28 or 29 September 1956, a group of indoctrinees entered the fallout zone with the
purpose of discovering “what types of clothing would give best protection against radioactive
contamination in conditions of warfare”.45 Burns recalled being sent to within half a mile of
where the bomb was detonated where, in enclosed rubberised suits, he and his fellow
indoctrinees were “marching and crawling and there was a truck passing every so often that
would shower us with a bit of dust and dirt to make sure we got some of the fallout”.46  This
seems a barbaric and dangerous experiment from a modern perspective. Film badges worn by
the New Zealand soldiers, however, showed that each received no more than an annual dose
from natural background radioactivity.47
The birth of the hydrogen bomb
The Cold War led to an ongoing quest for more powerful bombs. A new type of nuclear weapon,
which became known as the hydrogen bomb, was independently developed and tested first by
the United States in 1952, followed by the Soviet Union in 1953, and Britain in 1957.
There was a New Zealand connection from the start. In 1934, Ernest Rutherford and two of his
Cambridge University colleagues, Mark Oliphant and Paul Harteck, discovered the hydrogen
fusion reaction, the basic principle behind the hydrogen bomb. In a letter published in Nature,
“Transmutation Effects Observed with Heavy Hydrogen”, they described that when bombarding
concentrated heavy water – water with a heavy hydrogen, or deuterium atom – with accelerated
deuterium nuclei, the accelerated deuterium nuclei were fusing with a nucleus of deuterium in
the heavy water and forming a helium nucleus. As a product of this reaction, neutrons, heat and
an intense burst of gamma radiation were released.48
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While Rutherford’s Cavendish experiment had used more energy than it had produced, scientists
determined that under extremely high temperatures, unlimited quantities of heavy hydrogen
could fuse into helium, releasing energy in the process. Unlike the fission reaction that created
the first nuclear bombs, fusion was an extremely efficient process and the energy output of a
fusion bomb could greatly exceed that of a fission bomb.49
The United States decided to proceed with the development of a hydrogen bomb in 1950, despite
considerable scientific opposition to the project on the grounds that the large potential yield of
such a bomb would render it a “genocidal weapon”, capable of wiping out entire cities and
contaminating large areas with vast quantities of radioactivity. The first prototype hydrogen
bombs, which used a fission explosion to ignite a fusion reaction, were developed at Los Alamos
and tested at Enewetak Atoll in May 1951. In a more advanced design, the interior surface of the
bomb was designed to reflect X-rays and gamma rays from the fission explosion, causing
compression and heating of the deuterium fuel. This new design also resulted in extremely high
levels of radioactive fission products being blasted into the stratosphere, from where they settled
around the globe. This design was first tested in November 1952, in a 10.4 Mt explosion, the
largest man-made explosion ever up to that time. The United States conducted another test series
at Bikini and Enewetak Atolls in 1954. The largest of these explosions was a 15 Mt explosion on
1 March 1954, which caused unexpected levels of fallout and spread harmful radiation over a
large area, necessitating the evacuation of American personnel and native islanders from
Rongerik Atoll and other islands. The crew of a Japanese fishing boat stationed 85 miles from
the blast were victim to an ash-like shower of fallout causing the crew to become sick from
radiation poisoning – one of the crew subsequently died.50
In response to the Governor-General’s speech upon the opening of Parliament in June 1954,
Warren Freer, the Labour MP for Mt Albert, noted that one of the things omitted from the
speech, and not mentioned by Prime Minister Holland, was the hydrogen bomb, about which
Freer said, “Nothing has more disturbed the minds of the average men and women in the
English-speaking world”. Freer referred to an earlier statement by Holland that the hydrogen
bomb was the greatest promise for peace, but argued that he was wrong, and the stance of the
Church leaders was correct: that Easter the leaders of the Anglican and Catholic churches had
appealed to Parliamentarians the world over to “exercise some control over this weapon and to
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bring the world back to a Christian approach to international problems rather than one of cold
war or, in this case, red-hot science”. Freer called for Holland to let the New Zealand public
know where he stood on the question of “future tests of atomic weapons and hydrogen bombs, or
anything more hideous”.51 Internationally, these new hydrogen bombs led people to speculate
that a war waged using such weapons could mean the end of civilisation – not only could entire
cities be wiped out, but the radiation could make the planet uninhabitable.52 In New Zealand,
concern about the effect of future American tests led the Cabinet to set up a scientific committee
to report on the possibility of radioactive contamination of New Zealand and its Pacific island
territories. The committee, comprised of Charles Watson-Munro, Bill Hamilton, the secretary of
the DSIR, and Miles Barnett, director of the Meteorological Service, as well as three senior
representatives of the Armed Services, reported that there was no danger to New Zealand or its
territories. Holland issued a reassuring press release, prepared by the committee, about the likely
impact of the bomb tests, saying that any deposits would be of “no significance” and would pose
“no consequential risk to the inhabitants of New Zealand or its island territories”.53
Templeton has examined political discussions around the issue of the American hydrogen bomb
tests. Following the United States tests, Holland sent personal messages to the British and
Australian Prime Ministers, Churchill and Menzies, expressing his concern about the United
States tests and the risk of injury or danger to Pacific people and their food sources, and
querying as to whether the United States could, in future, be asked to provide warning of such
tests. In return, Churchill warned against “any action which might impede American progress”,
citing their strength in nuclear weapons “as the greatest possible deterrent against the outbreak
of a third world war”.54 With the United States nuclear weapons programme now so far ahead of
the British programme, the United Kingdom was dependent on American superiority over the
Soviet Union.
The United Kingdom continued to develop its own weapons, however, and its interest in heavy
water from New Zealand soon took on a new dimension. On a visit to New Zealand in
September 1952 John Cockcroft met with Cabinet and the Defence Science (Policy) Committee
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and made it clear the British wanted heavy water not just to use as a moderator in atomic piles;
they were also interested in it from a “defence research angle”.55
In May 1953 the New Zealand Cabinet approved in principle the construction of a joint New
Zealand/United Kingdom combined heavy water and electricity generating plant.56 The focus
now moved to determining the economics of the project and the nature of the agreement between
New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The economics were not in favour of a New Zealand
plant, however, and in December 1953 the British High Commissioner in Wellington informed
Holland that the United Kingdom could no longer participate in the project, citing the possibility
that the United States might soon be offering heavy water at “a keen price”.57
The British atomic energy projects moved from the Ministry of Works to a new agency, the
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA), in 1954.58 In March the heavy water
project was briefly revived. At a meeting of the British Chiefs of Staff, Sir Norman Brooks,
Secretary to the Cabinet, reported plans to improve Britain’s capacity to manufacture hydrogen
bombs by obtaining thorium from South Africa and heavy water from New Zealand.59 The next
week Marsden was advised that the United Kingdom might reopen discussions on the heavy
water project. Loath to put the reasons for the renewed interest in writing, Marsden cryptically
and verbosely described it to Hamilton, the DSIR secretary in New Zealand, as “a very special
urgent important reason”.60 On 23 April 1954, Viscount Swinton, British Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, advised Holland that, on the basis of new cost and supply
information, the United Kingdom Government now wanted to proceed with the heavy water
project but this time attached great importance to maintaining secrecy.61 On the same day,
Cabinet authorised Holland to tell the British High Commissioner that the New Zealand
Government was willing to go forward with the proposed combined heavy water and electricity
plant in the Wairakei geothermal area.62 Although Marsden, in London, knew of the secret plans
to develop a hydrogen bomb and of its links to the heavy water plant, it is unclear how widely
this was known in New Zealand.63
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However, when the British Cabinet formally decided to proceed with building a hydrogen bomb,
in July 1954, they had abandoned plans to use heavy water from New Zealand for the project.64
Revised cost estimates from American sources now meant New Zealand heavy water was again
considered attractive for their nuclear reactor, rather than hydrogen bomb, programmes and the
Wairakei project was back on. In announcing the reestablishment of the joint venture between
the UKAEA and New Zealand to produce electric power and heavy water from the steam bores
at Wairakei, Holland told Parliament that New Zealand would be making a “worthwhile and
unique contribution not only to its own power resources, but also to the development of atomic
energy, which, used for peaceful purposes, may well revolutionize the world’s industrial
processes”.65 Geothermal Developments Ltd, whose shareholders were the New Zealand
Government and the UKAEA, was formed in February 1955 to produce electricity and heavy
water at Wairakei. Marsden, who had retired from the public service in 1954 and returned to
New Zealand, was appointed technical adviser to the Board.66
Design work proceeded to the stage where prices for equipment, materials and labour could be
accurately estimated but this doubled the cost of the plant, raising the cost of the heavy water it
would produce from £44,000 to £90,000 per ton and in January 1956 the UKAEA advised that,
faced with the projected price increases, they felt forced to withdraw from the project.67 Holland
expressed regret at “the abandonment of an interesting partnership agreement” but the project
was still of value to New Zealand. Holland made it clear that New Zealand would proceed with
production of electricity from geothermal steam at Wairakei.68 John Cockcroft sent a personal
letter to Ernest Marsden, expressing his regret at having to abandon the heavy water project. He
added “I hope the New Zealand Prime Minister will not feel that he has been too badly let down
in our first attempt at New Zealand-U.K. co-operation in the Atomic field. I hope we shall come
back later with other projects which will be successful.”69 In April 1956 Geothermal
Development Ltd terminated its existence. Plans were revised to construct a larger power station
to absorb the steam, which would no longer be needed for heavy water production.70
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While official reports did not state any link between weapons development and Britain’s interest
in New Zealand’s heavy water there was newspaper speculation. Napier’s The Daily Telegraph
suggested in 1955 that “the availability of heavy water (and hence of heavy hydrogen) from New
Zealand was an important factor in the British Government’s decision to make the H-bomb”.71
Even so, according to Kevin Clements, “no political party expressed moral or political scruples
about the possible diversion of heavy water into weapons production”.72
British H-bomb tests
New Zealand’s help was requested for another aspect of the British nuclear programme in 1955.
Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies had ruled out the testing of hydrogen bombs on or
near the Australian mainland, so when the United Kingdom began plans to test the hydrogen
bomb a new test range had to be found. Scientists from the Aldermaston weapons development
laboratory estimated the site should be at least 800 kilometres from inhabited land or shipping
lanes. The best options were considered to be “various remote islands or the icy wilderness of
Antarctica”.73
British Prime Minister Anthony Eden was quick to ask for New Zealand’s assistance with the
testing programme, requesting help obtaining food, stores and fuel; use of the Auckland Naval
Base for repairs; and the use of the Cook Islands’ Penrhyn Island for a weather and radar station.
New Zealand was advised the operation was Top Secret.74  Holland gave the matter careful
consideration and agreed to the British request, saying New Zealand would be “very glad” to
provide the facilities requested.75
William Penney, who ran the weapons development programme at Aldermaston, discussed the
test site with the British Navy, which favoured the New Zealand sub-Antarctic island group the
Antipodes Islands – now a World Heritage site home to protected species of albatross, penguins,
petrels and seals – some 800 kilometres south-east of New Zealand. Here a bomb could be
detonated in a ship anchored close to the selected island.76 The Navy suggestion was rejected,
however, and the United Kingdom chose the Kermadec Islands, another New Zealand territory,
this time some 1000 km north-east of New Zealand, as the most promising site. This group of
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volcanic islands is dominated by Raoul Island, and is now part of New Zealand’s largest marine
reserve.77 But in the 1950s, it was just another group of remote islands inhabited only by a small
group of men at the weather station.78
The decision whether or not to let the United Kingdom use the islands in this way was up to
New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland. In a short biographical essay, Barry Gustafson
describes Holland as being a “fervent admirer of Britain” and quotes Holland, whose parents
were born in England, as describing himself as “a Britisher through and through” who was
determined to maintain links with Britain.79 Some correspondence from 1955 shows, however,
that regardless of the strength of Holland’s determination to maintain links with Britain, his
determination to remain in office, and even serve New Zealand’s own interests, was prevalent.
Eden made a direct request to Holland, regarding the use of the Kermadec Islands for the British
hydrogen bomb tests, in May 1955. Eden described how the weapons could be either exploded
on one of the islands from a tower, or fired in a ship anchored near an island, and asked if
Holland would agree in principle to the weapons trials so the United Kingdom could investigate
the site further. Eden concluded by expressing his earnest “hope that, in the interests of our
common defence effort and the importance of the deterrent for Commonwealth Strategy, you
will find it possible to agree”.80 Having not received a reply by the beginning of July, Eden sent
a prompting letter to Holland, asking for a favourable reply to his May message, adding “I am
sure that we can count on your full co-operation in a project that is so important to the
Commonwealth and the defence of the Free World”.81
Despite his “fervent” admiration of Britain and desires to maintain links with the country, it
seems that Holland was immediately wary of the British request, and took note of negative
publicity surrounding earlier newspaper reports of British plans to test in Antarctica. He also
sought the opinion of Marsden (by this time in his retirement but much sought after for his
expertise on nuclear and radiation issues) who advised Holland that while an isolated island in
the Pacific was “a logical choice” for the proposed weapons test, the Kermadec Islands were not
necessarily the best option. He acknowledged the weather was suitable but noted the presence of
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occasional ships and aircraft in the area and reminded Holland of the Japanese fishermen who
suffered radiation sickness after their boat was stationed 135 kilometres from the United States’
hydrogen bomb detonation at Bikini Atoll in March 1954. Marsden acknowledged the
Government might on the one hand feel a “moral obligation” to cooperate with the British
request but on the other hand might “feel that the sacrifice and difficulties in the use of the
Kermadecs is questionable”. Without bluntly advising Holland to refuse the request, Marsden
suggested the Auckland Islands, some 320 kilometres south-south-west of New Zealand, as a
preferable alternative to the Kermadecs.82
Historian James Belich’s recolonisation thesis argues that New Zealand was an ideological and
economic semi-colony of Britain until the 1960s. Holland, however, despite his own British
birth and deep affection for Britain, appears to have put his own and New Zealand’s interests
ahead of Britain’s. His decision to refuse Eden’s request was independent and pragmatic – the
National Party had won the 1954 general election with only 43.8 per cent of the vote and their
continuance in power could not be taken for granted.83 On 15 July 1955 Holland warned the
British High Commissioner in Wellington that the use of the Kermadecs for nuclear tests would
be a “political H-bomb” for New Zealand – not least because they would take place in an
election year – and declined the British request.84 Eden expressed his disappointment at
Holland’s refusal, reiterating the importance of the planned trials to the “defence of the free
world” and advising that if Britain did not find a suitable alternative he might be compelled to
ask Holland to reconsider the matter.85
As part of the search for an alternative test site, Eden requested New Zealand’s permission to
investigate Penrhyn Island as an aircraft base and asked if the Royal New Zealand Navy survey
ship HMNZS Lachlan would assist in a Pacific ground survey.86 Although still hoping that
Holland might change his mind about the Kermadecs, Malden and Christmas Islands, in the
Northern Line Islands (now part of the Republic of Kiribati), became the new preferred site and
in early 1956 the HMNZS Lachlan surveyed the Northern and Southern Line Islands on behalf
of the United Kingdom.87 Holland did not change his mind about use of the Kermadecs, and
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on 24 March 1956 Eden formally advised New Zealand that the range for the British hydrogen
bomb testing programme would be Christmas Island and Malden Island.88
While the public announcement that Christmas Island would be used for the bomb tests did not
come until June 1956, on 2 April 1956, following a press leak in the United Kingdom, New
Zealand newspapers announced that the “isolated coral atoll in the Pacific” had been chosen as a
base for Britain’s first hydrogen bomb explosion.89 Christmas Island, the biggest coral atoll in
the world, covered 642 square kilometres with its mixture of land and lagoons. There was
already a runway on the island – it was used as an American base during the Second World War
– but the British plan was to refurbish the airbase and build the necessary accommodation and
facilities. At Malden Island, a new airstrip, a meteorological station and a tent camp would be set
up.90
There was already opposition to the proposed hydrogen bomb tests. The New Zealand Labour
Party, since its first government in 1935, had had a policy of greater independence in foreign
policy, and this applied to nuclear testing too.91 In May 1956, when three Labour MPs asked
whether, in view of the conflicting reports on the likely effects of hydrogen bomb tests, Holland
would protest at the continuation of nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific. Holland replied that “the
development of this branch of the nuclear sciences must continue” and “periodic tests are
essential to this work”.92 In a later statement he added, “New Zealand will be helping to ensure
that the United Kingdom remains in the forefront in the field of nuclear research”.93 Holland saw
continued testing as a positive move for enhancing Commonwealth, including New Zealand,
security but, to maintain the support of the New Zealand public, it became a case of Not in My
Back Yard. By providing logistical support for the British tests but withholding New Zealand
territory, he could keep the balance between maintaining relations with the United Kingdom, and
fostering New Zealand pride in helping Britain’s military and scientific achievements. A major
concern was the risk of upsetting the New Zealand public through fear of fallout and damage to
New Zealand territory.
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Holland and his government also showed assertiveness and independence with regard to a
controversial United States proposal. As Templeton explains in Standing Upright Here, New
Zealand firmly rejected a late 1956 United States claim to sovereignty over Penrhyn Island,
which had become strategically important to the Pacific nuclear testing programme, pointing out
that the island had been New Zealand territory for more than 50 years. The American claim was
eventually dropped.94
In response to further British requests, New Zealand provided facilities for a weather station and
a radio station on Penrhyn Island, and the RNZAF provided transport for several officials
associated with the tests. In July 1956, Britain formally requested that two New Zealand frigates
be made available to act as weather ships during the 1957 test series.95 HMNZS Pukaki and
Rotoiti joined the British squadron at Christmas Island in late March 1957. The frigates were
tasked with “air/sea rescue, anti-submarine watch, thermal flash monitoring and water sampling
to test for radiation contamination” but their main role was to collect meteorological information
essential in the vicinity of the test zone.96 As Maurice Hayman, a radio operator on the HMNZS
Pukaki, later recalled:
A canvas hut was erected on the stern, where the balloons were inflated,
and then brought out for release, once the transmitter had been
attached. The balloon was released at a size of about six feet across.
After rising to heights of 50,000 feet or more, it would by then be
about the size of a two story (sic) house, before finally bursting. The
idea was to monitor the upper levels, forecasting wind speed, direction,
temperature, humidity and precipitation up to 100,000 feet as part of an
overall weather forecasting system, prior to each burst.97
In New Zealand and the South Pacific in general, however, there was growing concern about the
effect of radiation from the tests. In response to concerns passed on by the Minister of Island
Territories and a Samoan petition to the United Nations over the bomb tests at Christmas Island,
Deputy Prime Minister Keith Holyoake advised the New Zealand public that the British
Government had assured New Zealand there would be no radioactive hazards to the inhabitants
of the Cook Islands, the Tokelau Islands or Western Samoa.98 If Britain had made the assurance,
it seemed, it was good enough for New Zealand. In April 1957, the monthly review journal Here
and Now reported “there was, in the way Mr Holland solemnly relayed a British assurance that
no inhabited islands would be affected by radiation, almost a tone of pride in assisting at
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headline-making events”.99 In April 1957 Harold Turbott, Chairman of the Radiological
Advisory Council and deputy director-general of Health, responded to an External Affairs
request for information on measures to be taken by New Zealand against possible hazard to
peoples on Pacific islands under New Zealand’s jurisdiction arising from the coming British
hydrogen bomb tests. Turbott replied that the Council “is of the opinion that the New Zealand
Government must accept the British Government’s assurance that there is no danger to our
Island Territories” but did suggest that radiation monitoring in the region be extended.100 The
British assurances might have been passed onto the public, but officials did not necessarily
accept them. In response to the External Affairs query, the Department of Health suggested “the
inhabitants might be advised to eat only coconuts during the period of the tests”.101
Despite New Zealand’s considerable assistance to the United Kingdom, Holland was not given
advance notice of the first British hydrogen bomb test, which took place in the atmosphere
above Malden Island. It came as a “complete bombshell” to Holland who said his first news of
the bomb came from the newspaper.102 Templeton describes Holland as reacting to the news
with “great surprise and anger” and writing to British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to
complain about the lack of notice and advise of the concerns of the New Zealand public about
the risk of radiation hazards, to which Macmillan replied with what Templeton describes as
acute annoyance. There had been hints that a test would be taking place soon, and Templeton
described Holland’s reaction as a sign that his “mental powers were beginning to fail”. Holland
was to retire, for health reasons, months later.103
New Zealand did, in fact, have three observers at this first British hydrogen bomb test. On the
Royal Navy ship, HMS Alert, along with two military observers, was Bert Yeabsley, deputy
director of the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory. Wearing their white anti-flash suits,
hoods, glasses and dark goggles, the observers sat on the ship’s deck facing away from the blast,
turning towards it after 10 seconds. Yeabsley reported being impressed by the way the British
were conducting the tests, concluding that the tests “were being made in such a fashion that the
possibility of highly active local fall-out was reduced to a minimum and that no person under the
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care of the New Zealand Government was liable to suffer radiation damage from the
operation”.104
Figure 5.2: Prime Minister Sidney Holland (right) and his deputy Keith Holyoake, in August 1957, a month before
Holland retired and Holyoake became Prime Minister. Photographer Morrie Hill, 1/2-177291-F, ATL, Wellington, NZ.
Britain’s Operation Grapple, the codename for the project to test hydrogen bombs in the Pacific,
began with three prototype weapons tested in May and June of 1957, detonated at a height of
about 2,400 metres, in the atmosphere above Malden Island. Further test series, codenamed
Grapple X, Grapple Y and Grapple Z, took place off the coast of Christmas Island in November
1957 and from April to September 1958, with yields peaking at 3 Mt for an explosion on 28
April 1958.105
Following the first explosion on 15 May 1957, The Dominion editorial noted that Britain had
established “her credentials as a member of the thermo-nuclear club”.106 In a radio broadcast a
week after the test, Holland assured the public that “the tests are being carried out with the
utmost care and regard for the safety of human life”, going so far as to say “British scientists
seem to have mastered the problem of dangerous fallout associated with previous nuclear tests”,
though this was probably more a factor of it being a relatively small blast than the British having
any control or “mastery” over the fallout. Holland also said that the Pukaki, stationed some 50
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nautical miles from the explosion, reported “that she had a good view and was much
impressed”.107
Table 5.3: Operation Grapple atmospheric tests
Location and date Est Yield RNZN positions
Grapple series, above ocean near Malden Is.
Short Granite, 15 May 1957
Orange Herald, 31 May 1957






Grapple X, Y, Z series, above ocean near Christmas Is.
Blue Danube, 8 November 1957
Grapple Y, 28 April 1958
Pennant, 22 August 1958 (balloon burst over land)
Flagpole, 2 September 1958
Halliard, 11 September 1958









Source: Compiled by the author from Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-bomb, Houndmills, New York, Palgrave, 2001
and Crawford 1989.
Roy Sefton, a radio operator stationed on the Pukaki, recalled the first blast:
My eyes were closed behind dark glasses, but opened at the flash – and I
saw my finger bones. Then there was a rumbling like stampeding horses
before the shock wave hit the ship.108
Just 15 seconds after the explosion, the Pukaki crew were ordered to “open your eyes, stand up
and face the burst”. Commander Hale, in his report on the explosion, described the view:
… the fire ball grew in size shaped like a round firy [sic] and
turbulent cauliflower changing from an angry deep red streaked with grey
to a larger smouldering ball of cloud with a glowing centre … .Between
the 2nd and 3rd minutes the terrific up draught of air and cloud soon
became apparent by what appeared to be a strikingly white water spout
being drawn into the centre of the fire ball, this rising mass increased
in volume until the more familiar but equally fantastic shape of the
mushroom was evident to everyone.109
Maurice Hayman, a telegraphist on the Pukaki, recalled a later blast:
The weather was calm, and I sat down on the quarterdeck dressed in
longs, shirt and anti flash gear. The officer in charge gave the order
to face to starboard, and we could hear the line countdown on the ship’s
speakers. With 15 seconds to go we were given the order to close and
cover our eyes. As it detonated, I felt the heat and saw the flash
through my eyelids and fingers. About half a minute later we were told
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to face the burst. All cloud cover had gone, and the coloured fireball
was climbing rapidly upwards. It was an impressive sight ...110
Following the first test the Pukaki sailed within six nautical miles of ground zero to rendezvous
with a British ship, though Geiger counter measurements recorded no noticeable radiation in the
air or water.111
Figure 5.3: Radiation testing on Pukaki, c1957. AAO 0029, courtesy Royal New Zealand Navy museum.
All the ships involved in Operation Grapple, however, took protective measures against the
possibility of radiation contamination. Parts of the ships could, if necessary, be sealed off to
provide an airtight enclosure, and the ships contained wash-down equipment to prevent any
unexpected fallout from settling and to wash away any that did. Radiation detection systems
were in place on all ships, and protective clothing was supplied by the British authorities on
Christmas Island.112
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Maurice Hayman, recalling one of the later blasts in the series, said:
It wasn’t clear at that time why everyone not required for duty below
deck had to sit up on deck close to the explosion. The correct procedure
for the fleet in the event of a Nuclear attack, was to spread out far
and wide, close the ship down, and start up outside water sprinklers. A
released British Defence Research Policy Committee report dated 20th May
1953, on the Nuclear Weapon Trials, answered this question. It read ‘The
object of the exercise, is to discover the detailed effects of various
types of explosion on equipment, stores, and men with and without
various types of protection.’ That explains why after the last balloon
release, we were not shut down and heading flat out away from the
burst.113
Holland retired as Prime Minister in September 1957, and was succeeded by Keith Holyoake. As
Deputy Prime Minister, Holyoake had already been vocal on nuclear issues, issuing a statement
earlier in September, following a visit to New Zealand by the British Minister of Defence, “that
New Zealand would not become an atomic power: it would acquire neither atomic nor nuclear
weapons and would not become a base for their storage”.114 Holyoake was more personally
against nuclear testing than Holland, and in 1958, when he agreed with a British request for New
Zealand assistance with the second round of British tests, ended his letter to Macmillan by
commenting that a question increasingly being asked by the average citizen in his part of the
world was “Why if there is no danger from these tests, do the British and Americans not hold
them nearer home?”115
Labour, who won the 1958 General Election, had campaigned on opposing all future nuclear
testing. Like Holland, the new Prime Minister, Walter Nash, was British – he had been born in
England and came to New Zealand as an adult. Templeton has described Nash as always
reluctant “to come out in direct opposition to what was presented as a vital British interest”.
Despite the election promises, Nash agreed to fulfill the National Government’s earlier
undertaking to support the 1958 British test series and two Royal New Zealand Navy ships
offered similar support to that given in 1957.116 Labour’s opposition to nuclear testing did not
extend to opposition to other nuclear technologies, however. In 1959, following the 1955
discovery of uranium deposits on the West Coast, the New Zealand Minister of Mines signed a
secret agreement in which the UKAEA funded a drilling programme to investigate the region’s
uranium deposits (uranium prospecting is examined in the following chapter).117 And it was the
Labour Party that advocated a North Island nuclear power station when the National
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Government was pushing for a Cook Strait cable to carry electricity from the South to the North
Island (see chapter nine).
New Zealand had only minor links to the United States testing programme. In 1957, the New
Zealand deputy defence attaché, based in Washington, attended an American nuclear test at
Nevada as part of a group of 80 invited observers from countries with defence links to the
United States. Again, a New Zealander was invited to and observed an American test at
Eniwetok Atoll in July 1958. The New Zealand Chiefs of Staff had noted that the opportunity for
New Zealand officers to witness nuclear explosions and study their effects firsthand occurred
very infrequently and the opportunity would be of considerable benefit to the officer involved
and those he could brief about it. The observer was not of the same opinion, however. After the
test, he reported that the limited information provided by the American authorities meant that
observation of the test was of limited value to a New Zealand observer. No New Zealand
military observed any more American tests.118
Opposition to nuclear testing
The possibility of nuclear war was now becoming part of popular culture and books like Nevil
Shute’s 1957 novel On The Beach, and the subsequent film of 1959, had a powerful effect on the
public imagination concerning the outcome of a global nuclear conflict. The story, set in 1963
after a nuclear war, is set in Melbourne as people in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa
wait for global circulation currents to reach their southern hemisphere homes and bring a deadly
cloud of radioactive fallout that will kill everyone. The fact that it was set in the southern
hemisphere, and featured the impact of a northern hemisphere war on countries like New
Zealand – death would come, but it would be slower with more warning – was a chilling
prospect to many New Zealand readers and helped strengthen anti-nuclear sentiment.119
In New Zealand, organised anti-nuclear sentiment had begun almost immediately after the end
of the Second World War. New Zealand’s first Hiroshima Day march was in Christchurch in
1947, organised by the New Zealand Peace Union. The testing of nuclear weapons by the United
States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union strengthened anti-nuclear resolve and an international
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anti-nuclear movement emerged in opposition to all nuclear weapons. In 1950, the World Peace
Congress started collecting signatures worldwide for the Stockholm Peace Appeal, which stated:
We demand the absolute banning of the atomic weapon, arm of terror and
mass extermination of populations [sic]. We demand the establishment of
strict international control to ensure the implementation of this
banning measure. We consider that any government which would be the
first to use the atomic weapon against any country whatsoever would be
committing a crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a war
criminal.120
The Appeal eventually collected 650 million signatures worldwide, more than 20,000 of them
from New Zealand. Despite this level of support, anti-bomb protesters were generally thought to
have communist sympathies and in 1950 Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of the 1940-49 Labour
Government, described the Stockholm Peace Appeal as “just another Soviet weapon”.121
Despite its initial perceived association with communism, the anti-nuclear movement was
fuelled throughout the 1950s by nuclear accidents, like those at Chalk River, Canada in 1952,
and at Windscale in the United Kingdom in 1957, and by growing fears about genetic damage
caused by radioactive fallout. British and American bomb tests in the Pacific brought the nuclear
world closer to New Zealand and gave impetus to the country’s nascent anti-nuclear movement.
There was widespread opposition to the tests in the Pacific – from church groups, students,
women’s organisations, Maori, unions and scientists with many groups passing anti-nuclear
resolutions and many groups and individuals writing to Holland to voice their opposition,
particularly after the first hydrogen bombs were tested.122 The strongest objection to bomb tests
arose from fears about the genetic and health effects of radioactive fallout.123
To people calling for an end to the testing of hydrogen bombs, Holland parroted Churchill’s
reply to his own voiced concerns, that it would be “a great disservice to the free world” for
Britain to seek to “impede the progress of our American allies in building up their overwhelming
strength in a weapon which provides the greatest possible deterrent against the outbreak of a
third world war”. Australia and New Zealand followed Britain’s lead on this issue, while newly-
independent India took an independent stance and called for an immediate halt to all nuclear
testing.124
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Holland responded to New Zealanders’ opposition to bomb testing by trying to justify Britain’s
role in the arms race as essential, and by minimising the harmful effects of fallout. In a May
1957 radio broadcast which followed the explosion of the first British hydrogen bomb, Holland
talked about the many letters he received from around New Zealand, both for and against the
nuclear tests, in which some people called for the Government to oppose all nuclear testing.
While he believed that most of these views were “sincerely held”, Holland also cautioned that
some of the letters were part of a programme of “Communist propaganda” against nuclear
testing. Holland defended his Government’s support for Britain’s nuclear testing by referring to
the “great deal of study of scientific information” they had conducted and because of the
vulnerable position of the “Motherland”, which must show “those who need to be shown that
she has the means to defend herself”. But regardless of views about the ethics of bomb testing,
the effects of fallout were a ubiquitous concern. Holland described people’s major concerns
being “that the atmosphere is being poisoned, that food supplies will be contaminated, and that
flesh and blood itself are being attacked by unseen, deadly radiations”. In response, Holland
rightly pointed out that the amount of radiation people were exposed to as a result of nuclear
testing was small compared with radiation from cosmic rays or X-rays. Holland’s assurances,
however, went beyond what he could know from current scientific information. In response to
concerns about fallout impacting on Pacific food sources, he assured that the British tests were
“high air bursts and the fallout will be negligible and will filter back from the stratosphere
without doing harm”. While voicing his support for the eventual banning of nuclear testing,
Holland stated that “the course being followed by Britain is the right course, and we must
continue to support her. Her aim is the security of the Commonwealth and the free world and our
safety lies in that security.”125
Throughout the 1950s, petitions in escalating numbers asked the New Zealand Government to
do more to protest against atmospheric and underground nuclear tests, with the Government’s
response changing depending on who was in power.126 While Holland’s National Government
voted against a 1956 United Nations resolution calling for a World Court opinion on the legality
of atmospheric testing, in 1959 Nash’s Labour Government supported a United Nations
resolution condemning nuclear tests, sought a nuclear test ban treaty and helped develop the
world’s first nuclear weapons-free zone, in Antarctica. After regaining power in 1960, however,
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Holyoake’s National Government voted against a United Nations resolution which declared the
use of nuclear weapons as contrary to the laws of humanity.127
Despite growing opposition to nuclear testing, the arms race continued. In 1957, the same year
that Britain was testing its first hydrogen bomb, the Soviet Union was launching the world’s first
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and, later that year, Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite.
These developments raised the spectre of intercontinental nuclear missiles, or nuclear weapons
launched from space. The Soviet president, Nikita Khrushchev, wanted the West to be fearful of
the communist superpower. As John Lewis Gaddis wrote, from 1957 through 1961, Khrushchev
“openly, repeatedly, and bloodcurdlingly threatened the West with nuclear annihilation”.128 In
turn, Khrushchev’s threats were used as justification for the United States continuing its nuclear
testing programme.
In response to anxiety about fallout, the United States and United Kingdom agreed in 1958 to
suspend nuclear testing for a year. Britain never resumed nuclear testing but in 1962 the United
States began a new Pacific test series that increased anti-nuclear sentiment in many New
Zealanders. By this time, France had become the world’s fourth nuclear power, after testing
nuclear bombs in French territory in North Africa.129 Before the 1962 tests, Holyoake let the
United States Government know of the likely outcry in New Zealand and in New Zealand’s
island territories in the Pacific, but for the New Zealand public he issued a press statement
blaming the resumption of testing on the Soviet Union – which in 1961 had tested a 50 Mt bomb
in the atmosphere – forcing the decision upon the West.130
The United States’ 1962 bomb tests were conducted at Christmas Island and Johnston Atoll
between April and November. A test on 9 July 1962, when a 1.2 Mt hydrogen bomb was
launched on a rocket and exploded 320 kilometres above Johnston Island, was a pivotal
experience for many New Zealanders. The high altitude test, designed to test the effect of a
nuclear explosion on radio and radar communication, disturbed New Zealand’s
telecommunications systems and created an artificial aurora, described in the New Zealand
Herald as an intense glow above the northern horizon that spread rapidly across the sky before
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“the luminous red band widened, and quivering white shafts of light could be seen within it”.131
The New Zealand Herald editorial the next day described the eerie glow from the nuclear
explosion as doing “more than a hundred protest marches to fill men’s minds with dread”.132
David Lange, who would be Prime Minister of a Labour Government from 1984 to 1989, later
recalled that:
… the confusion in the sky that night haunted me as a vision of a man-
made apocalypse, a terrifying retaliation of natural forces against the
evil of unnatural invasion and a warning that a small country at the
edge of the world in the South Pacific was no longer far enough away
from the quarrels of the great powers to escape their consequences. It
was a shock to realise that the power of nuclear weapons could straddle
the world and unleash a threat on an inoffensive country like New
Zealand.133
The American tests seem to have created mixed feelings in New Zealand. While the test was
shocking, the United States was still an ally and the leader in the West’s fight against
communism. The New Zealand Herald acknowledged that the “yearning to see these dreadful
engines of destruction abolished must be nearly universal” but also stated that to “clamour for
immediate nuclear disarmament flies in the face of reality”.134 Later that year, the New Zealand
Atomic Energy Committee, in response to a request from the Prime Minister’s Department,
commented on the potential impact of high altitude nuclear tests on the ionosphere, and advised
that such tests would increase the levels of long-lived radioisotopes such as strontium-90, and
recommended that the New Zealand Government “oppose further high-altitude tests unless such
tests have the support of and the scientific observations are coordinated by an internationally
recognised scientific organisation”.135
New Zealand supported the United States in other ways and was its ally in a way it was not to
France. In the 1960s, New Zealand soldiers fought in the American war in Vietnam – the first
war New Zealand had fought independently from Britain. In justifying New Zealand’s
contribution of 550 men, Prime Minister Holyoake cited resistance to communism as one of the
reasons, and said “We must, I believe, range ourselves with our American and Australian
allies”.136 In the early 1960s, communism was increasingly being seen as a threat. One of the
peaks of this threat – now regarded as the closest the world came to a third world war – was
what became known as the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. For years, the United States had had
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intermediate range missiles stationed in Britain, Italy and Turkey, all aimed at the Soviet Union.
When Cuba became a communist state, spontaneously and without Soviet intervention,
Krushchev took the opportunity to reciprocate, planting Soviet missiles on Cuban soil, aimed at
the United States. President Kennedy demanded the immediate removal of the missiles and
imposed a naval blockade of Cuba. The crisis was averted when the Soviets agreed to dismantle
and remove the missiles in return for the United States agreeing not to invade Cuba.137
The scientistsʼ responses
The post-war period saw proposals for a research reactor in New Zealand, a uranium prospecting
boom, nuclear testing in the Pacific, and fallout deposition in New Zealand. Politicians were
driving decisions about New Zealand’s level of support and involvement in these ventures, but
what did New Zealand scientists, particularly those working in the field of nuclear physics, make
of these developments? Scientists tended to tread a pragmatic path between excitement and
interest in the new nuclear science and technology, and growing public fear of radiation and
radioactive fallout that was leading to increased opposition to nuclear testing. It is interesting to
look at the example of Ernest Marsden, New Zealand’s original nuclear advocate, because of the
way that his attitude to nuclear weapons and nuclear technology changed over the decades after
the Second World War.
At about the same time that he was advising Holland against allowing the United Kingdom to
test hydrogen bombs in the Kermadec Islands (though he was happy to recommend the
Auckland Islands), Marsden was beginning his own research into the biological effects of
background radiation. In his “retirement”, which began in 1954, Marsden worked up to six days
a week, either from his attic laboratory at his home, or as a guest worker at the DSIR’s
Dominion Physical Laboratory or the Royal Cancer Hospital in London.138 He was passionate
about this new line of work, telling a colleague “I wish I could start my career again and work
on these radiobiological problems”.139
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Figure 5.4: Sir Ernest Marsden in June 1961, on board the Sydney Star at Bluff, New Zealand, testing the
radioactivity of a sample of seawater. Reference number F-153607-1/2, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
Marsden liked an audience and received a lot of press coverage – he sometimes talked up the
effects of radiation from bomb tests and sometimes minimised them, pointing out that radiation
levels from fallout were very low in comparison to natural background radiation.140 He rightly,
however, said the effects of radiation from bomb fallout were not fully understood and deserved
further study.141
Marsden began speaking out against the testing of nuclear weapons in 1959, after the United
Kingdom had completed its nuclear testing programme in Australia and the Pacific. He
highlighted the worldwide increase in radioactive fallout resulting from Soviet and American
nuclear tests and told the Auckland Star “the time has come for an absolute standstill on such
atomic explosions to give time for a proper assessment of the damage already done to us and to
our children even yet unborn”.142
This was not the first time Marsden had publicly opposed nuclear weapons. As told in chapter
four, he had supported the 1946 Baruch Plan, which had stipulated that the United States dispose
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of its atomic weapons, stop all weapons work and turn over its atomic energy knowledge to the
United Nations. In a 1947 speech, Marsden had said that it was not safe to develop atomic
energy until there was a practical and enforceable agreement that it would not be used for atomic
bombs.143 At the same time, however, he promoted the development of a nuclear reactor in New
Zealand as being of defence significance to the Commonwealth. And later, in the early 1950s, he
supported British plans to develop nuclear weapons, and was keen for New Zealand to assist the
British nuclear programme by constructing a nuclear reactor and providing heavy water and
uranium.
After the British nuclear programme was concluded in 1958, Marsden declared that New
Zealand was partly to blame for the Commonwealth “falling miserably behind in nuclear
development”. If there was a third nuclear power, he declared, there would be no “bombing
competition” between Russia and America.144 Marsden continued to criticise New Zealand’s
lack of investment in defence science, including telling Holyoake that New Zealand had been
“grossly discourteous and negligent of opportunities to help Britain” in this area145;  a reference
to New Zealand’s continued failure to construct an atomic pile.146
Why, at the same time as implicating New Zealand in the United Kingdom’s failure to keep up
with the arms race, was Marsden speaking out against nuclear weapons? As journalist Tony Reid
described in a newspaper profile of Marsden, his attitudes to nuclear weapons development were
“ambiguous and sometimes contradictory”.147 It is possible that despite his initial personal
misgivings about the post-war development of nuclear weapons, Marsden’s loyalty to Britain,
along with the close involvement of many of his friends and former colleagues in the British
nuclear programmes, caused him to push these misgivings aside. Marsden was easily seduced by
science – as demonstrated by his willingness in early 1945 to leave his position as head of the
DSIR to take a junior physicist’s role on the North American nuclear programme – and the
development of nuclear weapons was at the forefront of scientific and technological
development. Once the British nuclear testing programme was concluded, therefore, and with
evidence of increased environmental radioactivity resulting from bomb fallout, Marsden had no
hesitation in publicly opposing nuclear weapons.
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Other scientists also had changing attitudes to nuclear issues. Jim McCahon, who had worked on
the South Island uranium survey in the late 1940s, then had been seconded to the Atomic Energy
Research Establishment at Harwell for two years before joining the Dominion X-Ray and
Radiation Laboratory in 1951, continued working in radiation physics but became a lifelong
supporter of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.148 Some scientists involved in the
Manhattan and Montreal projects, like Maurice Wilkins, were so appalled by the bomb that they
turned away from physics. (In Wilkins’ case it was a great move for science, as he went on to
share a Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his work on the structure of the DNA helix.)
After making a number of anti-nuclear statements to the media from 1959 onwards, Marsden
began communicating his anti-nuclear weapons sentiments to Holyoake in 1961.149 In 1963,
when the French announced their proposal to move their test site to the South Pacific, Marsden
advocated, in a letter to Holyoake, a nuclear-bomb-free southern hemisphere. He pointed out
that fallout from nuclear bomb tests had so far impacted more on the northern hemisphere than
the southern, and called on Holyoake to announce that New Zealand would not provide any
assistance to countries carrying out bomb tests in the southern hemisphere, and suggested he call
on other southern hemisphere countries to do the same.150 In May 1963 the New Zealand
Government formally protested to the French Government over their preparations for a nuclear
test at Gambier Island.151 Later that year New Zealand was the fourth country, after the United
States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, to ratify the Partial Test Ban Treaty,
demonstrating, in Holyoake’s words, New Zealand’s “desire to see an end to nuclear tests that
are likely to give rise to contamination of the atmosphere”.152 The signatories to the Partial Test
Ban Treaty agreed to prohibit, prevent and not carry out nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer
space, or under water. While it dealt to fears about fallout it did not mean an end to the further
development of nuclear weapons, as testing programmes just moved underground.
While focusing on his research into environmental radioactivity, Marsden continued to speak out
against nuclear weapons development and testing. On a visit to South Africa he described the
hydrogen bomb as “the most striking example of the possibilities of misuse of modern scientific
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knowledge”.153 In June 1965 he told Salient, the Victoria University student newspaper, “we
must do what we can to stop nuclear warfare. We must do what we can to promote nuclear
disarmament”.154 New Zealand’s nuclear advocate had become a voice of caution.
New Zealand signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a treaty in which
countries possessing nuclear weapons agreed not to help other states to acquire them, on 1 July
1968.155 New Zealand now began making diplomatic protests over French tests in the Pacific,
monitoring fallout in the South Pacific, and working internationally towards disarmament.156
Conclusion
Nuclear bomb testing moved close to New Zealand, to Australia and to islands in the South
Pacific Ocean in the 1950s. New Zealand’s National Government supported the British nuclear
testing programme by offering logistical support in the form of fallout measurement and weather
observations, and by providing unwitting test subjects for experiments on clothing to protect
against radioactivity. The New Zealand Government was also a partner in a planned joint New
Zealand-British project to produce heavy water for the British nuclear programme at Wairakei in
the central North Island.
Despite the level of New Zealand support for the British nuclear programme, it was not blind
loyalty. There was a national interest in New Zealand’s involvement in the planned heavy water
plant, as it was associated with an electricity generation plant for local power supply, which
went ahead even after the heavy water plant plans were shelved. And in 1955 Prime Minister
Sidney Holland took the bold but self-interested step – public opinion was likely to be against
the tests – of refusing a British request to use New Zealand island territory for a series of
hydrogen bomb tests. The basis of his decision was probably that it would improve his own
chances of being re-elected at the next General Election. Despite this, Holland saw the tests as
essential to the United Kingdom retaining its position in the arms race, and as well as offering
logistical support from the Navy, he spoke to reassure the public that the tests were necessary
and they would pose no danger from radioactive fallout. When Holland learned of the first
British hydrogen bomb from news reports, rather than being alerted in advance, he felt angry and
betrayed.
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By the end of the 1950s Britain was withdrawing from being an imperial superpower to being a
European regional power and letting the United States take over as the West’s global
superpower. Britain’s last nuclear tests were in 1958. When the United States resumed nuclear
testing in 1962, New Zealand did not have the background of assistance with their nuclear
programme and so was freer to be critical. Attitudes to nuclear weapons were changing too, with
an emerging protest movement highlighting the dangers of radioactive fallout and the madness
of stockpiling nuclear weapons reflected in global treaties that New Zealand signed, including
the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968.
The 1950s might have been economically prosperous, but the country’s milk and meat were now
tainted with strontium, nuclear bombs were being tested nearby and despite all the talk about the
atomic age bringing prosperity and a scientific utopia, all New Zealand had seen of the nuclear
age was radioactive fallout. Still, anti-nuclear sentiments were restricted to opposition to nuclear
weapons, and did not extend to opposition to peaceful applications of nuclear technology such as




Uranium prospecting on the West Coast
“I believe that it is possible we have discovered the second most
highly concentrated uranium deposit in the world.”
Frederick Cassin, November 1955, Buller Gorge1
“It looks as if theyʼve got something all right.”
Dr Les Grange, Director of NZ Geological Survey2
By the mid-1950s, anti-nuclear sentiment was growing, mostly associated with people’s fears
about health risks from radioactive fallout from bomb testing. For most people, however, this
antipathy towards bomb testing did not cause any ill-feeling about the potential use of nuclear
power for electricity generation, or the possibility that emerged in the 1950s that New Zealand
might start mining and exporting uranium ore. If anything, the opposite was true: New Zealand’s
first reported uranium find caused great excitement.
The local reaction to the 1955 discovery of uranium in the Buller Gorge was consistent with its
potential as an economic stimulus for the region – a uranium mining industry would provide
jobs, wealth and an improvement in local infrastructure. The Government supported companies
prospecting in the region, and as well as publishing a booklet that stimulated interest in searching
for uranium provided financial and scientific support for companies to investigate and analyse
uranium deposits. While there were some concerns about the safety of prospectors working with
uranium-rich rocks, and appropriate advice was given on how to ensure their safety, there was no
moral or ideological opposition to uranium prospecting in New Zealand, right up to the last
investigations in 1979.
Early surveys of radioactive minerals
New Zealand’s first attempt at a uranium survey was Ernest Marsden’s 1945-46 survey of the
fiords and beaches of the South Island, which had found uranium in beach sands but had failed to
reveal any promising sources of uranium for mining. Through the 1950s, global demand grew
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for uranium to fuel the developing nuclear weapons and energy programmes in the United States
and United Kingdom. With world production of natural uranium estimated at 10,000 tonnes per
annum,3 the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) was drawing its uranium
supplies chiefly from the Belgian Congo, South Africa, Australia and Portugal while the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) sourced its uranium domestically and from
Canada.4 By 1955, Australia had uranium mines at Radium Hill in South Australia, Rum Jungle
in the Northern Territory and Mary Kathleen in Queensland, with a new agreement to export
uranium oxide to the UKAEA.5
Two international uranium experts visited New Zealand in 1952. Charles Davidson, chief
geologist to the UKAEA, and Robert Nininger, chief geologist to the Atomic Energy
Commission of Australia, reported that, in their opinion, it was unlikely there were economic
uranium deposits in New Zealand. In saying this they were confirming the New Zealand
Geological Survey view based on Marsden’s surveys in the 1940s.6
There were also approaches from the United States. In April 1954, the Vitro Organization (a
large engineering company involved in the construction and operations programmes of the
USAEC) advised New Zealand that the USAEC would look with “considerable favor” upon any
effort in friendly countries to uncover new deposits of uranium ores, and it would be possible to
negotiate “very attractive contracts” with the United States Government. The Vitro Organization
stated their interest in working with New Zealand on a national uranium survey and advised that,
“it would seem to be very much in the national interest of New Zealand to encourage competent
and well-planned efforts in this field of activity”.7 New Zealand, however, already had a plan in
motion. On a visit to Australia, Dr Les Grange, head of the New Zealand Geological Survey, met
Philip Dodd and Frank Frankovich, from the USAEC, and invited them to New Zealand to help
plan a search for uranium. The American geologists were working with the Australian Federal
Government, helping to develop the Rum Jungle uranium deposit in the Northern Territory. They
visited New Zealand in early 1954 and helped the Geological Survey to plan a new approach to a
uranium search.8
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Following the advice of Dodd and Frankovich, in December 1954 the Geological Survey enlisted
the help of amateur and weekend prospectors in a nationwide search for uranium with the
publication of Prospecting for Radioactive Minerals in New Zealand.9 This followed a precedent
set in North America where amateur uranium prospecting reached such a scale that some real
estate agents offered a Geiger counter free with the purchase of large properties.10 The
Geological Survey booklet provided information on the field properties of radioactive deposits,
along with instructions on likely places to find them and, for those unable to buy a Geiger
counter – available for £40 each from local electronics suppliers – simple instructions on how to
make one.11
Fig 6.1: Uranium prospecting was promoted as a weekend or summer hobby. Grange advised that “A Geiger counter
can be made at home at an expenditure of little more than £10, and thus it is well within the reach of anyone who has
ability in mechanical and electrical work. If a significant deposit of radioactive minerals is not found the small financial
outlay will not be grudged, and, after all, it will have added interest to the summer holiday.” 12
While Grange advised that the likelihood of finding economic uranium deposits in New Zealand
was slim, the potential prize was great. In 1954, uranium ore was selling for between A£1 10s
and A£504 per ton, depending on the concentration of uranium in the ore (from 0.1 per cent to
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10 per cent), and the Atomic Energy Act of 1945 promised the first finder of uranium a financial
reward.13
Uranium fever on the West Coast
When two elderly prospectors discovered uranium in the road cutting near Hawks Crag, the West
Coast experienced a short but intense uranium rush and the hills rang to the sounds of clanging
rock hammers and ticking Geiger counters. The prospectors – labourers, businessmen, chemists,
miners, and weekend trampers and deerstalkers – were not the only people excited. The uranium
finds triggered the collective memory of the West Coast gold rushes of the 1860s, arousing new
hope for a return to those prosperous days when packed public houses and dance halls lined the
streets and West Coast ports were the busiest in the country.14
Uranium was a familiar word in the mid 1950s: it was the fuel for the nuclear reactors that were
going to revolutionise electricity generation and change the way people lived. It was the raw
material that would take the world, including New Zealand, into the atomic age. Hundreds of
eager prospectors acquired copies of Prospecting for Radioactive Minerals in New Zealand and
bought or made Geiger counters, sending samples of any promising rocks to the Geological
Survey or the Reefton School of Mines for analysis. But it was 11 months after the booklet was
published, and hundreds of samples later, before a rock was found with any significant
radioactivity. One Sunday afternoon at the beginning of November 1955 two veteran
prospectors, Frederick Cassin and Charles Jacobsen, were returning home after a day prospecting
in the hills above the Buller Gorge. As the story goes, the sprightly septuagenarians had finished
their day with a few drinks in the Berlins Hotel and, needing to relieve themselves on the drive
home, pulled their truck over to the side of the road next to Batty Creek. Out of force of habit,
Jacobsen put the Geiger counter on the rock face. The counter ticked wildly and the needle went
off the scale. The excited pair returned to the Berlins Hotel to spend the night, coming back to
Batty Creek the next morning to gather rock samples before leaving for Wellington.15
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Fig 6.2: Frederick Cassin and Charles Jacobsen holding a Geiger counter to a sample of uranium ore. “I believe that
it is possible we have discovered the second most highly concentrated uranium deposit in the world”, said Cassin.
Source: The Dominion Collection, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. Reference number F-
144916-1/2.
Cassin and Jacobsen arrived in the capital on 9 November, armed with their samples of
radioactive rock. Their find excited the national and international media, along with other
prospectors, especially as Cassin claimed that the reef from which they took the ore registered a
radioactive count higher than at Rum Jungle in Australia’s Northern Territory or the world’s
richest uranium mines in the Belgian Congo. “I believe that it is possible we have discovered the
second most highly concentrated uranium deposit in the world”, The Press reported him as
saying.16
In Wellington, Cassin and Jacobsen met Prime Minister Sidney Holland, who tested their sample
with a Geiger counter and congratulated them on their initiative.17 Newspapers reported that
while the rock samples were being analysed, 70-year-old Jacobsen entertained friends and fellow
prospectors by holding the Geiger counter against a sample of the yellowish, black-streaked ore,
and handing them the earphone. People were unfailingly impressed with the agitated clicking in
the earphone coupled with the sight of the indicator needle creeping round to 450 counts per
second.18
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A few days later, newspapers reported the Geological Survey’s confirmation that the samples
tested contained 0.27 per cent uranium and were more than twice as uranium-rich as the Rum
Jungle ore.19
Cassin and Jacobsen returned to the Buller Gorge to stake out and register their claim. Following
the vigorous outdoor work they returned to the Berlins Hotel where they were so busy enjoying
their drinks and recounting tales of their find, that a Westport man, James Fair, registered New
Zealand’s first uranium claim. On Monday 14 November 1955, Fair registered a claim for a 400
hectare block on the south bank of the Buller River on each side of Batty Creek, surrounding but
excluding any mineral lease applied for by Cassin and Jacobsen.20 “The two guys who had found
[the uranium] were celebrating still at Berlins,” Fair later recalled.21 Cassin and Jacobsen were
just 25 minutes behind Fair, however, and filed their claim at 4 pm that day.22
The Geological Survey’s Les Grange visited the Hawks Crag site a week after Cassin and
Jacobsen’s find, firing up the nearby town of Westport. The Press reported his visit:
Quickly assembling a high-fidelity field-rate meter made at the Harwell
Atomic Research Station in England, Dr Grange went immediately to the
face of rock which the discoverers exposed when they made the find. “That
looks pretty good”, he said as the needle showed a strong reading on the
scale of his instrument. “Hector, it’s gone right off the scale!”
exclaimed Dr Grange a few moments afterwards, when testing the same
roadside rock face a few feet to the right.23
Grange estimated the reef to be 900 feet long, 300 feet deep, with an average width of about six
feet (approximately 275 metres by 90 metres by 2 metres).24 Although these dimensions were yet
to be verified, Dr Grange said the deposit was a highly worthwhile mining proposition.25 “It
looks as if they have got something all right” he was reported as saying after visiting the site.26
Media reports of Cassin and Jacobsen’s find gave other prospectors clues on likely prospects and
in the days that followed the West Coast swelled in the grip of a uranium rush. Ninety years after
the gold rush that led to the European settlement of this rugged area, the hills and river valleys
were alive with prospectors eager to find uranium to fuel the developing United Kingdom and
United States nuclear programmes. A uranium strike was also an exciting possibility
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domestically; a local uranium source would, it was thought, make nuclear power all the more
affordable for New Zealand. Media reports on the find were unswervingly positive.
While nuclear power was widely perceived to be the hope of the future, and there was talk of an
“atomic age”, in 1955 uranium was primarily used as fuel for nuclear weapons, like the ones
being tested by the United States and the United Kingdom in the Pacific. Amongst all the
excitement of the West Coast uranium finds, however, there was no comment that New Zealand
might not want to be involved in mining and exporting uranium – the local and national response
was completely positive. The uranium find also tied into the nineteenth century notion of New
Zealand as a land of natural abundance. While deficient in arable land, the West Coast was
already known to be blessed with economic resources such as gold, coal and timber. Uranium
was another economic mineral to add to the list.27
Uranium-rich deposits continued to be found. By 14 November, there were six reported uranium
finds – three in the Paparoa Ranges, one in Buller Gorge, and two close to Reefton – and a new
air of hope and prosperity on the West Coast.28 “Health Hazards from Radioactive Materials”
read a headline in The Press, reporting from the United Nations Atoms for Peace Conference in
Geneva. 29 The warning seemed to go unheeded: hotels made presents of radioactive rock
fragments to parting guests; shop windows attracted customers with displays of uranium-bearing
rock; and the Berlins Hotel, where Cassin and Jacobsen had spent the night after their uranium
find, had its busiest afternoon’s trade since the gold rush.30 The Press reported that at Hawks
Crag – where Cassin and Jacobsen had said their uranium find was – a rich terracotta ore at the
roadside attracted passing motorists, many of whom took home samples of the radioactive
rock.31 A week after the first report of uranium, The Press reported a rush on Geiger counters
and said the second printing of Grange’s Prospecting for Radioactive Minerals in New Zealand
was almost exhausted.32 The Press reported the mayor of Westport as saying, “The finding of
uranium-bearing ore in the Buller Gorge has caused a wave of optimism unknown in the district
for more than 50 years”.33
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The Press also reported:
There has been an unmistakable air of new liveliness in the main
street of Westport during the brilliant weather while the “uranium
boom” was at its peak, and there were more cars in the business area
on Monday and yesterday than had been seen for years … Businessmen
say that business has shown a returning briskness already.
Travellers have been getting better orders. Hotels were crowded out
yesterday, and some guests were required to go elsewhere or accept
makeshift accommodation … Hotel talk is unceasingly on the subject.34
While excitement reigned on the West Coast, Wellington-based scientists were continuing to
examine the uranium find. The quality was there, but was it there in sufficient quantity to make
extraction economically viable? For minerals like uranium that are distributed throughout a rock,
rather than concentrated in seams (as many precious metals are), exhaustive processing is
required and for a uranium deposit to be economic it would have to exist in quantities and
proportions that offset the cost of extracting the uranium from the host rock. The location of the
deposit – its depth, geographic spread and distance from where it would be used – would also be
a factor.
Fig 6.3: Even the local ice-cream factory got into the act, offering “uranium ice cream” to West Coasters in November
1955. Grey River Argus, 23 November 1955, p5.
Meanwhile, a DSIR technical report put a damper on the initial excitement. On 23 November,
only nine days after the first uranium claim was registered, more detailed analysis showed that
Cassin and Jacobsen’s initial sample had anomalously high levels of uranium; further samples
from the same location contained one-quarter to one-hundredth of the first sample’s levels.35
While New Zealand’s first uranium find was reported as being “not commercial”, the DSIR
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report said it gave a valuable lead as to further places and rock types in which to search.36 On
learning of the DSIR’s report, Cassin refused to lose enthusiasm, with newspapers reporting his
declaration that the Government report was “too silly for words”, given that no boring tests had
been carried out. He intriguingly told The Press that it appeared people had been asked to “soft-
pedal” about it because of “international complications”.37
Cassin and Jacobsen’s uranium find had initially attracted interest from Australian mining
companies – the prospectors told reporters they had been offered “unlimited funds” to develop
the strike – but following the DSIR report that the lode was of no commercial significance the
Australian companies withdrew support.38 Cassin and Jacobsen did no further prospecting of
their claim; if overseas interests would not buy their claim they could at least wait for their
promised reward under the Atomic Energy Act. Their attitude did not impress the Geological
Survey: as Dick Willett, the director of the Survey expressed it, some prospectors were “content
to find a piece of radioactive rock, peg a claim and wait for the State to either present them with
a reward or hope for some overseas group to buy them out.”39
Finders of Australia’s uranium deposits had received up to £25,000 each. Cassin and Jacobsen
were not so lucky. In 1956, they were each awarded £100 under the Atomic Energy Act. In
making the reward, the Minister of Mines noted that “whilst it was disappointing that the early
reports were not more encouraging as to the commercial value of the area, the discovery was
important in renewing interest by prospectors”.40 Cassin and Jacobsen were reportedly “bitterly
disappointed” at the value of the reward – they said that as a result of earlier discussions “at
Ministerial level” they had been expecting at least £10,000.41
Prospecting for uranium continued. In May 1956, prospectors employed by Buller Uranium
Limited, a subsidiary of the Nelson company Lime and Marble Limited, reported three finds of
radioactive boulders and outcrops in the lower Buller Gorge.42 Uranium Valley, a company set
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up by two Westport men, found uranium in carbonaceous shales at the Fox River mouth and in
the Paparoa Ranges inland from Punakaiki.43
Fig 6.4: Map showing distribution of the uranium-bearing Hawks Crag Breccia on the west coast of the South Island
of New Zealand. Uranium was found in the Buller Gorge, at the Fox River mouth and up Bullock Creek in the
Paparoa Ranges. Source: Adapted from Beck et al, 1958.
Uranium was back in the news. Just a week after these new finds were reported, Professor
Gordon Williams, Dean of the University of Otago School of Mines and Metallurgy (also the
holder of a mineral prospecting warrant for a Buller Gorge claim), told a mining conference that
                                                 
43 All references to the Fox River Mouth claim are from CABH 3391, CH58, 6/38, ANZ CHCH unless otherwise
cited  All references to the Paparoa claim are from CABH 3391, CH58, 6/39, ANZ CHCH unless otherwise cited.
156
uranium “twice as good” as any ore found previously had been discovered in the Buller region
and that there was now “a distinct possibility of an underground uranium metal mine in New
Zealand”.44
Unlike the Cassin and Jacobsen find, the 1956 discoveries held up under scrutiny. Over the next
four years, the New Zealand Government spent more than £35,000 on the West Coast search for
uranium, mostly to fund the prospecting efforts of Buller Uranium and Uranium Valley.45 The
money from most of the government grants was to be contingently repayable – if the companies
ever went into extraction and production of uranium oxide the money would have to be repaid.46
Geological Survey and Mines Department staff, who were also working in the area, supported
the prospectors.47 There was no question of the government opposing or not supporting uranium
prospecting – uranium was a globally desirable mineral that could boost New Zealand’s
economy, and was treated just as any other economic mineral would be.
Fig 6.5: Helicopter landing at Benneyʼs Landing, site of Buller Uraniumʼs prospecting camp on the north side of Buller
Gorge, October 1956. Source: Photographer Tas McKee, from Lloyd Jones collection.
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In the Buller Gorge names like “Uranium Creek” and “Radioactive Creek” started appearing on
maps. Buller Uranium used money from their parent company, Lime and Marble, along with
their government grants, to cut tracks in the steep Buller Gorge bush, make clearings for
helicopter airdrops, and establish and provision four uranium-prospecting camps and to run a
field telephone from the main camp to the trunk line hear the Buller River.48 A free government
grant was used to cover the cost of an October 1956 helicopter airlift to transport materials and
equipment to a new camp at “Benney’s Landing”, named after the Under-Secretary of Mines,
400 metres above sea level, between Uranium and Bullen Creeks on the north side of Buller
Gorge. In this area of cleared scrub prospectors built a sapling platform as a landing stage for a
helicopter to fly in material for the camp, and built a hut above the escarpment faces where
uranium-bearing material had been found. Buller Uranium received a further contingently
repayable government grant of £5000 to trace the extent of the mineralised zones through further
exploration and sampling of deposits.49 Prospectors expanded their search, tramping through the
rainforest each laden with a geological hammer, a slasher, a compass, a Geiger counter and a
scintillometer, an electronic device used to measure gamma radiation.50 In 1957 and 1958 the
Government provided £18,100 to construct a jeep track from Tiroroa Siding to the uranium area
high above the north side of Buller Gorge.51
Uranium Valley built huts at two locations in the Paparoa Ranges, carrying supplies by
helicopter, packhorse and on the backs of the prospectors to bases at Bullock Creek and Pororari.
In both the Buller and Paparoa locations rock faces were cleared of vegetation and blasted to
expose unweathered rock so as better to trace the radioactive seams. The work was hard – the
conditions were rough, the weather was wet, and measles, influenza, and blood poisoning
plagued the prospectors.
Uranium was in and out of the news throughout the late 1950s, but once the initial optimism for
a uranium mining industry was proved unfounded, public enthusiasm abated. In January 1957
The Press report that “Rich uranium reserves, conservatively estimated at between £10,000,000
and £20,000,000, but probably worth twice as much” had been discovered in the Buller Gorge
made only a few column inches on page 13 of the newspaper.52 Ernest Marsden remained
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characteristically enthusiastic, however, and in June 1957 The Dominion covered his address to
the Hutt Valley Chamber of Commerce at which he was reported as saying that within a few
years West Coast fields would be producing enough uranium to run a nuclear reactor in New
Zealand. Ever optimistic, Marsden saw the issue of nuclear power for New Zealand as being a
question of “when”, rather than “if”, predicting that New Zealand would be running its first
nuclear reactor in 10 years’ time.53
Rewards under the Atomic Energy Act
As the number and significance of the uranium finds grew, so did dissatisfaction with the
Government’s level of support for uranium prospecting, and the paltry rewards offered under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1945. Lime and Marble Limited, who had put the most money and effort
into a systematic prospecting programme, criticised the lack of information about market
prospects, and said the 1945 Atomic Energy Act, which was passed before any uranium was
found in New Zealand, did not meet present conditions. “Unlike Australia, USA, or Canada”,
said Lime and Marble head Tas McKee, “there is no Government buying agency offering
guaranteed prices or mine development allowances, and bonus payments. Furthermore, there
have been no tax concessions available such as … the Australian provisions which … allow
complete remission of income tax for all profits from uranium until 1965”. McKee concluded by
saying, “it seems fairly certain there will be no investments of private overseas capital in New
Zealand uranium until terms as attractive as in Australia are offered”.54
Lime and Marble, along with the Mines Department, the DSIR and Otago University, were
consulted in framing The Atomic Energy Amendment Bill, which was passed in October 1957. 55
The Atomic Energy Amendment Act, modelled largely on the Australian legislation, took away
the confiscatory provisions of the 1945 Act, and gave the owner the right to sell uranium ore at
current market prices, either to the Minister of Mines or, with the Minister’s permission, to other
parties. The Act also established a schedule of rewards for discoveries of uranium.56 In February
1958, the Government approved rewards for three West Coast uranium discoveries. The first
payment was of £400 each to Charles Jacobsen and the estate of the late Frederick Cassin, in
acknowledgement of the significance of their first find of uranium in the Buller Gorge. At the
same time as the Jacobsen and Cassin reward was increased, £200 rewards were given to
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Hamilton company director Robert O’Brien for his discovery of uranium at Kawatiri on the
upper Buller River, and jointly to James Dowd and Lloyd McAlister (of Uranium Valley) for
discovering uranium in Hawks Crag Breccia at the Fox River mouth.57 In April 1958 Cabinet
approved rewards of £200 to Uranium Valley for their June 1957 discovery of uranium at
Bullock Creek (in 1961 this reward was increased by £800 to £1000 in recognition of the
potential value of the find) along with £1000 to Lime and Marble for their discoveries north of
the Buller River and £200 for their finds in the Big River area.58
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority
In April 1958 the UKAEA, who had heard about New Zealand’s uranium finds from Ernest
Marsden, advised they would like to send a geologist to New Zealand to meet with
representatives of the companies prospecting for uranium in the Buller Gorge.59 Colin Campbell,
the UKAEA chief geologist, visited the West Coast in late 1956 and produced a report that
concluded there was a possibility of locating a deposit of commercial grade.60 In a radio
broadcast on 10 December Campbell stated he thought the Buller Gorge area showed promise as
a uranium mining field, adding “it will be a splendid chance for the New Zealand metal mining
industry to get on its feet and to put this country ‘on the map’ as a producer of the newest kind of
fuel – the raw material for nuclear energy.”61
To assist in the development and exploration of the area, in February 1957 the UKAEA sent a
geologist, K. Beer, to the West Coast.62 By this time, the Geological Survey had two staff
mapping stratigraphy and structure in the Buller Gorge, along with a Wellington-based
petrologist working full time on mineralogy.63 While the prospecting of private companies
resulted in confidential reports, the DSIR geologists published the results of their research,
adding to the body of knowledge about the local geology and prospecting methods.64 Under the
guidance of West Coast inspector of mines Lloyd Jones, a survey party from the Mines
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Department was surveying all outcrops and preparing accurate plans of the mineralised portions
of the breccia to assist Buller Uranium in their search. Even so, the Mines Department later said
Beer was the first to sample the deposit on a “systematic basis”. Samples he cut were analysed at
the Dominion Laboratory but gave very poor results.65
J. B. Richardson, a UKAEA mining engineer who came to New Zealand to offer assistance and
advice on uranium prospecting, followed Beer. As a result of Richardson’s report, the UKAEA
agreed to finance sampling operations in the Buller Gorge, provided they would be given first
right of refusal over any uranium found in New Zealand.66 In January 1958 the Greymouth
Evening Star reported that as a result of the Richardson report, “a new prosperity is expected for
the West Coast”.67
After protracted negotiations between Buller Uranium and the UKAEA, a confidential
agreement between the Crown, the UKAEA and Buller Uranium was signed on 11 March
1959.68 The agreement arranged for the UKAEA to carry out a three-stage investigation of the
uranium deposits in that area, with each stage contingent on success in the previous stage. As
part of stage one, they set up an office and laboratory in Westport and in January 1959 Bill Hill
arrived to be their resident geologist. Unfortunately, however, this lengthy delay, caused by some
issues Buller Uranium had with the proposed agreement, meant that by the time the agreement
was signed the market for uranium was deteriorating. A Mines report later said that the UKAEA
“was persuaded to spend time and manpower on investigating the New Zealand uranium
potential at a time when it was already assured of all the supplies it needed for some years ahead,
and at a time when some other countries had more substantial claims for their resources to be
investigated”.69 The New Zealand Herald added that, by this time, “the Authority had lost much
of its interest in the deposit but felt that they had committed themselves and were determined to
fulfil their contract even if it was only implied”.70 It can be seen as representative of the
closeness between the two countries that it was almost seen as a given that New Zealand would
offer its uranium supplies first to the United Kingdom – but only if they were not needed
domestically. In turn, the United Kingdom felt a responsibility to New Zealand even after they
no longer had an immediate need for new uranium sources.
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The UKAEA funded the extension of Buller Uranium’s access road on the north side of Buller
Gorge, at the end of which prospectors set up a camp with bunkhouse, drilling equipment and a
rock crusher. The stage one drilling programme ran from September 1959 to March 1960. Ten
short adits, or tunnels, were drilled by jackhammer, and once a clean rock face was exposed, a
two-ton sample of rock was blasted out of the rock face onto collecting tarpaulins mounted on
wooden frames. The rock was put into drums then passed through a rock crusher, and sent to the
Geological Survey who broke the sample up for analysis by New Zealand and British
scientists.71 The results were disappointing: as a Mines Department report stated, the results
confirmed that “instead of the persistent mineralized horizon that had been assumed, there was
only a series of small, thick lenses of mineralized material spaced widely apart and, in general, of
low grade”.72 Accordingly, effective 15 August 1960, the UKAEA terminated their agreement.73
Fig 6.6: Lime and Marble staff pose outside the adit on the south side of the Buller Gorge, in 1960. Source: Jock
Brathwaite, reproduced with permission.
Prospecting, meanwhile, was continuing in other areas. Lime and Marble, with more government
funding, set up a new camp and drilled an adit on the south side of Buller Gorge74 which
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immediately yielded uranium oxide levels higher than those found in the UKAEA programme
north of the river.75
Uranium glut
By 1960, however, there was a glut of uranium on the world market, and prospects for sale of
any New Zealand-sourced uranium oxide were poor. Since New Zealand’s search for uranium
began in 1954, uranium had gone from relative scarcity to abundance on the global market. At
the same time, the predicted rapid climb in the use of nuclear reactors for electricity generation
had not eventuated. This, along with some countries’ stockpiling of uranium for defence
purposes, contributed to a reduction in demand for uranium – to the extent that some overseas
mines had closed. Western production of 43,000 tons per annum – coming mainly from the
United States and Canada with lesser amounts from South and Central Africa, Australia and
France – was exceeding demand, most of which still came from the military. Uranium-producing
mines in the West held contracts for delivery of uranium oxide concentrates to the UKAEA and
the USAEC under which the prices paid for uranium incorporated amortization of the mines and
treatment plants. When the contracts expired in the 1960s, any new producers of uranium oxide
would have to compete with producers with fully amortized plant, who were predicted to be able
to drop the price of uranium from $8-10 per lb to as low as $4 a lb of uranium oxide (this meant
that to make ore grade, any uranium-bearing material would have to be a persistent and
consistent deposit containing at least 0.4 per cent uranium oxide). In Australia, exploration for
and development of uranium prospects was virtually at a standstill and the Australian Bureau of
Mineral Resources advised New Zealand not to consider establishment of a uranium mining and
treatment industry until there was evidence of firm contracts at a suitable price.76 In the previous
five years, the New Zealand Government had spent £36,902 on financial assistance to uranium
prospectors (with a further £17,775 contributed by the UKAEA) and prospecting results did not
warrant further expenditure.77 In March 1960 the Mines Department recommended that no
further government money be spent on uranium prospecting.78
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West Coasters, along with prospectors such as Tas McKee of Lime & Marble Ltd, were
disappointed to the point of scorn with the Government decision. Gordon Williams sided with
the angry locals, and was reported as saying that the newly explored south side of the Buller
Gorge was “undoubtedly a most exciting prospect by any standard”.79 In a letter to Williams, the
Minister of Mines responded by saying, “It seems to me that uranium has in New Zealand
become invested with rather mystic attributes and, as you yourself have mentioned, publicity in
the press has contributed to this situation. When all is said and done the assessment of a uranium
prospect must be based on the same fundamental mining engineering principles as are applied to
any other mineral deposit and this seems on occasion to have been lost sight of.”80
Companies involved in prospecting on the West Coast opposed this. On 23 March 1960 Buller
Uranium and Uranium Valley consolidated their opposition to the recent Government decision
and took a deputation to the Minister of Mines. The Minister heard their complaint and asked for
a written submission.81 Lime and Marble and Uranium Valley responded by jointly preparing a
proposal for a comprehensive exploration and prospecting plan for the Buller/Paparoa uranium
province. The plan included expansion of consultant and laboratory services, drilling,
radiometric surveys, geological mapping, mineralogical and petrological work and field
prospecting and was expected to cost around £250,000. They said that “if the programme
suggested is adopted it will be in line with what has been carried through in other
Commonwealth countries, where Government actively encourages prospecting.”82 But when
Cabinet met on 20 June 1960, on the recommendation of the Minister of Mines, they declined
the requests for additional prospecting funds and for the companies’ proposal for a uranium
prospecting and exploration programme.83
Lime and Marble continued to push for an expanded exploration programme and proving of the
West Coast uranium deposits. In December 1960 Tas McKee suggested that New Zealand seek a
mission from the International Atomic Energy Agency to visit New Zealand in connection with
its uranium deposits84 and in 1963 Lime and Marble’s chairman suggested to Clarence Beeby,
New Zealand ambassador to France, “that New Zealand approach EURATOM [the European
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Atomic Energy Community] with a proposal to carry out a proving programme, in return for
which they gain an option to buy the output of a mutually acceptable mining company”.85
Renewed interest in West Coast uranium
Lime and Marble retained their interest in uranium prospecting. When the New Zealand
Electricity Department’s 1964 Power Plan flagged a first nuclear power station in the 1970s,
Lime and Marble resumed their push to prove the Buller Gorge uranium deposit.86
Since the 1955-60 programme of exploration, some New Zealand officials, including those at the
Mines Department, had suggested it would be possible for New Zealand to manufacture its own
reactor fuel by processing uranium-bearing ores to uranium oxide in New Zealand. This was
considered by the Electricity Department to be an attractive proposition, given that the 1966
Power Plan estimated a future nuclear power station spending £5-6 million a year on imported
uranium fuel.87 Furthermore, based on known reserves, a world shortage of uranium was
predicted in the 1970s. If new deposits of the present minimum grade were not found then lower
grade or less extensive deposits – like those known to exist in the Buller Gorge – might become
commercial to work.88 Globally, there was increasing optimism in the uranium industry and the
search for new uranium deposits was intensifying. As forecasts of future nuclear power capacity
were revised upwards, so were the predicted requirements for uranium. In 1967, 120,000-
170,000 MW of installed nuclear electricity generating capacity was forecast for 1980, meaning
that some 500,000 tons of uranium needed to be found by 1981. As the result of projected
demand, global exploration was at an all-time high.89
The drive to resume investigations of New Zealand’s uranium deposits intensified. In February
1966 the New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee recommended to the Minerals Resources
Committee that “in view of the increasingly wide knowledge and predictions for the future
demands for uranium, a full appraisal of the New Zealand deposits should be given priority”.90 In
August 1966 a party of six of Australia’s leading nuclear scientists visited New Zealand for a
week. The leader of the group, Mr M. C. Timbs, reportedly provoked locals and the media by
predicting that world price for uranium could reach US$30 within 10 years, making West Coast
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deposits economic; saying it might be possible for New Zealand to supply Australia with heavy
water made at Wairakei and for Australia to supply New Zealand with uranium; and saying
“both Australia and New Zealand were on the threshold of nuclear power and a lot of expertise
had to be developed. Exchange visits were made on the highest possible level and these would be
stepped up.” This made the front page of The Press – the fact that someone from overseas was
proclaiming New Zealand’s prospects for uranium mining was taken a lot more seriously than a
New Zealander making the same claim.91 In October, the New Zealand Geological Survey put
forward to the Mineral Resources Committee a four-year proposal (1967-70) to recommence and
extend the investigation into New Zealand’s uranium deposits.92
In mid-1966, Uranium Valley had applied to renew their mineral prospecting warrant over the
Bullock Creek-Pororari River area, necessitating the Mines Department to review its policy with
regard to uranium prospecting. While previous prospectors had not discovered any economic
uranium deposits on the West Coast, more work needed to be done to either conclude that such
deposits did not exist or to identify lower grade deposits, or high-grade deposits of smaller
extent, that might become economic if uranium prices were to rise. Uranium Valley’s application
was for the one area where, in the opinion of the Mines Department, more work was needed –
the uranium mineralisation was different and not well understood, and more advanced
prospecting, including drilling, was required.93
The Mines Department, however, knew that Uranium Valley Limited did not have the necessary
financial and technical competence to undertake such a programme, so recommended to the
Mineral Resources Committee that uranium prospecting officially recommence, with the first
stage being financial support for Uranium Valley’s investigation of the siltstone beds of the
Hawks Crag Breccia exposed in the Pororari River. Other money was made available for
additional reconnaissance work, and for more detailed investigations of the South Buller
Gorge.94 It is important to note that financial assistance to mining operations, in the form of
loans and grants, was part of standard Mines Department practice, but the total amounts loaned
or granted were not great, and the relative support for the uranium prospecting, as compared to
other mining operations, was significant.
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The following year, on the invitation of Lime and Marble, which was now a 50 per cent
shareholder in Uranium Valley as well as parent company of Buller Uranium,95 Australian
company CRA Exploration purchased an option to look for new uranium locations in the Buller
Gorge, Pororari River and the Fox River mouth areas. Between April and September 1967 CRA
spent $A37,299 on exploration, including an extensive helicopter scintillometer survey to
measure radiation intensity. The survey found no new uranium prospects – rather it confirmed
that the main mineralised areas had been located by previous ground surveys. CRA determined
that mining these areas would not be economical. 96
In October 1968, following requests from Lime and Marble, the Ministers of Mines and Finance
approved grants of $17,887.20 to drive two adits at Uranium Valley’s Paparoa sites (the grant
being on the basis of $4 for every $1 spent by the company) and a further $8,340 to drive a
300-foot (about 90 metres) adit on a claim held by Buller Uranium in the Buller Gorge.97 By
now, the health effects of working with radioactive materials were more widely known and the
Ministry of Health’s National Radiation Laboratory provided radiation monitoring badges for
prospectors working in the adits. Drillers were alerted to “the necessity for good personal
hygiene both bodily and with respect to clothing” and, to avoid the cancer-risk of inhaling
radioactive rock particles with their cigarettes, were told that “hand rolled cigarette smoking”
should be “limited to cigarettes rolled before commencement of a shift”.98
While the tunnelling revealed no immediate possibility of economic mineralisation in the
Pororari area, the adits driven in the until-now neglected south Buller area indicated ore-grade
material that warranted further investigation. Buller Uranium proposed a south Buller drilling
programme at a cost of $65,280.99 The Mines Department supported the proposal, and on 12
October 1970 Cabinet approved a contingently repayable grant of up to $41,640 for Buller
Uranium, at the rate of one government dollar for every dollar the company spent.100 Because
this new subsidy rate (previous grants had been at $4 : $1) left a greater financial burden on the
company, they sought outside help and reached an agreement for a joint venture whereby
Carpentaria Exploration Co (an Australian company owned by Mt Isa Mines) would fund and
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supervise the drilling in return for an option over mining rights.101 Drilling started in early 1971
and two shifts of drillers operated a diamond drill 24 hours a day for nearly two months.102 Stage
one of the programme was completed by August 1971, when drill core assays were sent to
Australia for analysis.103 Once again, the results from the drilling were not encouraging and a
planned second stage did not proceed.104
Growing international interest
Investigations until now had tended to progress when global demand for uranium was high, and
come to a standstill when demand was low, or, in the case of international companies, when they
had better prospects in other countries. As a result, the West Coast’s uranium deposits had still
not been proven – no-one knew with any certainty the full geographical extent or concentration
of New Zealand’s uranium reserves.
One salient fact was that the growth in demand for uranium never seemed to catch up with
projections. In 1971, contracts were being signed at US$5 a lb of uranium oxide; almost half the
price received in 1968. Demand for uranium depended on growth of the nuclear power industry,
which tended to lag behind projected growth because electricity generation by conventional oil-
and gas-fired power stations continued to be cheaper than that produced by nuclear power.105 At
the same time, several uranium-producing countries had built up significant uranium stockpiles
and it was feared that they would put this on the market at even lower prices.106
Looking to the future, however, a predicted shortfall of recoverable uranium in the Western
world of one million tonnes by 2000 meant that substantial new uranium deposits needed to be
under development by the mid-1980s.107 West Coasters remained optimistic about their uranium
reserves. Aware of the new demand projections, in June 1972 Mr Blanchfield, MP for Westland,
asked the Minister of Fuel and Power, “what preparations have been made to utilise the uranium
deposit in the Buller Gorge”. Mr Gander replied that the Government had no proposals to
                                                 
101 Mines Department to Solicitor General, 1 June 1971, AATJ 6090, W4897/242, 23/2/1220, ANZ.
102 File note in AATJ 6090, W5152/131, 12/46/1156, ANZ.
103 File note in CABH 3391, CH58, 6/28, 1957-1979, ANZ.
104 Buller Uranium to Mines Department, 16 November 1971, AATJ 6090, W4897/242, 23/2/1220, ANZ.
105 Mining Journal, 3 December 1971, AATJ 6090, W4897/102, 5/22, part 5, ANZ.
106 Mining Magazine, September 1971, AATJ 6090, W4897/102, 5/22, part 5, ANZ.
107 Australian Atomic Energy Commission 22nd Annual Report 1973-74, p10, AATJ 6090, W4897/102 5/22-1, part
1, ANZ.
168
recover uranium from the Buller Gorge, reiterating that the region’s uranium concentrations were
too low to be considered an economic source of uranium.108
Some international companies disagreed. In keeping with the growing global demand for
uranium, companies from Italy, the United States and Germany contacted New Zealand officials
to express their interest in prospecting for uranium in New Zealand.109  Closer investigations,
however, revealed that the most promising uranium provinces were already held by Lime and
Marble and their subsidiaries. In April 1973 the German company Uranerzbergbau-GmbH & Co
KG (Uranerz) approached Lime and Marble.110 Uranerz was a government-financed company
searching for uranium supplies for West Germany. In October that year representatives of Lime
& Marble and Uranerz met with the New Zealand Government. Following negotiations with
Lime and Marble, Uranerz was prepared to prospect areas in the Buller Gorge and Paparoa
Ranges. 111
In their first year in New Zealand, Uranerz planned a $150,000 prospecting programme
including aerial surveys and surface exploration. In the drafted joint venture agreement Uranerz
would have financial responsibility for the venture and Lime and Marble would be given the
option to take up to 40 per cent of the equity capital when the uranium was mined. The plan was
to mine the ore and treat it close to the site, exporting the extracted uranium oxides.
In 1974 the Government approved the joint venture, subject to New Zealand equity in any
mining operation being set at a minimum of 50 per cent, and the negotiation of suitable terms for
export of the uranium concentrate. Negotiations continued throughout 1975, with particular
emphasis on the amount of uranium ore that would be available for export. At this time, serious
consideration was being given to the need for nuclear power to contribute to New Zealand’s
growing electricity demand; the discovery of a supply of uranium in New Zealand would impact
on the choice of nuclear reactor. Based on current demand projections and the installation of a
natural uranium fuelled reactor, the Commissioner of Energy Resources recommended that in the
event of a major uranium discovery, a supply of at least 5,000 tonnes should be reserved for local
use.112 In the longer term, the New Zealand Electricity Department estimated that 20,000 tonnes
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of uranium would be needed to meet the 30-year lifetime needs of thermal reactors planned to
come on line before 2000, with the expectation that fast breeder reactors – that produce more
fissile material than they consume – would be introduced in 2000.113
After further negotiations with Uranerz it was proposed they could export 25 per cent of the first
10,000 tonnes of uranium concentrate produced and 50 per cent thereafter. In March 1977
Uranerz agreed to the export formula provided the New Zealand Government purchase uranium
from Uranerz at world market prices. New Zealand Treasury, aware that the price of uranium
had been very unstable with recent steep price rises, were concerned that “New Zealand could be
faced with a rapidly escalating price which it would have to pay for an indigenous resource – and
which would not bear any relationship to costs of production in New Zealand.”114 Concerns were
also raised over New Zealand’s obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
At the same time, Australia was grappling with the issue of uranium mining. In September 1977
the Australian Council of Trade Unions, led by Bob Hawke, confronted the Australian Liberal-
National Coalition Government with a demand for a referendum to decide whether uranium
mining should go ahead at the Ranger mine in Kakadu National Park, as the Government was
proposing, but the Government rejected their demand outright. The Australian Labor Party was
also voicing dissent. In a televised statement on 4 September 1977, Labor Party leader Gough
Whitlam attacked the Government’s decision, implying that the course Australia was following
could add to the risk of nuclear war. He also said that the decision would add to poisonous
nuclear wastes for which no safe disposal and storage technology had been devised.115
Back in New Zealand, negotiations between the Government and Uranerz continued and
agreement on an export formula was finally reached in early 1978. Uranerz began their on-
ground investigation programme in March. After five years of negotiating, Uranerz’ involvement
with the West Coast uranium was short-lived. The results of two months’ fieldwork were
disappointing and they surrendered their prospecting licence in 1979.
Conclusion
Starting in 1955, and continuing for more than two decades, New Zealand individuals and
mining companies prospected for uranium and the New Zealand Government offered them
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substantial financial support. The reason the discovery of uranium in New Zealand did not lead
to the establishment of a uranium mining industry was economic. Uranium was found in various
locations on the West Coast of the South Island but never in quantities that would make its
extraction economically worthwhile.
This study has found no opposition to more than two decades of uranium prospecting, which
could have led to an industry providing uranium to the UKAEA or to a planned nuclear power
plant north of Auckland. As demonstrated in chapter five, the 1950s and 60s saw growing
opposition to the testing of nuclear bombs, particularly after the British nuclear testing
programme was completed in 1958. This antipathy to bomb testing, however, did not extend to
efforts to establish an industry mining uranium, which as well as being fuel for nuclear energy
generation was used in nuclear weapons.
Uranerz’s investigations in the late 1970s turned out to be the last focused investigation for
uranium in New Zealand. After 25 years and hundreds of thousands of dollars spent looking for
and attempting to prove the West Coast’s uranium resources, no economic deposits were ever
found. At the time that Uranerz abandoned their search for uranium, the mineral was no longer
considered important for New Zealand – a substantial natural gas field had been discovered in
offshore Taranaki, and nuclear power stations had been deleted from the New Zealand Power
plan in favour of gas turbines. It would not be until after the introduction of New Zealand’s
nuclear free legislation that mining radioactive minerals would be seen in a sinister light.
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Chapter 7
Thereʼs strontium-90 in my milk:
Safety and public exposure to radiation
“The early pioneers learned by bitter experience that they were using potentially lethal
agents, and many of them paid with their lives for the knowledge they had gained in
exploring this new field. But their death was not in vain and their suffering helped to
guide those who came after them.”
George Roth, director, Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory, 19521
“While my mother tried on several pairs of shoes herself I would be ʻplayingʼ with my feet in the X-
ray machine. I had such fun; I can still see those little metatarsi going in, out, in again. I didnʼt ever
want to leave the shop. To see parts of your own skeleton was a major childhood event and it was
a sad day for childrenʼs psyches when such a fun thing had to stop.”
Ruth Brassington, 20052
While attitudes to the possibility of a uranium mining industry and nuclear power generation in
New Zealand were positive, there was, at the same time, a growing awareness of radiation
hazards. Most public concern was focused on hazards from radioactive fallout from the nuclear
weapons being exploded in the Pacific but, as awareness about the genetic effects of radiation
grew, this concern extended to other exposures to radioactivity. Hermann Muller had in 1946
won a Nobel Prize for his discovery that X-rays could cause genetic mutations.3 By the late
1950s it was acknowledged that there was no safe threshold below which radiation did not
threaten genetic damage, and some fission products – including strontium-90, strontium-89,
caesium-137 and iodine-131 – could cause an increase in a population’s rates of bone cancer,
leukaemia, throat cancer and other cancers. The realisation that any radiation exposure was
hazardous focused attention on unnecessary X-rays, and nuclear accidents, like the 1957
Windscale disaster, in which a nuclear reactor caught fire in one of Britain’s two plutonium
production reactors, raised concerns about the safety of nuclear power generation.4
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Radiation protection legislation
The Health Department took the initial lead in warning New Zealanders about the risks from
exposure to radiation. From the 1920s, the Department of Health had been drawing the attention
of New Zealand’s hospitals and medical practitioners to international X-ray and radium
protection recommendations. In 1947 the DSIR’s Tracer Elements Committee, which was set up
to deal with health and safety issues arising from the use of cyclotron-produced radioactive
isotopes being imported from the United States, circulated a document called “Procedures for
Supply and use of Radioisotopes in New Zealand”, along with copies of a USAEC circular on
“Health Protection in Handling Radioisotopes”.5 The American guidelines required: workers to
wear film badges; the monitoring of the blood count of workers; weekly laboratory checks for
radiation contamination; the safe storage of radioactive material; and safe waste disposal. In
1948 the committee circulated copies of a British manual on “Control of Health Hazards from
Radioactive Materials”.6
It was not until the 1940s that New Zealand had its own legislation concerning radiation
protection. As covered in chapter 3, the Electrical Wiring (X-Ray) Regulations, which were
introduced in 1944, required the registration of all X-ray plants and set out technical
requirements for the safety of X-ray equipment. The Radioactive Substances Act 1949, which
was drawn up after collaboration between the Dominion X-ray and Radium Laboratory and the
College of Radiologists, required a licence from the Minister of Health to use, own or sell
radioactive substances or irradiating apparatus. The Act also set up a Radiological Advisory
Council to provide the Government with specialist advice on all matters concerning radiation
and to licence people controlling radioactive substances and radiation-emitting apparatus for
medical, scientific or industrial purposes. The Council consisted of three radiologists, a senior
member of the DSIR, a nominee of the University of New Zealand, a health physicist and the
Deputy Director-General of Health, Harold Turbott, as chairman.7
The Radiological Advisory Council, which had its first meeting in April 1950, recommended
that the Minister of Health issue Regulations under the Act. The Radiation Protection
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Regulations 1951 were not prescriptive and included no code of practice, but said that no person
shall be subjected to a maximum permissible exposure (except in the case of a patient being
exposed for medical reasons) and that the licence holder is responsible before the law for any
breach of the Regulations.8 So while the Regulations advised practitioners on what not to do,
how they arranged to meet with these requirements was up to them. In 1951 the Department of
Health issued the detailed Recommendations for Protection from Radiation Hazards which was
distributed to hospitals around New Zealand. The publication described X-rays as “potentially
lethal agents” that “should be treated accordingly” and gave recommendations on how to set up
rooms containing irradiating apparatus, and how to protect medical staff from X-rays and
radioactive substances.9
The Radiological Advisory Council was proactive in promoting safety and in 1952 issued a
survey of radiation hazards in New Zealand. The publication, written by George Roth, director
of the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory, informed practitioners about the type of
hazards associated with working with radiation. Roth pointed out that although there were 650
X-ray plants in use in New Zealand, there were only 45 qualified radiologists or radiotherapists,
meaning that most X-ray plants were operated by people “who cannot be expected to have expert
knowledge of the potential dangers of X-ray work and of the methods which make it safe to use
ionising radiations”. While acknowledging that most radiation workers were conscious of the
need for protection, he said there were still some radiation workers who “either believe that they
are personally immune from the injurious effects of excessive exposure to ionizing radiation or
even profess to deride the idea of danger altogether”.10 Roth wrote of two general practitioners
and one radiologist who died as the result of radiation injuries as well as about a dozen cases of
“self-inflicted radiation injuries of various degrees of severity” in X-ray workers, including
radiologists, radiographers, medical practitioners, the matron of a small hospital, a chiropractor,
a dentist and a university student.11
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Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory
The Department of Health had taken on greater responsibility for radiation protection in 1951,
when it took over most functions of the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory from the
British Empire Cancer Campaign. The Department of Health put more resources into the
laboratory and between 1950 and 1953 its staff increased from seven to 22, under the
directorship of George Roth. Jim McCahon, one of the physicists involved in the 1945-46
uranium surveys, was appointed physicist in charge of the radioactive substances section.
Following his work making and operating Geiger counters for the DSIR’s uranium survey,
McCahon had gained an MSc in physics from Otago University. He had then been seconded to
the Atomic Energy Research Establishment in Harwell, England for two years, where he had
gained experience in radiation instrumentation and the measurement of radioactive materials.12
The Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory worked closely with radiation workers in
hospitals and private practice, taking the approach that radiation safety “cannot come about by
laws and regulations alone: it can only be achieved through the intelligent co-operation of the
radiation workers themselves, who have realized the nature of the hazard, and the importance of
taking adequate precautions”.13 The Laboratory’s specific roles included monitoring and
controlling the importation of all radioactive substances for all users in New Zealand. It also
carried out the routine processing of about 20,000 radiation test films annually. The Laboratory’s
diagnostic section looked after radiation protection at the country’s X-ray plants, with staff
visiting each installation at least once every three years to measure the level of scattered
radiation, check protective barriers, make output measurements and make recommendations for
improvement in practice and technology. The radioactive substances section inspected the
premises of anyone wanting a licence to import and use radioactive material, was responsible for
the safe use of radioactive substances in clinical, industrial and research work in New Zealand,
and supplied all the radon used in New Zealand from its radon extraction plant. As described in
Andrew McEwan’s history of the Laboratory, the remote-controlled radon plant allowed for the
radon gases emanating from a radium solution to be trapped and compressed into tiny gold tubes.
During the 1950s, the Laboratory fulfilled 60 to 90 orders per year for radon supplied for
medical use in needles, seeds, phials of ointment and special applicators. The demand for radon
declined through the late 1950s and 60s, and the radon plant was closed in 1967, by which time
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supplies of radioactive gold-198 seeds were available from Lucas Heights in Australia. The
therapy section made regular visits to the country’s X-ray therapy installations to calibrate
equipment and advise on problems in radiophysics.14
X-rays and medical
Despite growing public concern about exposure to radioactive fallout from bomb tests, the New
Zealand population’s greatest exposure to artificial radiation came from X-rays. As the potential
dangers of radiation exposure came to light, the use of X-rays came under closer scrutiny,
particularly the non-medical use of X-rays, for example, in shoe shops.
Table 7.1: Number of registered X-ray plants in New Zealand on 31 March 1957.
OwnershipPurpose for which X-ray plants are used:
Public Private
Total
Radiographic or fluoroscopic 219 95 314
Therapeutic 25 28 53
Dental 52 486 538
Chiropractic and naturopathic (diagnostic) - 51 51
Shoe fitting - 78 78
Veterinary 4 19 23
Industrial 6 1 7
Miscellaneous purposes (educational, research, testing, demonstrations, etc.) 20 - 20
TOTAL 326 758 1084
Source: Report to UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 17 February 1958, H1, 26758, 108/11,
1957-58, ANZ .
By 1957 New Zealand had 60 radiologists, 1,084 X-ray plants, 1,089 persons licensed to use X-
ray plants for specified purposes, and 311 people licensed to use radioactive substances in
specified amounts.15 Turbott boasted that New Zealand’s radiation protection legislation was
“the most effective within the Commonwealth, if not the world”. He was right in saying that
                                                 
14 Report to UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 17 February 1958, HI, 26758, 108/11,
1957-58, ANZ; McEwan 1983, pp58-9, 77.
15 Report to UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, 17 February 1958, HI, 26758, 108/11,
1957-58, ANZ.
176
New Zealand was a world leader – in 1958 only Sweden and New Zealand had a full record of
diagnostic X-ray installations.16
While safety concerns about X-rays had so far been focused on radiation workers, there was
growing awareness of the potential risk to those receiving the X-rays. The total radiation dose
received from a diagnostic X-ray had dropped dramatically since X-rays were first used, but
there were still X-rays being taken which had dubious benefit. In the middle of the twentieth
century, tuberculosis was still one of the diseases most likely to kill New Zealanders (after heart
disease, stroke and pneumonia) and an X-ray screening programme was introduced in an effort
to curb the epidemic.17 The screening programme used mass miniature radiography (MMR), a
cheap form of X-ray photography in which up to one hundred 1-inch chest X-ray pictures could
be taken every hour. MMR was introduced to New Zealand in 1941, when 2,204 Wellington
factory workers and secondary school students were screened, and an active tuberculosis rate of
0.6 percent was discovered. The first mobile X-ray unit was introduced in 1947 and by 1957
there were nine miniature X-ray units travelling around New Zealand by caravan, taking an
annual total of 242,332 miniature X-ray pictures, and identifying 383 new cases of
tuberculosis.18 That same year, the question of mass chest X-rays as a method of finding new
tuberculosis cases was reviewed by the College of Radiologists. The review committee stated,
“[i]n the case of routine X-ray examinations of the chest, the small dose involved is justified
provided that a significant number of new cases is being discovered”.19
In the United States, however, the Public Health Service recommended in November 1957 that
the mass X-ray method of finding tuberculosis cases be discontinued. In Australia, the National
Radiation Advisory Committee recommended in July 1958 that there be an immediate reduction
in the amount of radiation being spread by the medical use of X-rays, including a review of the
need for mass chest X-ray surveys.20 In New Zealand, however, MMR continued into the 1970s.
In 1969, the Department of Health advised medical officers of health that MMR programmes be
concentrated on “high risk” groups – identified as including Pacific Islanders, Maori, freezing
workers and psychiatric patients – with every town with a population of 100,000 or more being
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visited at least every six months.21 A 1972 issue of Health, the magazine of the Department of
Health, cheerfully advised that “all persons over the age of 15 years have an annual X-ray”. By
this time, the 370,370 people X-rayed over the previous year had resulted in 102 active cases of
the disease being found.22
Genetic studies, by now, had revealed the particular vulnerability of the developing cells of
children and foetuses to radiation damage, but the risks of radiation were still not fully
understood or quantified. One use of medical X-rays that was becoming controversial was X-
rays of pregnant women, which though sometimes used in New Zealand were never standard
practice. In 1957 Australian newspapers reported that the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission had advised the Federal Government that “the exposure of pregnant women to X-
rays may incline the child in later life to the disease of leukaemia”.23 In June 1957 it was
reported that a decision of the Board of the Sydney Women’s Hospital meant that expectant
mothers were no longer receiving routine X-rays.24 In New Zealand, while foetal X-rays were
never routine, it was considered safe well into the 1970s for pregnant women to have general X-
rays. In 1971 the Department of Health responded to queries from MMR staff about X-raying
pregnant women by saying “there is no risk to the unborn child at any stage in pregnancy during
the taking of an X-ray on a MMR Unit. The only radiation involved would be scattered radiation
and it is doubtful whether this would even reach the uterus.”25 Children had, however, long been
recognised as being vulnerable, with the Department of Health in 1958 recommending against
the routine mass X-raying of children. The main stated concern about children being X-rayed
was radiation received to the gonad area.26 It is curious, therefore, that in 1958 it was recognised
that an MMR chest X-ray could affect the gonads of a child but in 1971 it was not acknowledged
that an MMR X-ray of a pregnant woman’s chest could affect the foetus. Another major
childhood source of radiation exposure was from dental X-rays, and in 1957 the Radiological
Advisory Council met with representatives of the Dental Association of New Zealand, to take
steps to ensure that “radiation received by school children dental X-rays was reduced to a
minimum”. There was public concern on the issue, but in July 1957 newspapers responded to the
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Council’s move by reporting that parents “need have no fear of allowing their children to
undergo dental X-rays”.27
A major non-medical use of X-rays took place in shoe shops. In the 1940s and 50s X-ray
fluoroscopy devices called pedascopes were the norm in many Western shoe shops, allowing the
customer to look at the bones of their feet inside a given shoe, to see how well it fitted. There
was no medical benefit from the use of pedascopes, and children used them to play with as well
as for having their shoes fitted. Ruth Brassington, born in 1943, recalls using a pedascope in
Christchurch:
It was towards the end of the 1940s when I first recall placing my feet
in an X-ray machine in a shoe shop. That was what we did when we tried on
new shoes (all real leather, made in England), to see if there was room
left in front of our toes for growth. Not only did my mother and the shop
assistant look down the viewing tube to check my feet; the tube height
was adjustable so children could get it low enough to look down
themselves. While my mother tried on several pairs of shoes herself I
would be “playing” with my feet in the X-ray machine. I had such fun; I
can still see those little metatarsi going in, out, in again. I didn’t
ever want to leave the shop. To see parts of your own skeleton was a
major childhood event and it was a sad day for children’s psyches when
such a fun thing had to stop.28
By the time of Roth’s 1952 survey of radiation hazards in New Zealand it was well known that
“excessive exposure to radiation may affect the growth of bones and thus interfere with the
normal foot development of children who are fluoroscoped repeatedly when being fitted with
new shoes”.29 In 1952 the Radiological Advisory Council approved a warning notice to all
owners of shoefitting X-ray plants, advising them of the hazards associated with these
machines.30 In a 1954 interview about radiation hazards with the New Zealand Listener, the
American Nobel Prize-winning chemist and nuclear critic, Linus Pauling, called shoe-fitting X-
ray plants “really terrible, a crime”.31 Nonetheless, their use continued – a 1957 survey counted
78 shoe-fitting X-ray machines in New Zealand.32 Controls were introduced, however, and in
February 1957 Roth reported that “[a]ll shoefitting plants have been reduced in their output to
less than about 15 r/min at the level of the foot. They have been equipped with time switches
which limit the exposure to about 7 seconds and make it impossible to give a further exposure
during the next 35-40 seconds; overlapping lead-rubber aprons have been fitted over the aperture
into which the customer puts his foot, and warning notices have been affixed to the shoefitting
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X-ray plants, prohibiting their use by children”.33 Through the rest of the 1950s and into the
1960s, shoe-fitting X-ray machines were kept under regular surveillance and by 1964 there were
only 16 machines still in use. The last machines were removed from shoe shops in 1969.34
The Department of Health kept up to date with international practice with regard to radiation
protection and updated legislation and regulations as appropriate. The Radiation Protection Act
of 1965 was followed by the Radiation Protection Regulations 1973 and the Transport of
Radioactive Materials Regulations 1973.35
Monitoring radioactive fallout
Although the contribution of radioactive fallout to an individual’s annual radiation dose was low
in comparison to radiation from X-rays, it was an emotive issue, as fallout was associated with
bomb testing, and it was a new phenomenon about which little was known. Concern about
fallout was widespread and not limited to the emerging peace movement. While many of the
fission products deposited in New Zealand and around the world had short half-lives and soon
decayed to harmless non-radioactive isotopes, longer-lived radionuclides, such as isotopes of
caesium and strontium, were also produced in high yields in the explosions.36
Concerns about radiation risks led to industrial action. In 1956 waterside workers in Wellington
declined to unload a Japanese vessel until it had been tested for radiation. (The test results were
normal.)37 In 1957 the Otahuhu Branch of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants passed
a resolution asking that all fish landed from commercial craft be tested for radioactivity.38 In
1961 the Auckland Combined Waterfront Union passed a resolution requesting the Department
of Health ensure that suitable equipment be provided in Auckland to conduct immediate tests on
any radioactive material coming into the Port of Auckland, and that a competent person be
available to conduct tests.39 There was some official information to counter these fears of
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radioactivity. An article in The Press pointed out, for example, that the British population was
receiving much more radiation from the medical use of X-rays than from the atomic energy
programme or fallout from bomb tests.40
Table 7.2: Important fallout radioisotopes and their half-lives.
Radioisotope Half life Emitter
Strontium-90 (90Sr) 28 years B
Strontium-89 (89Sr) 52 days B
Caesium-137 (137Cs) 30 years gamma
Iodine-131 (131I) 8 days B and gamma
Barium-140 (140Ba) 12.8 days gamma
Initial fallout measurements in New Zealand were led by scientific curiosity, but as concerns
grew about the impact of radioactive fallout products on humanity, more widespread and
systematic surveys emerged. In February 1955 the USAEC released a report on radioactive
fallout hazards, identifying the main radioactive hazard as strontium-90, but noting that there
was no cause for concern from existing fallout levels. The British Himsworth Report, submitted
in May 1956, highlighted the hazards to human beings of ionizing radiation from all sources –
natural, medical, industrial and military – but also carried a warning about strontium-90, alerting
that it could reach harmful levels if nuclear bomb tests continued. Many of the fallout monitoring
projects of the 1950s therefore focused on measuring levels of the fallout product strontium-90.41
The General Assembly of the United Nations had, in 1955, established a Scientific Committee
on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) to examine the effects of radiation on human
beings and their environment. The initial intention of setting up the Committee was to deflect a
proposal calling for the end to all nuclear explosions, but the Committee endured, and presented
several influential reports compiling radiation information from contributing countries.42
New Zealand was involved in several international programmes to monitor radioactive fallout,
some of them in cooperation with the countries responsible for the bomb testing. From 1953 to
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1966, as part of a project cooperating with the USAEC, the United States Department of
Agriculture measured strontium-90 levels in soils from several New Zealand locations, providing
a record of fallout levels in New Zealand. Staff from the DSIR Soil Bureau took the soil samples
and forwarded them to the United States for analysis.43 This monitoring was part of the wider
USAEC Project Gabriel, a secret survey to evaluate the radioactive hazards from the fallout of
debris from nuclear weapons detonated in warfare. The survey, which began in 1953, looked at
the distribution of strontium-90 by monitoring soil, air and water at about 150 American and
international stations.44
As part of a worldwide monitoring programme, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory of
the United States Department of Energy began monthly measurements of strontium-90 in
rainwater at Wellington in 1959. The USAEC also contracted the Institute of Nuclear Sciences to
measure concentrations of various fission products – including strontium-90, caesium-137 and
barium-140 – in Wellington rainwater. This monitoring took place from 1959 to 1970. The
Institute of Nuclear Sciences continued its own measurements until 1984, by which time levels
of these radionuclides had become undetectable. As part of its worldwide fallout monitoring
programme, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority monitored strontium-90 in Ohakea
rainwater from 1955 to 1965, with caesium-137 monitored after that.45
Other monitoring programmes were locally initiated. As part of the International Geophysical
Year programme in 1957, the DSIR set up a number of stations in and about New Zealand to
collect rainwater and determine its radioactivity. Monthly rainwater collections were sent to the
Dominion Physical Laboratory for evaporation, processing and counting.46 At the end of 1958,
the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory took responsibility for the DSIR network of eight
monitoring stations, in New Zealand (Auckland, Wellington, Havelock North, Greymouth,
Christchurch and Invercargill), Fiji and Campbell Island, which they used to continue measuring
levels of strontium isotopes and total beta activity. In 1962 sites were added at Kaitaia, New
Plymouth and Dunedin. Monitoring by the National Radiation Laboratory (the name of the
Dominion X-ray and Radium Laboratory from 1963) continued until 1985, by which time
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detectable levels were very low, and monitoring was reduced to the stations at Kaitaia, Hokitika
and Rarotonga.47
Willard Libby, the American scientist who pioneered radiocarbon dating, wrote to Athol Rafter,
Director of the DSIR Division of Nuclear Sciences, in July 1957. In his role with the USAEC,
Libby asked Rafter if he would collect samples associated with Project Sunshine, a secret study
of worldwide radioactive fallout patterns that involved the analysis of radionuclides in samples
of soil, plants and animals, and, in some cases (though not, as far as I have discovered, in New
Zealand) human bones and teeth.48 The USAEC contract with the Institute of Nuclear Sciences
stated that the aim of the project was “to study the nature of the precipitation mechanism and the
variation of local rates of precipitation with seasons,” with results to be given to Libby in order
“to help settle questions of global atmospheric circulation”.49 The contract was actually
concerned with the transport of radioactive debris about the globe. The Division of Nuclear
Sciences was already monitoring several radionuclides and Libby’s request involved little extra
effort on the part of the Division.  The USAEC accepted the Division of Nuclear Sciences’
request for support, supplying capital items to the value of US$12,880. The programme involved
collecting rainwater at Gracefield, near Wellington, and after each rain determining the
concentration of strontium-90, caesium-137 and barium-140. One of these radionuclides,
barium-140, has a half-life of only 13 days, and detection was designed to try to show the speed
of fallout from recent bomb tests. The contract expired in 1962.50
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also funded some fallout monitoring carried
out by the Institute of Nuclear Sciences. In 1962, The Institute of Nuclear Sciences applied for
funding for a project to investigate the distribution of the radionuclides strontium-90, caesium-
137, cerium-144, zirconium-95, promethium-147 and antimony-125 in a series of ocean water
profiles and surface water stations in the South Pacific. A further aim of the research was to
measure the assimilation of some radionuclides by marine organisms.51 The IAEA funding paid
for equipment to the value of US$9,780 and supplies of US$2,660, which were used to measure
radioactive elements in the water of the South Pacific, to allow distribution patterns of fallout
from nuclear tests to be studied and correlated with measurements already being made of other
radioactive elements, such as carbon-14 and tritium. Although not part of the research contract,
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the DSIR noted that the equipment would also allow the Institute to study the build-up of
radioactive substances, particularly strontium-90, in the teeth of young children. By this time, the
Dental Research Institute had an extensive collection of teeth of children living in known areas
of known soil types. In 1963, William Hamilton, head of the DSIR, advised the Minister of
DSIR that it was proposed “to cooperate with the Dental Research Institute and Soil Bureau, in
an update study of this important and dangerous fission product”.52 The Institute of Nuclear
Sciences contract was renewed on 8 April 1964 for another $2,600 for supplies.
Some fears of fallout were vague and generalised, but the way strontium got into the food chain
and could find its way into human bones was a source of more concrete fears about human
health, particularly in children. New Zealand had long prided itself on producing enough milk,
meat and agricultural produce to feed itself and export to Mother England. Milk from the
country’s dairy herd was promoted as an essential foodstuff for infants and daily milk had been
provided free to kindergarten and primary schoolchildren since 1937. In the 1950s, however, it
was revealed that New Zealand’s milk, credited with building “better babies and strong bodies,
bones and teeth in growing children”53 was also providing New Zealand children with daily
doses of radioactive strontium-90 and caesium-137. These new radioisotopes – they did not exist
on earth before the hydrogen bomb tests that started in 1952 – were mistaken by the human body
for calcium and stored in bones alongside calcium.
The Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory/National Radiation Laboratory monitored
strontium-90 and caesium-137 – and occasionally strontium-89 and iodine-131 – in milk samples
from nine New Zealand regions from 1961 onwards. Results showed that concentration of
strontium-90 and caesium-137 in cows’ milk peaked in 1965, with the highest levels recorded in
any one month being from Westland and Taranaki in 1965. During the peak fallout period of
1963-66, levels of strontium-90 and caesium-137 in New Zealand averaged about 40 per cent of
northern hemisphere levels, but in later years, after 1966, levels of caesium-137 were similar to
those in the northern hemisphere, meaning that in New Zealand, caesium-137 rather than
strontium-90, was the fission product responsible for giving humans the biggest radiation dose.54
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Figure 7.1: This graph shows the annual dose New Zealanders received from dietary strontium-90 and caesium-137
from 1953 to 1985. The peak levels of strontium and caesium uptake in 1964 and 1965 coincided with the deposition
of fallout from the Phase 2 weapons tests by the United States and the Soviet Union. Source: Murray Matthews,
Radioactive Fallout in the South Pacific: A History. Part 3: Strontium-90 and Caesium-137 Deposition in New Zealand
and Resulting Contamination of Milk, National Radiation Laboratory, Christchurch, 1993, p106.
Public awareness of the dangers of strontium-90 increased after November 1959 when
Australia’s ABC News reported that the New Zealand soil survey had revealed a startling
increase in strontium-90 between 1953 and 1958.55 The next month, the New Zealand Public
Service Journal outlined how strontium-90 arrived in the soil from fallout from bomb tests,
travelled from the soil to pasture grass, from the grass to cows’ milk, and from milk to lodge in
human bone where it remained radioactive for years and could cause bone tumours, leukaemia
and other diseases. Commentaries about the significance of the levels of strontium found in New
Zealand varied. The reported results showed that strontium levels at one of the collection sites, at
Claremont, had trebled between 1956 and 1958. While the Acting Prime Minister, Jerry Skinner,
assured the public there was “nothing to fear”, the director of radiophysics at Wakari Hospital,
described the figures as “alarming”.56 Strontium levels peaked in 1965. In 1967, at the request of
the Education Boards, the Government dismantled the free milk in schools scheme.57
Coincidentally, this was just two years after the levels of strontium-90 and caesium-137 peaked
in New Zealand’s milk.
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Fig
Figure 7.2: This Neville Lodge cartoon, from 4 July 1966, followed reports of the first French nuclear test in the
Pacific. Evening Post, 5 July 1966, p14.
In New Zealand, the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory/National Radiation Laboratory
tried to point out the minimal impact of fallout as compared to natural radiation sources. In 1962,
for example, Bert Yeabsley, acting director of the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory,
responded to concern about radioactive fallout from the National Council of Parent and Child
magazine by saying “there is no cause for alarm; indeed when the true facts are realised there is
no cause for even mild concern”. He said that the fission product strontium-90 added “less than 1
per cent to the total radioactivity in our soil”.58
The public, however, was becoming more aware about the hazards of radioactive fallout and
wanted better access to information. In 1960 the Public Servant’s Association (PSA) requested
from the Prime Minister that the results of tests of radioactive fallout be published.59 The PSA
continued to pressure the Department of Health in this regard, and in 1961 the Department of
Health agreed to issue statements on radioactive fallout in New Zealand, presenting the findings
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to date and the health implications of the present levels. This was followed by quarterly reports
on fallout measurements together with annual summaries analysing the situation.60
By the 1960s, opposition to these Pacific nuclear tests was widespread. Britain stopped testing in
1958, and the United States’ last Pacific tests were in 1962, but France began its Pacific testing
programme in 1964. The New Zealand Government’s official position was now against nuclear
testing in the Pacific and New Zealand scientists were playing an increasing role in providing
public information about bomb tests and fallout levels. In November 1965 Athol Rafter, of the
DSIR’s Institute of Nuclear Sciences, boasted that were the French Government to carry out
secret atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific, New Zealand would know about it within
days.61
Other sources of radiation
In addition to fallout, X-rays and natural background radioactivity, another source of radiation
exposure was luminous paint, which was still often used in watches and in some industrial
plants. Roth made an informal survey of Auckland watchmakers in 1949 to investigate the use of
radioactive luminous paint in repairing luminous watch dials and hands. It was Roth’s
observation that watchmakers were not aware of the dangers, were taking no precautions, or
were secretive about having radioactive paint.62 Despite there being non-radioactive luminous
paints available after the Second World War, use of radioactive luminous paints continued in
New Zealand into the 1950s.
An article published in the New Zealand Horological Journal in 1960 outlined the Dominion X-
Ray and Radium Laboratory’s work with watchmakers regarding radiation protection, including
a survey of radiation hazards involved in the use of radioactive paints by watchmakers. The
survey, which estimated that the average New Zealand watchmaker spent five to 10 minutes per
week engaged in radium dial painting, said that no cases of radium poisoning had yet been
recorded in New Zealand and concluded that there was “no significant hazard to watchmakers in
New Zealand through the use of radium activated luminous paint either from the actual
luminising itself or from the repairing of watches and clocks with radioactive luminous paint”.
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The laboratory did, however, make plans to measure radon in the breath of people known to have
worked with, or who were currently working with, radium, including some watchmakers.63
Figure 7.3: An early advertisement for a siphon system with a radon bulb – along with carbon dioxide a small amount
of radon gas was added to the water. Source: John Campbell, Rutherford: Scientist Supreme, AAS Publications,
Christchurch, 1999, p304. Reproduced with permission.
Not all exposure to radiation was accidental or a side-effect of something good. Despite all the
publicity to the contrary, there were still people who believed in the health-giving benefits of
radiation. In 1954, more than 20 years after radon water and other radium-based “health”
products had been shown to be harmful and potentially deadly, the Dominion X-Ray and
Radium Laboratory learnt that a Wellington firm, Messrs Claude W. Batten and Co., were
advertising Radon Sparklets Bulbs, a product to add to their syphon system to make radioactive
water. The advertisement for Radon Sparklets Bulbs stated that:
Radioactive water, consumed as a table water, is of considerable value in
increasing the vitality and healthy state of the system. It is an all-
round tonic and invaluable as a treatment for rheumatism, arthritis and
nervous disorders. By using RADON SPARKLETS BULBS with a Sparklets
Syphon, Radioactive Water can be prepared at home. Each bulb contains a
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fixed quantity of the essential radioactive element which is the source
of Radon (Radium Emanation), so that benefit normally obtained by
residence at a Spa can now be conveniently and inexpensively procured
without interference with the ordinary routine of daily life.64
The laboratory tested samples of Radon Sparklets Bulbs and found they contained 0.5-10
micrograms of radium. This made the bulbs “radioactive substances” under the Radioactive
Substances Act 1949 and Radiation Protection Regulations of 1951. Under the Act, it was
prohibited to manufacture, sell, import or export any radioactive substance without the consent
of the Minister of Health. The laboratory advised the supplier not to let any more Radon
Sparklets Bulbs, a product the English manufacturer had stopped making, leave the premises,
pointing out that it was not the radiation detectable externally from the bulbs that was likely to
cause hazards, but that “in making the radon-activated water the contents of the bulb may
become dislodged and enter the water used, making possible the ingestion of radium”. The
amount of radium contained in the bulbs was considered enough, over time, to cause death if
lodged permanently in the human body. Apart from the danger of radium being ingested by the
user, the spent bulbs were also considered a serious health hazard because they contained
unsealed radium which could become widely distributed.65
Natural environmental radiation, or background radiation, was also beginning to be better
understood. Ernest Marsden continued his own research into environmental radioactivity, with
much of his interesting and unusual research attracting coverage in the daily press. His most
publicised findings came from his research into Niue Island, where a DSIR Soil Bureau study
had showed the island’s soil had unusually high levels of radioactivity.66 This prompted Marsden
to further research and he found the radioactivity of food grown on the island to be up to 100
times normal.67 His findings caused quite a stir internationally, with the popular press picking up
on Marsden’s assertions that Niueans were a master race. Not only were they taller, much
happier and less prone to disease than other races, he was reported to have said, selective
breeding had led to the population building up a resistance to radiation which would be
advantageous in the event of a nuclear war.68 Despite criticism of his theory, Marsden persisted,
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stating in 1962, “My contention that the people of Niue Island would be better off in a nuclear
war than the rest of us is a good story and I’m sticking to it!”69
Another of Marsden’s high-profile projects was his investigation into the radioactivity of
tobacco. By the 1960s, links between cigarette smoking and lung cancer had been established.
Marsden saw the striking increase in British deaths from lung cancer as being possibly linked to
increased imports of Southern Rhodesian tobacco, which he had found to have high levels of
polonium-related radioactivity.70 In 1965, at Marsden’s request, the DSIR’s chemistry division
developed a new type of cigarette filter to reduce the amount of polonium inhaled when smoking
cigarettes.71
Despite his seemingly eccentric scientific pursuits, Marsden maintained his international
scientific connections and was held in high regard by the physics community. While working on
his retirement projects he corresponded with some of the top Commonwealth nuclear scientists –
including John Cockcroft and William Penney in the United Kingdom, and Charles Watson-
Munro in Australia – using his connections to call in favours for advice or equipment that may
otherwise have been difficult to obtain. In return, Marsden was known to send eminent scientists
parcels of New Zealand lamb, to arrive just in time for Christmas.72 In 1961 he was invited to be
President of the Rutherford Jubilee International Conference in Manchester, a gathering of 500
of the world’s leading physicists to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the discovery of the
atomic nucleus.73
Radioactive waste
In the years before the atmosphere and the oceans were considered part of the biosphere that
sustains all life on the planet, if radioactive waste was out of sight, it was out of mind. In 1955,
when it was expected that New Zealand would soon have nuclear power stations for electricity
generation, it was suggested that any atomic waste generated could be sealed in concrete blocks
and dropped into the Kermadec Trench. At this time, oceanic trenches were believed to be
troughs of stagnant water and were considered suitable burial grounds. Even so, this was
considered to be only be a short-term solution, until the technology existed to shoot the nuclear
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waste into space “and let it revolve around the world, doing no harm to anyone or anything”.74
Suggestions like this did not arouse concerns, as consigning radioactive waste to the deep ocean
trenches or outer space meant it was considered to be far from having any harmful influence on
humanity.
At the Second United Nations Conference on the Peaceful uses of the Atom in 1958, however,
Soviet scientists gave a paper on “Discharging radioactive wastes into deep water ocean
depressions”. They dealt particularly with the Kermadec Trench and from their observations
concluded that the water in the trench was in contact with the general oceanic circulation and
was not therefore a safe place to dump radioactive wastes. By this time, it was estimated that the
United States had dumped about 10,000 curies75 of nuclear waste into the Atlantic Ocean as well
as some into the Pacific Ocean. The United Kingdom admitted to dumping 500-600 curies of
nuclear waste in more than 2,000 fathoms of water in the Atlantic, an amount of radioactivity
that was described at the 1958 conference as considered “perfectly trivial”. Low-level waste was
also being pumped into the Irish Sea as effluent from the United Kingdom’s Windscale nuclear
power plant.76
While the marine disposal of radioactive waste was an issue for discussion by the 1950s, it was
still acceptable. In 1956, the United Nations held its first conference on the Law of the Sea, out
of which came four conventions covering territorial zones, continental shelf and the high seas.
Article 25 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which finally came into force in 1962,
stipulated that “Every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from the
dumping of radio-active waste”.77 Note the convention did not outlaw the dumping of
radioactive waste in the sea, it was just concerned with pollution as a result of such dumping,
and, as marine disposal was still considered the best thing to do with radioactive waste, New
Zealand continued to dump radioactive waste into the sea until 1976.
New Zealand’s use of nuclear material was for medical and industrial applications only and
created only low-level radioactive waste. While it was insignificant in comparison to the level of
waste produced by the production of nuclear power or weapons, it still had to be disposed of
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safely. This low-level waste took the form of contaminated articles such as gloves and
equipment, and used or damaged pellets of isotopes like caesium-137, cobalt-60, strontium-90
and radium. For many years, this waste was dumped into the Hikurangi Trench, just east of Cook
Strait.78 Sealed radioactive sources were embedded in concrete in 20-litre steel drums. The 1972
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter was
a global convention to protect the marine environment from human activities. With the adoption
of the requirements of the Convention in New Zealand’s Marine Pollution Act 1974, a special
dumping permit was required for such disposals. This procedure was followed once in 1976,
since when such waste has been stored at the National Radiation Laboratory in Christchurch.79
Table 7.3: Nuclear waste (sealed sources) dumped at sea up to 1976











Radioactive waste disposed at sea in New Zealand, with activity measured in becquerels (Bq), the SI unit of
radioactivity that replaced the curie. One Bq is equivalent to one nucleus decay per second. Source: M K Robertson,
Radioactive waste disposal – policies and practices in New Zealand, National Radiation Laboratory Report 1996/2,
February 1996.
New Zealand was also, briefly, involved in the transit of American radioactive waste through
New Zealand. When the United States installed a nuclear power station at McMurdo Base in
New Zealand Antarctic Territory in 1961, in accordance with Article V of the Antarctic Treaty,
radioactive waste from the reactor had to be returned to the United States for disposal. New
Zealand had earlier been involved in the initial transport of nuclear material to the Antarctic
reactor in the summer of 1961-62. The reactor was installed at the American base at McMurdo
Sound, where, previously, half of all freight shipped to the base was fuel for generators, space
heaters and vehicles.80 The reactor’s radioactive fuel cores, and a start-up source had to be
replaced several times over the life of the reactor, so uranium-235 and uranium-238, as well as
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neutron sources of mixed polonium and beryllium, were shipped through Lyttelton on their way
to the American Antarctic base. The spent fuel – uranium-235 and uranium-238 – as well as
many barrels of low-level radioactive waste similarly stopped in Lyttelton on their way back to
the United States for disposal.81 Under the Radioactive Substances Act 1949 the Department of
Health had the right to enter any ship carrying radioactive substances. However, as the
Department of External Affairs pointed out, a confidential exchange of notes between New
Zealand and the United States on 24 December 1958 stated:
As a matter of international courtesy, the NZ authorities will exempt
from inspection, search or seizure of United States Government property,
including official mail and documents, entering, located in or leaving
New Zealand in connection with United States operations in Antarctica.82
The Dominion X-ray and Radium Laboratory expressed concern over safety of the reactor fuel
and neutron source being transported through New Zealand ports, and the return of spent fuel
elements and of waste radioactive material, but they did agree to waive inspection rights
provided they were given a schedule of any nuclear materials and waste being shipped through
New Zealand, and assurance that the shipments were in accordance with the IAEA Regulations
for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material.83
The Antarctic reactor was plagued with problems, however, and by 1967, earlier plans to add
nuclear power stations at American bases at Byrd Station and the South Pole Station had been
shelved.84 The reactor had been operating for a decade when a routine inspection in 1972
revealed a crack in a water tank used to provide radiation shielding. Further investigations
revealed that some of this water had leaked into surrounding insulation and the soil below the
reactor. As it was too expensive to import the equipment required to more fully test and repair
the damage, the reactor was decommissioned.85 To comply with Antarctic Treaty provisions, as
well as the dismantled reactor being removed from Antarctica, so was any soil showing traces of
radioactive contamination. In the years following the reactor shut down, more than 70 tonnes of
contaminated soil from underneath and around the site of the reactor were removed and shipped
back to the United States, via Lyttelton. The main radioactive contaminant was caesium-137, but
the level of contamination was mostly so low that the shipments were exempt from approval or
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inspection by the National Radiation Laboratory.86 In 1975, Robert Mann, an Auckland
biochemistry lecturer and director of the Environmental Defence Society, brought the shipments
of radioactive soil to the attention of the media, who responded with headlines like “Hush-up
Over Deadly Cargo: Minister Asked to Explain”. One of the key points Mann and others were
making was in relation to the New Zealand Electricity Department’s plans for a nuclear power
station to provide electricity to Auckland. Mann told the Christchurch Star that the
Government’s “casual” attitude to the nuclear reactor and its “potential dangers” on Antarctic
soil did not bode well for “attitudes and policies regarding its plans to set up a nuclear plant here
on the mainland in 1979”.87 The Minister of Health of the Labour Government, Thomas
McGuigan, who was also the MP for Lyttelton, downplayed the significance of the shipments,
saying there was never any risk and accusing Mann of using “scaremongering tactics”.88
Some of New Zealand’s own nuclear waste was disposed of in landfills, like contaminated
laboratory equipment from Victoria University buried at Wilton Tip (now Ian Galloway Park) in
the early 1960s. As Rachel Barrowman recounts in her history of Victoria University of
Wellington, in 1961 a technician trying out a new Geiger counter discovered certain rooms in the
university’s physics department, which had been used by early physicists such as Charles
Watson-Munro, recorded high levels of radioactivity, most likely as a result of careless handling
of radium-226. Technicians from the Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory surveyed the
department and removed some contaminated material which, as was standard practice at the
time, was encased in concrete and dumped at sea. Two years later, a new radiation monitor
revealed further evidence of contamination and a more comprehensive clean-up was ordered.
Radioactive contamination was discovered on furniture, equipment, floors, walls, dust and
papers. To complicate matters, in 1963 Ron Humphrey, a physics lecturer who had been working
in the contaminated rooms, died of leukaemia after a two-year illness, and his family were suing
the university for compensation. The department was carefully decontaminated and all
contaminated material, including a large workbench, was removed to a nearby garage in
Waiteata Road, pending a possible court case over Humphrey’s death. When the case was settled
out of court, the material was trucked to the Wilton tip. The cause of Humphrey’s leukaemia was
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not determined, but post-mortem analysis of his bones – the place where ingested radium
becomes concentrated – showed his radium levels were within the normal range.89
The story made front page news in Wellington’s The Dominion when the story broke in 1963,
with a headline “Radiation Danger Discovery”. The reporting, however, was straightforward:
there was no scaremongering or sensationalism and the Dominion X-ray and Radium Laboratory
was treated as an authority on the matter. Waiteata Road residents were concerned, however, and
a complaint was made to the Health Department, to which Turbott provided the assurance that
even if a person were in the same room as the materials in the garage, they “would not be
hazardous to a person not in direct contact with them”.90 Attitudes were to change over the
coming decades, however. When the same issue attracted media attention during building
renovations in 1988, by which time New Zealanders had embraced the nuclear-free policy, the
story again resulted in front page headlines – this time they read “Radiation leak: official cover-
up” – as well as reports and interviews on radio, television and in newspapers around the
country.
Nuclear civil defence
While New Zealand was never a primary nuclear target and did not see the need to adopt the
level of civil defence measures of countries like the United States, where many cities had fallout
shelters beneath city streets and homeowners built backyard nuclear bunkers, safety from nuclear
explosion or fallout did become an issue for New Zealand’s military and civil defence. From a
twenty-first century perspective it is clear that the greatest threats to twentieth century New
Zealand came in the form of earthquakes, cyclones and floods. But it was, in fact, preparedness
for a nuclear attack that instigated New Zealand’s first civil defence schemes and the eventual
establishment of a Ministry of Civil Defence.
The Local Authorities Emergency Powers Act of 1953 was enacted after similar British and
American legislation, and was prompted by Cold War fears of the perceived danger of nuclear
attack.91 Civil Defence next became an issue after the New Zealand Government’s White Paper
Review of Defence 1958 stated that:
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… The safeguarding and educating of the civil population against the
nuclear effects of war must, for the first time, become an essential part
of national defence plans. The geographical position of New Zealand no
longer affords the country security from the worst impact of a global
conflict. A nuclear war and the hazards to civilian population of
radioactivity will not necessarily be confined to the countries of the
main combatants. Radioactivity knows neither frontiers nor distance and
the contamination of nuclear weapons could assume world-wide proportions.
… The defence plan must also take into account the possibility of a
direct attack on this country with nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. Even a
single submarine with guided missiles would offer a considerable threat
to our shores.92
By now, even countries like New Zealand, remote from the northern hemisphere nuclear powers,
were feeling threatened: intercontinental ballistic missiles had first been launched in 1957, the
Soviet Union had launched Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite, and the United States was
building submarines capable of firing nuclear missiles.93 Nevil Shute’s 1957 book On the Beach
had had a profound impact on society and there was growing awareness that the southern
hemisphere, New Zealand included, would not escape the effects of a nuclear conflict.94
The Ministry of Civil Defence was set up in 1959, within the Department of Internal Affairs, but
responsible to the Minister of Defence. The threat of nuclear attack was the Ministry’s primary
concern. A 1959 publication, Civil Defence in New Zealand, declared the most likely nuclear
targets to be Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. The threat from nuclear weapons
was considered very real, and the booklet described the effects of nuclear weapons as
devastating “property and personnel by heat, blast and direct radiation over a circular area” with
“residual radiation from the fall-out … fatal to persons exposed to it without protection for 24 to
48 hours, while beyond that exposed persons would be made ill from radiation sickness and
some might die”. While evacuation of potential targets was considered the civil defence priority
in the event of a nuclear attack, the booklet also mentioned the need for fallout shelters “of
relatively simple type such as slit trenches and Anderson-type frames95 partially sunk into the
ground, with a cover of 3ft of earth”. Shelter policy, it advised, would be the subject of future
planning and advice.96 The Civil Defence Act of 1962 designated preparing for and coping with
armed attack and natural disaster as the main functions of the Ministry. After 1963, however,
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with the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Ministry’s functions began to tend towards
natural disaster preparedness rather than nuclear attack.97
Figure 7.4: This Army Department map shows fallout zones for a nuclear bomb drop on Wellington city. Source: AD
66 34 Misc 26, Atomic bombing of Wellington, map 1, ANZ.
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Nuclear ship visits were also considered a civil defence issue. In 1958 Roth wrote that
“[p]ossible hazards arising from, e.g. a collision with a nuclear powered ship in or near the
Harbour, are such that only the most compelling economic or military reasons would justify the
entry of a nuclear powered ship into the Port of Auckland”.98 Nonetheless, Walter Nash’s Labour
Government had in 1960 seen fit to accept a visit of the USS Halibut, an American nuclear
submarine, to Auckland and Wellington. This first nuclear ship visit was followed in 1964, under
Keith Holyoake’s National Government, by visits from American nuclear-powered cruisers USS
Longbeach, USS Bainbridge and the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise.99 In 1967, Jim McCahon
wrote to the Department of External Affairs on the issue of nuclear ship visits, pointing out that
nuclear-propelled vessels “carried a very small risk of an accident which could affect people and
installations on the shore” and suggested it was reasonable to require indemnity for the entry of a
nuclear-powered ship into New Zealand waters.100 In 1971 Holyoake’s Government advised the
United States that a condition of future visits from nuclear-powered ships would be that the
United States agree to accept liability in the event of a nuclear accident, and a New Zealand
Code of Practice for Nuclear Powered Shipping was prepared by the New Zealand Atomic
Energy Commission. But by the time the United States agreed to accept liability, in 1974, a new
Labour Government, under Bill Rowling, chose to continue the ban on nuclear-powered ships.101
New concerns about New Zealand becoming a nuclear target arose in 1968, when it was revealed
that it was going to host a radio transmitter to be used for communication purposes by the United
States’ fleet of nuclear submarines. In June, The Press revealed that United States Navy
engineers, working with officials from New Zealand’s Lands and Survey Department, the
Ministry of Works and the Post Office, had inspected three possible sites for a transmitter for the
Omega navigation system: in the Lake Sumner and Lake Pearson areas and in the Omarama
district of North Otago. The purpose of the new system was to provide aircraft, ships or
submarines equipped with an Omega radio receiver with data on their exact geographical
position anywhere in the world, to within about one or two nautical miles; being able to pinpoint
locations is something we take for granted now with global positioning satellites but this was not
possible then. The Press reported that the Omega system would operate on VLF meaning the
signals could travel very long distances, with the system working with only eight stations
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worldwide.102 The University of Canterbury student newspaper, Canta, responded with three full
pages on the story, with headlines like “Omega Radio Will Invite Nuclear Attack” and
“Christchurch Airport Would be Prime Target”. Canta reported:
Until now, New Zealanders have drawn some comfort from the knowledge that
in the event of nuclear war, there is no apparent reason why any hostile
nation might select so small, relatively sparsely populated, and
unimportant a land for destruction. At one stroke, the New Zealand
Government plans to place us among one of the eight most important
targets in the world. … As a hostile nation would be unable to locate
U.S. polaris submarines, the only effective way to reduce American
firepower would be to eradicate as rapidly as possible the known 8
stations by which they navigate. … From the moment such a station reached
completion, Intercontinental missiles with atomic warheads will be aimed
to home on New Zealand, since this would be the only way to remove the
threat from the world roving polaris fleet. … If it is the will of New
Zealanders to be the target during the first few hours of atomic attack,
then there will be no opposition to this plan. If enough of you believe
that it should be opposed, then let your strongest voice be heard over
this land, before this thing is done.103
Canta also reported that Christchurch airport would not be spared if the alpine site was bombed,
“so we could expect saturation bombing over Canterbury. Missiles could attack New Zealand at
the same time as similar targets in Australia were eradicated. The sparsely populated hinterland
of Canterbury would be reduced to an arid desert. Those not killed by the initial blast heat or
radiation would die from fallout spreading from the explosions in the alps and at Christchurch
Airport. Christchurch itself would be completely destroyed.”104
People responded to Canta’s call for action and Omega became a national issue. Suddenly the
idea that New Zealand might become a nuclear target seemed very real. Students demonstrated
against the proposed station, people marched in protest and the Labour Opposition leader,
Norman Kirk, came out against Omega. Meanwhile, debate raged about whether the system was
intended for military or commercial shipping. Either the protestors’ voices were heard or New
Zealand’s terrain proved too challenging – the proposed station was not built in New Zealand; it
was eventually built in Victoria, Australia.105
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In the 1950s, New Zealanders became aware of the health risks posed by radioactive fallout from
bomb testing, and the public began to be wary of dangers posed, for example, by strontium
contamination of milk. But this fear of radiation dangers from fallout was associated with the
testing of nuclear bombs and did not usually extend to a fear or suspicion of nuclear power or
nuclear science and medicine. Despite growing evidence of the dangers of all exposure to
radiation, workers were happy to line up for a free X-ray to screen for tuberculosis, parents let
their children’s feet be irradiated by pedascopes in shoe shops, radon-irradiated water continued
to be offered for sale and watchmakers hid their supplies of radioactive paint from authorities.
Towards the end of the 1960s, however, public awareness had grown and demand for these
potentially dangerous novelties waned.
Concerns about fallout led to public action, which prompted the Government to be more open
about fallout information. The Dominion X-ray and Radium Laboratory – the public’s trusted
source of advice and information on radiation issues – began publishing quarterly fallout
statistics in the 1960s. But in other application of nuclear science and medicine, it was not public
demand, but government officials responding to the latest scientific evidence or to international
law that led to the implementation of more stringent regulations. The Department of Health took
the lead in advising the medical profession and the public on safety measures and had to take
measures to control over-enthusiastic users of radioactive materials who chose to continue using




Nuclear science in New Zealand in the atomic age
“A country backward in nuclear science can only stumble blindly in the atomic age, ignorant
of opportunities, deficient in technique and the pawn of countries more advanced.”
J. Williams, Report on Development of Nuclear Sciences in New Zealand, 19 July 19561
“A new source of power to light the homes of the people and turn the wheels of industry; an
order to build a ship that will cross the seas without coal or oil fuel. This atomic age is indeed
beginning to show signs of an assured future.”
The Dominion, 17 October 19562
In the 1950s, nuclear technology, which had until that time been primarily focused on weaponry,
came to encompass electricity generation and other so-called “peaceful” uses of the atom: by
1957, nuclear power for electricity was being produced in the Soviet Union, the United States
and the United Kingdom, and the United States had launched the world’s first nuclear-powered
submarine.
In this new atomic age, the United States vied with the United Kingdom to supply New Zealand
with a nuclear reactor and nuclear science laboratory equipment. Woods and other historians
have written about the “ANZAC dilemma” in which New Zealand was “tied inextricably to two
great and powerful friends, whose policies occasionally diverged and whose interests were
coming to differ from those of New Zealand”.3 Although the United Kingdom was used to New
Zealand following its lead, and the United States expected a small country like New Zealand to
accept their offers of assistance and guidance, New Zealand asserted independence in
continually keeping national interest to the fore when it came to decisions about its nuclear
future.
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That didn’t dampen excitement about the atomic age: while opposition to Pacific nuclear bomb
tests was growing, New Zealanders were enthusiastic about peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
In 1960, thousands of people flocked to the ports to welcome the United States’ nuclear
submarine USS Halibut, a positive symbol of an atomic future. This unchallenged positivity
about a nuclear future, however, would not last.
Nuclear science in New Zealand
By the mid-1950s, many of the young DSIR scientists who had worked on the Manhattan and
Montreal projects had moved into other areas of research. While the DSIR had taken pride in the
work these scientists had done in the United Kingdom, there were now limited opportunities for
them to be involved in nuclear projects in New Zealand, and with an agriculturalist, Bill
Hamilton, leading the DSIR – which was operating under a budget slashed by Sidney Holland’s
National Government – there was no one with Marsden’s enthusiasm and leadership to
champion nuclear projects.4
Charles Watson-Munro, who had led the New Zealand teams working on ZEEP and GLEEP, left
the DSIR in 1951 to take the position of professor of physics at Wellington’s Victoria University
College. He did not stay long. There were limited opportunities for an experienced nuclear
reactor specialist in New Zealand and in 1955 Watson-Munro left New Zealand to become chief
scientist with the Australian Atomic Energy Commission. Australia’s atomic energy projects
were now well in advance of New Zealand’s: a uranium mining industry was exporting to the
UKAEA and a £5.5 million atomic energy programme had begun with the construction of a
heavy-water moderated, enriched-uranium research reactor (HIFAR) at Lucas Heights near
Sydney.5 George Page and Gordon Fergusson, both part of Watson-Munro’s team that had
worked on the British nuclear reactor project (GLEEP), continued working on nuclear sciences
in the DSIR’s Dominion Physical Laboratory, though Page soon left New Zealand to join
Watson-Munro and fellow New Zealander Cliff Dalton at Lucas Heights.6
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Figure 8.1: When the Australian nuclear science research establishment officially opened at Lucas Heights on 18
April 1958, New Zealanders held the two top roles. On the left is Cliff Dalton, deputy chief scientist. In the centre, six
from the left, is Charles Watson-Munro, chief scientist. Courtesy Australian Nuclear Science and Technology
Organisation.
After Marsden left his role as head of the DSIR, another New Zealand scientist took a leading
role in developing the field of nuclear science, taking it in a whole new direction. By becoming a
world expert in the nascent field of radiocarbon dating, Athol Rafter established an international
reputation for the DSIR’s nuclear sciences team, and set the direction for the future research of
what became the Institute of Nuclear Sciences. In 1948, Rafter, a DSIR chemist, had been sent
on a trip to the United States and the United Kingdom, with Fergusson, to learn about
radiochemistry. Back in New Zealand, Rafter later recalled, “no one really knew what to do with
us. Nuclear science was a very young baby clothed in mysticism and nuclear annihilation. Any
expenditure on nuclear science was of necessity a major expenditure, and any work involved
hazards that the people of New Zealand little understood.” Rafter and his colleagues, however,
managed to assemble sufficient equipment to provide nuclear science services to medicine,
agriculture and industry. Working in a shed “that looked like an outhouse” Rafter prepared
radioactive isotopes for use around New Zealand. Page, working in the attic of the Dominion
Physical Laboratory, built a mass spectrometer and Fergusson assembled equipment to measure
natural background radioactivity.7
The team used isotope techniques on many projects, including determining nitrogen metabolism
of apple trees; finding the origin of sulphur in New Zealand coals; measuring radioactivity levels
in waters, gases and soil samples; and surveying the heavy water content of New Zealand
waters.8 Rafter also began experimenting with the new technique of radiocarbon dating, which
calculates the age of organic material by comparing the ratio of radiocarbon atoms (carbon-14)
to regular carbon atoms (carbon-12) in a sample with known radiocarbon:carbon ratios from
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different time periods. Rafter was prompted to investigate the new technique by the DSIR head
Frank Callaghan, who requested that Rafter attempt to date the age of New Zealand’s volcanic
ash showers to “stop the geologists arguing”.9 Rafter used radiocarbon dating first to date pieces
of organic matter from ash deposits in the North Island and to date moa bones. After difficulties
with the process used by Willard Libby, the American pioneer of radiocarbon dating, Rafter
worked with Fergusson and a DSIR team to perfect a more reliable method of radiocarbon
dating using carbon dioxide gas rather than solid carbon.10 The new technique was very
successful: the carbon dioxide method soon became the standard procedure and Rafter and his
team established an international reputation for radiocarbon dating.11
An Evening Post article in 1952 described New Zealand’s nuclear scientists as using radioactive
isotopes from Harwell, and working “quietly, often in inadequate laboratories and with
makeshift equipment which astonishes visiting scientists”, where they were “doing very valuable
work in the fields of industry, agriculture, medicine and historical research”.12 Outside of the
DSIR, other New Zealand research laboratories were making use of radioactive and stable
isotope tracers: the Department of Agriculture’s Animal Research Laboratory to determine the
effect of cobalt on animal metabolism; the New Zealand Fertiliser Manufacturers’ Research
Association to study fertiliser uptake in plants; and the Otago University Medical School to
study thyroid function.13 Radioactive isotopes were also being used in industry, for example to
trace welding faults at the Maraetai power station on the Waikato River.14
In academia, Auckland University College had constructed and was using a low energy linear
accelerator – a machine that can accelerate subatomic particles and ions to significant speeds –
for research, and Otago University was constructing a Van de Graaff accelerator. Victoria
University College and Auckland University College were studying cosmic rays and radioactive
contamination of the atmosphere and there was work on low-energy X-rays at Canterbury
University College.15
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Nuclear science techniques practised by New Zealand scientists were now established in many
areas of New Zealand industry and agriculture. But the most extensive use of radioactive
isotopes was in medicine. In radiation therapy an isotope of cobalt, cobalt-60, had begun to be
used in preference to radium as it was a cheaper source of radioactivity for treatment. Other
radioactive isotopes for diagnosis and therapy were prepared for hospital use by DSIR scientists
from bulk shipments received from overseas.16 With no local source of the radioisotopes needed
for research and industrial, agricultural and medical applications – from cobalt-60 and radium-
228 used in cancer treatment to caesium-137 and phosphorus-32 used in industry and agriculture
– New Zealand had to import them initially from the United Kingdom, the United States and
Canada, and, from the 1960s, from the HIFAR nuclear reactor in Australia. Because of the
limited useful life of most isotopes, they had to be brought to New Zealand by air, and in most
cases with protective shielding. But some particularly short-lived isotopes, such as fluorine-18,
used overseas in dental examinations and with a half-life of just 109 minutes, could not be used
in New Zealand as the time involved in transporting them would render them useless.17
Eisenhowerʼs Atoms for Peace speech
The United States began promoting peaceful uses of nuclear technology in the 1950s. On 8
December 1953, the United States President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, addressed the United
Nations General Assembly with a speech promoting the establishment of an international atomic
energy agency which could stockpile fissionable materials for use by non-nuclear powers for
peaceful purposes. He called for atomic energy to be applied “to the needs of agriculture,
medicine and other peaceful activities” and specifically “to provide abundant electrical energy in
the power-starved areas of the world”.18
While the nuclear powers discussed the establishment of an international atomic energy agency,
the United States started to fulfil the promises made in Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech by
offering assistance to other countries to construct small-scale nuclear reactors, sponsoring
international scientific conferences on nuclear science, and providing technical information and
training programmes.19 Kevin Clements has described the United States as being “concerned to
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overcome its reputation as a nuclear bully and consolidate its reputation as a peace-loving
nation”.20 Focusing on the peaceful potential of the atom, at the same time as continuing to test
new and mightier nuclear weapons, played into what Matthew O’Meagher has called “the
utopian hopes and genuine scientific excitement” of the new technology.21 While planning
proceeded for a United Nations conference on peaceful uses of the atom, the United States began
to sign bilateral agreements to provide non-nuclear countries with information on the design,
construction and operation of research reactors. While the United States promoted its Atoms for
Peace programme as being motivated by a desire for world peace and prosperity, the United
States National Security Council was clear that any bilateral agreements the United States
entered into regarding provision of atomic energy or nuclear technology should seek to promote
the United States’ own atomic energy interests, and any nuclear materials provided by them to
another country must be returned for reprocessing in the United States.22 By promoting bilateral
agreements ahead of the multilateralism soon to be introduced in an international atomic energy
agency, the United States was able to maximise its own influence and control over the Western
world’s nuclear industries, and reap any benefits from research advances made in its partner
countries.
The biggest advances in nuclear technology were now taking place in the United States where,
following on from the science of the Manhattan Project, Willard Libby had developed
radiocarbon dating and Robert van de Graaff had developed a powerful new type of particle
accelerator.23 New Zealand was a long way away from these advances, but still liked to
acknowledge the role of Ernest Rutherford in the scientific cooperation that lead to the birth of
nuclear physics. While the United Nations was working on the United States’ Atoms for Peace
conference proposal, New Zealand had a representative on the United Nations Security Council,
Leslie Munro. In November 1954, Munro made a speech to the First Committee of the General
Assembly in which he pointed out Ernest Rutherford’s role in the development of knowledge
that would later lead to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to the international cooperation
in atomic research that had persisted up until the Second World War. “Dare I express the hope”,
Munro said:
… that it may now be possible, slowly but surely, to revert to the basis
of international cooperation on which our atomic science was
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constructed. Is it too much to hope that before long the Rutherfords and
Kapitzas24 of present-day atomic physics may again join in seeking
solutions to the many mysteries which still remain? No matter how great
its resources, no matter how advanced its technology, no matter how
numerous or well trained its scientists, no one nation could hope by
itself to match the pooled efforts of a group of nations in this field.
On the other hand, scientists from even the smallest countries, which
may have little to offer by way of raw materials or industrial capacity,
can make vital contributions.25
As well as calling for the resumption of international cooperation among atomic scientists,
Munro expressed New Zealand’s support for the establishment of an international atomic energy
agency and a proposed scientific conference on the peaceful uses of the atom.
The United States was active in seeking a bilateral agreement with New Zealand. In 1954, New
Zealand was one of several countries visited by an American team offering Government level
cooperation with atomic energy projects.26 But while the Department of External Affairs was
enthusiastic at the prospect of cementing New Zealand/United States relations through signing a
bilateral agreement under the Atoms for Peace programme, how did the government agencies
that would be most involved in a nuclear reactor for research or power generation – the DSIR
and the State Hydro-electric Department – react? In contrast to the External Affairs officials,
focused on strengthening New Zealand’s relationship with the United States, representatives of
the Government’s scientific and engineering agencies were cautious and pragmatic. Arthur
Davenport, secretary of the State Hydro-electric Department, in May 1955 told the Secretary for
External Affairs, Alister McIntosh, that, “the construction of a research reactor in New Zealand
would not assist in the practical application of nuclear energy in the generation of nuclear power.
If the construction of such a research reactor is an essential part of the bilateral agreement with
USA, this Department is not prepared to recommend the signing of the agreement.”27 Bill
Hamilton, secretary of the DSIR, also had concerns about the proposed bilateral agreement,
suggesting to McIntosh that any exchange of information between the United States and New
Zealand be restricted to unclassified data as “the receiving of even a small amount of classified
information might limit freedom of publication of original work done in New Zealand, or work
based on information obtained in an unclassified form from other sources, such as the United
Kingdom”.28
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The United States’ standard bilateral agreement became more worthy of New Zealand’s
consideration in 1955 when it was revised to include funding for half the price of a nuclear
reactor (with a ceiling of £125,000, or US$350,000).29 The DSIR, however, was still coping with
a reduced budget, and advised the External Affairs Department that the DSIR was “of the
opinion that New Zealand is not yet at a stage where it could contemplate entering into such an
agreement”, noting that the “high capital cost involved and the cost of maintenance would be out
of all proportion to the benefits which would accrue, particularly as we are able to secure for our
present limited needs all the radioactive isotopes which New Zealand requires for research
purposes in agriculture, medicine, biology, etc”. While the United States had surpassed the
United Kingdom in taking the scientific lead in nuclear technology, there were still many
personal and professional links between New Zealand and British scientists; the DSIR also said
that were New Zealand in the future to make a decision to construct a research reactor, it would
be preferable to do so through existing links with the United Kingdom.30
As well as wanting to maintain existing links with British science and scientists, there seems to
have been a degree of mistrust of the United States amongst New Zealand science
administrators. It was later revealed that the United Kingdom was concerned about the
possibility of New Zealand buying an American reactor, saying that they did not want New
Zealand to buy an inferior or outdated reactor (they believed their technology was superior) and
offering their help.31 The DSIR was happy, however, to accept a technical library from the
United States Atomic Energy Commission. When the American Ambassador handed over the
library to Holland on 20 October 1955, Holland made a connection between Ernest Rutherford
and the latest nuclear technology, proudly noting that “in a sense all the scientific advances
surveyed in this assembly of material had their beginnings in this country of ours.”32 Rutherford,
of course, did no work on nuclear science in New Zealand, but, once again, the New Zealand
Government was happy to claim national links with this exciting new field of science.
Atoms for Peace conference 1955
The first United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy,
commonly known as the Atoms for Peace conference, was held in Geneva from 8 to 20 August
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1955, 10 years after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The conference was the first large-
scale meeting of scientists from the West and from Communist-bloc nations since the Second
World War, and was marked by the release of much previously secret or highly-classified
information.33 The main scientific concerns of the conference – which presented nuclear energy
as the only long-term solution to society’s energy needs – were the generation of electricity
through nuclear reactors, and the use of radioisotopes in medicine, biology, agriculture and
industry.34
At the conference, the United States restated its offers of half-price nuclear reactors and supplies
of fissile materials to countries which would undertake research in nuclear physics and so add to
the sum of world knowledge about peaceful uses of the atom; and offered opportunities for
advanced training for scientific and engineering graduates from countries planning to construct
atomic power stations.35 The New Zealand delegation was also approached informally by
members of the Australian delegation with a scheme for Australian-New Zealand partnership in
an atomic research project. 36
It is important to note that while it was done with more fanfare, the United States was not the
only country offering assistance in the field of nuclear technology. The Soviet Union had given
technical assistance to help China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and East Germany to set
up experimental bases for research in nuclear physics. The United Kingdom, whose atomic
energy programme was initially more advanced than the United States’ and had been
unencumbered by any secrecy clauses such as in the United States 1945 Atomic Energy Act, had
already been offering informal technical assistance to other European countries and hosting
visitors from New Zealand and other Commonwealth countries.37 This Commonwealth scientific
cooperation dated back to the Second World War, when a system of formal scientific liaison
officers was set up, one of the aims of which was to share information and pool research results,
particularly as related to defence science – a prospect that the United States found threatening
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and had opposed. In June 1946, alongside a Prime Ministers’ Conference held in London, was a
Commonwealth Conference on Defence Science, the stated objective of which was to distribute
research and development in defence science. The Dominions could assist Britain by providing
scientists and engineers, who were in short supply in the United Kingdom, in return for post-
graduate training. Arrangements such as the New Zealand scientists seconded to the Atomic
Energy Research Establishment at Harwell were therefore at least as beneficial to the United
Kingdom as to New Zealand.38 This system of what was near-competition between the United
Kingdom and the United States for the loyalty and expertise of Antipodean scientists can
therefore be seen as being established during the Second World War.
Hamilton led the New Zealand delegation to the 1955 Atoms for Peace conference. The
delegates, who also included representatives from the State Hydro-electric Department, the
Ministry of Works, the Department of External Affairs and two university physics departments,
reported on the conference on their return. While they all accepted the need for New Zealand to
have nuclear power in the future, and agreed that people would have to be trained in preparation,
they disagreed over whether or not New Zealand should establish a nuclear energy research
programme.39
Again, it is interesting to note the difference in stance between External Affairs officials, who
were clearly seeking to strengthen relations with the United States, by now the Western
superpower and New Zealand’s partner in the ANZUS treaty, and the more insular responses
from New Zealand’s scientific and engineering communities, who focused on what they saw as
New Zealand’s immediate needs. In his report on the conference, Lloyd White, from New
Zealand’s High Commission in London, noted that “a country’s political weight will henceforth
be judged, at least in part, by its participation in the atomic field. If we want to maintain an
influential position among nations ... we must take part in this progress.” He went on to argue in
favour of an atomic research programme in New Zealand, noting that while it was too early to
place an order for a nuclear reactor for atomic energy production, it was not too early “to be
thinking about training atomic technicians and accumulating a body of knowledge on the sort of
atomic reactors which would be best suited to New Zealand conditions”.40
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Templeton has described White’s boss, External Affairs head Alister McIntosh, as “ever-
cautious” and “no great lover of scientists” 41  but he did recognise the potential value to New
Zealand of cooperation with the United States in nuclear science. Before the 1955 conference
McIntosh had written to Hamilton saying that the high level attention being given by the United
States to the Atoms for Peace conference was a political fact that New Zealand must take into
account.42 Whether or not Hamilton took any notice of this is unclear; he seems to have
consistently recognised the need for nuclear power at some time in the future, but not for any
advancements in the field of nuclear science research. In his report on the conference, Hamilton
dismissed White’s argument as sounding “like a variant of ‘keeping up with the Joneses’,”
adding that “surely the influence of a nation depends on the standard of living of her people, in
the broadest sense, and the contribution of ideas she can make in world affairs, not on whether
she is doing atomic research irrespective of whether or not it is germane to her problems.”43. In
his report on the conference, Hamilton advised that New Zealand should not undertake research
in nuclear physics and technology, but rather should begin training “a few bright young
engineers-cum-physicists in general reactor design and operation in order to keep abreast of
developments … and to assist in deciding what type of nuclear plant New Zealand should buy
and when would be the appropriate moment to enter the market.”44 Hamilton’s antipathy
towards White’s attitude was reciprocated: Templeton has uncovered a personal letter sent in
addition to his formal report in which White described Hamilton as “hopeless as a delegation
leader” and observed that he had clearly “made up his mind in advance that New Zealand should
not interest itself in atomic research”.45
Latta, from the State Hydro-electric Department, who was perhaps best placed to judge New
Zealand’s need for a nuclear reactor for electricity generation, agreed there was “no pressing
necessity to construct atomic power stations in the immediate future” and stated his belief that it
would be better to allow experimental nuclear power stations overseas to advance further before
New Zealand committed to “expending a great deal of capital on plant which might be obsolete
before it went into service.”46
These New Zealand scientists and engineers were not going to be pushed into accepting a reactor
– which, while a gift in part, would have cost a great deal of investment in terms of money and
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people power – just because a global superpower wanted them to. As well as refusing to be
swayed by the United States offers, New Zealand was also reluctant to enter into any sort of
cooperation with Australia. While Philip Baxter, head of the Australian Atomic Energy
Commission, and chief scientist Charles Watson-Munro, were keen for New Zealand and
Australia to pool their efforts in nuclear science, the DSIR, under Hamilton, was not convinced.
Baxter subsequently attributed New Zealand’s failure to advance in the field of nuclear sciences
to Hamilton’s agricultural bias and failure to recognise the possibilities of the new field.47
Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy
Meanwhile, in the Department of External Affairs, Paul Cotton, a young graduate working in the
Specialised Agencies Division, proposed that a Cabinet Committee be set up to respond to
questions regarding the American offers of assistance and Australian offers of cooperation, and
to study the general implications for New Zealand of the increasing development of peaceful
uses of atomic energy.48 Acting on Cotton’s recommendation, Cabinet set up a Cabinet
Committee on Atomic Energy to study the reports of the delegation to the Atoms for Peace
Conference.49 At its first meeting, on 13 February 1956, the Cabinet Committee established a
committee of the permanent heads of the departments with an interest in the development of the
peaceful uses of atomic energy.50 The Permanent Heads Committee on Atomic Energy was
asked to report and make recommendations on the question of a bilateral agreement with the
United States of America; the American “half-price” reactor offer; and participation in the
Australian Atomic Energy Commission’s research programme.51 They were also asked to
prepare a draft statement of New Zealand’s policy on the development of the peaceful uses of
atomic energy. 52
Hamilton, who chaired the Permanent Heads Committee on Atomic Energy, drafted a policy
statement, stating that New Zealand had no intention of setting up a research reactor in the near
future and, provided the proposed Cook Strait submarine cable project – a plan to transport
electricity from the South Island to the North island – was feasible, would have no need for
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nuclear power for 30-40 years. Hamilton’s draft was at odds with the Cabinet Committee’s
enthusiasm for the United States offer of a bilateral agreement and a half-price reactor; Cotton
found the draft “most unsatisfactory”, and subsequently prepared a new draft of the report, that
moderated Hamilton’s views, for presentation at the first meeting of the Permanent Heads
Committee on Atomic Energy.53   
The Permanent Heads Committee subsequently recommended to Cabinet that the bilateral
agreement with the United States be concluded as soon as possible.  They also advised against
accepting an offer of cooperation with Australia, believing that an atomic research partnership
with the Australian Atomic Energy Authority would be costly, with no apparent benefit to New
Zealand.54 In regard to the United States’ offer of a half-price reactor, the Committee
recommended that the immediate priority was to purchase an accelerator, but also recommended
approval for the installation of a research reactor to be in operation in “approximately three years
time”.55 More significantly, the Committee noted that “New Zealand cannot keep abreast of
developments in nuclear science by merely seconding officers to work in overseas organisations
such as Harwell in the United Kingdom or Chalk River in Canada. Officers seconded to these
establishments will not return if there are no facilities in New Zealand in this field to enable
them to pursue the advanced work for which they have been trained” and recommended the
immediate establishment of an institute of nuclear sciences. It advised that the new institute
should incorporate the Isotopes Division of the Dominion Physical Laboratory, and be
established as a branch of the DSIR, with an advisory committee representing the University of
New Zealand, DSIR and other interested parties.56
At about the same time, the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) set up a small
technical sub-committee to report on the future part New Zealand might play in atomic energy
research and application.57 The CSIR sub-committee, which comprised George Currie, Vice-
Chancellor of the University of New Zealand, Ernest Marsden, Professor Darcy Walker of
Victoria University College and Bill Hamilton, made recommendations to the CSIR which
adopted their report with minor modifications and conveyed it to the Minister in a memo in June
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1956.58 The CSIR paper recommended the establishment of an institute of nuclear sciences as a
branch of the DSIR, with the immediate purchase of an accelerator, and a research reactor
planned for two-to-three year’s time. While similar to the Permanent Heads Committee’s report,
the CSIR report differed on two key points – it gave the need to purchase a research reactor
much less emphasis and omitted the proposal to take advantage of the American offer of a
half-price reactor.59
Arguments that a bilateral agreement with the United States might hinder New Zealand’s
relationship with the United Kingdom had now dissipated: after New Zealand’s original
rejection of the United States’ offer, the United Kingdom had told New Zealand they would
welcome an agreement between New Zealand and the United States, partly because it would
make the exchange of information between New Zealand and the United Kingdom easier. 60 By
this time the United Kingdom may have been recognising the American superiority in nuclear
technology and could see advantages to New Zealand having access to this technology. So
following the recommendations of the Permanent Heads Committee and the CSIR sub-
committee, Cabinet decided to sign the bilateral agreement with the United States, while
deferring consideration of the remaining proposals.61
The bilateral agreement between New Zealand and the United States was signed on 13 June
1956. The agreement allowed for the exchange of information regarding the design, construction
and operation of research reactors and allowed for the lease of up to 6 kg of enriched uranium
(uranium with a higher proportion of the fissionable uranium-235 than occurs naturally) for use
as reactor fuel.62 Of interest in today’s global situation is the fact that the United States signed a
similar agreement with Iran in March 1957, which also included leasing Iran enriched uranium.63
The bilateral agreement with the United States represented a significant strengthening of the
relationship between New Zealand and the United States on nuclear matters, though the
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relationship with the United Kingdom was still strong. New Zealand had an agreement to send
up to three men a year to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Research Establishment at
Harwell, but it was to be another three years before a formal agreement was signed between the
UKAEA and the New Zealand Government regarding New Zealand’s uranium resources.
While Cabinet was considering the full reports on the future of nuclear science in New Zealand,
opposition to their recommendations was growing. The universities were concerned that the
proposed institute of nuclear sciences might not be sited on a campus and that full opportunities
for DSIR/university cooperation might not develop.64
Discussions on the subject of nuclear research revealed clear differences of opinion as to the
value and urgency for New Zealand of an expanded nuclear research programme. In an August
1956 paper outlining the issues to his Minister, the Secretary of External Affairs noted that their
Department’s major concern in the matter was New Zealand’s relationship with the United
States, adding that New Zealand’s failure to take advantage of the United States’ offer of
$350,000 towards the cost of a reactor “may be difficult for the United States authorities to
understand” and that the matter was “causing some embarrassment in our relations with the
Americans”.65 Within the DSIR, the enthusiasm of individual scientists in the Dominion
Physical Laboratory (according to External Affairs) was not matched in the senior
administration where the development of research and training in nuclear sciences was seen only
as a financial burden.66
Despite the DSIR’s seeming ambivalence on the issue, Cabinet decided to accept the United
States’ offer as part of a suite of decisions regarding New Zealand’s nuclear future. The 11
March 1957 Cabinet decision stated that New Zealand’s policy in regard to research into and
development of atomic energy should include:
(i) opportunity for New Zealand scientists to keep reasonably abreast
of developments in the uses of atomic energy overseas
(ii) secondment of a small number of departmental officers for study
at important nuclear stations in other countries
(iii) purchase of an accelerator as a first step in the implementation
of this policy
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(iv) the setting up of a suitable committee or institute to deal with
the question of location, etc. when the purchase of an
accelerator is authorised
(v) an approach to the United States Government with a view to
accepting their offer to pay a portion of the cost of a suitable
reactor.67
With regard to the issue of an institute of nuclear sciences, representatives of the University of
New Zealand also put forward their views that any such institute should be autonomous, rather
than associated with a government department like the DSIR, and called for an overseas expert
to be brought to New Zealand to advise on the development of nuclear science in New Zealand.
After a report on nuclear science in New Zealand by Philip Baxter, chairman of the Australian
Atomic Energy Commission, and physicist Leslie Martin, and a visit from a USAEC mission,
the CSIR submitted proposals to Government, which Cabinet approved. The university’s
argument was overruled and the decision was made to establish an institute of nuclear sciences
as a branch of the DSIR.68 The plan was slow to be implemented, however, and the Government
was criticised for the delays in getting the institute set up and ordering equipment. In January
1958 the Otago Daily Times editorialised that “the atomic age is getting into its stride and New
Zealand is already lagging several years behind”.69
Institute of Nuclear Sciences
The establishment of the Institute of Nuclear Sciences helped to give status to the nuclear
scientists already working within the DSIR, and gave New Zealand a second organisation –
alongside the Department of Health’s Dominion X-ray and Radium Laboratory – focused on
nuclear and radiation science. In 1958, as a step towards the establishment of the Institute of
Nuclear Sciences, the DSIR’s nuclear scientists were given the status of working under a
separate DSIR Division of Nuclear Sciences with Rafter as director. As part of the June 1958
Cabinet decision that established the Institute, Cabinet also approved the entering of negotiations
with manufacturers of accelerators with a view to ordering a 3 million volt Van de Graaff
accelerator; and expenditure on the first stage of development of the programme involving the
purchase of land, purchase and housing of an accelerator, and building of an administration and
laboratory block. In answer to the universities’ requests, the Institute of Nuclear Sciences was
required to make provision for the use of facilities and allocation of laboratories for use by the
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universities and other government departments.70 The original plan for the Institute of Nuclear
Sciences was that it would first require a multi-curie cobalt-60 source, then a Van de Graaff
accelerator, and then a research reactor.71
While Philip Holloway, the Labour Minister in charge of the DSIR, talked about the “miraculous
possibilities” of the application of nuclear science to New Zealand’s future, Hamilton was less
enthusiastic. The most positive thing that Hamilton said about the DSIR’s latest research unit
was that the new Institute of Nuclear Sciences would help existing work in nuclear science by
“providing better equipment and facilities”.72
Figure 8.2: The DSIRʼs Athol Rafter pioneered radiocarbon dating in New Zealand and, with Gordon Fergusson,
perfected a more reliable method of radiocarbon dating using carbon dioxide gas rather than solid carbon. Rafter
went on to lead the DSIRʼs Institute of Nuclear Sciences from 1959 until his retirement in 1978. Source: Courtesy of
GNS Science.
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Figure 8.3: The DSIRʼs Institute of Nuclear Sciences was formed in 1959 and continued under this name until the
disbandment of the DSIR in 1992, after which the organisation became part of the Institute of Geological and Nuclear
Sciences Ltd, now known as GNS Science.
While the work of the new Institute would focus on radiocarbon dating and use of isotopes for
environment and industrial monitoring, there was some public apprehension about New
Zealand’s foray into nuclear sciences. While rhetoric about atomic energy being the promise of
the future was high in the 1950s, the reality in New Zealand was that the greatest public
awareness of things nuclear was the American and British bomb testing in the Pacific that had
ceased only when a temporary moratorium had been reached the previous year. In a 1959
address to a Nuclear Sciences Symposium in Wellington, Holloway, the Minister in charge of
the DSIR, said that the new Institute must:
enable our young men and women to become so used to the word “nuclear”
science, and so used to its practical application that they themselves
will have confidence, and inspire confidence into the community. We must
persuade the people that nuclear science is not necessarily a fearful
thing; that reactors, accelerators, and all other machines used in its
development, need not cause apprehension. The Press of the country must
present the peaceful development of nuclear science clearly so that the
public will accept it as a natural development and not something to be
dreaded.73
At the same time as approving the Institute of Nuclear Sciences, Cabinet established the New
Zealand Atomic Energy Committee (NZAEC), initially as an advisory committee for
formulating the policy of the new Institute of Nuclear Sciences.74  One of the Committee
members was Sir Ernest Marsden.75 Marsden’s knighthood was another example of New
Zealand acknowledging its role in the birth of nuclear physics – while Marsden had made an
important contribution to New Zealand science by leading the DSIR for two decades, it was after
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the Minister of Health spoke in Parliament about Marsden’s role in the birth of nuclear physics
that he was recommended for a knighthood for his services to science.76 The responsibilities of
the NZAEC were to advise on the organisation and administration of the Institute of Nuclear
Sciences; make recommendations regarding the programme of research work at the Institute and
the funds required; advise on the coordination of New Zealand’s activities in atomic affairs;
encourage the publication and dissemination of the results of nuclear research; and advise on
other matters relating to nuclear sciences.77
The first challenge was to find a site for the new Institute. It was required that the site be in the
Wellington area, close to existing DSIR services, have adequate rock foundations for heavy
equipment, and be at a safe enough distance from the public for the operation of a nuclear
reactor. In March 1959, the DSIR recommended a hillside site at Gracefield, opposite the
existing DSIR campus.78 In 1959, Rafter was appointed inaugural director of the DSIR’s
Institute of Nuclear Sciences, which was finally established after protracted negotiations with the
universities. Meanwhile, in November 1959, the 3 million volt Van de Graaff accelerator was
ordered at a cost of £84,000. The Health Department finally approved the site in July 1960, and
by September, the Ministry of Works had presented new cost estimates for the project.
Immediately after the extra expenditure had been approved, the DSIR requested that the
Ministry of Works purchase the land, develop the site, prepare plans and call tenders for the
building.79 With regards to the planned nuclear reactor, Cabinet finally, in 1960, approved in
principle the purchase of a reactor from the United States. But when they learned that it was no
longer United States policy to give the half-price reactor subsidy to developed countries like
New Zealand, the plans for acquiring a nuclear reactor were once again deferred.80
Progress on construction of the building was slow, and when the Van de Graaff accelerator
arrived in New Zealand in July 1961 it had to go into storage. When, by December 1961, there
had been little further progress, the NZAEC considered the situation so serious that they
approached the Prime Minister and members of Cabinet to outline the delays in the programme
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and seek continued assurance of support.81 The NZAEC addressed Cabinet on 5 March 1962,
arguing the ways in which nuclear science was supporting New Zealand agriculture, forestry and
environmental science and making specific mention of attempts to irradiate apple seeds to
prevent germination during cold storage; giving Forestry Research Institute quick methods for
determining variations in timber density; accurate and easy methods of gauging river flows;
radiocarbon dating; and checking fallout from bomb tests.82
The Institute of Nuclear Sciences building was finally completed and the accelerator assembled
by 1966. Unfortunately, the magnet on the Van de Graaff accelerator was found to be damaged
but the warranty had expired while it was in storage.83 Nonetheless, the accelerator soon became
an important tool in the Institute’s work and was used for radiocarbon dating as well as other
research projects until a more powerful tandem accelerator replaced it in 1986.84
Atoms for Peace Conference 1958
The Second International Scientific Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was
held under the auspices of the new United Nations International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in Geneva from 1 to 13 September 1958. With more than 6000 participants, it was the largest
international conference ever held.85 The IAEA had been set up in 1957 as the “Atoms for
Peace” organisation proposed in Eisenhower’s 1953 speech. In the words of its statute, its
purpose was “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and
prosperity throughout the world”.86 While its initial focus was on the peaceful use of atomic
energy, the IAEA’s work that came to be most relevant to New Zealand scientists was in the
setting of international standards and regulatory procedures with regard to health and safety,
which could be applied to the use of radioisotopes in industry, medicine and agriculture as well
as atomic energy.87
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Figure 8.4: Atmospheric carbon-14 levels measured by Rafter and Fergusson from 1955 showed an increase in
levels of carbon-14 that they attributed to atmospheric nuclear bomb testing. This graph, which shows carbon-14
levels from 1955 to 2005 depicts a clear spike in carbon-14 levels in the 1960s, when atmospheric testing was at its
peak. The continuous line is Wellington data, the unconnected points are Northern Hemisphere data, with carbon-14
levels expressed as parts per million above normal levels. Source: Courtesy Rodger Sparks.88
New Zealand was represented at the 1958 Atoms for Peace conference by Bill Hamilton and
Athol Rafter from the DSIR, Darcy Walker, professor of physics at Victoria University, H. N.
Parton, professor of chemistry of the University of Otago, Ernest Marsden, representing the
NZAEC, and John Scott, of the New Zealand High Commission in London.89 At the conference,
Rafter presented the discovery of a link between atmospheric nuclear testing and raised level of
radiocarbon in the atmosphere, which he and Fergusson had first published in The New Zealand
Journal of Science & Technology under the title “The Atom Bomb Effect”. He and Fergusson
had determined that the nuclear weapons tests of the 1950s had doubled the normal amount of
atmospheric carbon-14 in the northern hemisphere, and increased southern hemisphere levels by
60 per cent. Since radiocarbon dating relies on comparing radiocarbon:carbon ratios in a sample
with known ratios from specific time periods, this finding was highly significant, with the
sudden spike of “bomb” carbon allowing samples from the 1960s to be dated to within a year or
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two.90 Impressed by their paper, Libby, the American pioneer of radiocarbon dating, contacted
Rafter to ask if his team would participate in Project Sunshine, a USAEC project to measure
environmental radioactivity resulting from nuclear bomb tests. As covered in chapter seven, a
network of monitoring stations was established in New Zealand with USAEC funding, with
rainwater samples tested monthly for levels of strontium and other radioactive isotopes. In 1959,
however, the network was passed onto the Department of Health’s Dominion X-Ray and
Radium Laboratory that was now responsible for monitoring fallout levels in New Zealand.91
The trip was also an opportunity for New Zealand scientists to learn more about the northern
hemisphere nuclear programmes and to cement relationships with scientists in the United States
and United Kingdom nuclear industries. After the conference, Hamilton and the other New
Zealand delegates were guests of the UKAEA and visited the Atomic Energy Research
Establishment at Harwell, the Calder Hall nuclear power station in Cumbria, and Dounreay in
the north of Scotland where a team led by the New Zealander R. W. Hurst was experimenting
with the first fast breeder reactor. In these early years of nuclear technology, before the problems
of disposal of a reactor’s radioactive waste were acknowledged, a nuclear reactor that could
produce more fissile material than it burned was considered a good thing. Hamilton then
travelled to the United States, where he visited the USAEC’s headquarters in Washington,
Brookhaven National Laboratory at Long Island, and the nuclear laboratory at Los Alamos,
which continued to be involved in the development of nuclear weapons.92
First-hand exposure to the British and American nuclear industries did not sway Hamilton’s
resolve that a nuclear reactor was not a priority for New Zealand science. In the Dictionary of
New Zealand Biography profile of Hamilton, this agricultural scientist is described as being
“convinced that the country’s economic future depended on scientific research that was focused
on its resources and potentials”.93 A nuclear reactor did not fit into this scheme. In reporting on
the 1958 conference, Hamilton repeated his conclusion from the end of the 1955 conference that
New Zealand should not undertake research in nuclear physics or technology. He did
recommend, however, that there was scope to extend the use of radioisotopes in industry in New
Zealand, recommending the appointment of a full-time staff member to advise industry on how
                                                 
90 T.A. Rafter and G.J. Fergusson, ‘The Atom Bomb Effect: Recent Increase in the 14C Content of the Atmosphere,
Biosphere, and Surface Waters of the Oceans’. New Zealand Journal of Science and Technology 38, 8 (1957B):
872–883.
91 Galbreath 1998, p162
92 The Evening Post, 11 November 1958, ED1, W2673, 2/0/22/5, part 2, ANZ.
93 Ian L. Baumgart, ‘Hamilton, William Maxwell 1909–1992’, Dictionary of New Zealand Biography,
www.dnzb.govt.nz, downloaded on 8 April 2010.
222
isotopes could be profitably employed. Illustrating the DSIR’s agricultural focus, he also advised
on an expansion of the use of radiation-induced mutations in the DSIR’s plant breeding
programme. “The cobalt source now at the Division of Nuclear Sciences is well suited for
irradiation of plant material and no further additional facilities are required” he wrote, though he
did concede that “the installation of an accelerator and, at a later date, a reactor, will permit a
wider choice of ionising radiation”.94 The possibilities of fusion as a power source were a feature
of the 1958 conference but Hamilton rightly told  The Evening Post that it was “unlikely that
electric power obtained by harnessing the hydrogen bomb – the fusion of deuterium and tritium
– will be making a great contribution to the world’s supply in the present century”.95
Figure 8.5: In June 1958, Holloway, the Minister in charge of the DSIR, suggested the new Institute of Nuclear
Scienceʼs accelerator could be used to convert sawdust into poultry food. New Zealand Herald, 5 June 1958, p12.
John Scott of the New Zealand High Commission in London also reported on the 1958
conference. Consistent with the support that the Ministry of External Affairs had been giving
American approaches to assist New Zealand with pursuing atomic energy for the future, Scott
concluded his report by saying, “Every country, including New Zealand, which aspires to high
living standards, enlightened policies and practices for social betterment, and the maintenance of
its position in the forefront of the progressive and developing countries of the world, must accept
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the challenge which atomic energy presents. It is a tool which will benefit greatly those who put
use to it quickly.” While saying that the 1958 conference focused on developments in relation to
fusion, Scott also reported on some of the latest predictions on the future use of isotopes,
including, “the production of books using specially prepared paper that would last 20,000 years,
the preservation of food, disinfestation of grain, and the treatment of inoperable cancer”.96 In
New Zealand there were other unusual predictions about the possibilities of nuclear technology
for the future. In announcing the decision to set up an institute of nuclear sciences and purchase
an accelerator, Holloway talked about the “miraculous possibilities” in the peaceful use of
nuclear energy. As well as outlining applications of nuclear science to medicine, industry and
agriculture, he said one possibility was that the new accelerator could process 1000 tons of
sawdust a year into poultry food worth £20,000.97 How irradiation could turn sawdust into food
was not explained.
US Nuclear Equipment Grant and New Zealandʼs first nuclear reactor
New Zealand science was as under-funded in the 1950s as it is today – particularly after
Holland’s National Government slashed the DSIR’s budget. Offers of gifts of laboratory
equipment to the DSIR and the universities were always going to be well received, so when the
USAEC offered gifts to support research in nuclear science, they were accepted with no apparent
suspicions of ulterior motives on the part of the Americans.
The first proposal for a nuclear reactor in New Zealand had come from Ernest Marsden and
Charles Watson-Munro in 1947. Their proposal was for an Australasian low-energy pile, which
they believed would have defence significance. This proposal never came to fruition, and later
plans for a research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Sciences were continually deferred to the
point of never being realised. In 1961, however, New Zealand did get a nuclear reactor, though
rather than being associated with the DSIR it was installed in Canterbury University’s
Engineering School.98
At the request of the New Zealand Government, a six-man American nuclear advisory mission
made a 10-day tour of New Zealand in March 1958, visiting and lecturing at various places. The
team, led by the USAEC’s Richard Kirk, visited with the intent to advise on the establishment of
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an atomic energy programme in New Zealand, specifically on the running of a nuclear institute,
the siting and operation of a research reactor, the health and radiation problems involved in
running a nuclear research institute, and the use of isotopes in agriculture, medicine and
industry.99
After the visit, the American Ambassador suggested to Holloway that certain items of equipment
which the atomic energy mission considered would be of immediate use in New Zealand
institutions for research and training might be made available by the United States authorities
under arrangements allowed for in the 1956 bilateral agreement. In March 1959, the Labour
Prime Minister Walter Nash formally replied to the American Ambassador to express New
Zealand’s interest in the proposal, attaching a list of equipment requested by the Auckland and
Canterbury universities and the DSIR Division of Nuclear Sciences.100 The physics and
chemistry departments of the University of Auckland requested various equipment for their lab
to the value of US$65,672; the nuclear engineering laboratory of the Department of Electrical
Engineering of the University of Canterbury requested funding for a sub-critical research reactor
and ancillary equipment to the value of US$130,000; and the DSIR’s Division of Nuclear
Sciences requested a mass spectrometer and other equipment to the value of US$102,280 – a
total grant of US$297,952101 (worth more than US$2 million in 2009 terms).102
So while the Institute of Nuclear Sciences was still expecting to gain a nuclear reactor at some
stage in the future, the University of Canterbury was the site of New Zealand’s first – and only
– nuclear reactor. Nuclear power was seen as inevitable for future power generation and this was
a valuable opportunity to train nuclear engineers in New Zealand. The sub-critical reactor at
University of Canterbury arrived in the electrical engineering department in 1961, under the care
of professor of electrical engineering N. M. MacElwee who only four years earlier was reported
as saying that “it does not appear that nuclear power would have any advantages over hydro-
electric power in the near future”.103 The sub-critical reactor by definition had no critical mass of
fuel to produce a chain reaction; its operation depended on neutrons being continuously added
from an outside source. The reactor used 2.5 tons of natural uranium as a fuel, a solid mixture of
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plutonium and beryllium as a neutron source, and tap water as a moderator.104 A reading of the
Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory files, however, suggests that the engineering
department accepted the gift without knowing much about what it entailed. In order to approve
the importation of radioactive material, required under the Radioactive Substances Act 1949, the
Dominion X-Ray and Radium Laboratory needed specific details of the reactor’s fuel and
source. The Laboratory had to write to the USAEC, the donator of the gift, for details,
confessing that “no-one in New Zealand has any information on the physical properties of the
uranium – in fact we are not even sure if it is uranium metal or uranium oxide, or whether U235
has been extracted”.105
The secretary of the NZAEC, Jim O’Leary, described in a letter to the Dominion X-ray and
Radium Laboratory “a great deal of loose talk and emotion regarding the danger involved in
such material” that could be dispelled if managed correctly.106 As predicted, the October 1961
delivery of the plutonium/beryllium neutron sources, which arrived by ship to Lyttelton, was
considered newsworthy – though in today’s light it is remarkable what little excitement a
shipment of plutonium aroused. The Press reported that the “plutonium” label in the ship’s
manifest caused “a stir” amongst the crew when the cargo came on board, but they were
reassured by shipping authorities, who in turn had been assured by the Dominion X-ray and
Radium Laboratory, that the cargo was safe. This shipment, the first shipment of plutonium and
the most powerful neutron source ever to arrive in New Zealand, consisted of three small
cylinders, each about 2.5 cm in diameter and 4 cm long, sealed inside a large drum filled with
paraffin wax.107
The University of Canterbury’s sub-critical nuclear reactor was soon operational. From 1964
onwards, the School of Engineering prospectuses advised that all third professional year
electrical engineering students would attend a short lecture course on the electrical aspects of
nuclear engineering. A later elective course, Advanced Electrical Engineering, focused almost
entirely on nuclear engineering and used the reactor for laboratory demonstrations and
experiments, though for some reason this was not made explicit in the name of the course.108 It is
also surprising that neither the Engineering School annual prospectus, or Student Engineer, an
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annual booklet published by the Engineering Society of the School of Engineering, mentioned
the sub-critical reactor, which as the only nuclear reactor ever to operate in New Zealand would
surely have been a drawcard for the School.109 There was nothing secret about the reactor,
however. Richard Duke, an electrical engineering student who took the nuclear engineering
course in 1973, recalls the reactor being installed in a room with internal windows, through
which the general student population and visitors could observe its daily use. The reactor seemed
to draw no opposition and at the School of Engineering’s annual open days “there were always
long queues of people waiting to climb the steps to peer into the reactor tank and see the rods”,
recalls Duke.110 In 1981, by which time it was clear that New Zealand had no need for nuclear
power, at least until after the end of the century, the University of Canterbury ceased offering the
nuclear engineering course, closed down the nuclear engineering laboratory and dismantled the
reactor. The uranium in it went to the Institute of Nuclear Sciences and the neutron sources
containing the plutonium went to the university’s physics department where it was used in
research before being recalled after reaching its 30 year lifespan.111
While the American gifts under the Atoms for Peace programme were of benefit to the New
Zealand scientists and institutions whose laboratories they went to, it was not altruism on the
part of the United States. The terms of the USAEC’s gifts of research equipment to the
University of Auckland’s physics and radiochemistry laboratories were that the results of any
research deriving from the use of equipment and materials would be shared with the United
States.112 The equipment arrived in November 1960, and Ted Collins of the physics department
wrote of the “fever of excitement in the Chemistry Department as they open up their Xmas Box
from Uncle Sam”.113 When American Ambassador Anthony Akers visited the new laboratories
in October 1961, he expressed his view “that your countrymen share the American dream of a
world at peace, and it is with great pleasure that I participate here today in this programme
reflective of the peaceful use of the atom”.114
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Atoms for Peace
While New Zealand scientists did not embrace the nuclear age to the extent that its American
friends might have hoped, it was still part of New Zealand’s vision of the future. At a 1960 visit
of the United States’s nuclear submarine Halibut, thousands of Aucklanders and Wellingtonians
flocked to the ports to welcome the vessel. The National Film Unit included the visit in their
regular Pictorial Parade, describing the “sleek dark shape” entering Wellington Harbour in the
early morning and marvelling that “somewhere inside her long grey hull a small atomic reactor
provides enough power to take her around and around the world”.115 The New Zealand Herald
described the “silent, slate-grey” submarine that arrived at Devonport as an “impressive sight”,
marvelling that she had travelled most of the 3,900 miles (6,200 km) from Pearl Harbour under
water. “Ferry passengers gaped and New Zealand sailors slipped away from their jobs to peer at
her” the paper continued.116 As Matthew O’Meagher described the Halibut, “it was a symbol of
progress and its capacity to travel the oceans was a vivid and attractive manifestation of the
possibilities, not the fears, that New Zealanders again hoped the atom could foster”.117
The Institute of Nuclear Sciences was well established by the mid 1960s and was conducting
original research as well as providing services to agriculture, industry and medicine. Director
Athol Rafter continued to hope for the long promised nuclear reactor, telling a visiting group
from the National Research Advisory Council in 1965 that a nuclear reactor would be “of
immense value to the nation and its scientists, and of particular value to industry”.118 With the
Institute of Nuclear Sciences now fully operational and its accelerator installed, the NZAEC
was, in 1966, reconstituted to act as an advisory committee on any aspects of research,
development or application of nuclear science in New Zealand.119
By now, New Zealand was making annual contributions to the IAEA’s budget, which covered
most of the regular functions of the Agency such as staff, conferences and some technical
assistance.120 New Zealand representatives attended the third IAEA Atoms for Peace
conferences in 1964.
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When the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union signed the Limited Test Ban
Treaty in 1963, there was new hope that the world might be moving away from the endless
development of new and more powerful nuclear weapons and that nuclear technology would
start being used more for peaceful purposes than for weaponry.121
Conclusion
The 1950s and 60s saw the United States and United Kingdom looking to establish in New
Zealand a nuclear partner whose dependencies on the bigger nation would be to that nation’s
advantage. New Zealand officials, however, cooperated only in a self-interested way, moving
forward in the field of nuclear science only to the extent that it would benefit the advancement of
the nation and its own scientific endeavours.
While New Zealand had concerns about nuclear bomb testing, it was generally enthusiastic
about the so-called peaceful uses of the atom, and lined up, along with other smaller countries, to
accept gifts from the USAEC – including a technical library, a nuclear reactor for the University
of Canterbury and laboratory equipment for the DSIR – and training opportunities from the
United Kingdom. Despite repeated offers of a subsidised nuclear reactor, however, the DSIR and
the State Hydro-electricity Department were adamant that a research reactor was not a priority
for New Zealand science or industry; rather than it being a welcome gift it would be an
unnecessary source of expenditure. The scientists and engineers making these decisions showed
independence in this regard – weighing up the offers made and making pragmatic decisions
about what would be useful to New Zealand’s future – often to the chagrin of the Department of
External Affairs, who saw the DSIR’s agricultural focus as blinding them to the potential
benefits of nuclear science and were concerned about the impact on New Zealand’s relationship
with the United States.
New Zealand did not participate in the global nuclear industry to the degree that some other
politically small countries did – Australia, for example, was exporting uranium from its mines
and creating radioisotopes for medical and industrial use at its Lucas Heights reactor – but did
play its part on the global stage, sending delegates to United Nations conferences on the peaceful
uses of the atom and making financial contributions to the IAEA.
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The establishment of a DSIR Institute of Nuclear Sciences in 1959 cemented the work of a
group of nuclear sciences working within the DSIR and, under the leadership of Athol Rafter,
established an international reputation in the field of radiocarbon dating, becoming the southern
hemisphere’s top radiocarbon dating laboratory. Even in 1959, however, when the Institute was
established, there was a degree of nuclear fear and misconceptions about what nuclear science
might involve, that the Government felt the need to reassure the public about.
New Zealand was now about to face a new decision with regard to a nuclear future. In 1964 the
New Zealand Electricity Department flagged that a nuclear power station would be needed to
meet New Zealand’s electricity demands by about 1977 and began the search for a suitable




Plans for nuclear power
“It is safe to say that within about half a century electricity from nuclear sources
will be supplied to houses and small industries under much the same conditions as the
present water supply.”
Ernest Marsden, June 19551
“... nations may in the future be rated as advanced or backward, developed
or under-developed, according to their success in applying atomic energy to the
solution of their problems.”
External Affairs, 14 June 19572
By the late 1970s, nuclear technology was an integral part of New Zealand’s medical system and
nuclear science was thriving: the Institute of Nuclear Sciences was supporting environment
studies and industrial and agricultural industries and had established a reputation as the southern
hemisphere’s leading radiocarbon dating laboratory. New Zealand’s attempts to establish a
uranium mining industry, however, had come to nothing; despite extensive investigations the
West Coast uranium deposits were not economic. A heavy water plant planned for Wairakei had
not gone ahead and the plans had not been revisited. But ever since the 1950s, there was one
other aspect of nuclear technology that had been a hope for New Zealand’s future – nuclear
power for electricity generation.
Early plans for nuclear power
Consideration of nuclear power as an energy source for New Zealand homes and industry began
in the 1950s, when nuclear power seemed poised to offer the world a safe, cheap, clean and
almost limitless supply of electricity. In 1954 the world’s first nuclear power plant began
operating in Obninsk, near Moscow, and two years later a British nuclear plant at Calder Hall
began feeding power into the national grid. The young Queen Elizabeth, who opened the plant,
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announced that nuclear energy would be “harnessed for the first time for the common good of
our community”.3
Internationally, the rhetoric for atomic energy was high. In his address to the 1955 Atoms for
Peace Conference, Indian nuclear physicist and president of the United Nations Conference on
the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy, Homi Bhabha said “for the full industrialization of the
under-developed areas, for the continuation of our civilisation and its further development,
atomic energy is not merely an aid: it is an absolute necessity. The acquisition by man of the
knowledge of how to release and use atomic energy must be recognized as the third great epoch
in human history”.4 In the United States, the chairman of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission spoke of an atomic future where electricity would be “too cheap to meter”.5
Australia’s plans for nuclear power were already well in advance of New Zealand’s when, in
1955, Charles Watson-Munro left New Zealand to lead Australia’s atomic energy programme
and described atomic power as “a coming force that would be comparable with the first
onslaught of electricity on civilisation”. 6
But New Zealand’s interest in nuclear power was about more than just keeping up with the rest
of the world. By the mid 1950s, electricity demand in New Zealand was rapidly outstripping
supply – particularly in the North Island – despite the regular commissioning of new hydro-
electric power stations. In a 1955 paper on the economics of nuclear power in New Zealand,
Tony McWilliams described New Zealand as “probably the only country in the world with a
relatively high standard of living which has a continuing and serious power shortage”.7
In 1955, in response to the need for a more systematic planning process, Cabinet set up a
Combined Committee on the North Island Power Supply, initiating a system of annual planning
reports.8 That same year, Geothermal Developments Ltd was formed to produce electricity and
heavy water at Wairakei (as covered in chapter 5), uranium was found in the Buller Gorge (as
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covered in chapter 6) and the New Zealand delegation returned from the first United Nations
Atoms for Peace conference (as covered in chapter 8).
In his report on the Atoms for Peace conference, DSIR secretary Bill Hamilton wrote that there
were three main possibilities to solve the North Island’s looming electricity problem: bringing
hydro-power from the South Island by submarine cable; conventional thermal plants burning
coal or oil; or nuclear power. Hamilton’s characteristic pragmatic approach stated that the choice
between the three must rest on their respective economic advantages but he did point out the
benefits of the submarine cable. Not only was hydro-electric power a renewable resource that
should be fully developed before we turned to non-renewable sources like coal and uranium, he
wrote, it was independent from overseas supply and would not be threatened in the event of war.
Hamilton also saw delaying the introduction of nuclear power as advantageous, as we would
then have the benefit of technological advances and a likely cheapening of the power source.9
Bill Latta, of the State Hydro-electric Department, was in broad agreement with Hamilton – the
idea of a Cook Strait cable had come from Latta in 1950 – concluding in his report on the
conference that “there is no pressing necessity to construct atomic power stations in the
immediate future”.10
Not everyone agreed. Before leaving for Australia, Watson-Munro advised that unless
geothermal steam was found to provide a plentiful and cost efficient energy source, the North
Island would be forced to rely on atomic power within the next 10 years.  He considered the
country’s hydro-electric potential close to exhaustion, and advised that the use of a submarine
cable to bring power from the South Island to the North Island was too problematic. 11
By early 1956, the media was presenting the solving of New Zealand’s ever-increasing demand
for electricity as a choice between nuclear power and a Cook Strait submarine cable. While the
DSIR and the State Hydro-electric Department favoured the Cook Strait cable, many individual
scientists preferred the nuclear option, and roused popular support for it too. Not only was
nuclear power seen as being more reliable than hydro-electricity, because it was not dependent
on the weather, it was also able to be sited close to where the power was needed and costs were
expected to come down by the time New Zealand was ready to commission a nuclear power
station.
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Figure 9.1: In this Auckland Star cartoon, Prime Minister Sidney Holland, who was criticised for going slowly on
nuclear power, is seen driving the 1911 hydro-electric model vehicle. Source:  Lonsdale, Auckland Star, 27 April
1956.
Francis Farley, senior lecturer in physics at Auckland University College and, along with
Hamilton and Latta, one of New Zealand’s delegates to the 1955 Atoms for Peace Conference,
was reported as saying that “the real obstacle to nuclear power in New Zealand is the over-
cautious play-safe attitude that is adopted in Wellington”, predicting that if the “present increase
in power demand continues, we might expect to have 10 nuclear power stations by 1975 to
1980”.12 Farley’s colleague Professor Percy Burbidge agreed, arguing that “the system of
generating power in one island and transmitting it largely to the other is to be deplored”.13 In an
article in the Auckland Star, Farley criticised the Minister of Works, Stan Goosman, and the
head of the State Hydro-electric Department, A. E. Davenport, and put forward his view that
atomic power would be cheaper than a Cook Strait cable.14 Ernest Marsden, always keen to have
his voice heard on nuclear issues, supported the argument for nuclear power, and was reported as
saying that those who were holding New Zealand back from nuclear science were “lazy-minded
conservative diehards who are afraid of change” and frightened that nuclear science had become
“a malevolent, uncultured arbiter of our destiny instead of the traditional servant of the industrial
revolution”.15 Darcy Walker, Watson-Munro’s successor as professor of physics at Victoria
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University, and another New Zealand delegate to the 1955 Atoms for Peace conference, wrote
an impassioned letter to the Department of External Affairs in which he referred to nuclear
science as “the crowning achievement of man’s research in the physical sciences” and criticised
New Zealand’s “lack of decision about atomic energy”. Walker called for “a bold and
enterprising attitude towards atomic energy” to help New Zealand retain its best brains and
stimulate a new outlook on the nation’s industrial future. “If nuclear science and engineering is
largely ignored”, Walker added, “we forego the benefits of one of the most powerful stimulating
forces of modern science. If we have faith in the future of New Zealand we cannot afford to do
this.”16
Figure 9.2: Stan Goosman, Hollandʼs Minister in charge of Works and the State Hydro-electric Department, is seen
being blinded by the light of atomic power: an editorial the previous week had described those who said atomic
power stations were years away were “blind to the fact that Britain is proceeding with a full-scale nuclear power
programme”.17 Goosman was seen as blind to the idea that that nuclear power was the right option for New
Zealandʼs future. Source: Lonsdale, Auckland Star, 4 May 1956, p2.
The editor of the Auckland Star took the side of physicists like Farley and Burbidge. Under
editorials headlined “These scientists must not be ignored”, and “Only the best advice will do”
the stance of government officials like Hamilton and Latta was criticised, with the comment that
“at a time of electricity crisis, when the whole country is paying for the mistakes of the past, the
Government remains stubbornly deaf to the advice of men in a position to give the best possible
advice on the practical economics of a nuclear power station”. The May 1956 editorial added
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that the “people are in no mood to tolerate further short-sightedness over power planning. They
see atomic energy as a probable, and perhaps the only effective, alternative to a future darkened
by power shortages”, and called for an investigation into the possibility of nuclear power.18 The
Otago Daily Times added to the argument against the submarine cable, describing Cook Strait as
“a region notoriously disturbed by strong currents and seismic shocks in which the seabed
contains fissures of considerable width”.19 It was not just the mainstream newspapers advocating
nuclear power. The left wing newspaper The People’s Voice concluded a piece reporting Farley
and Burbidge’s arguments by saying “It is in the interests of workers, housewives, farmers and
industrialists of New Zealand to have available a source of reliable power, and it is the
responsibility of the government to provide it”.20
As the argument between the university physicists and the government officials continued, other
newspaper headlines warned of looming power cuts if Auckland consumers failed to meet
voluntary savings targets: there was high public awareness of the need for a new power source.21
But the Government line about nuclear power remained cautious. Stan Goosman, the Minister in
charge of Works and the State Hydro-electric Department in the National Government, warned
New Zealanders not to harbour premature hopes that nuclear power would soon be brought into
New Zealand, saying that nuclear power would not be economically feasible for many years.22
Goosman responded to Burbidge’s claims by challenging the argument that atomic power would
be cheaper than hydro power and asking “on what ground, or by what authority, Professor
Burbidge sets himself up as an authority on practical power supply economics”.23 Hamilton
remained circumspect, with newspapers reporting his views that nuclear power held no promise
of cheap electricity and it would probably be 20 years before New Zealand had need for trained
operatives capable of supervising the running of nuclear power stations.24 The Ministry of
Works agreed, with senior engineer J. W. Ridley stating that while atomic power would be one
of New Zealand’s major sources of energy in the future, it would not be an economic proposition
for New Zealand within the next 20 years.25 The voices of overseas experts always carried
weight in a domestic argument, and in May 1957, when Leonard Cronkhite, director of the
United States Atomic Industrial Forum, visited New Zealand his opinion was widely reported.
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Cronkhite voiced his support for the Government stance, saying that New Zealand appeared to
be the least in need of atomic power of any of the 12 countries he had visited on his world tour.
Cronkhite pointed out that New Zealand was “fortunately situated with natural power resources,
such as rainfall, fast-flowing rivers, and geothermal power resources. The country could
probably use the money required by an atomic reactor to much better advantage by producing
power by these means.”26
Opinions remained divided, with individual scientists tending to be the ones voicing their
endorsement of nuclear power. As with the current climate change “debate”, these vocal
dissenters got more than their share of media coverage. A DSIR physicist, Tony McWilliams,
after returning to New Zealand from Harwell (where he had been working on the fractional
distillation of heavy water in preparation for the planned Wairakei heavy water plant), pushed
for the early use of nuclear power plants in New Zealand. In a 1957 address to the Wellington
branch of the New Zealand Institute of Engineers, which was widely reported in newspapers,
McWilliams said that “nuclear power shows promise of satisfying completely the incremental
power demand with considerably less strain on the economic resources of the country. It frees
the power supply from the vagaries of the weather which will always plague hydro-electric
power. Great advantage should stem from the use of nuclear power and its early introduction
should be seriously considered.” He added that nuclear power stations could be introduced to
New Zealand as early as 1962-63.27 There were also some warning voices from within the
universities, however, and as early as 1955, Professor Rastrick, of Canterbury University
College’s mechanical engineering department, warned that the problem of disposal of
radioactive waste would have to be overcome before atomic power could be generated in New
Zealand.28
Today, the Labour Party is closely associated with New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy and for
enacting nuclear-free legislation in 1987, but when it came to decisions about nuclear power in
the 1950s, they were more pro-nuclear than National. At the end of 1957, after a Labour
Government led by Walter Nash had been elected, the new Minister of Works and Electricity,
Hugh Watt, responded to public calls with an announcement that the Government would launch
an investigation into the possibility of nuclear power stations in New Zealand. While in
opposition, the Labour Government had opposed the Cook Strait cable project, and Watt now
                                                 
26  The Evening Post, 29 May 1957; The Press, 1 June 1957.
27  The Dominion, 26 September 1957, ED1, W2673, 2/0/65/3, ANZ; J. A. McWilliams, ‘The Economics of Nuclear
Power in New Zealand’, September 1957, ED1, W2673, 2/0/22/5, part 2, ANZ.
28 The Dominion, 31 August 1955, EA1, W2619, 121/2/1, part 1, ANZ.
238
said that the investigations into nuclear power would be more intense than under the previous
Government and would be conducted with the view that electricity produced by nuclear means
was a distinct possibility for the future.29
The State Hydro-electric Department reported in 1958 that the Government had made enquiries
regarding the provision of power from atomic energy, which it described as a “promising source
of power”. It continued, however, that New Zealand had “natural sources which, at the moment
and for some few years ahead, seem likely to provide power more economically and with less
drain on overseas funds”. It recommended that atomic energy be reconsidered in five years.  The
report continued by approving the construction of a new hydro-electric station at Benmore on
the Waitaki River, initially to supply power to the South Island, and deferred a decision on
linking the islands with a Cook Strait cable.30
By 1961, after numerous technical issues had been resolved, the Government approved the
scheme to link the North and South Island power systems and a contract for manufacturing and
laying the cables was placed. In 1965 a submarine high-voltage DC cable – only the third of its
kind in the world – finally linked the North and South Islands. The Benmore station, on the
Waitaki River, became operational in May 1965, with most of its power going north to provide
the growing population of the North Island with, at last, a plentiful and reliable source of
electricity. But while the Cook Strait cable had won the toss up between nuclear power and a
link between the North and South Islands, it now seemed that both solutions would eventually be
required.31
Meanwhile, the annual reports of the New Zealand Electricity Department (NZED)’s Planning
Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand continued to project future
electricity demand and detail plans for future power sources for New Zealand. (The State Hydro-
electric Department had became the New Zealand Electricity Department in 1958, reflecting the
country’s diversifying sources of electricity.) The 1964 report of the Planning Committee on
Electric Power Development in New Zealand contained the first mention of nuclear power as a
possible source of electricity for New Zealand. In this report hydro, geothermal, natural gas, oil,
coal and nuclear were all considered to meet New Zealand’s future and rapidly escalating
demand for power. In considering nuclear power as an option, the Committee noted that “there is
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no doubt that this means of power generation must be introduced in New Zealand by about
1977”. It also had the foresight to note that the cost of setting up such a plant could be in the
order of at least £100 million, and recommended that a possible site for a nuclear reactor be
selected, and a meteorological observing and recording station be set up to provide details on
local atmospheric conditions.32
Training nuclear engineers
While there had been many arguments about the timing of the introduction of nuclear power to
New Zealand, and the relative benefits of different energy sources, it was widely accepted, even
amongst the cautious DSIR hierarchy, that nuclear power would be introduced at some stage in
the future, and scientists and engineers should be trained for this eventuality.  As covered in
chapter 8, in 1961 the University of Canterbury set up a nuclear engineering course, complete
with a sub-critical nuclear reactor in the laboratory, to train engineers for the New Zealand
industry.
The responsibilities of the New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee (NZAEC) included liaison
between organisations and departments concerned in planning for the introduction of nuclear
power, and in 1964 the committee set up siting and manpower subcommittees to study suitable
sites for a nuclear power station and manpower requirements for the operation of a power
station.33 The NZAEC Manpower Subcommittee was chaired by Robin Williams (one of the
young New Zealand scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project during the Second World
War) and included representatives from the NZED, the Ministry of Works, DSIR, and Institute
of Nuclear Sciences.34
The Manpower Subcommittee first reported in 1966, outlining recommendations for a training
programme to enable the NZED and the Ministry of Works to train staff to work with
consultants engaged in siting, design, construction and start up of a nuclear power station that
was anticipated to be needed by 1977. A first stage, sending two senior engineers for a four-
month nuclear engineering course at Lucas Heights in Australia, had already taken place.35
Henry Hitchcock of the NZED described the 1966 course, which he attended as a 54-year-old
research engineer, as both interesting and traumatic. He recalled arriving at the course “equipped
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with stage one physics and stage one chemistry which I’d passed in 1930, which is two years
before the neutron was discovered. Nuclear physics was a big jump ... I was dragged from the
beginning of the twentieth century to the second half of the twentieth century by the scruff of my
neck.”36
A programme sending more engineers – nuclear, electrical, mechanical and civil – as well as a
reactor physicist and a health physicist was to follow, with the Australian School of Nuclear
Technology at Lucas Heights and the University of New South Wales in Sydney recommended
as the closest places for intensive nuclear engineering education. The Committee noted that
offers for overseas training had also come in from the UKAEA and Atomic Energy of Canada
Ltd.37 The Committee rejected the idea of expanding training facilities in New Zealand, but was
operating under the expectation that training would eventually be available at the proposed
Institute of Nuclear Sciences research reactor at Gracefield.38 After purchasing a sub-critical
nuclear reactor with funds provided by the American Atoms for Peace programme in 1961, the
University of Canterbury’s Electrical Engineering Department began offering a nuclear power
engineering course to train students for the eventual introduction of nuclear power stations to
New Zealand. More advanced training was offered overseas: throughout 1967 and 1968 a further
seven NZED officers attended the training course at Lucas Heights and another two NZED staff
attended a nuclear course at Imperial College in London.39
A larger team spent two years training in the United Kingdom. In May and August 1967, a team
of six New Zealanders – five engineers and a radiation physicist – travelled to the UKAEA
Reactor Design headquarters at Risley, Lancashire where they worked on a joint British and
Australian project to adapt the enriched fuel Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor into a
reactor that could be fuelled by natural – rather than enriched – uranium. The New Zealand
group was led by Hector Jones of the NZED and included men from the Ministry of Works, the
NZED and the Department of Health’s National Radiation Laboratory. The New Zealanders’
main objective in this project was to become competent in the technology associated with a
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water-moderated nuclear reactor, so as to form a team of engineers capable of working with
overseas consultants when it came time for New Zealand to commission a nuclear reactor.40
Figure 9.3: The ANZAC team, at the end of their two-year stint, at the UKAEA Reactor Design Office at Risley. The
New Zealand team includes Rob Aspden (in back row, smiling, third from left), Hector Jones (in front and to the right
of Aspden) and Neil Fyfe (back row, obscured). Three other members of the New Zealand team are absent from the
photograph. Courtesy Rob Aspden.
The project was completed in 1969 – coincidentally, the same year the Maui gas field was
discovered in offshore Taranaki by a group of international petroleum companies. After the
course, three members of the New Zealand team stayed on in London to study the functions of a
licensing authority, and the procedures followed in reactor safety assessment and nuclear power
station safety inspection, with the Ministry of Power’s Inspectorate of Nuclear Installations.
They also visited Germany and Canada’s heavy water reactors. In their report to the NZED they
concluded that even if the discovery of natural gas deferred the planned New Zealand nuclear
programme, then global advances in operating nuclear power stations of the type suitable for
New Zealand conditions would have built up to the point where reasonably developed and
proven systems will be available. “Such a delay should not mean any let-up in our efforts to
prepare for the introduction of nuclear power stations into New Zealand” they added. “On the
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contrary, the ‘breathing space’ should be utilised to continue to build a pool of engineers and
scientists trained in the various technologies and know-how involved, and who will be capable
of forming a solid foundation on which successful nuclear power generation in New Zealand
must ultimately rest.”41
Despite increased uncertainty about the future of nuclear power for New Zealand caused by the
Maui gas discovery, which had the potential to solve New Zealand’s electricity needs for the
medium term, officers from the NZED, Ministry of Works, Department of Health and
Commission for the Environment continued to be trained at Lucas Heights and other
international nuclear technology courses. By the beginning of 1976, 26 New Zealanders had
undergone some form of overseas training in nuclear technology.42
Finding a suitable site
Auckland’s population was rapidly expanding and creating the biggest increase in electricity
demand. In his 1964 report on nuclear power generation, Eric Mackenzie, general manager of
the NZED, had recommended that serious consideration be given to locating a nuclear power
station north of Auckland city, given “the very difficult transmission problems concerned with
delivering power to the Auckland area” and the lack of an indigenous fuel resource.43 In
December 1964 the Siting Subcommittee of the NZAEC met for the first time, and, responding
to recommendations tabled by the NZED, selected a peninsula in the south-east area of the
Kaipara Harbour as the primary site for New Zealand’s first nuclear power station, with a nearby
site, at South Head, identified as a second option.44
The Siting Subcommittee was led by Philip Blakeley of the NZED and included representatives
from the Ministry of Works, the Meteorological Office, the Department of Health (Jim
McCahon of the National Radiation Laboratory) and the Institute of Nuclear Sciences. The
Committee’s brief was to select a site that took into account health and safety issues and
engineering and transport requirements, and had a suitable supply of cooling water, and to begin
observations of climate, hydrology and background radioactivity. While sites at Kawau Creek
and Oyster Point on the Kaipara Harbour were the focus of investigations, the Committee also
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considered a further 18 sites between the Manukau and Kaipara Harbour entrances on the west
coast – including a site at Bethells Beach and one between Piha and Karekare – and between the
Whangaparaoa Peninsula and Pakiri on the east coast. Water for the proposed power station
would come from streams in the Waitakere ranges and in the hills north of Puhoi or by drilling
to the water table. In 1965 the Meteorological Office installed anemometers to measure wind
speed at the two favoured sites on the Kaipara Harbour, and the NZED began measuring sea-
water temperatures. The New Zealand Navy conducted a hydrographic survey near the two sites
and the New Zealand Geological Survey conducted seismic surveys to investigate the underlying
geology.45 Further investigations studying foundation materials and availability of cooling water
confirmed by 1968 that the South Head site was suitable, and investigations began to focus on
the Oyster Point site, which had the advantage of being closer to Auckland.46
In considering the best site for a power station, priority was given to safety of the human
population in the event of an accident. One of the issues faced was the risk of earthquakes, and
in 1971 the New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee set up a Working Group for Seismic
Effects on Nuclear Installations to “examine and report on problems relating to design
requirements and the construction of nuclear reactor installations in New Zealand, resistant to
seismic effects”.47 The impact of the day-to-day running of a nuclear power station on the land
and marine environment was given less consideration. A report was received, however, from the
New Zealand Oceanographic Institute, who advised that the discharge of warm water effluent
from a power station into an enclosed shallow harbour like Kaipara, the largest harbour in
Northland, would significantly raise the water temperature which, as well as encouraging the
breeding and growth of species already present, could encourage the establishment of exotic
warm water species arriving on ships. It also said that algal blooms and various destructive
marine boring organisms could be more likely in the warmer waters. In summing up, the
Oceanographic Institute said that altering the temperature regime in the harbour could “affect a
large number of people and cause considerable public inconvenience and anger … because it
would affect the facilities for recreation … and commercial fisheries.”48
Given that Auckland was the city most in need of a new power source it is perhaps not
surprising that academics from Auckland University led the call for nuclear power. In the
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tradition of Watson-Munro, Farley and Burbidge before him, Auckland University’s chemistry
professor, A. L. Odell (who was involved in many nuclear science projects), in 1965 said that
New Zealand would benefit greatly through cooperation with Australia on the introduction of
nuclear power.49 The Dominion called his suggestion “eminently sound”, pointing out that
Australia had already amassed a fund of scientific and engineering knowledge about nuclear
power that could help save New Zealand time and money.50 By now Australia’s research reactor
at Lucas Heights had been operating for five years, and in another four years, in 1969, plans
would be announced for a nuclear power station to be built in Jervis Bay in New South Wales.
Tenders for the reactor, which would have to be supplied from overseas, would be called for and
$1.25 million spent on building access roads, houses for future employees, and water and power
services.51
Commission date set
While earlier reports identified the likely need for nuclear power by about 1977, 1968 was the
first year that plans for a nuclear power station came within the NZED’s 10-year planning
period. The 1968 annual report recommended a 250 MW reactor turbine generator unit to start
operation in 1977, with three similar units following at yearly intervals, to build the station up to
1000 MW generating capacity. As well as observations made at the favoured Kaipara Harbour
sites, consideration had also been given to possible additional nuclear power station sites in the
Firth of Thames, south of Auckland City, and at Baring Head, near Wellington. The 1968 report
concluded, however, that the programme for the introduction of nuclear power could be
significantly affected in the event of early large-scale discoveries of natural gas, which would
have the advantage of being an entirely indigenous resource.52
The 1969 report pushed the commissioning date for the first 250 MW nuclear power station back
one year, to 1978. 53 Also in 1969, the British company of Preece, Cardew, and Rider were
engaged to prepare a report studying the economics of nuclear generation in relation to hydro-
electric and thermal power generation. If nuclear power was found to be economically viable,
they would then proceed to make a specific proposal suitable for New Zealand conditions.54 In
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May 1969 The Evening Post touted natural uranium, heavy water for the first electricity-
generating nuclear reactor in New Zealand, giving its advantages as being a low-cost fuel, with
fuel fabrication procedures simple enough to be carried out in New Zealand. The article also
added that such a reactor “produces a considerable quantity of plutonium”, adding that “because
it is unlikely New Zealand would require plutonium until some years after the first nuclear
station is established, the spent fuel would be stored away in underground tanks on the station
site”. 55 Plutonium was useful as a reactor fuel and for bomb production, but if it was being
produced but not used it would become a highly radioactive waste that required enormous care
to be either held or transported. Plutonium is also inflammable and can be very dangerous when
dispersed by fire. It was not until the mid 1970s that plutonium produced by reactors was seen as
a potential problem rather than an advantage, though even then environmentalists’ main
concerns were the possibility of some plutonium escaping into the atmosphere, or the threat of
terrorism – rather than disposal of the highly radioactive waste.56
Preece, Cardew and Rider’s final report on the Economics of Nuclear and Alternative Forms of
Generation was received by the NZED in late 1970. While the initial brief of the company was
to confirm that nuclear power was the most economic way to meet growing demand in the North
Island, and to recommend the most suitable type of reactor, the Maui gas discovery switched the
focus of their investigations to economic comparisons between gas-fired, oil-fired, and nuclear-
fuelled stations. Preece, Cardew & Rider’s report showed that the “relative economic merits of
the various types of generation considered depended on the price payable for fossil fuels, and the
weighting given to overseas funds”. The consultants recommended that if, after taking into
account the above factors, nuclear-fuelled generation appeared to be the most attractive
proposition, tenders should be called for a 1000 MW nuclear-fuelled station. Should the tenders
confirm its economic advantage, construction of such a nuclear power station could proceed.57
Indigenous fuel sources, however, were now proving more abundant than previously realised.
By 1972, testing of the oil wells off the Taranaki coast had revealed large quantities of natural
gas; more than enough to fire the 600 MW power station under construction at New Plymouth.
At the same time, a reassessment of Waikato’s coal reserves revealed enough coal in the Huntly
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area to support a 1000 MW thermal power station.58 In 1973, the New Zealand Government
entered into a joint venture with an oil consortium to develop the Maui off-shore gas field, a
move the NZED saw as meaning that New Zealand could now defer the introduction of nuclear
power stations until the late 1980s, or even later, should more indigenous energy resources be
found. Even so, they made it clear that consideration should continue to be given to the
resources required for a future nuclear power programme.59
The early months of 1973 were very dry and New Zealand’s reliance on hydro-electricity meant
more electricity restrictions and even occasional power cuts and blackouts. Later in the year
came the oil crisis, in which Arab nations set up an embargo on oil exports, leading to huge
increases in oil prices which limited the possibility for thermal generation using oil but also
highlighted the difficulties of reliance on imported fuel supplies. Another dry summer followed.
In response, the NZED’s construction programme was advanced, the Power Planning Committee
pushed for sufficient capacity to meet dry season demand, and the 1973 Huntly coal-fired station
was approved.60
The 1974 report noted that “other countries without the indigenous resources of New Zealand
are embarking on a vigorous nuclear programme to meet their energy requirements” and as far
as New Zealand was concerned, “plans for introducing nuclear power must be made”. 61 This
was the first plan that adopted a 15-year planning period (as opposed to the 10 years used
previously), meaning that a nuclear power station was back on the power plan. A North Island
nuclear power station of 2 x 600 MW was scheduled for commissioning in October 1988, with
the rider that the introduction of the station should be deferred if suitable alternative indigenous
energy sources became available. The report noted that “in the planning of nuclear power
stations, safety will be a major consideration, and any proposals will have to comply with the
exacting standards which would undoubtedly be laid down by whatever independent authority is
responsible for the licensing and supervision of such instalments.” 62  Appendix II contained
information about radioactive waste disposal. It described how spent fuel from a New Zealand
nuclear power station would be stored at the power station for up to three months, to allow the
decay of short-lived fission products. It would then be loaded into specially constructed
containers “designed to remain intact in severe accident conditions” and transported to the
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reprocessing plant where the unburnt fuel would be recovered. It concluded that “should a
decision be made to install a nuclear station it will be necessary to conclude an agreement with
an overseas reprocessing plant to treat the used fuel. The spent fuel would be transported to the
plant, and the wastes treated and stored in that country along with the other wastes produced at
the plant.”63
The same year, the New Zealand Science Review carried an editorial about safety aspects of
disposing of waste from a nuclear power station in New Zealand. The editor, J. G. Gregory,
commented on Prime Minister Norman Kirk’s assurance that no decision on a nuclear power
station for New Zealand would be considered “until or unless there is an absolute assurance that
it is possible to dispose of the poisonous and dangerous wastes of that power plant in complete
safety”.64 Gregory noted that “even the United States Atomic Energy Commission did not claim
to be absolutely sure of the safety of disposal and postulated the consequences of release of
plutonium-239”, and continued:
More of our children would abort or be stillborn, more would be born
with genetic defects, more would die in infancy, we ourselves might not
live to see our grandchildren. All this would occur in an atmosphere of
mental tension and ill health, social stress, and heightened civil
unrest … It is not an option to dump these wastes anywhere – in the sea,
in salt mines, in space, in the Antarctic, anywhere.65
The following year, 1975, the Labour Government established a Fact Finding Group on Nuclear
Power to report on the possible environmental consequences of a nuclear power production
programme in New Zealand. The Group set up four expert working parties to study electricity
supply and demand; nuclear power generation and reactor safety; health risks; and the siting of
power stations. 66
Public opinion had changed by 1975. Internationally, nuclear power plants had been generating
electricity for domestic and industrial consumption for nearly 20 years, and were now in use in
nearly 20 countries, including the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, Canada,
France and India. By waiting so long to seriously consider nuclear power – primarily for cost
reasons, as even without taking into account the hidden costs of nuclear power, such as
management of radioactive wastes, indigenous power sources continued to be assessed as being
cheaper than nuclear – New Zealand had deferred its nuclear decision until the arguments for
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and against nuclear power were more sophisticated. Nuclear energy produced by fission had
initially been promoted as a cheap, pollution-free, self-perpetuating source of energy. However,
because of unexpectedly high costs, the unresolved problem of what to do with the radioactive
waste it generated, and increased public opposition to nuclear energy, many plans for nuclear
power plants had been shelved. Public opposition had grown in part because of the industry’s
connections with weapons manufacturing (the British nuclear power plant at Calder Hall, for
example, produced plutonium for weapons as well as generating electricity) and a series of
nuclear accidents. A 1957 fire at Britain’s first nuclear reactor at Windscale, for example, caused
radioactive contamination of the surrounding countryside and a reactor meltdown on a Soviet
icebreaker in 1966 made international headlines. The images nuclear power conjured up were no
longer so rosy. The Listener’s Boyce Richardson described nuclear reactors as now symbolising
“an impersonal future world of computers, robots, explosive violence and uncontrollable
technology, rather than the cornucopia overflowing with goods and pleasure that they once
promised”.67
Safety was an increasingly important concern. The nuclear power programmes of Europe, begun
in the 1960s and boosted by the oil shock of 1973, were in a new phase that Listener writer
Geoff Chapple described as one of “public challenge, planning delays and outright rejection”.68
Anti-nuclear protestors had occupied nuclear reactor sites in Germany, France and the United
States, staged street demonstrations in the United Kingdom and Australia, and caused informal
moratoriums on the building of new reactors in West Germany and Japan. Australian scientist F.
P. Robotham described those fighting against the “atomic juggernaut” as a “strange and
somewhat unique coalition of church groups, scientists, trade unionists, political parties and
plain ordinary people”.69
Elsie Locke’s claim that “a profound distrust of nuclear energy in any form was widespread”
was true of a portion of the New Zealand population. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament
had led a campaign opposing visits from nuclear-powered ships. Nuclear power was seen as
potentially dangerous, and, since 1971, American nuclear powered ships were not allowed into
New Zealand harbours unless the United States guaranteed liability for any damage to people or
places in the event of a nuclear accident (as covered in chapter seven).70 Environmental
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movements had also emerged around the world, and in New Zealand the fight against the raising
of Lake Manapouri to boost hydro-electric power generation had, in Boyce Richardson’s words,
“moved forever the foundation on which official and public thinking about the environment of
this country is based”.71 In 1974, the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution
examined the impact of nuclear power on the environment at a time when the United Kingdom
seemed on the threshold of a major commitment to nuclear power, in particular to the fast-
breeder reactor. In its report published in 1976, the Commission found that inadequate means for
disposal of radioactive waste, as well as the risks of using and producing large quantities of
plutonium, made the large scale introduction of nuclear power “irresponsible and morally
wrong” adding that “we should not rely for our energy supply on a process that produces such a
hazardous substance as plutonium unless there is no reasonable alternative”.72 In March 1976, a
coalition of environmental and anti-nuclear groups formed the Campaign for Non-Nuclear
Futures to oppose the introduction of nuclear power to New Zealand, promoting instead
renewable alternative energy options like solar, wind and geothermal power. The main goal of
the campaign was to collect half a million signatures in a petition against nuclear power.73 It was
against this background that New Zealand considered whether or not to proceed with nuclear
power.
Royal Commission of Inquiry into Nuclear Power Generation
The 1975 report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development, which had retained
proposals for two 600 MW nuclear power stations, noted that “if there is to be any chance of
meeting a 1988 commissioning date it will be necessary for a decision to be made by 1977 on
whether or not to introduce nuclear power”.74 It was with this in mind, then, that Robert
Muldoon’s National Government, that had come to power in 1975, set up a Royal Commission
of Inquiry into Nuclear Power Generation: it had been part of the National Party’s election
manifesto that nuclear power would not be introduced to New Zealand “until a public inquiry
into all aspects of this source of energy has taken place”.75 The commissioners were announced
in August 1976: the Commission was to be led by Sir Thaddeus McCarthy, a retired judge and
President of the Court of Appeal. The other commissioners were Ian Blair, a plant pathologist
with community involvement in protection against water pollution; Vivienne Boyd, Vice-
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President of both the National Council of Women and the Wellington Association of Baptist
Churches; Bruce Liley, professor of physics at Waikato University; and Lindsay Randerson, a
businessman.76 There was some opposition to the appointment of Liley, the only scientist
appointed to the Commission. Liley’s research into the application of plasma physics to nuclear
fusion reactors was cited by Campaign Half Million and some environmental groups, including
Friends of the Earth, as evidence of his advocacy for nuclear power for electricity generation and
they called for his resignation.77 The Minister of Electricity, Eric Holland (son of the late Sidney
Holland) defended Liley’s appointment, arguing that they had appointed a truly impartial
commission that would present credible and dispassionate recommendations.78 Just a few days
after the commissioners were announced, the Planning Committee on Electric Power
Development in New Zealand tabled its 1976 report, in which the two planned nuclear power
stations were now scheduled for 1990, with a decision on whether or not to proceed with them
required by 1977.79
Figure 9.4: The Campaign for Non-Nuclear Futures launched its Campaign Half Million to collect signatures opposing
the introduction of nuclear power to New Zealand – something the New Zealand Electricity Department saw as
inevitable. Meanwhile, many countries with nuclear power had moratoriums on new nuclear power stations and the
global industry was in decline. Source: Malcolm Walker, Sunday News, 4 July 1976, p17.
Before the 1970s, the focus of anti-nuclear protests was opposition to nuclear weapons testing,
but the anti-nuclear movement was increasingly encompassing opposition to nuclear power and
nuclear warships, and nuclear issues were coming to a wider public awareness. It is revealing to
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look at a single issue of The Dominion, from 27 August 1976. Page one carried two nuclear
stories, one on the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand’s plans
for two nuclear power stations by 1990, which began “New Zealanders will probably have to
accept nuclear power by 1990”, and one on the Civil Defence preparations for an upcoming visit
by the nuclear-powered USS Truxtun. Under the Government’s safety code for the entry of
nuclear-powered ships to New Zealand ports, the national civil defence nerve centre under the
Beehive was activated, and radiation monitoring devices were installed at 20 sites around
Wellington Harbour.80 Page 3 of the newspaper carried a story about MPs debating and
defeating a Bill calling for a South Pacific nuclear weapon free zone and the prohibition of
nuclear weapons and reactors from New Zealand (this issue will be covered more fully in
chapter 10).81 At about this time the links between nuclear power and nuclear weapons were also
being made, and not just by people in the peace movement. The Dominion editorial of 17 August
1976 had described international stability as being disturbed by countries acquiring nuclear
weapon capability through projects meant for peace, describing the Einsenhower’s Atoms for
Peace project, in which the United States provided many countries with nuclear reactors, fissile
material, and training for their scientists, as being “founded out of bad conscience”. The editorial
continued to point out that “the fuel from reactors … can produce a crude bomb” and “the
technology is freely available not only to governments anxious to develop a nuclear muscle but
also to terrorist organisations”.82
Over the course of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Nuclear Power Generation in New
Zealand, the Commission heard 141 submissions from organisations potentially involved in the
establishment of nuclear power stations in New Zealand, such as the NZED, the DSIR, and the
Ministry of Works and Development, from environmental, church and women’s organisations,
as well as from a number of interested individuals. The Commission members also travelled
overseas to conduct interviews and visit energy installations in the United States, Canada,
Europe and South Africa.83
Most submissions were against the introduction of nuclear power, generally because of cost –
other options were still assessed as being cheaper than nuclear – or for reasons of environmental
safety and public health. Others criticised New Zealand’s total energy consumption, urging a
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move towards a sustainable society promoting energy conservation and development of
renewable resources. The Inquiry report noted that submissions were, numerically, opposed to
nuclear power, which respondents found “an expensive, dangerous, imported technology”.84
Many of the individual and group submissions came from scientists, and here it is interesting to
note the change of attitude towards nuclear technology from the 1950s to the 1970s, especially
as it is possible to track the changing opinions of individual scientists. In the 1950s, when the
DSIR and NZED were wary about the need for nuclear power, many individual scientists,
including Percy Burbidge and Gordon Williams, were berating the Government’s cautious
attitude and talking enthusiastically to the media about the inevitability of nuclear power and the
need to start training nuclear engineers immediately. By 1977, when he made a submission to
the Royal Commission on Nuclear Power Generation, Burbidge was long retired from his
position as professor of physics at the University of Auckland. In contrast to his 1950s calls
favouring a nuclear power station over a Cook Strait cable, Burbidge now claimed that not only
was there ample energy available from native sources of energy for the next 30 years, but “the
danger to our population and the potential damage to our industrial production are too great to
justify the introduction of reactors for electrical power”, identifying dangers inherent in the
operation of nuclear reactors arising from the possibility of radioactive contamination due to
accidents relating to coolant leaks, waste disposal, mishandling or meltdown.85 Gordon
Williams, a past Dean of the University of Otago School of Mines and Metallurgy, had in the
1950s been excited about the prospects for uranium mining in New Zealand. But in his 1977
submission against the introduction of nuclear power to New Zealand he referred to nuclear
power as “a partially developed technology that is not acceptably safe”.86 The Soil Association
of New Zealand, the General Practitioners Society and the Geological Society of New Zealand
were among other scientists and groups of scientists who made submissions against the
introduction of nuclear power to New Zealand, with all groups mentioning public safety, or the
hazards inherent in the operation of nuclear power stations, as a factor in their opposition. Only
one scientist, the Institute of Nuclear Sciences’ Neil Whitehead, made a submission speaking
positively about nuclear power, in which he argued that under present safety standards, health
risks from nuclear power stations were extremely low and public fears were “unjustified”.87
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Figure 9.5: This Malcolm Walker cartoon, from the Sunday News of 25 April 1976, shows a small frightened man,
representing the New Zealand public, about to be shot from a slingshot wielded by nuclear power proponents onto
the point of a large dart protruding from a nuclear power station. Walker is referring to the strong-arm tactics of those
supporting the introduction of nuclear power, and the relatively weak protests of those against the introduction.
Malcolm Walker, Sunday News, 25 April 1976, p19.
At the same time as the Commission was calling for submissions, the public made clear their
views on nuclear power in other ways: in November 1976 Campaign Half Million, organised by
the Campaign for Non-Nuclear Futures, presented to Parliament a petition, with 333,088
signatures, calling for an entirely non-nuclear future – they opposed nuclear power as well as
nuclear weapons –  for New Zealand.88 Edward Teller, the American scientist known as “father
of the H bomb” (“Try not to call me the father of anything,” said Teller to the Listener’s Geoff
Chapple, “My son resents the situation where the H bomb is considered to be his kid brother”)
visited New Zealand in 1977 for a week-long study and lecture tour. He visited the Wairakei
power station, had morning tea with the New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee, and enjoyed a
great turnout at “sherry with members of the Royal Society”. While hundreds of scientists and
government officials attended receptions for the acclaimed scientist, other New Zealanders
picketed his talks, protesting his role in the development of nuclear weapons and his advocacy of
nuclear power.89
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The report of the Fact Finding Group on Nuclear Power, a scientific investigation that was
separate from the Royal Commission, was presented to Government on 31 March 1977 and
released to the public shortly thereafter. The Group’s mandate was to report on the possible
environmental consequences of nuclear power generation in New Zealand. In contrast to
concerns voiced by environmental groups, they reported that under strict supervision and normal
operations, a nuclear power plant may be “among the least environmentally objectionable of the
alternatives”.90
While the Royal Commission members were hearing submissions, conducting their own
research and preparing their report, electricity demand projects were greatly reduced. In the 1977
Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development, updated demand forecasts
meant that a nuclear plant was dropped from the 15-year plan. By this time increased power use
was no longer seen as a marker of a growing economy – the Government had begun to
encourage energy conservation – and demand had not grown as fast as had been predicted. The
reduction in demand deferred the requirement for the nuclear power station beyond the 15-year
planning period. The initial purpose of the Commission of Inquiry was now, in one sense,
obsolete. It was clear that New Zealand did not need to make an immediate decision on whether
or not to adopt nuclear power. The Commission of Inquiry nonetheless completed its
investigation and published its report, in the hope that the technical detail amassed and the
information about the public debate would be useful when the nuclear option was considered in
the future.91
The Royal Commission of Inquiry report, Nuclear Power Generation in New Zealand, was made
public in May 1978. In line with the updated NZED electricity demand projects, the report
concluded that, “nuclear power is not justified for New Zealand until about the turn of the
century, or even perhaps later.” While this recommendation was the result of reduced demand
projections, the Commission noted public opposition to the plans for a nuclear power station,
describing the history of nuclear power as one of “official enthusiasm, early public acceptance or
apathy, and then of rising opposition”. A survey of New Zealanders at the time showed that only
24-25 per cent favoured nuclear power. The report described nuclear power’s early association
with military objectives as being responsible for the “cloud of suspicion and mistrust” that
enveloped the technology in the minds of the public and commented on New Zealanders’
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general ignorance about nuclear power, something seen as “an emerging technology, novel and
esoteric”. In commenting on the opposition to nuclear power evident in the submissions, the
commissioners noted that New Zealand had a strong environmental lobby, but no strong pro-
nuclear lobby. The commissioners, however, who had visited many overseas nuclear
installations as part of their inquiry, were impressed by the officials and engineers they met who
were “almost unanimous that nuclear power was a necessary and irreplaceable source of the
future energy for mankind”.92
The report did not reject nuclear power outright, however, suggesting that the question of
nuclear power should again be considered in depth by about 1985. It also advised that New
Zealand must “maintain and update its knowledge of nuclear power generation as well as
evaluating and proving alternative means, so that it is to that extent qualified to avail itself of the
nuclear option should it prove desirable”.93
Based on the demand forecasts, the Inquiry recommended that nuclear power be retained as an
option for the future, once indigenous resources had been fully exploited, with an expected
commissioning date of 2005-07. Interesting in today’s climate is the Inquiry’s observation that
obstruction to the environmental impacts of enlarged hydro, geothermal and coal production
could, in the future, lead the call for the adoption of nuclear power. “If New Zealand wants more
electricity, and we are sure it will, some environmental impacts will have to be paid”, it said.
The Commission was far-sighted in recommending such energy saving measures as encouraging
the use of heat pumps and ensuring that all houses have some form of ceiling insulation.94 These
recommendations have only recently become government policy in programmes initiated by the
Green Party.
Conclusion
By the late 1970s, it was time for New Zealand to make a decision about whether or not to take
the first steps towards commissioning a nuclear power station. What had seemed inevitable in
the 1950s and 60s was, however, now being brought into question as an anti-nuclear movement
grew, environmental protests gained force and other energy sources continued to look cheaper
and more viable than nuclear power. But there was still the problem of how New Zealand was
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going to meet the growing demand for electricity. In 1975, the National Government established
a Royal Commission on Nuclear Power Generation.
While the Commission of Inquiry was investigating, however, electricity demand projects were
greatly reduced and nuclear power was reassessed as not being needed for at least another 15
years, beyond the planning time for the NZED. The decision not to proceed with nuclear power
at this time was therefore wholly pragmatic, and did not need to be put to any ideological or
economic test – there just was not an immediate need for another large power station as had been
predicted just a few years earlier. The Commission reported all the same, noting that the
majority of submissions were against the introduction of nuclear power to New Zealand.
This would, however, have felt like a victory for anti-nuclear campaigners. And while, in the
end, there was no real call for a nuclear power station, the fact of the Commission of Inquiry’s
existence helped to focus attention on health, safety and environmental issues associated with
nuclear technology and consolidate public opinion on the matter. Many of these same
individuals and groups would become instrumental in the election of the 1984 Labour
Government, with their staunch opposition to nuclear-powered warships, and the beginning of a





The forging of a new national identity
“New Zealand is a nuclear-free country. We reject any strategy for our defence which relies
on nuclear weapons. New Zealand will not in any way take part in the nuclear arms race or
join in any confrontation between nuclear forces. New Zealand will take no action which
suggests that its security depends on nuclear weapons.”
Prime Minister David Lange, 19861
“New Zealand gets nuked, too”
Chapter heading in Douglas Copelandʼs iconic book Generation X, 19912
While New Zealand had embraced nuclear technology in industry, agriculture and medicine, had
tried to establish a uranium mining industry, and had examined the possibility of nuclear power,
there was, running alongside these ventures, a steadily growing movement against nuclear
weapons and their testing in the South Pacific. Public and political anti-nuclear sentiment, which
emerged in response to the British and American explosions of the first atomic bombs, was
further fuelled by French nuclear testing in the Pacific and, later, by visits from American
nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed warships.
French nuclear testing in the Pacific
As covered in chapter five, in The Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the United States, United
Kingdom and Soviet Union agreed to refrain from nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space
and under water.3 New Zealand signed the Treaty on 8 August 1963, the day it became open for
signatures.4
That same year, President de Gaulle announced France’s plan to move the French atmospheric
testing programme from Algeria’s Sahara Desert – where France had tested its first nuclear
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bomb in 1960 – to the atolls of the South Pacific.5 New Zealanders marched in protest at the
French plans and signed a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) petition calling for a
complete halt to all nuclear testing in the southern hemisphere, a move initiated by the
Australian Labor Party. With the slogan “No bombs south of the line”, the 1963 petition called
for a southern hemisphere nuclear-free zone and, with more than 80,000 signatories, was New
Zealand’s biggest petition since the women’s franchise of 1893.6 The following year, 1964,
China became the world’s fifth nuclear power, to condemnation by New Zealand’s Prime
Minister Keith Holyoake who described the test as “violating world opinion and greatly
increasing the risks of dissemination of nuclear weapons”.7
In contrast to New Zealand’s logistical support for British nuclear tests in the Pacific, and, to a
lesser extent, support for the American tests, New Zealand was very clearly and vocally opposed
to French nuclear testing in the Pacific. Holyoake’s Government communicated its opposition to
the French plan to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific, and to the continuation of nuclear testing
in general, directly to the French Government on several occasions. This opposition was
expressed as being on the basis of public concerns about potential dangers to health from
radioactive fallout, and because of New Zealand’s goal of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.8
Despite the protests, France tested its first bomb at French Polynesia’s Moruroa Atoll on 2 July
1966.9 In response to concerns about an increase in radioactive fallout in the region, the National
Radiation Laboratory intensified its radiation monitoring programme in the South Pacific.
Levels of radioactive fallout were measured in New Zealand and at a chain of Pacific island
stations – in Fiji, Rarotonga, Samoa, Tonga, Niue, and what were then known as the Gilbert and
Ellice Islands (now the Republic of Kiribati) and at Raoul and Penrhyn Islands. Portable gamma
ray monitors were read several times a day at island stations near the test zone. At other stations,
daily air filter samples and weekly rainwater samples were measured for the total fallout content,
and milk samples analysed for iodine-131. When the French atmospheric testing programme
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ended, a modified environmental monitoring programme continued, to detect any venting to the
atmosphere of debris from the underground nuclear tests. 10
In their annual reports on fallout resulting from the French nuclear weapons tests, the National
Radiation Laboratory commented that “there are no internationally accepted levels for the
exposure of people to fallout from nuclear weapons testing” but compared measured values with
annual dose limits set by the International Commission on Radiological Protection and with
radiation exposure from background radiation.11 Based on the data collected, and comparison
with these levels, the National Radiation Laboratory regularly reported that the French tests
“constituted no public health hazard”.12 Although the Laboratory was dealing with factual data,
comparing one figure against another, their refusal to say the French tests were contributing
dangerous levels of radioactive contamination to the Pacific islands had the effect of giving
some people the impression they were condoning the French testing or even hiding information
from the public. In 1972, media attention was given to a Fijian biologist’s criticism of the
National Radiation Laboratory’s interpretation of the monitoring results, along with his
comments that radioactive elements like strontium-90 were concentrated in the food chain, for
example as small fish ate contaminated plankton and larger fish ate smaller fish, and that fish
should be included in the monitoring programme.13
Table 10.1: French atmospheric nuclear tests in the Pacific
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Source: Adapted from New Zealand at the International Court of Justice: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific, New
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 1996, pp48-49.
New Zealand made diplomatic protests after each of France’s tests, and continued to work
internationally towards disarmament. In 1968, New Zealand signed the Treaty for the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to
other states. The United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union also signed the Treaty in
1968, but China and France, the world’s other nuclear powers, did not.14
At the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment at Stockholm in June 1972,
Duncan McIntyre, the National Government’s Minister of Maori and Island Affairs, secured
eight co-sponsors for a statement calling for a halt to nuclear weapons tests that could
contaminate the environment.15 Following the tabling of this statement, a draft resolution
sponsored by New Zealand and Peru was adopted. It resolved:
1. To condemn nuclear weapons tests, especially those carried out in the
atmosphere.
2. To call upon those states intending to carry out nuclear weapons
tests to abandon their plans to carry out such tests as they may lead to
further contamination of the environment.16
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On 26 October 1972, New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations moved in
the First Committee a resolution with 13 co-sponsors calling on all nuclear weapons states to
suspend nuclear weapons tests in all environments. The resolution was passed by 106 votes to
four, with eight abstentions. 17
Figure 10.1: Marchers in Wellington City in 1972 protest against French nuclear testing in the Pacific. Source: 1/4-
020364-F, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
While the Vietnam War dominated the efforts of many in the peace movement, the CND and
other groups continued to campaign against French nuclear testing in the Pacific, with street
marches in New Zealand and direct protests by boats sailing into the French test zone. In 1972 a
12-metre kauri ketch, the Vega, renamed Greenpeace III for the trip, sailed from Auckland to the
                                                                                                                                                             
16 NZFAR 22, 6 (1972), p106-107.
17 NZFAR 22, 10 (1972), pp92-95; NZFAR 22, 11 (1972), p57.
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French test area to protest, with support from Greenpeace, the CND and many Auckland people.
After a month in the area, during which time the French tested two nuclear bombs, the
Greenpeace III was rammed by a French navy minesweeper, damaging the boat, which was
towed into Moruroa for repairs. The news did not reach New Zealand for a week, after which it
made front page headlines. Under the headline “Blast off! Crew held as bomb tests begin,” The
Dominion reported that Greenpeace III had been seized as it entered the French test zone, and its
crew were being held near Papeete.18 As the damaged boat returned to New Zealand for more
repairs, other boats sailed towards Moruroa to protest, and the Labour Party announced that if it
were in power it would send a frigate to Moruroa, with Kirk stating in Parliament “we stand
four-square on our policy of opposing nuclear tests, opposing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, bringing about nuclear disarmament”.19 It was not only members of the peace
movement who were protesting. The Federation of Labour imposed a ban on French shipping
and aircraft with watersiders refusing to load or unload anything to or from France. Post Office
workers in Wellington and Auckland placed a ban on telex and cable traffic to and from France
and its territories.20
This was an election year, and the opposition Labour Party’s stated policy of taking a stronger
stance against French nuclear testing may have helped Norman Kirk be elected Prime Minister
of a new Labour Government in November 1972. In response to the new Kirk Government’s
approach to France asking for a postponement of the French nuclear tests to allow time for
discussions, France invited New Zealand to send a scientist to Moruroa to investigate potential
health risks. George Roth, retired director of the National Radiation Laboratory, visited the
French nuclear test sites from 23 February–5 March 1973. Roth reported that more atmospheric
tests were likely at Moruroa, with underground testing also a possibility, but he also relayed
assurances given to him that any official New Zealand protest vessels would come to no harm if
they were in the test area.21
Growing public concern about the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing
led New Zealand and Australia, in 1973, to ask the International Court of Justice in The Hague
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to challenge the legality of France’s atmospheric tests at Moruroa.22 Before the Court had made a
ruling on the legality of French atmospheric testing, however, France announced that it would
cease atmospheric testing and only test underground in the future. The Court decided, by nine
votes to six, that since France had stopped atmospheric testing, there was no longer a case to
answer.23
As covered in chapter five, in 1957, the New Zealand Navy frigates HMNZS Pukaki and Rotoiti
had sailed to Christmas Island to act as weather ships in support of the British hydrogen bomb
tests. In stark contrast, New Zealand navy frigates were now going to protest against nuclear
testing in the Pacific. In June 1973, Prime Minister Norman Kirk sent the navy frigate HMNZS
Otago to Moruroa, to join a small group of protest yachts that had already left from New
Zealand, to “ensure that the eyes of the world are riveted [on] Moruroa”.24 Kirk, the Minister of
Defence, and other dignitaries farewelled the frigate from Auckland on 28 June 1973. As well as
the 243-strong navy crew, the frigate carried Immigration Minister Fraser Coleman, a group of
journalists, and the National Radiation Laboratory’s Jim McCahon, on board as radiation safety
officer.25 The Minister of Defence said the frigate, which the Evening Post dubbed the “ban-the-
bomb frigate”, would ignore any French attempts to make her leave the testing area: “she’ll
proceed on her merry way, exercising her right to peacefully sail the international high seas”, he
said.26
The HMNZS Otago arrived in the test zone in early July, once personal radiation monitors had
been distributed to all people on board, and with McCahon taking daily air samples to test for
radioactivity. On 21 July, a French nuclear bomb was detonated at Moruroa. The Otago crew
listened to the French countdown, then were on deck a few minutes later, from where they saw
the mushroom cloud, which McCahon described as “a tall spindly stem with a flattened blob on
top, a reddish-brown colour against the surrounding white clouds”. Following the explosion,
McCahon increased the frequency of radiation measurements but was unable to detect any
radioactivity from the small explosion. After the test, the HMNZS Canterbury relieved the
Otago in the test zone and on 28 July, by which time McCahon had transferred to the
Canterbury, a second French bomb was detonated. This time, because of the wind direction, the
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Canterbury did detect a small amount of radioactive fallout, equivalent to each person on board
receiving a dose of less than 2 millirads.27 Canterbury returned to Auckland on 12 August. The
New Zealand frigates had achieved their goal of staging a protest to the French, and of focusing
world media attention on French nuclear tests in the Pacific: twice-daily reports by the on-board
journalists were published in New Zealand and disseminated around the world.28
Figure 10.2: Jim McCahon, second from the left in the back row, travelled on the HMNZS Otago, and then the
HMNZS Canterbury, as radiation safety officer. An employee of the National Radiation Laboratory since the 1950s,
McCahon was pleased to be able to “add my little bit of protest to the whole thing” but in his diary of his journey he
said that amongst the naval officers on board he often felt he was the only person actually protesting against the
French nuclear tests, rather than simply following Government orders. Next to McCahon, in the dark shirt, is Fraser
Coleman. The other men, all civilians, are probably a medical officer and the three journalists. Source: Courtesy Jim
McCahon.
Those were the last atmospheric nuclear bomb tests in the Pacific. On 24 September 1974
France announced they had completed their programme of atmospheric tests and would now be
                                                                                                                                                             
26 The Evening Post, 9 July 1973, p1.
27 McCahon 1973, pp18, 32, 49-53.
28 Shaun Brown, ‘On Protest with Otago’, New Zealand Listener, 20 August 1973, p14; David Barber, ‘New
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testing their nuclear weapons underground.29 Once the underground testing programme began in
1975, New Zealand scientists found they could detect the explosions on the DSIR seismograph
network designed to detect earthquakes. “It was back in 1975 that we saw something very
strange on the seismogram recording in Rarotonga”, Warwick Smith, the DSIR’s chief
seismologist, later recalled. “ ‘What on earth was that?’ we thought – because it didn’t look like
an earthquake! We subsequently realised that what we had seen was a recording of the first
French underground nuclear test in the Pacific.” Underground tests in French Polynesia set up
something like a sound wave in the ocean that propagated extremely well to the station in
Rarotonga. “We realised we had quite a sensitive detector of the French nuclear tests.” Smith
would announce the test to the Prime Minister’s office which would contact other countries’ top
officials and then release the information to the media. “It was all cloak and dagger stuff for a
while”, says Smith. “Then, in the final stages of testing, the French used to make announcements
that in less than an hour they would be doing another test.”30
Table 10.2: French underground nuclear tests in the Pacific, 1975-1990
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Auckland, 1990, p17.


































































































































































































































































































































1996 27 January Fangataufa <120 kt
Source: Adapted from New Zealand at the International Court of Justice: French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific, New
Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Wellington, 1996, pp48-49.
Even after France took its nuclear testing programme underground, there remained a general
public suspicion that the tests were harmful. New Zealand, along with Australia, and various
small Pacific countries, continued to protest to France after each test and New Zealanders
protested on street marches and boycotted French goods.32 The National Radiation Laboratory
continued to monitor the impact of the tests, issuing annual reports on environmental
radioactivity in New Zealand and the Pacific. The degree to which the voice of the National
                                                 
31 Dates and approximate yields for 1995-96 test series are from www.ratical.org/ratville/nukes/testChrono95-
8.html, downloaded on 12 December 2004.
32 Stuart McMillan, Neither Confirm Nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute Between New Zealand and the United
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Radiation Laboratory was trusted and believed, however, had waned since it first started issuing
environmental monitoring reports in the 1960s. Greenpeace pointed out in 1990 that by 1977 the
National Radiation Laboratory had been monitoring the atmosphere since 1957 and had issued
50 reports in which they regularly declared the French tests did not constitute a public health
hazard.33
While making specific protests to France after each nuclear test, the Labour Government also
worked towards wider disarmament issues, pushing for a South Pacific nuclear-weapons-free
zone and a halt to weapons testing in general. On 31 October 1975, the New Zealand
Ambassador Malcolm Templeton introduced to the United Nations a resolution, co-sponsored
with Fiji and Papua New Guinea, calling for a South Pacific nuclear-weapons-free zone.34 In
November 1975, however, Labour lost the election to National. Robert Muldoon became Prime
Minister, and the initiative was abandoned. 35 In February 1976 Muldoon said the National Party
caucus was unanimous in agreeing with his policy of lifting the ban on visits to New Zealand by
nuclear warships, and the first visit could be that very year.36
Visits from nuclear-powered ships
Nuclear ships had been visiting New Zealand since 1960 but in the 1980s, during the peak of
France’s Pacific nuclear testing programme, nuclear ship visits became another significant issue
for the anti-nuclear movement. The first nuclear-powered vessel to visit New Zealand was the
USS Halibut, a nuclear-powered submarine that visited Auckland and Wellington in April 1960.
The next nuclear-ship visits were four years later, when the nuclear-powered cruisers the USS
Longbeach and USS Bainbridge docked in Wellington in September 1964. (The nuclear-
powered aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, which accompanied them, was too big to enter
Wellington Harbour and had to stay in Cook Strait.) From 1965 to 1975, no nuclear-powered
vessels were invited to New Zealand and it was made known to the United States authorities that
they would not be welcome. The issue at this stage was not public opposition to nuclear ship
visits (though there was growing opposition from environmental and peace groups), but rather
the issue of liability in the case of an accident.37
                                                 
33 Miles and Shaw 1990, p19.
34 NZFAR 25, 10 (1975), pp6-14.
35 Clements 1988, p83; Dewes and Green 1999, pp16.
36 The Dominion, 27 February 1976, p3.
37 Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, The Safety of Nuclear-Powered Ships, Department of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, 1992, p183; Locke 1992, p220.
269
The New Zealand Atomic Energy Committee had set up a sub-committee in 1968  to look at the
public safety aspects of visits to New Zealand of nuclear-powered ships. In 1971, Holyoake’s
Government advised the United States that a condition of future visits from nuclear-powered
ships would be that the United States agree to accept liability in the event of a nuclear accident,
and a New Zealand Code of Practice for Nuclear Powered Shipping was prepared. But by the
time the United States agreed to accept liability, in 1974, a new Labour Government, under Bill
Rowling, chose to continue the ban on nuclear-powered ships.38
Table 10.3: Nuclear powered ship visits to New Zealand
Dates Vessel Type Port
19–22 April1960 USS Halibut Submarine Auckland
24–27 April 1960 USS Halibut Submarine Wellington
8–9 September 1964 USS Longbeach Cruiser Wellington
8–9 September 1964 USS Bainbridge Cruiser Wellington
8–9 September 1964 USS Enterprise Aircraft carrier Wellington
27 August–2
September 1976
USS Truxtun Cruiser Wellington
1–5 October 1976 USS Longbeach Cruiser Auckland
16–22 January 1978 USS Pintado Submarine Auckland
19–24 January 1979 USS Haddo Submarine Auckland
22–29 September
1980
USS Truxtun Cruiser Wellington
25–29 May 1982 USS Truxtun Cruiser Wellington
3–8 August 1983 USS Texas Cruiser Auckland
10–15 August 1983 USS Texas Cruiser Wellington
9–14 November 1983 USS Phoenix Submarine Auckland
23–30 March 1984 USS Queenfish Submarine Auckland
 Source: Adapted from Report of the Special Committee on Nuclear Propulsion, 1992, p183.
Kevin Clements has described Labour supporters in the mid 1970s as being “fervently anti-
nuclear for principled and political reasons” while the new National Government cast itself as
“politically realistic in foreign and defence policies and not subject to the ‘woolly minded’
schemes of Labour in promoting unrealistic concepts such as a Pacific-wide nuclear-weapons
free zone”.39 In 1976, therefore, National Prime Minister Robert Muldoon advised that nuclear
powered ships could once again visit New Zealand as long as the owning nation accepted full
responsibility for the ship, and the ship complied with the safety standards of the port it was
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39 Clements 1992, p86.
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visiting, by now updated in the new Code of Practice for Nuclear Powered Shipping.40 Muldoon
saw any continuation of Labour’s ban on nuclear ship visits as “nonsensical and a danger to the
continuation of the ANZUS alliance”.41
Visits of nuclear-powered ships to 1970s New Zealand would have a very different reception to
those in the 1960s. In 1975 New Zealand’s original “Peace Squadron” had been formed, when it
had become clear the Labour Government was under pressure to admit nuclear-powered and
nuclear-armed ships. The purpose of the Peace Squadron was to coordinate and inspire boat
owners to use their craft to prevent nuclear ships from entering New Zealand ports and it
subsequently met every nuclear ship to visit the country.42
In response to Muldoon’s plans to resume nuclear ship visits, Labour MP Richard Prebble
sought recognition of a South Pacific nuclear-free zone with the August 1976 introduction of his
Nuclear Free Zone (New Zealand) Bill. Three weeks later, another Labour MP, Edward Isbey,
introduced the United Nations Nuclear Free Zone Resolution Adoption Bill, which would adopt
the United Nations resolution on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific that had been passed in
December 1975. Both bills were rejected by the Government and not allowed a first reading.43
A further rejection of the proposed South Pacific nuclear-weapons-free zone was the Muldoon
Government’s invitation for the nuclear-powered cruiser USS Truxtun to visit Wellington. On 27
August 1976 the Truxtun entered Wellington harbour met by a small Peace Squadron, whose
boats were outnumbered by security boats. In protest at the ship’s visit, members of the Harbour
Employees Union and the Watersiders’ Union stopped work soon after the Truxtun entered the
harbour. Ferry sailings were cancelled (even though it was school holidays!) and the Truxtun
was forced to anchor in the stream for her six-day visit.44 Muldoon and a group of Cabinet
Ministers and MPs lunched with the captain on board the ship, after which Muldoon made fun of
the protesters’ objections by telling media “I didn’t see anyone with four thumbs”.45
By the time of the next nuclear ship visit, the Auckland Peace Squadron had some 50 craft
registered, crewed and skippered by “members of Parliament, company directors and executives,
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radical activists and many ordinary members of the public who had never participated in protest
before”.46 As the USS Long Beach approached Auckland early on the morning of 1 October
1976 she was met by members of the Peace Squadron, forcing her to slow down and stop while
the protest boats were dealt with by the cruiser’s naval and Police escort. The Long Beach
eventually made its way into the harbour, through and past more than 150 protesting small craft
– yachts, launches, dinghies and canoes. In Auckland, 3,000 people marched down Queen Street
in protest at the visit of the nuclear cruiser, and in Parliament, politicians spent two hours
debating the pros and cons of the visit following a motion by Labour MP Richard Prebble that
the anchorage of the Long Beach in the harbour between Kings Wharf and the Devonport naval
base was unsafe. While the Peace Squadron plan to stop the Long Beach berthing in Auckland
failed, this first full-scale demonstration by the anti-nuclear movement attracted strong media
attention and set the pattern for later protests.47
It was not only peace activists who sprang into action when a nuclear ship arrived in New
Zealand waters. The New Zealand Code for Nuclear Powered Shipping was interpreted in a
range of documents dealing with local responsibilities in regions where nuclear-powered ships
might visit.48 The Ministry of Civil Defence’s 1976 Public Safety Plan for the Port of Wellington
established that the day before the scheduled arrival of a nuclear-powered ship, the Minister of
Civil Defence, in conjunction with the Police, Defence Department and local authorities, would
establish a Public Safety Operational Headquarters in the basement of the Beehive, under the
supervision and control of the Regional Commissioner of Civil Defence. As part of being in a
state of “relaxed readiness” for an incident or accident, a tugboat crew would have on board
protective clothing, individual dosimeters (to measure radiation exposure), potassium-iodate
tablets49 and service respirators for their crew. The Department of Health would also issue
Ministry of Defence, Police, Ministry of Transport, Wellington Free Ambulance, Wellington
Regional Fire Board and Wellington Harbour Board with their requirements of potassium-iodate
tablets. Police, who would also be supplied with protective clothing, individual dosimeters and
service respirators, were also required to have available roadblock signs saying, STOP –
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RADIOACTIVE HAZARD AREA.50 The Wellington civil defence plan first sprang into action
for the 1976 visit of the USS Truxtun. In the days before the ship arrived, The Dominion
reported the installation by the National Radiation Laboratory of radiation monitoring devices at
20 sites around Wellington Harbour, and the arrival of two busloads and a planeful of Police
officers from Auckland. The day before the ship arrived, the national civil defence nerve centre
was activated under Parliament buildings, with The Dominion reporting the arrival of five Land
Rovers carrying troops with technical equipment and sleeping bags.51
The next nuclear ship visit was in January 1978, when the USS Pintado was confronted with
about 80 protest vessels – canoes, surfsailers, motorboats and yachts – on its approach to
Auckland. This time, anticipating the nuclear-powered submarine’s reception, the HMNZS
Waikato helped the Pintado navigate her way through the protest craft into Auckland. Along
with the frigate was a fleet of Navy and Police vessels and two navy helicopters, which escorted
the submarine and harassed protest vessels.52 The protesters had wide support: the next day, the
New Zealand Herald reported that a flow of letters to the editor on the subject were running at a
ratio of 9:7 against nuclear-powered ships coming to New Zealand.53
The Labour Party fought the 1978 election on a promise to close the country’s ports and airports
to all nuclear-powered and nuclear-weapon-carrying craft but the Muldoon Government was re-
elected.54 The visit of the nuclear submarine USS Haddo on 19 January 1979 met with a large
protest fleet including yachts, dinghies, kayaks and surfboards. On land, street protesters – who
the New Zealand Herald described as “predominantly young, generally sandaled and mostly
white” – marched through central Auckland then massed at the waterfront chanting “one, two,
three, four, we don’t want your nuclear war”. The American commander of the Haddo described
the approach to Auckland as “frightening because of the danger the protesters put themselves
in”. The head of the Auckland Police district was not so polite, describing them as “seagoing
hoodlums rather than protestors”. Two men managed to climb aboard the submarine, while
fellow protesters threw yellow paint bombs at the vessel, earning the headline “Nuclear Haddo a
‘yellow submarine’ as protestors get far too close” in Wellington’s Evening Post.55
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Figure 10.3: Protestor Stephen Sherie on the bow of the USS Haddo in Auckland Harbour, 20 January 1979. Source:
EP-Navy-Warships-USS Haddo-02, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
Figure 10.4: The USS Haddo is met in Auckland Harbour by a flotilla of protesting boats. Source: EP-Navy-Warships-
USS Haddo-01, Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ..
The National Party remained in power and American nuclear cruisers and submarines continued
to visit Auckland and Wellington. The USS Truxtun visited Wellington in September 1980 and
May 1982, the USS Texas visited Auckland and Wellington in August 1983 and the USS
Phoenix visited Auckland in November 1983. Peace Squadron boats on the harbour and
protesters marching through the city streets greeted each nuclear ship. The last nuclear ship to
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visit New Zealand was the submarine USS Queenfish, which docked in Auckland in March
1984. The nuclear-powered submarine was confronted by a Peace Squadron protest fleet the
New Zealand Herald described as consisting of “58 yachts, 12 canoes, about 30 other small
craft, a surf sailor and a naked man on a surfboard”. The Auckland Star described the protest as
the “most spectacular” yet, with boats firing red flares and flying black flags and protesters
chanting and beating drums as the Queenfish slid into her mooring.56
The revisiting of the nuclear-powered ships debate had the effect of re-igniting the anti-nuclear
movement. In 1981, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone Committee was established in
Christchurch, and began organising a signature campaign and publicity that included bumper
stickers and badges. The Committee encouraged local groups to declare themselves nuclear-
free.57 As well as ideological reasons for wanting a nuclear-free New Zealand and South Pacific,
there were genuine concerns about the potential health impact of the continuing French nuclear
testing programme. Greenpeace was beginning to focus media attention on the effect of the
American nuclear testing programme on the Marshall Islanders. There were reports of multiple
miscarriages, babies born with birth defects, and high rates of cancer amongst the islanders, and
in May 1985 the Greenpeace ship the Rainbow Warrior evacuated 320 people from the
radiation-contaminated Rongelap Atoll to a nearby atoll.58
Concern about the effects of radiation from the French nuclear test series was growing. In 1983
France invited a number of scientists from South Pacific countries to visit Moruroa Atoll to
study the effects of the nuclear test programme (New Zealand had been pressing France for
some years to allow scientists to visit). In October 1983 the National Radiation Laboratory’s
director, Hugh Atkinson, led a scientific mission to Moruroa. The team included five scientists
from New Zealand, Australia and Papua New Guinea, including Atkinson and Andrew McEwan,
Atkinson’s successor as director of the National Radiation Laboratory. During their four days on
Moruroa, the scientists collected shellfish, algae, coral, reef fish, and soil and vegetation samples
from the atoll, as well as plankton and ocean fish from outside the reef. Air and water samples
were also collected. The samples were then analysed by either the National Radiation
Laboratory in Christchurch or the Australian Atomic Energy Research Laboratories at Lucas
Heights. The scientists’ report, released in July 1984, was reassuring. While it concluded that 20
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per cent of long-lived fission products contributing radiation doses to New Zealanders came
from French nuclear tests, as opposed to the earlier mostly northern hemisphere tests, it said that
resulting radiation levels were not harmful. Even in French Polynesia, the report concluded,
radiation doses “are lower than world average levels and do not lead to the expectation that any
radiation-induced diseases would be detectable”.59 Newspapers, however, picked up on the
report’s comments that in a worst case scenario, fracturing of the volcanic rock beneath the atoll
could lead to radioactivity leaking within five years.60 Some people, however, saw the report’s
finding that the tests were not causing dangerous levels of radioactivity as fuelling French claims
that the tests were harmless. Greenpeace released a counter-paper calling for independent
scientists to be allowed access to the data, and arguing that new more comprehensive data
should be collected on radioactive contamination of the limestone and coral beneath and within
the lagoon, and for an anecdotal survey of the health of Polynesian people.61
The Fourth Labour Government and a “nuclear-free” New Zealand
David Lange became head of the opposition Labour Party in 1983. He later recalled that he
“took it for granted that we would ban nuclear weapons from New Zealand as soon as Labour
was elected”.62 This ended up being one of the defining issues of the next General Election.
Lange got his chance to run for Prime Minister after the introduction of yet another nuclear-free
Bill led Muldoon to call a snap election in July 1984. According to Lange, who succeeded
Muldoon as Prime Minister, and George Gair, a Minister in Muldoon’s Cabinet, Muldoon’s
Government had run out of money and calling an early election avoided the need to produce a
budget that would reveal this fact.63 Whether the nuclear-free issue was therefore a reason or an
excuse for a snap election is unclear, but it was certainly at least a catalyst.
Labour MP Richard Prebble, member for Auckland Central, again attempted to legislate a
nuclear-free status for New Zealand by introducing a Private Member’s Bill in June 1984. The
Nuclear Free New Zealand Bill, Prebble told Parliament, would ban visits by nuclear-armed or
nuclear-powered ships, prohibit the building of nuclear reactors or the dumping of nuclear waste
in New Zealand, and would completely ban all nuclear weapons. “Our isolation and our small
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size” Prebble said, “enable us to make a bold and imaginative initiative that would capture the
imagination of the world”.64 The National Government was against the Bill, saying it would spell
an end to the ANZUS alliance, the security agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the
United States signed in 1951. But when the Bill was put to the vote, National MPs Marilyn
Waring and Mike Minogue voted with the Labour Party and Social Credit in favour of a second
reading. The National Government, which had a majority of only one in the house, won the vote
(there were 40 votes against the Bill and 39 for it) only because two former Labour MPs, now
acting as Independents, voted with them against the Bill.65 The next day, National MP Marilyn
Waring withdrew from the party caucus, saying she would no longer vote with the National
Party on disarmament matters. Although the Nuclear Free New Zealand Bill had been narrowly
defeated, Prime Minister Robert Muldoon acknowledged the Government’s majority was now
uncertain, and called a snap election to be held in one month’s time, on 14 July 1984.66
Nuclear issues received a lot of attention in the month-long election campaign. Of the four
political parties that fought the 1984 general election, only the National Party did not promise to
ban nuclear-armed and -powered vessels from New Zealand ports. The Labour Party’s stated
policy on international affairs was to reaffirm its prohibition of visits by nuclear-armed and/or -
powered warships, seek the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons-Free zone, and
prohibit the dumping of nuclear wastes and the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific. In the
General Election of 14 July 1984 Labour won a landslide victory and David Lange became
Prime Minister. 67
Labour’s nuclear-free policy was a reflection of what by now was the mood of New Zealanders.
By November 1984, 94 areas of New Zealand had declared themselves nuclear-free, accounting
for 2,075,747 people, or 65 per cent of the population.68
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Figure 10.5: David Lange and Naomi Lange at Labour Party headquarters in Mangere on election night, 1984
General Election, photographed 16 July 1984 by Evening Post staff photographer Phil Reid. Source:
EP/1984/3357/23-F, ATL.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, like the National Party, was concerned about the impact of a
nuclear-free policy on ANZUS. The Ministry advised Lange’s Government that pursuing its
nuclear-free policy would be harmful to New Zealand’s relationship with the United States and
could negatively impact on New Zealand’s security arrangements and economy.69 Lange wished
for New Zealand to remain in the ANZUS alliance and believed he could get around the issue by
selecting an American ship to visit New Zealand that would not impinge on New Zealand’s
nuclear-free policy; a ship that was neither nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed. Lange discussed
the issue with United States Secretary of State George Shultz in July and September 1984, then
in November 1984 he sent Ewan Jamieson, the New Zealand Chief of Defence Staff, to Hawaii
to discuss with the United States military authorities a suitable ship. The United States had a
strict “neither confirm nor deny” policy when it came to questions about whether or not its ships
were carrying nuclear weapons, but they understood New Zealand’s situation and suggested the
USS Buchanan, an aged oil-fired navy destroyer. Jamieson returned to New Zealand and told
Lange the USS Buchanan would be the ideal ship to visit New Zealand. In January 1985 the
United States made a request to the New Zealand Government for the USS Buchanan to visit
New Zealand. The request was leaked to the media and there was wide speculation about the
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nuclear capabilities of the vessel. By now Lange was holidaying and unable to be contacted in
the Tokelau Islands and public officials and his Government had to consider the request. 70
Lange returned to New Zealand to advice from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the request
be accepted, and a report from Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer, agreed to by Cabinet,
advising that because they could not conclusively say if the USS Buchanan was nuclear-armed
or not the request be refused. Lange endorsed Palmer’s report. In a private meeting between
Prime Minister David Lange and the United States Ambassador, H. Monroe Brown, the United
States was advised that the visit of the USS Buchanan could not proceed, as the ship did not
conform to New Zealand policy. Lange suggested that a different ship – one that was not
nuclear-capable – be sent in its place. New Zealand’s refusal to give access to the USS
Buchanan was announced publicly on 4 February to shock and anger from the United States,
who had been under the impression that they had an informal agreement with Lange, and their
request would be accepted. Support from the New Zealand public, however, was strong. The
Lange Government’s refusal of the Buchanan visit had coincided with 15,000 people marching
down Queen Street in Auckland chanting “if in doubt, keep it out!” 71
The United States Government responded to New Zealand’s new nuclear-free policy by greatly
reducing defence and intelligence cooperation with New Zealand under ANZUS, and by making
it clear that if New Zealand wished to have an effective defence relationship with the United
States, it must accept American nuclear weapons.72 New Zealand was portrayed as “anti-
ANZUS, anti-American, even anti-Western” with some Americans having the attitude that if
“you’re not with us in every particular, you must be against us”.73 Despite both Australia and the
United States withdrawing from planned ANZUS military exercises, Lange stated that although
New Zealand did not wish to be defended by nuclear weapons, the country remained committed
to ANZUS.74
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The United States response to New Zealand’s stand strengthened New Zealanders’ support for
the nuclear-free policy.75  Writer Stuart McMillan later claimed that the nuclear ships ban
“assumed elements of an assertion of national identity. In the minds of some people, what it
meant to be a New Zealander, partly, was to live in a nuclear free country”.76 On 18 February
1985 a nationwide public opinion poll conducted for The Dominion revealed that 56 per cent of
respondents were against nuclear-armed warships visiting New Zealand. In addition, 42 per cent
of respondents were against visits from warships that were nuclear-powered.77
The policy had an international impact. New Zealand’s ban on nuclear ships, and the United
States’ response to it, put New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy into world headlines and attracted
the notice of other governments.78 In March 1985, Lange’s televised appearance at the Oxford
Union debate at Oxford University also gained international media attention and boosted New
Zealand’s pride in their Prime Minister. At the 1 March debate, Lange spoke in the affirmative,
against American Senator and Moral Majority leader Jerry Falwell, for the proposition “that
nuclear weapons are morally indefensible”.79 His response to a young Rhodes Scholar who asked
how Lange could justify New Zealand’s continued membership of ANZUS – Lange suggested
he would answer if the young man would hold his breath for a moment, adding “I can smell the
uranium on it as you lean towards me!” – was received with laughter and applause from the
audience.80 Lange’s intellect was praised by the British media, and his side won the debate 298
votes to 250.81
Bombing of the Rainbow Warrior
The bombing of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985 further reinforced New Zealand’s emerging
identity as an independent and nuclear-free nation willing to stand up for its principles in the
face of bigger, more powerful nations. Since the New Zealand Government’s 1973 frigate
protest, many private yachts had continued to leave from New Zealand to protest against the
French nuclear tests at Moruroa. In July 1985 the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior was
docked at its berth in Auckland Harbour where it was preparing for a journey to Moruroa. On
the evening of 10 July 1985 two explosions hit the Rainbow Warrior. The ship’s lower regions
                                                 
75 Clements 1988, p138; McMillan 1987, p94.
76 McMillan 1987, p92.
77 The Dominion, 18 February 1985, p1.
78 McMillan 1987, p132; Lange 1990, p113.
79 NZFAR 35, 1 (1985), pp7-11.
80 Lange 1990, p113-5; David Lange at the Oxford Union debate, 1985, www.nzhistory.net.nz/media/sound/oxford-
union-debate, downloaded 11 May 2010.
81 Lange 1990, p115; The Evening Post, 4 March 1985, p2.
280
were flooded, partially submerging the boat and drowning Portuguese photographer Fernando
Pereira who was trying to retrieve his camera.82
Figure 10.6: The Rainbow Warrior in Auckland Harbour after bombing by French secret service agents.
© Greenpeace.
The Rainbow Warrior bombing captured the attention of the nation and led to the biggest Police
operation in New Zealand history. When Police investigations revealed the likely participation
of a team of agents from the French intelligence service the media attention intensified. On 23
July two French agents - they were later identified as Major Alain Marfart and Captain
Dominique Prieur, members of a team of at least 13 agents - were charged with arson and the
murder of Pereira. Police investigations followed with Police gathering evidence from France
and Interpol. In turn, the French Government conducted its own investigation and initiated a
programme of disinformation, in which they suggested Communist involvement in Greenpeace
and in the bombing itself.83 The French Prime Minister, however, later acknowledged that agents
of the French secret services were responsible for sinking the Rainbow Warrior, acting under
orders to that effect.84 On the first day of Mafart’s and Prieur’s trial, 4 November 1985, their
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charges were reduced from murder and arson to manslaughter and wilful damage. The French
agents pleaded guilty and were subsequently each sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment.85
Historian Michael King described the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior as being not an isolated
incident, but part of the context of “40 years’ use of the Pacific Ocean as a nuclear testing and
dumping ground” and the result of France’s belief “that it had the right to use any means to
safeguard its own testing programme”.86 This act of state-sponsored terrorism, followed by
France’s continuation with the nuclear test series at Moruroa while the French agents were
awaiting trial, outraged the New Zealand public and cemented support for the anti-nuclear
movement. In the months after the bombing Greenpeace membership grew and donations to the
organisation reached more than $200,000.87 As Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer said in
an October speech in The Hague, “this outrageous incident has only helped to strengthen
opposition in New Zealand and elsewhere to nuclear testing”.88 The challenges to New Zealand’s
nuclear-free identity only served to intensify it.
France retaliated by blocking or delaying imports of a range of New Zealand products in
February and March 1986.89 In July, amid claims that France would veto New Zealand butter
exports to the EEC if the agents were not released, Mafart and Prieur left New Zealand. Under
an agreement negotiated by the United Nations Secretary General, they were flown to Hao Atoll,
450 km NNW of Moruroa, where they were to remain for three years. In exchange, France was
to pay New Zealand US$7 million compensation and issue a formal letter of apology. In
December 1987, however, Mafart was repatriated to Paris for medical treatment, where he was
promoted to the rank of major. Prieur returned to France in April 1988 amid reports she was
pregnant. The New Zealand Government registered a formal protest. In May 1990 an
international arbitration tribunal agreed that France had breached its international legal
obligations by removing from and failing to return the agents to Hao, and recommended that
France contribute US$2 million to a fund to promote friendly relations between the two
countries.90
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A nuclear-free zone at last
Other countries joined New Zealand in promoting a nuclear-free South Pacific. On 6 August
1985, one month after the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior (and 40 years after an atomic bomb
was dropped on Hiroshima), New Zealand was one of eight countries to sign the South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty at the South Pacific Forum in Rarotonga. Initiated by Australia and
New Zealand, the Rarotonga Treaty sought to establish the world’s third nuclear-weapons-free
zone by preventing the storage, dumping, manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons in the
South Pacific.91
At a Labour Party regional conference the next month, the Minister of Defence, Frank O’Flynn,
moved a resolution calling for the “urgent implementation of [anti-nuclear] legislation”. 92 His
resolution was successful and David Lange, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, introduced the draft
legislation on 10 December 1985 as the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and
Arms Control Bill. It had its first reading and was referred on to the Foreign Affairs and Defence
Committee. On introducing the Bill, Lange said it fulfilled New Zealand’s obligations under the
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and reflected “the intention of the signatories to the
Treaty that the destabilising elements of nuclear confrontation not be allowed to intrude into this
region”.93
Publicly, anti-nuclear sentiments continued to grow. In April 1986, an accident at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in the Soviet republic of Ukraine killed 31 people, caused the relocation of
more than 100,000 people, and sent a plume of radioactivity across Europe. The incident, the
world’s worst nuclear reactor accident, received huge publicity and further solidified public fear
and antipathy to all things nuclear.94 The 1986 Defence Review looked at New Zealanders’
attitudes to defence and security issues and canvassed opinions on New Zealand’s new nuclear-
free policy. The Defence Committee of Enquiry ran a national poll that revealed that 92 per cent
of respondents were opposed to nuclear weapons being stationed in New Zealand; 73 per cent
wanted a nuclear-free defence policy; and 66 per cent wanted nuclear-armed ships banned from
New Zealand ports (41 per cent wanted nuclear-powered ships banned too).95 This was in
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contrast to a similar survey, conducted in the late 1970s, that showed that more than 60 per cent
of respondents were in favour of visits by American nuclear-armed warships.96
Figure 10.7: In June 1986, the United States made it clear that New Zealand would be kicked out of the ANZUS
agreement. Here David Lange is seen being booted out of Cafe Anzus, while Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke
shares a drink with United States President Ronald Reagan. Source:  Tom Scott, 5 July 1986, A-312-4-001,
Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, NZ.
As feared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy spelt the end of
the ANZUS agreement. In June 1986, United States Secretary of State George Schultz told the
press that New Zealand and the United States “part company as friends, but we part company”
indicating that in order to be treated as an ally by the United States, New Zealand would have to
accept that from time to time she would be visited by a United States warship that was nuclear-
armed.97 In August, the United States announced it was formally suspending its security
commitment to New Zealand under ANZUS pending adequate corrective measures over New
Zealand’s stance on nuclear ship visits.98
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty was ratified by New Zealand on 13 November 1986
and came into force on 11 December 1986.99 Combined with the nuclear-free zones of Latin
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America to the east and Antarctica to the south, it meant that 40 per cent of the Earth’s surface
was declared nuclear-free.100
The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act entered into force on
8 June 1987.101 The Act’s stated purpose was “to establish in New Zealand a Nuclear Free Zone,
to promote and encourage an active and effective contribution by New Zealand to the essential
process of disarmament and arms control” and to implement the South Pacific Nuclear Free
Zone Treaty and four other international treaties and conventions relating to disarmament and
arms control.102 The Act established a nuclear-free zone comprising all New Zealand land, water
and airspace out to the limits of the territorial sea of New Zealand. Within this nuclear-free zone
there was a full prohibition on the testing or transporting or stationing of nuclear weapons.
Clause 11 of the Act banned the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand of any ship
“whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power”. The Act also established a
Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control to advise the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister on matters related to disarmament and arms control and the
implementation of the Act.103
The Act also amended the Marine Pollution Act 1974, making it an offence to dump any
radioactive waste or other radioactive matter into New Zealand waters. On behalf of the Ministry
of Health, the National Radiation Laboratory director Andrew McEwan had earlier made a
submission against this aspect of the Act, pointing out that combining in one Bill legislative
controls on nuclear-powered ships and the controlled disposal of radioactive waste “may
reinforce public misconceptions relating to hazards associated with useful applications of
radioactive materials and nuclear technology” and restated the National Radiation Laboratory’s
stance that the existing Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matters, to which New Zealand was a signatory, was “a satisfactory control
mechanism for the disposal of low-level radioactive wastes”. McEwan also pointed out that risks
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posed by nuclear-powered vessels docked in New Zealand ports were small in relation to those
already posted by hazardous cargoes.104
As well as outlawing the stationing or testing of nuclear weapons in the zone, the Act prevented
New Zealand’s armed forces from possessing or controlling nuclear weapons whether inside or
outside the zone. While it outlawed visits from nuclear-powered ships, the Act did not restrict
scientific applications of nuclear technology or nuclear power for electricity generation, though
this would be source of confusion as New Zealanders increasingly came to think of their country
as “nuclear-free”.105
Figure 10.9: The Labour Partyʼs campaign poster for the 1987 General Election played up the Partyʼs role in banning
nuclear weapons from New Zealand land and waters. Source: Authorʼs collection.
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Later that year Labour campaigned in the General Election on its success in making New
Zealand nuclear-free. Labour won the election, but its programme of economic reforms rapidly
lost the party popularity. But, as David Lange later wrote, as “the popularity of the Labour
Government shrivelled”, support for the nuclear-free legislation remained strong: “nuclear-free
New Zealand had taken on a life of its own”.106
New Zealand gets nuked too
Legislating for a nuclear-free New Zealand was a stand against the nuclear arms race and for the
protection of New Zealanders from direct nuclear strikes or nuclear accidents but it didn’t
protect New Zealand from the impact of a northern hemisphere nuclear war. The United States
and Soviet use of the nuclear threat throughout the Cold War has been described as “racking the
nerves of generations” and New Zealanders’ nerves were no exception.107 After a series of
successful moves to control and limit nuclear arms in the 1960s and 1970s – the Partial Test Ban
Treaty of 1963, the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT)
of 1972 – the early 1980s had seen a deterioration of relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union. Arms control talks failed during Ronald Reagan’s first term in office (from 1981
to 1984), by which time the nuclear arsenals of the world contained tens of thousands of
weapons.108
Nuclear war was considered to be a very real possibility. The 1974 Pugwash International
Conference on Science and Public Affairs had put the likelihood of nuclear war at 50:50, a view
the Australian office of National Assessment reiterated in 1981.109 New Zealanders tended to
agree. In envisaging New Zealand in 2001, environmental studies lecturer and peace campaigner
Robert Mann wrote in 1981 that he expected New Zealand “only a couple of decades from now
to be subjected to the effects of a major nuclear war”.110 Twenty-four per cent of Aucklanders
polled in 1982 by the Commission for the Future’s Study Group on Nuclear Disaster thought
there was an even chance of nuclear war in the next 20 years, with a further 34 per cent thinking
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it was likely there would be a nuclear war.111 In the Commission for the Future report on Nuclear
Disaster published in 1982, two local attack scenarios were considered, one a 1 kt tactical
warhead launched at a nuclear-powered vessel docked in Devonport, the other a 1 Mt airburst.
The first scenario envisaged:
A guided missile cruiser (eg. US “Long Beach”) berthed at the Devonport
Naval Base, is attacked by a hostile vessel using a 1 kt tactical
nuclear weapon. Lethal nuclear radiation (600 rem) reaches out to a
distance of 800m, while extensive blast damage (5psi) occurs out to
450m. The core of the 430 MW reactor is vaporised and combines with the
radioactivity derived from the weapon itself; both rise with the
fireball and return to earth in the manner characteristic of fallout
from the explosion of a weapon alone. The plutonium from the nuclear
weapons carried on board adds to strike weapon and reactor fission
products … The attack causes thousands, or a few tens of thousands, of
civilian casualties.112
The authors pointed out that New Zealand was out of range of Soviet land-based systems and the
attacks were therefore unlikely, but not implausible, over the intended 30-year lifetime of the
report.113 In concluding, the authors of the report said the most serious impact on New Zealand
of a northern hemisphere war were unlikely to result from fallout or other weapons effects but
from the loss of trading partners. They recommended that rather than continuing to “ignore the
possibility of nuclear war” New Zealand should be planning to survive a nuclear war.114 The
report was not well received by the National Government, with several Cabinet Ministers
describing it as “vague” and “emotive”. Just two months later, the Government abolished the
New Zealand Commission for the Future, saying, “recent publications show that the
Commission’s work was no longer relevant to the issues facing New Zealand”.115
While New Zealand’s Ministry of Civil Defence was set up in 1960 specifically to deal with the
threat of nuclear war, by the 1980s its emphasis had changed to deal almost exclusively with the
threat of natural disasters, especially floods.116 In a 1983 interview with The Listener, George
Preddey, one of the authors of the Commission for the Future’s report and now assistant
director-general of the Ministry of Civil Defence, said the British attitude to nuclear civil
defence, with its little pamphlets suggesting people put brown paper over their windows in event
of a nuclear disaster, might encourage morale, but it wasn’t realistic. “Our attitude here”, he said
“is that it is quite misleading to suggest that there is any effective response to nuclear attack. We
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believe there is no effective civil defence response, that it is unrealistic to plan for a direct
nuclear attack on this country.”117 Preddey’s personal opinion was different. In his 1985 book
Nuclear Disaster: A New Way of Thinking Down Under. Preddey suggested that preparing for a
nuclear disaster could include:
An infrastructure to co-ordinate the mobilisation of every element of
New Zealand society and the economy in the event of a nuclear disaster;
Deployment of emergency monitoring equipment (for fallout, ultraviolet
light, acid rain, and other contingencies of nuclear war) and the
training of personnel to use this;
Distribution of appropriate emergency medical supplies, perhaps
including potassium iodate tablets (to block iodine-131 uptake in the
event of major attacks on Australia), sun filtering creams (to block
ultraviolet light), eye protection, etc;
Dissemination of authoritative, accurate information for the public on
the likely immediate hazards, essential if mass panic and the worst
psychological impacts were to be avoided.118
Preddey’s was not a lone voice. Opinion polls taken as part of the 1986 Defence Review showed
that New Zealanders thought the country should prepare or plan for coping with the aftermath of
a nuclear war in the northern hemisphere. Some 60 per cent of people thought New Zealand
should be developing all possible plans for coping with post-war conditions, with a further
quarter of the opinion that there should be some preparation made for shelters and the storing of
food and water.119
Meanwhile, another threat was looming. Atmospheric chemists first suggested in 1982 that there
was a possibility of climate change induced by nuclear war. They calculated that the fires that
would burn for weeks after a nuclear war – from burning cities, croplands and forest and stored
fossil fuels – would produce a thick layer of smoke that would “drastically reduce the amount of
sunlight reaching the earth’s surface”, having the effect of almost totally eliminating agricultural
production in the northern hemisphere, meaning that no food would be available for any
survivors of a nuclear war.120 A subsequent study, the first to use the phrase “nuclear winter”,
found that a global nuclear war could lead to sub-freezing land temperatures in continental areas
– down to minus 15-25°C – for many months.121 Further studies supported the idea of a nuclear
winter; as a nuclear winter would affect the southern as well as the northern hemisphere the
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matter caught the attention of the New Zealand media and public, and on 21 October 1984 a
group of scientists took part in a nuclear winter debate on TV1’s Sunday programme. 122 An
Australian climate scientist, Barrie Pittock, looked at the impact of a nuclear winter on New
Zealand and Australia in his 1987 book Beyond Darkness.123
Other individuals and organisations issued their own books and pamphlets about nuclear safety.
Brian Hildreth’s A Nuclear Survival Manual for New Zealanders, published in 1986, outlined
preparation and protection measures for surviving in the aftermath of a nuclear war, including
survival first aid, energy and self-reliance. It wasn’t a pleasant world that was envisaged:
One of the immediate consequences of a nuclear war will be the breakdown
and probable collapse of the complex organisation of human society. As a
survivor, you must be acutely aware at all times of the dangers this
breakdown will produce. Part of your survival strategy must be to
maintain constant vigilance against other human beings if your physical
safety is to be ensured.
As well as plans to establish a hidden campsite (including a decoy site to foil would-be
interlopers) and how to store and hide a food cache, the book included instructions for first aid,
midwifery and dealing with “survival stress”.124
A more moderate view was provided in New Zealand After Nuclear War in 1987. Funded by the
Ministry for the Environment and published by the New Zealand Planning Council, the book
was a national case study of the effect on New Zealand of a large-scale war in the northern
hemisphere. Focused on the impact on food, health, energy, communications and transport, it
updated the Commission for the Future’s work by looking at nuclear winter and the effects of an
electromagnetic pulse. The study concluded that while New Zealand was not likely to be a direct
target or suffer direct effects of a nuclear war, the most serious long-term effects “would be
caused by the loss of imported supplies on which every sector of activity in New Zealand
depends and the loss of markets for export production which shapes much of the social and
economic structure of the country”. The authors recommended programmes be initiated to
improve public knowledge of the likely impact on New Zealand of a nuclear war be improved,
draw up contingency plans for action if war occurred be, and take action to reduce vulnerability
to the effects of nuclear war.125
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But by 1987, not only was New Zealand now “nuclear-free”, the international nuclear threat was
diminishing. In December that year, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev signed a historic
agreement to eliminate all intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear forces, removing one-fifth of
the nuclear weapons in the world. Two years later, in 1989, the Soviet Empire collapsed and the
Berlin Wall, that had divided communist East Germany and capitalist West Germany since
1961, was opened. By 1991 the Soviet Union had disintegrated and the United States was the
only remaining global superpower.126
Conclusion
By the time France started testing nuclear weapons in the Pacific, in 1966, the New Zealand
Government opposed nuclear testing and was working towards disarmament and a
comprehensive nuclear test ban. There was growing public concern about the health and
environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing and some people were asking for more
information about fallout and questioning authorities, including the National Radiation
Laboratory, who said there was no danger from the tests. Opposition to nuclear weapons testing
led to wider antipathy to things nuclear: as well as marching against French nuclear tests in the
Pacific, New Zealanders protested against visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed American
warships and signed a petition against the introduction of nuclear power to New Zealand.
The concept of a “nuclear-free” New Zealand became a political issue with grass roots support.
In 1981, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone Committee was established in Christchurch, and
began encouraging local groups to declare themselves nuclear-free. The two main political
parties were now divided on nuclear issues: the Labour Party supported a South Pacific nuclear-
weapons-free zone and opposed nuclear ship visits, and the National Party, highlighting the
importance of the ANZUS alliance with the United States and Australia, saw both these things
as politically unrealistic.
New Zealanders’ broad-based opposition to nuclear testing and nuclear warships culminated in
the 1984 election of a Labour Government that campaigned on a platform that included banning
nuclear vessels from New Zealand ports and establishing a South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free
Zone. Three years later this policy was enshrined in legislation with the passing of the New
Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987. This was a bold and
independent move that had costs as well as benefits. New Zealand’s strong and independent
                                                 
126 Hobsbawm 1994, pp249-251; Keyler 1996, pp453-67.
291
stance was lauded around the world, but it did cost New Zealand membership of the ANZUS
alliance with the United States and Australia.
Perceived bullying by the United States and France over New Zealand’s decision helped cement
New Zealanders’ allegiance to the new nuclear-free policy and incorporate it as a vital piece of
national identity embraced by a majority of the population. While the nuclear-free policy was
initially a Labour initiative, the National Government that was elected in 1990 rejected their
initial stance and opted to continue Labour’s nuclear-free policy.
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Chapter 11
A nuclear-free New Zealand?
The ideal and the reality
“We are no longer a colony, we are no longer hanging on to the skirts of major powers,
we are a nation on our own and we are prepared to stand up and face the world on our
own responsibility”.1
Gerard Wall, MP, 1972
“In rightly trying to find all effective methods of opposing nuclear armaments,
we can easily come to feel that we must oppose all things radioactive,
thus wasting effort and putting ourselves in an indefensible position.”
Jim McCahon, 19882
New Zealand adopted a nuclear-free policy in 1985 that was legislated for in 1987, banning
nuclear weapons and nuclear-propelled warships from New Zealand’s land, air and waters. New
Zealand’s nuclear-free status is now an important part of national identity, and has been
interpreted much more widely than the legislation, leading to bans on uranium prospecting,
nuclear power, and most recently, outcry about shipments of Australian uranium ore stopping at
New Zealand ports on its way to export markets.3
It would be easy to think that New Zealand’s nuclear-free legislation, and the public opinion that
it reflected, and then reinforced, reflects the courageous and independent way that New
Zealanders have always thought, but this is only part of the story. As many other publications
have shown, some New Zealanders were quick to recognise the hazards of radiation and the
moral indefensibility of nuclear weapons. The “anti-nuclear” movement began with the first
peace march in 1947 and evolved through decades of protest against nuclear testing in the Pacific
and, later, protests against visits from nuclear-powered ships and against the introduction of
nuclear power, and culminated in the introduction of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,
Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987. As this thesis has shown, however, alongside this
“anti-nuclear” movement was what can be seen as a “pro-nuclear” movement. Although they
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were not a coherent group, and did not form an organised lobby, New Zealand contained many
people and organisations with a pro-nuclear attitude, and was subject to the influence of outside
organisations, most importantly, the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) and
the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), who had their own reasons for wanting
New Zealand to adopt nuclear technology or engage in joint scientific projects. Between these
two groups, or voices – the anti-nuclear and the pro-nuclear – options were considered and
decisions made. Again and again it can be seen that rather than be pushed in one direction or
another by groups or individuals with a particular opinion or agenda, the people with decision-
making power made practical decisions based on economics and national interest when it came
to deciding whether or not to adopt a certain piece of nuclear technology or whether or not to
participate in projects or ventures with international agencies. The 1950s and 60s saw the United
States and United Kingdom looking to establish in New Zealand a nuclear partner whose
dependencies on the bigger nation would be to that nation’s advantage. New Zealand officials,
however, cooperated only in a self-interested way, moving forward in the field of nuclear science
only to the extent that it would benefit the advancement of the nation and its own scientific
endeavours.
New Zealand’s nuclear-free story is well known. This thesis has revealed the lesser-known story
of nuclear New Zealand. While there was never any call for New Zealand to have its own
nuclear weapons, in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s New Zealanders embraced nuclear technology
and were as excited about the dawning atomic age as any nation’s people. In the first few
decades of the twentieth century New Zealand medics and scientists made great use of the
discoveries of radium and X-rays, where the risks were relatively low but the benefits were very
high. “The public are mad on radium” the Government balneologist said in 1914, and generosity
by the New Zealand public, whose donations helped the hospitals to purchase radium for cancer
treatment, meant that by 1929 New Zealand had a greater supply of radium per head than the
United Kingdom. The field of nuclear physics began with the discovery of the atomic nucleus by
New Zealander Ernest Rutherford. New Zealand’s association with Rutherford did not drive
New Zealand’s uptake of the new technologies, but Rutherford did help educate the public on the
new science in his lectures on visits back to New Zealand. He also helped New Zealand
scientists procure supplies of radium, and most importantly, he facilitated the appointment of his
past pupil, Ernest Marsden, to positions first at Victoria University College and then as head of
the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research.
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When the Second World War led to the search for a means to turn the energy known to reside in
the atomic nucleus into a weapon, a group of young DSIR scientists were seconded to work with
British teams on the North American project. New Zealand’s support for the British nuclear
programme in this way can be seen as an extension of the historical military and scientific
association with the United Kingdom, but there were strong elements of self-interest there too.
New Zealand scientists had access to the American nuclear projects because of the direct
intervention of Ernest Marsden, who hoped to use the American-trained scientists to set up a
nuclear science team at the DSIR after the war. After the bombs had been dropped on Japan, and
New Zealand’s involvement revealed, newspapers reported proudly about the scientists who
worked on the Manhattan and Montreal projects during the war, and wrote hopefully about the
search for uranium – the fuel for atomic weapons and power – that resumed, no longer as a
secret, in 1946.
After the Second World War, there was promise of a new atomic age. There was a lot of
enthusiasm, official and public, for nuclear power to provide electricity for New Zealand, and
support for the search for uranium to boost the West Coast economy and provide a new export
industry for New Zealand. Significant government and private resources were poured into this
effort. The nuclear advocates promoting these ventures were more concerned with perceived
economic benefits of nuclear technologies than any issues of safety or waste management, and in
the 1950s there was no organised opposition to nuclear power or the possibility of a uranium
mining industry.
New Zealand entered two partnerships with the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority in the
1950s, one to produce heavy water for the UKAEA and electricity for New Zealand at a
geothermal power plant at Wairakei. In the second, the UKAEA funded prospecting efforts on
the West Coast in return for the first right of refusal over any uranium mined. There were also
partnerships with the USAEC. A bilateral agreement signed in 1956 allowed for the exchange of
information regarding the design, construction and operation of a research reactor and allowed
for the lease of up to 6 kg of enriched uranium for use as reactor fuel. The agreement resulted in
gifts worth more than US$2 million in today’s terms, including a sub-critical nuclear reactor,
being given to New Zealand universities and the DSIR. In other agreements, DSIR scientists
collected samples and conducted research for the USAEC and UKAEA as part of their
monitoring the effects of radioactive fallout from their bomb tests. I have found no record of any
opposition to any of these agreements with two of the world’s nuclear powers.
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New Zealand’s involvement in these ventures can be seen as resulting from a series of pragmatic
decisions made by officials acting in the national interest. New Zealand took advantage of
opportunities that would be in New Zealand’s best interest, for example, accepting gifts of
laboratory equipment from the USAEC, entering agreements with the UKAEA that would have
assisted the development of the Wairakei geothermal field and the Buller Gorge uranium
deposits and led to jobs to boost to the local economies. But if it was not in New Zealand’s
interest, New Zealand said no. Officials at the DSIR and the SHED repeatedly refused or delayed
the opportunity to set up a nuclear reactor in New Zealand, even after continued approaches from
the United States, who were offering a research reactor for free, because it was not seen as
necessary and the opportunity cost was high; at a time of tight science budgets its operating costs
would take money from more useful projects. Similarly, in the 1950s New Zealand decided to
deny New Zealand territory for use in British bomb testing and, in the 1980s, to refuse entry to
American nuclear warships – it was not in the national interest to say yes, though in the latter
case New Zealand was being far-sighted enough to be considering not just national but global
interests and was making a point about the folly of nuclear weapons.
Alongside these “peaceful” uses of nuclear technology was the ever-present spectre of nuclear
weapons tests in the Pacific, to which a segment of the New Zealand population was always
opposed. The New Zealand Government initially supported the British nuclear testing
programme, which ran from 1952 until 1958, by providing logistical support, most significantly
in the form of two frigates to act as weather ships for the 1957 and 1958 series of hydrogen
bomb tests. Significantly, however, New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland refused a 1955
British request to test these bombs on New Zealand territory: Holland feared public opinion
would be against using the Kermadec Islands for the test and was concerned it could upset his
narrow majority in Parliament.
Opposition to nuclear weapons testing grew during the 1950s and 1960s, fuelled by growing
information about the levels of radioactive bomb fallout being deposited in New Zealand and
around the world, and the deepening Cold War. The 1962 American weapons test at Johnston
Atoll upset radiocommunications throughout the South Pacific and filled the skies above New
Zealand with an eerie glow that the New Zealand Herald described as doing “more than a
hundred protest marches to fill men’s minds with dread”.4 By the time France started testing
nuclear weapons in the South Pacific, in 1966, the New Zealand Government was opposed to
nuclear weapons testing and, in striking contrast to the earlier support for the British tests, in
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1973 New Zealand sent a protest frigate to Moruroa to protest against the French tests.
Opposition to nuclear weapons testing was now firmly established, and started to expand to
include opposition to visits of warships carrying nuclear weapons or fuelled by nuclear power.
Contrast the 1960 visit of the American nuclear submarine the USS Halibut, which was
welcomed and marvelled at, with the colourful protests against American nuclear ship visits of
the 1970s and 1980s, where people marched in the streets and ships were met by a peace
squadron of protest boats.
Fuelled partly by opposition to nuclear-powered warships and concern about nuclear accidents
and radiation leaks, antipathy to the idea of nuclear power began to grow. By the time of the
report of the 1978 Royal Commission into Nuclear Power Generation in New Zealand most of
the submissions were against the introduction of nuclear power to New Zealand, some for
economic reasons and others because of health and safety concerns about the risks of nuclear
power. The NZED had had nuclear power on the national power plan from 1964, but by the time
the Commission released its report new indigenous fuel sources – gas and coal – had been found
and electricity demand forecasts had been greatly reduced, so the question of whether or not to
start building a nuclear power station did not need to be put to a full ideological or economic test.
At the same time as nuclear power was being considered, however, New Zealand and
international companies were continuing to prospect for uranium on the West Coast, with no
political or grass roots opposition. In the 1990s uranium prospecting was made unlawful in New
Zealand, probably as a reflection of the public’s broad interpretation of what it means for New
Zealand to be “nuclear-free”. In the 1970s, however, the possibility of a uranium mining industry
was not seen as a bad thing.
When New Zealand’s nuclear-free legislation was introduced in 1987 it applied to nuclear
weapons, nuclear-powered ships and nuclear waste. New Zealanders were immediately on the
world stage, and lauded for being independent and courageous. In the years that followed, this
nuclear-free ethos became deeply entrenched, a formidable part of national identity, that came to
spread to nuclear power, uranium prospecting, and often, to anything associated with nuclear
technology and radiation. Like other decisions in the country’s nuclear history, New Zealand’s
rejection of any involvement with nuclear weapons can be seen as a continuation of a series of
pragmatic and self-interested decisions. Nuclear weapons are in no-one’s best interest and New
Zealand was independent and bold enough to say so. But only a few years before the nuclear-free
legislation was introduced, New Zealand had – coincidentally – rejected, for the time being,
nuclear power for electricity generation. Companies had tired of spending money attempting to
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prove the uranium deposits on the West Coast and had abandoned their prospecting camps and
drilling projects. The nuclear-free legislation, which was focused on nuclear weapons, therefore
hit a New Zealand with limited so-called “peaceful” uses of nuclear technology – no nuclear
power, no uranium mining, no research reactors – and the anti-nuclear attitude was able to
spread, unchallenged, beyond the initial logical antipathy to nuclear weapons. This may seem
obvious, but what is not so well known is, as this thesis has shown, New Zealand had only
limited uses of peaceful nuclear technology by the 1980s not because of any ideological reasons,
but because of a series of decisions that were based on national interest and economics.
New Zealand’s “rejection” of nuclear power and uranium mining can now be seen as the result
of economic decisions made in the 1970s. The fact that we do not have a nuclear reactor can be
seen as a pragmatic decision made by a country with a limited budget for science that chose to
focus on agriculture and supporting sciences, and the lack of a heavy water plant can be seen as
the result of the British withdrawing from a planned joint venture. The fact that economic and
national interest arguments were used to argue against these things makes it possible to see that
economic and national interest arguments could be used to argue for these things – nuclear
power and uranium mining in particular – in the future.
New Zealand is “nuclear-free” when it comes to nuclear weapons, nuclear power and uranium
mining. But given the pattern of history, with its nuclear advocates as well as anti-nuclear
lobbyists, and in light of recent calls for aspects of New Zealand’s nuclear free policy to be
reviewed, New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy – in the broad sense in which it is currently
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